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ABSTRACT 
INCUMBENT MOBILIZATION OF SWING VOTERS:  
 VOTER-PARTY LINKAGES AND CONSOLIDATION OF ETHNIC VOTES 
IN ISTANBUL  
 
Gül Arıkan Akdağ 
PHD Thesis 2013 
Özge Kemahlıoğlu 
 
Key Words: Clientelism, Elections, Mobilization, Party organization, Swing voter  
 
This dissertation attempts to understand the mobilization strategies of incumbent 
parties to consolidate and increase their support among swing voters of an ethnic group. 
By analyzing the strategy of AKP on voters of Kurdish origin before 2011 general 
elections, it investigates the effectiveness of the clientelistic distribution of municipal 
resources in increasing support for the party and the conditions under which the party 
mobilizes these voters through clientelistic linkage. This investigation is conducted 
through a district and neighborhood level case study selected on the method of most 
similar cases in the districts of Beyoğlu, Sancaktepe and Beykoz situated in Istanbul. 
The main hypotheses are tested through five different steps.  First, through the electoral 
results it identifies a large number of voters of Kurdish origin as ideologically close to 
pro-Islamist and pro-Kurdish parties.  Second, it identifies the main organs responsible 
of mobilizing voters and defines the nature of the clientelistic network.  Third, the study 
suggests that the incorporation of these voters into the party’s clientelistic network is a 
function of the number and time of entry of activists of Kurdish origin in the party’s 
ranks and the intensity of their contacts with the voters. Fourth, through an analysis of 
the selected neighborhoods it reveals the effectiveness of clientelistic mobilization in 
consolidating and increasing support among swing voters of Kurdish origin.  Lastly, the 
inner party organization and critical juncture experienced by the party are argued to be 
influential in its ability to increase its network through the incorporation of new 
activists.  
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ÖZET 
İKTİDAR PARTİLERİNİN KARARSIZ SEÇMENLERİ MOBİLİZASYONU: 
İSTANBUL’DA SEÇMEN-PARTİ BAĞLANTILARI VE ETNİK OYLARIN 
KONSOLİDASYONU   
 
Gül Arıkan Akdağ 
Doktora Tezi 2013 
Özge Kemahlıoğlu 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kararsız Seçmen, klientalizm, Mobilizasyon, Parti örgütü,  
Seçimler 
 
Bu tez iktidardaki siyasal partilerin oylarını pekiştirmek ve yükseltmek için etnik 
kökenli kararsız seçmenleri mobilize etme stratejilerini anlama amacını gütmektedir. 
AK Parti’nin 2011 general seçimlerinde Kürt kökenli vatandaşları üzerine stratejisini 
inceleyerek, klientalist ağlar yoluyla belediye kaynaklarının dağılımının etkinliğini 
araştırmaktadır. Bu araştırma, benzer vakalar metoduyla ilçe ve mahalle düzeyinde vaka 
analizleri üzerinden gerçekleştirilmiştir.  Sahanın kapsamı İstanbul’da bulunan Beyoğlu, 
Sancaktepe ve Beykoz ilçelerinin belirli mahalleleridir.  Çalışmanın ana hipotezleri 5 
adımda test edilmektedir. Birinci olarak, seçim sonuçları doğrultusunda Kürt kökenli 
seçmenlerin önemli bir çoğunluğu AK parti ve BDP’ ye ideolojik olarak yakın karasız 
seçmenler olarak tanımlanmaktadır. İkinci olarak, seçmenleri mobilize etmekten 
sorumlu parti organları ve partinin klientalist ağının özellikleri tanımlanmaktadır. 
Üçüncü olarak, Kürt kökenli seçmenlerin klientalist ağlara katılımının Kürt kökenli 
parti çalışanlarının sayısı, partiye giriş tarihleri ve seçmenlerle ilişkilerinin 
yoğunluğunun bir işlevi olduğu gösterilmektedir. Dördüncü olarak,  seçilen mahallerin 
incelenmesi sonucunda klientalist ağlar yoluyla yapılan mobilizasyon çalışmalarının 
oylar üzerine etkisi gösterilmektedir. Son olarak, partinin merkezi yapısının ve parti 
örgütlerinin yaşadığı dönüm noktalarının, partinin ağlarını genişletebilmesinde ne 
ölçüde etkili olduğu gösterilmektedir.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The 12 June 2011 general elections in Turkey resulted with the electoral victory 
of AKP, which increased its votes and gained the right to form the government for the 
third time. The results of the elections are indicative of two important trends in the 
Turkish party system. First, the three consecutive success of AKP at the ballot box 
sustains a transition towards a predominant party system in Turkey. Second, the 
increasing vote shares of the pro-Kurdish party vis-à-vis AKP among citizens of 
Kurdish origin indicate rising polarization within the system. The combination of these 
two developments makes the study of mobilization strategies used by a predominant 
party in order to increase its support among potential swing members of an ethnic group 
particularly interesting, especially in the Turkish context where a considerable number 
of voters of Kurdish origin support AKP. 
The rise in the support for pro-Kurdish parties and the nature of the electoral 
competition between AKP and BDP has been evaluated through the ideological 
positioning of each party. The changing position of AKP on the Kurdish issue has been 
suggested as the major cause in diverging support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish 
origin. Indeed, an important characteristic that differentiates the 2011 general elections 
period from its precedents has been the harsh u-turn of AKP’s position concerning the 
Kurdish issue. Rising PKK attacks, increasing number of arrested Kurdish political 
elites under the KCK operation and finally, Erdoğan’s declaration that there is “no 
Kurdish problem in Turkey but Kurds have a problem” during the electoral 
campaigning period contributed to the rising violence in the streets in both the South 
East region of Turkey and in the big cities in the West where large number of Kurdish 
citizens reside.  In electoral terms, the result of this positional change has been the 
decrease in AKP’s vote shares among citizens of Kurdish origin in favor for the pro-
Kurdish party BDP. Both provincial and sub-provincial aggregate data on 2007 and 
2011 general elections in the South East region of Turkey as well as big cities in the 
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western part of the country where considerable numbers of Kurdish citizens reside 
support this trend.  However, a more detailed micro level analysis of the electoral 
outcomes across elections indicates fluctuations.  The fluctuation in support for AKP 
from the elections of 2009 to 2011 in different geographical subunits is even more 
interesting given the fact that AKP’s positional change was very large where the party 
moved from its pro-Kurdish stand of 2007 and adopted a clearly anti-Kurdish discourse 
in 2011.   
A considerable number of studies have found support for the existence of 
patronage or clientelism as a tool used by political parties to gain votes (Sayarı, 1977; 
Özbudun, 1981; Schuler, 1998; Sunar, 1990, Heper & Keyman, 1998, Güneş-Ayata, 
1994). Recently, the role of clientelistic linkage has attracted the attention of a 
considerable number of studies (S.Özbudun, 2005; Komşuoğlu, 2009; Kemahlıoğlu, 
2005, 2012; Sayarı, 2011).  Existing studies suggest that political parties use both kind 
of linkages for mobilizing voters and gaining their support (Kitschelt 2000, Estéves,  
Magaloni & Diaz-Cayeros, 2001; Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 2003; Alberto Diaz-
Cayero, 2008,  Calvo and Murillo 2010). Then, perhaps mobilization through the 
clientelistic linkage may explain divergence in the changing electoral shares of AKP 
and BDP among citizens of Kurdish origin. Unfortunately, such systematic analysis has 
not been carried in the Turkish context. The aim of the study is to fulfill this gap by 
analyzing the use of the clientelistic strategies by AKP to consolidate or increase its 
support among citizens of Kurdish origin and identify main factors increasing the 
party’s ability to formulate such a strategy.  
Studies on electoral competition provide an important ground to analyze the 
means available to political parties in order increase the effectiveness of their 
mobilization efforts. These studies can be classified under two approaches that diverge 
in terms linkages through which voters evaluate the accountability of political parties. 
The first set of studies mainly focuses on programmatic strategies in understanding 
electoral outcomes (Campbel 1960, Lipset & Rokkan 1967, Thomassen 1977, Lijphart 
1979, Mair 1997, Bartolini 2002; Downs, 1957; Hinich and Pollard, 1981; Enelow and 
Hinich, 1984; Hinich and Munger, 1994). The second group of studies focuses on the 
clientelistics distribution of state resources by political parties (Kaufman, 1974, 
Rosenstone & Hassen 1993, Auyero 2001, Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, Epstein, 2009). 
Both studies has found ground in the literature on Turkey (Ergüder 1981; Esmer 2001, 
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2002, Esmer &Sayarı 2002; Kalaycıoğlu 1994, 1999; Çarkoğlu, 1998, 2002, 2007a, 
2007b, 2010a, 2011b; Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000; Çarkoğlu & Kalyacıoğlu, 2007, 2009; 
Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006; Sayarı, 1977; Özbudun, 1981; Schuler, 1998; Sunar, 1990, 
Heper & Keyman, 1998, Güneş-Ayata, 1994, Özbudun, 2005; Ayşegül Komşuoğlu, 
2009; Kemahlıoğlu, 2005, 2012; Sayarı, 2011 ).  
Within this context, the use of clientelistic linkage may be an effective strategy for 
AKP in mobilizing citizens of Kurdish origin. Political parties mostly use both 
strategies to mobilize voters. Existing studies argue that other things being equal, which 
strategy a political party relies on more is based on types of voters and ability of the 
party to assure voters’ compliance. Mobilization through clientelistic as opposed to 
programmatic linkage is argued to be a more effective strategy among ideologically 
swing voters that are indifferent between two competing political parties (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; 
Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, 2003;  Estéves, Magaloni and Diaz-Cayeros, 2001). This 
study argues that mobilization through clientelistic accountability would be an effective 
strategy for AKP since, as it will be illustrated in the following chapters; a large number 
of citizens of Kurdish origin are ideologically indifferent between AKP and the pro-
Kurdish parties and can be identified as potential swing voters. In fact, a considerable 
number of scholars have indicated the presence of a common electoral base among 
citizens of Kurdish origin who are ideologically close to both AKP and BDP (Yavuz 
and Özcan, 2006; Van Bruinessen 1992; Yegen 1996, p. 225; Atacan 2001; Cizre 2002).   
If such a strategy is effective in mobilizing citizens of Kurdish origin, the 
conditions under which the party can efficiently implement this strategy may explain 
divergence in electoral outcome.  In this respect, this dissertation bases it analysis on 
three basic objectives, to identify the strategy the party formulates to mobilize voters of 
Kurdish origin through its clientelistic linkage, to test the effectiveness of such a 
strategy and explain factors preventing the party to formulate such a strategy.  
This study suggests that mobilization through clientelistic linkages is more 
effective when conducted on an individual level to different types of voters and when 
compliance is voluntarily assured. Yet such a strategy necessitates first the ability of the 
party to directly contact voters to identify their type. Second, it necessitates a repeated 
course of interaction for assuring compliance voluntarily. Yet political settings are 
mostly information scarce.  Within this respect, existing studies suggest that strong 
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party organization provides a suitable mechanism for the party to increase the scope of 
the clientelistic network and consolidate votes for the party (Auyero, 2001; Stokes, 
2005; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Calvo & Murillo, 2010). This dissertation argues 
that the greater the number of activists, the higher the degree of the cooperation among 
them, the lower their level of interaction with voters and the greater the repetitiveness of 
this interaction, the more efficient the clientelistic linkage will be. This is because the 
party will not only be able to identify voters more individually at a lower cost but also 
more easily assure their voluntary compliance through the repetitiveness of the 
interaction. On the other hand, repetitiveness is a function of length of the interaction 
and its intensity.  
Studies on the mobilization of ethnic groups argue that the presence of activists 
who are members of these ethnic groups in a party’s rank increases the efficiency of the 
mobilization of ethnic voters through the clientelistic linkage (Bates, 1983; Fearon & 
Laidin, 1996; Fearon, 1999; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Chandra, 2004). Within this 
respect, one of the main suggestions of this dissertation is that such a strategy is 
expected to be more effective when ethnic consciousness among the members of an 
ethnic group is high, relations between different ethnic groups are weak and the ethnic 
group is composed of different types of voters in terms of party preferences. This study 
argues that especially when there is high ethnic consciousness and weak 
intercommunity relations, accompanied by potential for violence; incorporation of co-
ethnic activists known by the members of the ethnic group and member of the existing 
ethnic social networks is vital for the party. Under these conditions, mobilization 
through co-ethnic will enable the party to more easily identify different types of voters 
which is necessary for clientelistic mobilization. Thus, while mobilization by out-group 
members may also be effective in incorporating members of an ethnic group into the 
network if a certain degree of inter-group relations persists, still successful mobilization 
would necessitate great efforts and a long period of time. As it will be evaluated in 
detail, ethnic consciousness among citizens of Kurdish origin is considerably high and 
is accompanied by conflictual inter-group relations. Furthermore, the Kurdish 
movement is characterized by high potential of violence which increases the probability 
of the AKP to incorporate the voters of Kurdish origin to the clientelistic network 
through known co-ethnic activists member of the existing ethnic social networks.  
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Under these conditions, the study suggests that the effectiveness of the 
clientelistic mobilization of the citizens of Kurdish origin is related to the breadth and 
length of the mobilization carried through co-ethnics. The presence of co-ethnic in the 
party affects the party’s decision to mobilize voters through clientelistic or 
programmatic linkage. When AKP contacts the voters of Kurdish origin through co-
ethnic, its mobilization will be more clientelistic since it can easily identify swing voters 
and apply specific targeting. Furthermore, voluntary compliance and attachment to the 
party would be performed on a shorter period of time. In contrast when conducted 
through non-Kurdish activists, mobilization will be more programmatic since the party 
will be unable to identify swing voters and ensure their compliance. Within this respect, 
the study suggests that divergence in electoral outcomes over the years across different 
geographical subunits is related to the conjunction of two variables; the number of 
citizens of Kurdish origin and the repetitiveness of their interaction which is a function 
of not only their time of entry in the party organization and but also intensity of their 
interactions with the voters.     
If mobilization through clientelistic linkage by a strong party organization where 
co-ethnic are incorporated is a more effective strategy in gaining support among 
potential swing voters of Kurdish origin, why do not all AKP party branches does not 
use the same strategy to mobilize them? A party’s decision to strengthen its 
organization and incorporate citizens of Kurdish origin is mostly evaluated as a function 
of the electoral competition it faces and the socio-demographic composition of its 
electoral support.  This study argues that although such a function is valid in the 
foundation period of a political organization, once it has been established the inner party 
organization structure acts as a constraint to the party’s degree of adaptability in 
changing circumstances.  
The logic of this argument is as follows. Both the presence of a strong party 
organization and co-ethnic is based on the ability of the party to motivate its activists. 
Just as swing non-Kurdish or Kurdish voters will support AKP on the bases of their 
access to benefits, potential activists of non-Kurdish or Kurdish origin will work for the 
party only if they have access to benefits. Nevertheless, the scare nature of material 
goods such as jobs, social assistance creates a problem of exclusion that any political 
parties have to overcome.  Scholars such as Pannebianco (1988), Boleyer (2005) 
suggest that the party organization provides a mechanism to regulate the problem of 
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distribution by creating immaterial incentives such as party posts to attain these 
incentives. Yet, these posts are also scarce in terms of quantity. Thus, the incorporation 
of activists through the allocation of posts to new entering activists means the 
displacement of existing ones from these posts. Under such conditions, existing activists 
will probably resist the new entry. Within this respect, the study argues that the absence 
of an intra-party advancement rule in centralized party organization acts as an obstacle 
to motivate the existing activists to recruit new ones, and the new ones to enter to the 
party. Furthermore, it also suggests that the path-dependence inherited in all institutions 
prevents centralized parties to introduce competitive intra-party advancement 
mechanisms after their founding phases, since leaders responsible to distribute these 
posts are also shaped by the institutions. Yet, as Pannebianco (1988) sugests change in 
the organizational order may occur through a critical juncture characterized by an 
organizational crisis that will give the opportunity to the leader to internally adapt the 
party to changing conditions.  
As it will be illustrated, AKP has a highly centralized party organization, yet the 
numbers of activists of Kurdish origin within its local organizations vary. In the light of 
these suggestions, variation in any given geographical unit in the number of activists of 
Kurdish origin into the network can be explained in two different manners. First, it may 
be their incorporation and attainment of a post at the founding phase of the party. At this 
period, their incorporation is expected to be related to rational calculations of the 
leaders based on exogenous factors. Second, later incorporation may have been possible 
through of a critical juncture that reset the coalition composition of the party and 
redistribute the posts. The ability of the party to motivate existing and newly activists to 
actively work for the party, in both periods, should be a function of the nature of the 
intra-party advancement rule at each period.  
In order to test these main arguments, this dissertation is constructed around nine 
chapters. Chapter 1 will also provide a brief literature review on the actual studies 
supporting our expectation on the possible impact of clientelistic mobilization through 
the party organization in explaining support for AKP among some voters of Kurdish 
origin. Introducing a satisfactory account on the effectiveness of clientelistic 
mobilization on voters of Kurdish origin can only be achieved if a solid theoretical 
foundation is provided. This is why Chapter 2 is reserved to a detailed explanation of 
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the main hypothesis, constructed through the existing literature and tested across the 
dissertation.  
The study rests on the basic assumption that large numbers of these voters are 
ideologically swing. Although, the ideological closeness of a considerable number of 
voters of Kurdish origin to both AKP and BDP has been revealed through the existing 
literature, Chapter 3 will test this assumption by analyzing the electoral patterns across 
the elections at two different levels: the Kurdish populated region and the provinces 
comprising this region. Main focus will be devoted in the evaluation of the party system 
indicators such as efficient number of parties and volatility index. Chapter 4 will 
interpret the main logic of the selection of the cases through which a deeper analysis 
will be conducted. The chapter mostly comprises of the classification of the districts 
according to the variables other than the tested ones that may independently affect the 
mobilization strategy of the party.  
Chapter 5 and 6 consist of a descriptive account of the formal organizational 
structure of the party and the general characteristics of its mobilization strategy. The 
study claims, a comprehensive analysis on the effectiveness of the distribution of 
resources through clientelistic linkage cannot be provided without underlying the major 
formal mechanisms through which political parties access to the resources on one hand 
and distribute them to the voters and the party activists on the other.  Especially under 
circumstances where resources are accessed and distributed by different organs at 
different levels of the organizational, not only internal mechanisms of information flow 
but also of cooperation between these organs are decisive in understanding the 
functioning of the clientelistic network. As a result, I have reserved Chapter 5 to depict 
a descriptive account of the formal structural design of the party where the internal 
functioning of the main decision-making organs, the mechanism of coordination 
between them and the rules of intraparty advancement within the party is revealed.  
The study assumes that political parties use both clientelistic and programmatic 
linkages in order to gain the support of voters. Defining the clientelistic network based 
on its individual and discretionary nature, this study argues that long term clientelistic 
mobilization where different types of voters are targeted and voters’ compliance is 
assured through persuasion is a more effective strategy. This is why Chapter 6 has been 
designed so as to define the general mobilization strategy of the party. The tendency of 
AKP to form a clientelistic linkage that functions not only as a problem-solving 
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network, but also as a mean to create a system of common identification through 
ideological mobilization will be demonstrated.  
 This study suggests that strong party organization, where party activists are the 
members of the same geographical space as voters, provides a suitable mechanism for 
the party to decrease the costs of such a mobilization strategy through the activities of 
its activists. Yet, it also argues that the effective mobilization of ethnic groups is based 
on the incorporation of co-ethnics within the party’s ranks; especially under 
circumstances where inter-group boundaries are sharply defined, relations are 
conflictual or ethnic consciousness is accompanied with the potential of violence. Based 
on these suggestions, Chapter 7 has been an attempt to depict the main difference in the 
strategy the party formulates through the neighborhood organizations to effectively 
mobilize voters of Kurdish as opposed to non-Kurdish origin.  
 The study suggests that identification of the party’s strategy is not sufficient for 
establishing a firm argument on the effectiveness of clientelistic mobilization on 
persuading voters of Kurdish origin. This is why, by comparing the selected 
neighborhoods, Chapter 8 is an attempt to test the impact of the number of activists of 
Kurdish origin, their time of incorporation and the intensity in the amount of the 
activities of the party activists on the effectiveness of mobilizing voters of Kurdish 
origin through the clientelistic network.     
 Chapter 9 attempts to explain why the AKP district branches do not use the same 
strategy in all geographical areas to mobilize voters of Kurdish origin even if it is a 
more effective strategy in gaining support among potential swing voters of Kurdish 
origin. Major focuses will be devoted to the analysis of the negative impact of the 
organizational order of the party set in its founding phase and the experience of a 
critical junction in later phases on the capacity of the party to adapt itself to external 
changing conditions. 
 
 
Research Design  
 
 
The aim of the study is to reveal the use of clientelistic mobilization by AKP in 
gaining the support of the citizens of Kurdish origin in its competition with pro-Kurdish 
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parties, to test the effectiveness of such a strategy and to explain diverging ability of the 
party to apply such a strategy.  
This kind of an analysis may be carried at different geographical levels. For 
example, a considerable number of studies have investigated the tactical distribution of 
state resources by national governments to lower administrative levels in an effort to 
affect electoral outcomes (Schady, 2000; Estéves et al, 2001; Penfold-Becerra’s, 2007; 
Calvo & Murillo, 2010, Anne Case, 2001, Denemark, 2000, Rocha-Menocal, 2001, 
Margit Tavits, 2009; Graham and Kane, 1998; Molinar and Weldon, 1994; Diaz-
Cayero, 2008). Nevertheless, when the mobilization strategies of political parties are 
under investigation, one should be careful in deciding the level through which the 
analysis is conducted. A considerable number of scholars suggest that political parties 
mostly formulate mobilization strategies on a geographical base since it decreases 
information cost accompanied in detecting voters’ preferences (Tavits 2009, p.105; 
Shady, 2000, p: 290; Bartolini, 2002, 93; Karp and Banducci, 2007, p. 218).  
Furthermore, the strategy formulated is expected not to be uniform across geographical 
subunits but to diverge according to variables that have the potential to affect the 
mobilization strategy of the party and electoral preferences. Within this respect, 
depending on their characteristics each level necessitates the formulation of different 
strategies.  Since the study aims at understanding the factors effective in mobilizing 
citizens of Kurdish origin through a clientelistic linkage where the party directly 
contacts the voter, the analysis of the party’s strategy at most local level is a necessity. 
Administratively the neighborhood constitutes the most local level of the organization 
structure. Nevertheless, in Turkey political parties can only legally be organized at the 
district level. Albeit the district level strategy of the party may be a function of the 
decision of higher authorities, given the centralized nature of the Turkish political 
parties it should probably be the case, the district still comprises the lowest formal level 
where strategies are formulated and implemented.  Similarly, although the distribution 
of state resources can also be analyzed at different levels, the district municipalities, 
which may provide a considerable resource for the party if governed by its co-partisan, 
are the most micro level unit where state resources are distributed. Yet, the 
neighborhood comprises the most local level of the administrative structure where AKP 
contacts the voters. Within this respect, the strategy formulated for the neighborhoods 
by the district branches or higher authorities is expected to be affected by the 
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conjunction of different exogenous factors at two different levels. It is expected to be 
tied to not only the factors peculiar to each district, but also the factors peculiar to each 
neighborhood. Similar conditions are expected to be effective for internal constraints to 
the formulation of such a strategy. Under such a complex relationship where the party 
strategies and distribution of resources are decided at the district level but voters are 
contacted at the neighborhood level, the field research has been conducted at both 
district and neighborhood level. 
Although these research questions could have been investigated in the South-East 
region of Turkey, which is where the competition between the two parties is the most 
intense, the study chooses to carry such an analysis in only one province which is 
Istanbul. The strategy behind the decision to select the cases only from one province is 
very simple: controlling for provincial level variables that may have an independent 
effect on the strategy formulated by the party in each of the districts. Respectively, 
Istanbul has been selected since it fulfills the necessary criteria on the number of 
citizens of Kurdish origin and nature of the competition between AKP and BDP. 
Furthermore, it provides a range of variation in both district and neighborhood level 
electoral results and dispersion of citizens of Kurdish origin.    
In terms of citizens of Kurdish origin although the province is not in the South 
East region of Turkey, it has witnessed large migration flows after 1990’s as a result of 
state policies of forced migration (Van Bruinessen, 1998, p. 49; Yalçın Mousseau, 2010, 
p. 51). Although, Server Mutlu estimates a Kurdish population of approximately of 
8,16% for the year of 1990, the actual number of citizens of Kurdish origin is expected 
to be higher due to large migration flows after 1990s. Supporting these suggestions, 
estimated percentages of citizens of Kurdish origin is calculated as approximately 
11,88% for the year of 20091 which is a  sufficient percentage to expect AKP to target 
citizens of Kurdish origin and to test the research’s main hypothesis. For the case of 
Istanbul, a great number of studies mention the bad economic and deteriorating 
economic conditions in the place of destination of the immigrants migrating from the 
region after 1990s (Ilkaracan and Ilkaracan, 1999, p. 317; Çelik, 2002, Aksit and 
                                               
1 Unfortunately, systematic data on the number of residents of Kurdish origin is not publicly available. 
Yet provincial level estimations have been carried by Mutlu for the year of 1990 (1996). The study has 
estimated  the percentages of residents of Kurdish origin for each of the districts in Istanbul for the year of 
2009 by using Mutlu’s estimations and the number of district residents registered to each province. The 
sum of these estimations provides also an estimated percentage of residents of Kurdish origin for Istanbul 
for the year of 2009. For detailed information on the measurement consult Chapter 3.  
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Akcay,1999, Sirkeci,2000; White, 1998, Van Bruinessen, 1998).  This makes the 
citizens of Kurdish origin living in Istanbul to be more sensitive to the mobilization 
efforts of the party through material incentives. 
Furthermore, the electoral competition the party faces strengthens our expectation 
that the party has an incentive to mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin.  The main 
competition in the province is not between AKP and BDP, but between AKP and CHP. 
Yet, given the fact that the competition between these two parties is very high, AKP’s 
efforts to mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin which comprise more than 10% of the 
population is also expected to be high. When AKP’s national and provincial level vote 
shares across elections are analyzed two important patterns, concerning the nature of the 
competition for AKP can be observed. The first three lines of table 1 and graph 1 
illustrates the vote shares of AKP at national, regional and provincial level. Although 
the electoral pattern of AKP vote shares across elections is more similar to the national 
pattern, Istanbul is one of the provinces where competition is higher. Furthermore, 
although the party’s vote shares were above the national average in 1999 and 2002 
general elections, it has dropped below the national average in 2007 and 2011 elections.  
 
AKP* and pro-Kurdish parties** vote shares at different 
geographical level 
  2011 2007 2002 1999 
nat. AKP 49,95 46,58 34,43 15,41 
Reg. AKP 42,10 47,96 20,45 15,49 
Ist. AKP 49,40 45,20 37,20 21,30 
nat.BDP 6,58 5,32 6,14 4,75 
Reg. BDP 46,78 34,70 36,10 29,32 
Ist. BDP 5,30 5,90 5,50 4,00 
Table 1: AKP and pro-Kurdish parties’ vote shares across different geographical levels (1999-2011) 
*AKP has been founded in 2001. For 1999 general elections the vote shares of its predecessor, 
FP (Fazilet Partisi- Felicity Party) has been used. 
** The names of the Pro-Kurdish parties are different for each of these elections. Its name was 
HADEP in 1999, DEHAP in 2002, DTP in 2007 and BDP in 2011 general elections. 
 
As a result, the AKP is expected to face more pressure to increase it votes. Similar 
trends are also visible when the effective number of parties and margins of the victory 
of the party are observed. With 2.80 point for 2011 and 3.35 point for 2007, Istanbul is 
between the effective number of parties functioning nationwide and in the Kurdish 
populated region, which are respectively 2.96 and 2.50 for 2011, and 3.46 and 2.80 for 
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2007. The margin of victory vis-à-vis its main competitor CHP is 17.1 in 2011, 18.2 in 
2007, whereas at national level this number is 24.01 in 2011 and 25.70 in 2007.     
 
 
Graph 1: AKP votes shares at different geographical levels (1999-2011) 
*AKP has been founded in 2001. For 1999 general elections the vote shares of its predecessor, 
FP (Fazilet Partisi- Felicity Party) has been used.  
 
Furthermore, Istanbul is the western province where BDP has effectively 
competed in 2007 and 2011 general elections, succeeding to send two and three 
deputies in the parliament respectively. As a result, BDP is an effective competitor for 
AKP with its attempts to mobilize Kurdish votes. The last three lines of Table 4.1 and 
graph 4.2 illustrate the vote shares of BDP at national, regional and provincial level. 
The party has managed to receive nearly 5% of the votes beginning with 2002 general 
elections. However, when the estimated percentage of Kurdish citizens and BDP vote 
shares are compared, still a considerable number of citizens of Kurdish origin seem still 
not supporting BDP.  This fact increases the importance of citizens of Kurdish origin as 
core or potential supporters for the AKP.  
With the considerably high number of Kurdish speaking residents, high electoral 
competition for AKP where BDP is an effective competitor, the incentive for AKP to 
mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin is expected to be high. Furthermore, as it will be 
revealed in the next section, there is a great variation in the distribution of the districts 
in terms of these variables, making it easier to select cases suitable to the research 
design. 
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Graph 2: Pro-Kurdish parties’ votes shares at different geographical levels (1999-2011) 
* The names of the Pro-Kurdish parties are different for each of these elections. Its name was 
HADEP in 1999, DEHAP in 2002, DTP in 2007 and BDP in 2011 general elections. 
 
Such an objective necessitates a deep analysis of the complex relationship 
between selected variables. As a suitable research technique for such a purpose, the 
study chooses to conduct this analysis through case studies to collect the necessary data 
to provide a clear and solid ground for my claims. Being well aware of the problem of 
selecting the cases on the bases of outcomes on the dependent variable2, a complex 
procedure has been adopted for the selection process.   That is to say, albeit the main 
arguments of the study were presented in abstract terms, they were not developed in an 
abstract manner.  The first step of the research was to conduct in-depth interviews with 
a considerable number of activists at key positions in the party, active in the formulation 
and implementation of the mobilization strategies in different districts. The major aim 
of these interviews was to identify more precisely the independent variables that may be 
effective in mobilizing voters of Kurdish origin. It was the outcome of these interviews 
through which the case selection procedure has been built. Within this respect, the 
selection of the experimental and control districts has been conducted on the method of 
most similar cases. First, a large number of districts have been grouped according to the 
independent variables identified to be effective in shaping the party’s programmatic and 
clientelistic strategies. These variables are percentages of residents of Kurdish origin, 
their socio-economic status, the degree of the electoral competition the party faces, the 
amount of resources at the district level and the population size of each district. Then, 
                                               
2 For more detail on the problem consult Geddes (1990). According to the author conducting an analysis 
on a limited number of cases selected only on the basis outcome may be misleading in interpreting a 
relationship between two variables.  
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these districts have been grouped according to their divergence in the dependent 
variable:  the effectiveness of the mobilization strategy of the party, which is measured 
in terms of the changing electoral support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish origin 
from 2009 to 2011 elections. To identify the difference in the mobilization strategy of 
AKP for gaining the support of Kurdish as opposed to non-Kurdish voters, two districts 
with high percentages of Kurdish residents and one district with low percentage of 
Kurdish origin have been selected. So as to be able to measure the effectiveness of the 
mobilization strategy of AKP among residents of Kurdish origin, the main selection 
criteria of the two districts of high percentage of Kurdish resident has been their 
divergence in terms of the dependent variable.  The selected districts are respectively 
Beyoğlu, Sancaktepe and Beykoz. All of them are similar in terms of the socio-
economic indicators, the degree of the electoral competition the party faces, their 
population size and the amount of resources at the district level. Beyoğlu and 
Sancaktepe diverge from Beykoz in terms of their equally high percentages of Kurdish 
residents while they diverge in terms of the support for AKP among voters of Kurdish 
origin across the elections.  Given the fact that effectiveness of the strategy of the party 
is to be analyzed at the neighborhood level, under the two districts , I have selected 
neighborhoods similar in terms of  the percentage and socio-economic conditions of 
residents of Kurdish origin but different in terms of the amount of support for AKP 
among residents of Kurdish origin across elections. These neighborhoods are Örnektepe 
and Hacıahmet from Beyoğlu, Inönü and Veyselkarani from Sancaktepe. While support 
for AKP from 2009 to 2011 is constant in Örnektepe and Beyoğlu, it decreases in 
Hacıahmet and increases in Veysel Karani.  The selection process of the district and the 
neighborhoods will be analyzed in more detail in the following chapters of the study.  
  
 
Data Collection:  
 
 
The data used in the study have two different sources. The first source consist of 
the analysis of publicly available quantitative data on demographic and socioeconomic 
indicators, electoral outcomes (mostly available at TUİK and YSK), and personally 
collected data on the resources of the municipalities, AKP party organizations etc. 
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These data has mostly been used for the selection of the cases in which deeper analysis 
will be conducted and to sustain the main findings of the study.  
The second source of data used to test the main hypothesis of the study has been 
collected through qualitative research techniques where both semi-structured indepth 
interviews and participant observations have been used in the collection process. Within 
this respect, 110 semi-structured indebt interviews have been carried with the party 
personel at key decision-making positions at both district and neighborhood level such 
as party presidents of Istanbul and elites from different levels of the organization such 
as districts presidents, vice-presidents responsible of the organization or neighborhood 
presidents from both main or woman branches. These interviews have principally been 
carried in the selected districts of Beyoğlu, Sancaktepe, Beykoz and less intensively in 
the districts of Zeytinburnu, Küçükçekmece, Esenler, Başakşehir, Sultanbeyli which 
have high percentages of residents of Kurdish origin, considerably low socio-economic 
indicators and whose municipalities are governed by AKP. The major objective of these 
interviews was the formulation of the preliminary hypothesis concerning the 
mobilization strategy of AKP such as the organizational structure of the party, its 
strategy to mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin, activists’ political experiences, means 
through which mobilization is performed etc. These interviews have also provided 
fruitful information for the testing of the hypothesis. 
Yet, the main data has been extracted during the legal period of the electoral 
campaigning activities set by the High Electoral Board that have taken place between 20 
April and 11 June 2011 all around Turkey.  Although, it is argued in this dissertation 
that clientelistic mobilization should be perceived as a long process not only carried 
during the electoral campaigning periods, conducting such an analysis in this period 
provided the opportunity to collect data in a very short period of time since these 
periods are when political parties spend all of their efforts in terms of labor force and 
money in contacting and mobilizing voters. In fact, the electoral campaigning activities 
of AKP were very intense in all the districts under investigation. Yet, as it will be 
exhibited in detail, they greatly diverged at the neighborhood level in the district of 
Beyoğlu. During this period, two of the deputy candidates in each electoral region have 
been appointed each day in one of the districts, in order to participate in the electoral 
campaigning activities of the districts. On the other hand, each district branch 
performed neighborhood visits with these deputy candidates, district and neighborhood 
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activists.  Through participant observation in these information rich activities at the 
district and neighborhood level, a huge amount of data for testing the main hypothesis 
of the study has been collected. Data on the target and content of the mobilization 
strategies on Kurdish as well as non-Kurdish voters, the nature and amount of activities 
performed, relations between members of the party and the activists, internal 
functioning of the party comprise some of them. The main importance in collecting data 
through participant observation has been the opportunity to physically observe the 
activists in their natural social environments. The reliability of this kind of information 
is certainly greater than the declared information by the activists during more official 
interviews, since they would probably have the incentive to misrepresent themselves. 
Furthermore, the electoral campaigning period provided me the opportunity to 
contact and interview a large number of activists from different ranks of the party. As a 
result, I have been able to perform interviews on an ad-hoc basis as if they were daily 
conversations. Although these interviews are not as extensive as the scheduled ones, 
they provide valuable information.  The advantage of these interviews has been its 
positive effect on the validity of the answers given by the respondents.  As the 
interviews were carried through a constant interaction in a very natural social 
environment, it decreased respondents’ skepticism on the intention of asked questions. 
As a result, they became more voluntary to cooperate and gave more sincere answers.  
In fact, I have been able to observe how the attitudes of the activists towards me and the 
questions asked changed as they repeatedly get into interaction with me. Although most 
of them tried first to understand my intentions and hesitated in giving me clear answers, 
by the end of the electoral campaigning activities, they did not distinguish me from any 
other person in the group and comfortably criticize the party policies or other activists 
even when I was near them.   
 
No. of attended daily activities 
Beyoğlu 10 Sancaktepe 11 Beykoz: 5 
Örnektepe 3 Veysel karani        5 Paşabahçe 2 
Hacıahmet 3 Inönü 4 RüzgarlıBahçe 2 
Kaptanpaşa 2 Kemal Türkler 1 Tokatköy 1 
Dolapdere 1 Sarıgazi 1     
Yenişehir 1     Total:  26 
Table 2: Number of attended daily activities 
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No. of interviewed activists 
Beyoğlu 40 Sancaktepe 38 Beykoz: 20 
District 17 district 17 district 8 
Neighborhoods 23 Neighborhoods 21 Neighborhoods 12 
Örnektepe 7 Veysel karani 9 Paşabahçe 6 
Hacıahmet 9 Inönü 9 RüzgarlıBahçe 6 
Yenişehir 3 KemalTürkler 3 
 
  
Kaptanpaşa 2     other districs 12 
Çukur 2     
 
  
        
 
  
    
Kurdish Origin 
Beyoğlu 
Sancaktepe 
Other districts 
19 
6 
11 
2     
    Non-Kurdish Origin 91 
 
  
    total  110    
Table 3: Number of interviewed activists 
 
In order to be able to collect objective data, and preventing the risk of 
overestimation, the participant observations and interviews have been conducted 
according to certain criteria. First, major focus has been given to the districts of 
Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe. I have paid attention to participate at an equal number of 
activities in all the neighborhoods under investigation. Although most of the activities I 
have participated were the activities of the districts branches, in neighborhoods such as 
Hacıahmet where the district branch did not perform any activities, neighborhood 
contact offices has been visited. Within this respect, I have attended 26 daily district 
activities where 11 were in Sancaktepe, 10 in Beyoğlu and 5 in Beykoz. The intensive 
nature of the programs of each of the district prevented me to participate in all the 
activities taking places in the selected neighborhoods. Yet, at least three days of 
activities has been observed in each of the neighborhoods, although this amount rose to 
five in some of them. Furthermore, the activities of the district branch have also been 
observed in other neighborhoods so as to be able to compare the changing content. This 
was especially done in Beyoğlu since in the selected neighborhoods the electoral vote 
shares of AKP was low. As a result, the two campaigning activities in the 
neighborhoods where the party is electorally strong have been attended. Furthermore, I 
have also tried to attend all activities in neighborhoods where considerable amount of 
Kurdish citizens reside. For such a purpose, I have participated in 2 daily district 
activities in each of the districts of Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe. During the electoral 
campaigning period, general activities such as dinners, mass meetings, picnics in the 
scope of Istanbul or district have also been performed. I have attended to at least one of 
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each activity. I have also participated in each neighborhood to at least one of the weekly 
main and woman branch meetings and education seminars. 
The number of the total interviews conducted, both scheduled and unscheduled, is 
110. Although, I had the opportunity to interview the same respondent for a few times 
during the electoral campaigning period, I counted them as one interview. Table 3 gives 
the detailed number of the interviews conducted on the basis of districts, neighborhoods 
and ethnic origin.   As it can be revealed from the table, I have taken into consideration 
three main points while conducting them.  First, I have interviewed a considerably 
similar number of activists in each of the district, except for Beykoz. This was a 
deliberate choice since Beykoz is my control district. The number of activists 
interviewed in each of the districts was 40 in Beyoğlu, 38 in Sancaktepe and 20 in 
Beykoz.  On the other hand, these interviews were divided between district and 
neighborhood level activists where a similar number of at least 7 activists were 
interviewed in each of the selected neighborhoods.  Attaining equality between the 
activists concerning their ethnic origin was impossible due to the characteristics of the 
demographic composition of the activists in Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe.  Among the 
respondents, 19 out of 110 were from Kurdish origin. Of these, 6 were from Beyoğlu, 
11 from Sancaktepe and 2 from other districts.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
SUPPORT FOR AKP AMONG VOTERS OF KURDISH ORIGIN: 
PROGRAMMATIC AND CLIENTELISTIC LINKAGES 
  
 
 
 
Studies on the Kurdish issue mention two main resources that contribute to the 
politicization of Kurdish ethnic demands that derives from the policies of the Turkish 
State.   First, it is argued to have its roots in the state formation of the Turkish republic 
and have developed in the course of its history due to the insistence of the Turkish state 
to ignore the distinctiveness of the Kurdish population and its attempts to assimilate it 
within the defined Turkish identity(Gunter 1997, Yavuz 1998, Kirişçi &Winrow, 1997; 
Kushner 1997, White, 1998, İçduygu at all, 1999; Cornell 2001, Heper, 2008). Second, 
the socioeconomic dimension of the issue is also a commonly cited source of the 
conflict. In fact, the region is one of the least developed region in the country ( Kirisçi 
and Winrow 1997; White 1998; Icduygu, Romano and Sirkeci 1999, Kirişçi 2011).  
 Within this respect, the process of the politicization of the Kurdish issue should 
be evaluated under important events shaping the Turkish political context. The 
modernization process of the Turkish state, the economic development the country has 
faced during the 1960’s and relatively liberal political scene has contributed to the rise 
of new elites of Kurdish origin that began to formulate policies with ethnic demands 
within the democratic realm. On the other hand, development in 1970’s gave the 
movement its Marxist-Leninist character. Nevertheless, the 1980 military coup has 
contributed to its illegal character by severely expelling these groups from the 
democratic realm through denying the Kurdish identity and banning all kind of 
activities carried on ethnic lines. This contributed to the radicalization of these elites 
and the Kurdish cause by orienting them to defend their objectives through violent 
means.  During the 1990’s, the increase in terrorist attacks of the PKK in the region and 
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the response of the state through military means on one hand, and the deteriorating 
economic conditions on the other, created an environment of insecurity and 
discrimination among citizens of Kurdish origin.  
Within this respect, the increasing support for pro-Kurdish parties entering the 
electoral scene after 1990’s should be evaluated within the realm of two processes: The 
gaining importance of the Kurdish issue vis-a-vis the center/periphery cleavage among 
citizens of Kurdish origin as a result of the anti-ethnic policies of the state institutions 
and the deteriorating economic conditions of the citizens of Kurdish origin as a result of 
the economic policies of the governments after 1980s. These two dimensions are 
important in understanding possible factors shaping the competition between AKP and 
the pro-Kurdish parties, and the basis of the support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish 
origin. Within this context, this section evaluates the existing literature on identifying 
the major dimensions of support for AKP.   
 
 
1.1- Mobilization through Programmatic Linkage 
 
 
Rationalist approaches explain the decision of a voter to support a party based on 
his/her perception on the distance of the party’s position to his/her preferred position on 
the dimension he/she defines as decisive. Within this respect, although, government 
policies on both the political and economic realm may be  the major cause behind the 
politicization of the issue; increasing support for PKK or pro-Kurdish parties in the 
region should not be evaluated as the direct result of rising of ethnic consciousness.  
The study suggests that the rising support for the PKK or pro-Kurdish parties should be 
related to the inability or reluctance of major parties to fully address the preferences of 
the voters of Kurdish origin. Within this respect the coming of pro-Islamist parties in 
the political scene of the Kurdish speaking region increasing their voters shares from 
23% in 1995 to 48% in 2007, has been interpreted as a major challenge to the monopoly 
of the PKK and pro-Kurdish parties (Tüzcer, 2009).  The increasing competition 
between the two blocks of parties and their success to attain nearly all the votes in the 
region has been analyzed within the framework of their programmatic positions. These 
studies base their argument on a programmatic perception of competition shaped by 
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policy formulation and implementation. Indentifying the major competition being 
between AKP and BDP, they suggest two possible dimensions affecting the success of 
AKP in this competition: reconciliation of the Kurdish issue in the center/periphery 
paradigm and economic policies. 
The first argument constructs around the fact that state policies after 1980 have 
contributed to the increase in ethnic consciousness among citizens of  Kurdish origin, 
who previously defined themselves in terms of center/peripheral cleavage. In fact, as 
Yavuz and Özcan (2006, p.106) state, a considerable number of citizens of Kurdish 
origin define themselves based upon both religious and ethnic markers. As these authors 
argue, most of the citizens of Kurdish origin mainly identify themselves first with 
religious values rather than ethnicity, but also feel Kurdish when confronted with the 
choice of ethnic identity (p.106).  
 According to these studies, the perception of the Kurdish issue and policy 
formulation by AKP and BDP at national level make them important rivals. Defending 
the idea that center/periphery cleavage has traditionally played an important role among 
the Kurds (see Bruinessen 1992; Yegen 1996, p. 225; Atacan 2001, pp. 111_12; Cizre 
2002, pp. 229-30), these studies suggest that the reactionary character of the pro-
Islamist parties against the secular and authoritarian center and the illegitimization of 
the pro-Islamist parties by the state institutions are their common traits with the Kurdish 
movement. Gunter and Yavuz (2007) suggest that the support for the pro-Islamist RP 
(Refah partisi – Welfare party) among citizens of Kurdish origin is the result of the 
perception of the party as an “anti-Kemalist” and “anti-systemic” party that has been 
suppressed by the same enemy as they have”, namely the secularist center. Similarly, 
Bozarslan (1996, p. 18) suggests that ideological and reactionary motivations were 
primary factors behind the success of the explicitly RP among the Kurds. According to 
Yavuz (1998, pp. 11- 13, 1999, 2003), the ‘oppositional identity’ of the pro-Islamic 
parties has appealed to the Kurds, who were also marginalized by the political system. 
Within this respect, the success of the party depends on its ability to reconcile 
ethnic and religious dimensions in their policy formulation and implementation.  The 
ideological position of pro-Islamic parties and the AKP on the Kurdish issue supports 
their ability to reconcile these two dimensions. Within this respect, they believe that ‘the 
Islamic layer of identity could be useful in terms of containing ethnic tensions and 
finding a peaceful solution’ (Yavuz and Özcan 2006; Sarıgil 2010, Efegil, 2011). Thus, 
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the problem can be solved by reformulating the Kurdish identity within the 
center/periphery context and simultaneously providing some basic social and political 
rights. Aktürk (2009) suggests that the political demands of the Kurdish movement are 
also not very different than the Islamic conception which has its base in the definition of 
the Millet in the Ottoman period. Nevertheless, the author suggests that such a 
reformulation of the Kurdish problem may face the difficulty to reverse the new secular 
reality that 80 years of secularization has created on the citizens of Kurdish origin.   
Furthermore, the conflict of the party with the representatives of the center and its 
attempt to reformulate Kemalist values concentrating around the redefinition of 
secularism and a redistribution of power between the elites of the center and the 
periphery is expected to be effective in increasing its support. Similarly, attempts of the 
party to exclude the military from the realm of politics, to change the composition of 
main bureaucratic agencies, and to form a more moderate version of secularism are all 
seen as areas of common interest. The AKP’s support for the democratization reforms 
of the EU concerning individual and social rights, its position on the democratic 
dimension of the Kurdish issue, and the provision of minority rights are aspects of the 
party’s policy that directly deal with the Kurdish problem. 
Given the fact that the economy is another decisive dimension of the Kurdish 
problem, another possible tool for the AKP may be the use of economic means, 
especially among citizens of Kurdish origin with low socioeconomic status to increase it 
support. Asserting that citizens of Kurdish origin who have nothing to lose and do not 
have the opportunity to collaborate may joint opposition groups, İçduygu, Romano and 
Sirkeci (1999) emphasize the role of the economy in explaining support for pro-Kurdish 
parties. Similarly, Sarıgil’s (2010) research, based on the World Values Survey (1999-
2000) highlights the significant effect of the economic situation in Kurdish voters’ 
decision to vote for Pro-Kurdish parties. It indicates that as the level of education and 
income increases, the likelihood of ethno-nationalist tendencies declines. Furthermore, 
Sarıgil empirically validates the claims of other authors on the equal role of both 
religion and ethnicity in the identification of most of the citizens of Kurdish origin.  
According to his results, religion is not empirically significant in explaining the 
likelihood of citizens of Kurdish origin to vote for pro-Kurdish parties. In other words, 
AKP and BDP do have a common electoral base that is religious and Kurdish at the 
same time and sensitive to material incentives in their voting preferences. 
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According to Sarıgil (2010) although religiosity and ethnicity affect Kurdish 
voters’ electoral choice, these definitions are mostly based on socio-economic term 
making material incentive as an important tool for affecting peoples party preferences. 
Similarly, this shows that there is high level of volatility among the constituencies of 
AKP and BDP, which are open to vote for both parties that do not address particular 
religious or ethnic preferences but representation and better living conditions (Demiralp, 
2012, p. 288-290). Within this respect, economic performance of the party or 
investment on projects that everyone can benefit in certain geographical unit may be 
one way to mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin. Such a strategy may be an option for 
AKP. 
This literature provides many examples on the use of community projects in terms 
of pork-barrel to increase its support in a specific geographical region especially for 
gaining the support of swing voters that ideologically indifferent between two parties 
(Ferejohn, 1974; Baron, 1991; Anne Case, 2001, Denemark, 2000, Rocha-Menocal, 
2001, Margit Tavits, 2009; Graham and Kane, 1998; Schady, 2000; Molinar and 
Weldon, 1994; Diaz-Cayero, 2008). Eventually, the studies signify the presence of a 
group of swing voters among citizens of Kurdish origin that are ideologically close to 
both AKP and BDP. Thus, the use of unconditional economic means can be a logical 
policy for AKP which controls these resources, especially among citizens with lower 
socioeconomic conditions who are more sensitive to these kinds of incentives.   
 
 
1.2- Mobilization through Clientelistic Linkage 
 
 
Studies on clientelism suggest that programmatic linkage is not the only way to 
attract voters. Another source of support can be provided through clientelist linkage, 
which is carried on an individual level and is mostly built on conditional economic 
transaction. According to Calvo and Murillo (2010) on which level the voter will decide 
who to vote is based on his/her distance to the clientelistic network. The presence of a 
clientelistic linkage may provide a further mechanism for voters to decide on which 
party to vote. 
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The existence of such a linkage to mobilize voters would provide certain 
flexibility to the party on its policy formulation at national level. This kind of a strategy 
seems to be especially vital for AKP’s continuing support among citizens of Kurdish 
origin especially under a political context characterized by a position change by the 
party on the Kurdish issue. Low socio-economic conditions among the citizens of 
Kurdish origin on one hand and AKP’s access to state resources on the other may 
provide the necessary impetus to use these resources for organization and mobilization 
purpose. 
Within this respect, although programmatic competition would probably explain, 
a considerable portion of the electoral shift between AKP and BDP, clientelistic 
accountability may be another source of support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish 
origin.  This alternative explanation may provide an answer to different electoral 
patterns at a more local level and continuous support even when AKP positions itself on 
the opposite side of the Turkish/Kurdish dimension at national level. For example, 
Demiralp (2012) suggest that  
“Many voters who support Islamist or Kurdish parties are open to political 
options that may not involve a coherent religious or ethnic agenda, as long 
as the rulers promote provincial interests, deliver basic public services 
effectively, and maintain a stable and satisfactory economic 
environment…For these voters, a party’s success mostly depends on its 
ability to speak to local interests, the candidate’s personal charisma, the 
party’s or the candidate’s previous services, or the voters’ personal relations 
with the candidate” (p. 295-296).   
 
 In fact, present studies provide a powerful ground to expect such a strategy. 
These studies identify two different characteristics in this respect. While the first 
concerns the role of the networks and patronage in shaping the voting behavior of 
Turkish and Kurdish citizens, the second focus on the use of distributions of municipal 
resources and populist policies by especially, pro-Islamist parties. Authors such as 
Sunar, (1974, 2004), Sayarı (1977), Heper & Keymen (1999), Güneş-Ayata (2004) 
identify the historical use of clientelism, beginning with the early years of the republic, 
by political parties in Turkey to increase electoral support. These authors place the 
development of clientelism in the national building efforts of the early years of the 
Turkish Republic. Within this respect, the first stage of clientelism was characterized by 
the relationship developed between local notables of the periphery and the center that 
have no base of support in the periphery.  Loyalty of the periphery in this era was based 
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on kinship, extended families or religious communities and local notables were used as 
a mean to gain this loyalty (Güneş-Ayata, 2004, p. 50). The notables were not used to 
increase support but to regulate the relations between the center and periphery. With the 
passage to multi-party politics in 1950s, electoral support of the people became a major 
factor for political parties’ competition, while rapid socio-economic transformation of 
the periphery increased consciousness of the voters on the bargaining power of their 
votes (Sayarı, 1977, p. 108-109). These developments contributed the replacement of 
notable clientelism to ‘party directed patronage’, where former notables transformed 
into party affiliated brokers (Sayarı, 1977, p. 108, Güneş-Ayata, 2004, p. 53). Social 
transformation and integration of the Turkish society in 1960s where rapid change 
through social mobilization and commercialization of economic activities was 
witnessed, decreased the importance of former sources of loyalties resulting to its 
replacement by party loyalty. In this period, the party became an important mean of 
access to state resources. The enlargement of state owned enterprises in this period 
increased the resources available to the government to use patronage as a political mean 
(Sunar, 1974, 2004). As a result, political parties became very attractive for the new 
emerging elites of the society competing for these resources. Güneş-Ayata suggests that 
this link between the political parties and voters was disrupted with the 1980 Military 
Coup. For Heper and Keymen (1999 p.266), this trend was also followed by the new 
governing party ANAP (Anavatan partisi –Motherland party) who purposefully 
preferred to form a direct link with the voters where material resources has been 
distributed via pork-barrel in rural areas. Within this period, the major impetus behind 
economic decisions was market signals not clientelist demands.  Nevertheless, the lift 
on the bans of former political leaders signaled the return to the old way of clientelism 
(Güneş-Ayata, 2004, p. 57-58).  
 The developments in the pro-Kurdish dominated region have been different from 
the rest of Turkey until recently. The major difference has been the lack of integration 
through social and economic transformation and the persistence of tribal and religious 
relations as source of loyalty. This prevented the transformation in this region from 
clientelism based on local notables to party affiliated brokers (Kudat, 1975). As Sayari 
stressed in 1977, although party organizations were present in this region they were not 
well established. Furthermore, low party identification created great electoral volatility 
where voters easily shifted their electoral preferences from one election to the other 
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(Sayarı, 1977, p. 110).  In fact, some kind of transformation in 1970s occurred among 
some citizens of Kurdish origin who gained the opportunity to go to western cities 
mostly for the purpose of education. However, the increase of their Kurdish 
consciousness prevented them to enter to major parties after 1980 due to the 
assimilationist policies of the military following this period. Furthermore, their 
secularist stands and reaction against the dominance of tribalism and religious order was 
in a sense decreasing their base among the traditionally organized region. As a result, 
these Kurdish citizens associated with PKK and pro-Kurdish parties constituting the 
founding elements of these movements. During 1990s, the increasing insecurity in the 
region and dominance of the military as the representative of the state decreased the 
ability of political parties to develop their network in the region. Yalçın Moussau (2012, 
p.57) suggest that the weak ties of political parties in the region resulting in the 
weakness of the clientelistic relations might have played a role in the negligence of the 
Eastern region. Recall that by comparing Muş and Istanbul, Sayarı (1976, 1977) makes 
a similar suggestion for the years of 1970’s. Although Yavuz and Özcan (2006) state in 
2006, the continuing  importance of the traditional tribal and religious loyalties in the 
perception of politics in the region (p.106), the forced migration policies of the military 
in 1990’s changed in fact the social characteristics of the region increasing insecurity at 
the individual level. As previously mentioned, the result of this policy was the 
immigration of an important part of the population to large cities in the region and the 
western part of Turkey. This caused a physical detachment from former loyalties and 
further economic deprivation, increasing alienation among the immigrants. The 
characteristics of new formed loyalties were primarily based on how the immigrants 
integrated to the society.  
A considerable number of scholars (Öniş 1997; Barkey 1998; White 1998; Toprak 
2005, p. 181; Yavuz and Özcan 2007, pp. 130-1) explain the RP’s success among 
Kurdish people in shanty-towns both in the western and eastern parts of the country 
with the use of their present network to integrate these immigrants in the system. By 
incorporating them  in their network through the provision of material incentives such 
as shelter, jobs, food and fuel, and immaterial incentive such as attending weddings, 
circumcisions and burial ceremonies, the party was successful in gaining support of a 
large amount of citizens. Their control of the municipalities especially in western parts 
of the cities created a great advantage for them. On the other hand, the absence of such a 
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network and inability to integrate can be seen as the major cause of the increasing 
violence with strong attachments to ethnic identification among citizens of Kurdish 
origin (White, 1998; Canefe, 2008). This situation increases support for BDP who tend 
to mobilize these immigrants by highlighting their “purposeful” exclusion from the 
system and growing socio-economic inequality. 
Similar evaluations can be made for AKP, which is the inheritor of the RP 
tradition. Gunter and Yavuz (2007, p. 296) states that AKP is the only party that has 
dense social network that works for  the victory of the party in every geographical units 
of the country, accompanied by control of a large number of municipalities. 
Furthermore, such a network, although developed through the distribution of incentives 
may provide an important ground for the dissemination of the ideology of the party 
creating a sense of common values shaped by the party and a certain degree of 
identification with the party. As White (1998) points it out, the importance of public 
services provided by Islamist parties in Istanbul’s shantytowns is a major factor not only 
on these parties’ electoral support but also on the Islamization of population.  
The role of the party organization in mobilizing the voters of Kurdish origin 
through material inducement seems prevailing. The role of the party organization in 
developing the clientelistic network among Turkish political parties has been indicated 
by Sayarı (1976). Although there is a considerable number of studies on the main 
characteristics on the organizations of political parties in Turkey, they mostly provide a 
descriptive account of the level of political participation in political parties, ideological 
orientations or socio-demographic characteristics. The study conducted by Sayarı in 
1976 is one among important studies that depicts a detailed account of the main 
characteristics of Turkish political parties in that period. Among recent the studies of 
Tosun & Erdoğan-Tosun (2010) and Uysal and Topak (2010) are important in 
highlighting different characteristics of the activists of main political parties in Turkey. 
While Tosun and Erdoğan-Tosun (2010) analyze the Turkish political parties in terms 
of the degree of political participation and organization, Uysal and Topak (2010) focuse 
on the identification of the social networks of the party activists.  Schüler’s study (2002) 
on CHP depicts the complex relationship between ethnic ties, hometown origin and 
patronage in the organizational ranks of the party. The number of studies questioning 
the possible role of the grass-root organizations on the effectiveness of the mobilization 
of the Turkish political parties is rather scarce with the exception of a few recent studies 
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that mainly focuses on AKP.  In their analysis on the mobilization strategy of AKP in 
the municipal elections of 2009 in Istanbul Çaha & Guida (2011) provide examples on 
how difference in the strength of the neighborhood organizations affects the nature of 
the mobilization efforts.  Kumbaracı (2009) depicts an account of the formal 
organizational structure of AKP with attempt to understand its level of 
Institutionalization and centralization. The study of Özbudun and Hale (2010) that 
comprises of an analysis of the organizational structure of the party, its local 
organizations and their effect on the mobilization of voters is important in the sense it 
highlights the intense activities of these organizations and their connections to the 
voters.  
Major studies in the Turkish literature successfully indicate the use of 
programmatic and clientelistic strategies by political parties and their possible affect on 
voters’ choice. However, they fail to provide a concrete argument on different 
mobilization strategies of AKP and the role of the party organizations in increasing the 
effectiveness of such mobilization efforts on vote choice whose validity can be tested 
empirically. The study aims to fulfill such a gap by focusing on the role of clientelistic 
linkage carried through the AKP’s local organizations in shaping voters preferences. 
Within this respect, based on the existing literature, the next section is a detailed 
illustration of the main hypothesis of the study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THEORY: EVALUATING AKP’S ELECTORAL SUPPORT AMONG 
VOTERS OF KURDISH ORIGIN 
  
 
 
 
The major concern of the present study is to understand the factors that increase 
in the effectiveness of the mobilization strategy of AKP among voters of Kurdish origin 
across different geographical units. Studies on the rise of ethnic parties have mostly 
answered this question by focusing on the programmatic dimension of the competition 
where rise in support for ethnic parties is evaluated in relation with the policy 
positioning of parties and voters in the political system. Adopting a slightly different 
approach, this study aims at testing the consolidating effect of clientelistic mobilization 
through the party organizations on the political preferences of members of an ethnic 
group. Under circumstances where the party is successful in incorporating the members 
of an ethnic group into the clientelistic network, political preferences is expected to be 
less sensitive to the programmatic nature of the competition since voters will tend to 
evaluate the party through its clentelistic performance. In contrast, under circumstances 
where the party fails to incorporate them, support for its competitor is expected to be 
more in line with the programmatic nature of the competition where voters decide who 
to support based on the programmatic positions of the parties. This study evaluates the 
validity of this suggestion by breaking it down into three lines of arguments.  
The first line of arguments concerns the means available to political parties to 
mobilize voters. The study suggests that political parties use both clientelistic and 
programmatic linkages in order to gain the support of voters. Clientelistic mobilization 
is a safer strategy when compared to programmatic mobilization since its distribution is 
individual and conditional to support.  Other things being equal which strategy a party 
will rely more on is based on types of voters and predictability of voters conduct.  
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Socio-economic conditions and political preferences are factors affecting voters’ 
elasticity. Within this respect, mobilization through clientelistic distribution is expected 
to be more influential among voters with low socio-economic conditions and swing 
voters that ideologically indifferent between two competing political parties. Albeit, 
conditionality is an important dimension differentiating clientelistic from programmatic 
linkage, this study mainly focuses on the individual and discretionary characteristic of 
the former. The major reason is the relativity of the conditionality according to the 
nature of the clientelistic linkage which is differently defined by the literature. Although 
some scholars perceive clientelistic exchange as a short-term process, very instrumental 
in nature, the study defines it as a long-term strategy where different types of resources 
are distributed to different types of voters and where compliance is voluntarily assured 
through building trust. Yet, to be able to develop such a clientelistic kinkage, this study 
suggests that political parties should directly contact the voters on a repeated course of 
interaction to be able to identify the political preferences and assure their compliance 
through building trust. Nevertheless, the political settings are mostly characterized by 
limited information. Consequently, political parties will have a tendency to create 
certain mechanisms to overcome the lack of information so as to mobilize voters more 
effectively.  
The second line of arguments concerns the effectiveness of clientelistic 
mobilization through party organizations. This study suggests that strong party 
organization measured in terms of number of party activists and the repetetiveness of 
their interactions with the votes provides a suitable mechanism for the party to 
effectively develop a long-term clientelistic linkage where different types of voters are 
individually identified and compliance is voluntarily assured. A strong party 
organization contributes to the effectiveness of the mobilization strategy in two 
manners. The first one concerns the quality of the relation it creates with the voters.  
Deeper rooted the party organization, in terms of length of its presence and the intensity 
of its interaction, into the society greater will be its capacity to deal with the information 
problem and specifically target voters. Even more important, the study suggests that 
what makes the clientelistic exchange through a strong party organization a stable 
strategy is not its effect in increasing the party’s ability to monitor voters as suggested 
by Stokes (2005) but in creating a system of shared values that promotes voluntary 
compliance and attachment with the party through repeated interactions.  The second 
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contribution concerns the scope of the strategy.  The number of activists and mechanism 
of information flow among them increase the number of identified voters. From this 
perspective, it can be said that the higher the number of the activists, the greater will be 
the channels of information between them the higher will be the scope of the 
clientelistic linkage.  
The third line of arguments concerns the effectiveness of the mobilization of 
members of an ethnic group through clientelistic linkage and thec mechanism through 
which these voters are incorporated into the clientelistic network. Explaining the rise of 
ethnic consciousness as a rational strategy adopted by both political parties and 
members of an ethnic group in the process of resources distribution, the study suggests 
first, that mobilization through clientelistic linkage is an efficient strategy to gain the 
support of members of an ethnic group. Yet especially under conditions where ethnic 
consciousness is high, inter-community relations are weak, the ethnic group is 
composed of different types of voters and has potential for violence incorporation of 
their members may be very costly through existing structure. Given the fact that ethnic 
groups are characterized by dense social networks that provide ready channels of 
interaction, political parties would probably try to infiltrate into these networks to 
mobilize these voters through the incorporation of co-ethnic into the party’s ranks. This 
is a why under these conditions political parties will rely on mobilizing these groups 
through co-ethnics to decrease the cost of identification and persuasion.  Therefore, the 
study suggests that the incorporation of members of an ethnic group into a party’s 
clientelistic network is related to the conjunction of two variables: the number and time 
of entry of co-ethnic in the party’s ranks and the intensity of their contact with the 
voters.   
The fourth line of arguments explains why a political party cannot form a party 
organization deeply rooted in the society and incorporate members of an ethnic group 
into the organization even if such a strategy is rational.  First, the study suggests that 
under circumstances where ideological orientations are low distribution of resources 
may be convenient source of the motivation of the activists. The nature of the 
mechanisms through which resources are distributed is vital in understanding 
motivation potential of political parties. Within this respect, focusing on the parties’ 
internal organizations, the study argues that the absence of competitive intra-party 
advancement rules that would motivate all, existing and new activists, to increase the 
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network, prevent the successful functioning and enlargement of a party organization 
(Chandra, 2004).  Centralized party organizations have a disadvantage since their 
mechanism of distribution is based on loyalty rather than performance.  The study 
argues that it is very difficult for centralized party organization to change their intra-
party advancement mechanisms even under conditions where it has or willing to do so.  
The path dependence inherent in all institutions prevents centralized party organization 
to set such a mechanism to incorporate new elites without frustrating existing ones in 
the later phases of its foundation. On the other hand, change may occur in the internal 
functioning of a centralized party organization through a critical juncture with a 
leadership change that has the ability to reset the coalition composition of the party and 
rules of intra-party advancement. The ability of the new leaders to set a competitive 
intraparty advancement rule is based on the previous experiences. The following section 
undertakes a detailed logical evaluation of each of these arguments in the light of 
existing studies.    
 
 
2.5- How Political Parties Persuade Voters: 
 
 
At the most general level, democracy may be defined as a regime of 
accountability and responsibility where political parties are responsive (Dahl, 1971) and 
accountable (Karl, 1990; Schmitter, 2004) towards the voters and voters evaluate 
political parties’ performance through regular elections. The means through which 
political parties mobilize voters are diverse in which ideology or economy is one of its 
important factors. The distribution of state resources by political parties for electoral 
purposes has been a widely analyzed dimension in the literature, especially in political 
settings where parties’ and voters ideological positioning is very close to each other. On 
the other hand, the literature differentiates between different linkages of party/voters 
accountability in which programmatic and clientelistic linkages are important variants. 
Voters may decide on which party to vote by evaluating them on either of these types of 
accountability. Which type it will take into consideration is based on the voter/party 
linkage that a political party has used in mobilizing them. Within this respect, political 
parties may distribute resources through either of these linkages; their decision is based 
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on two factors: the voter’s elasticity and the predictability of his/her conduct. This 
section will first, broadly explain these types of linkages in focusing on their main 
differences in mobilizing voters and their effect on electoral outcomes. Then, the 
conditions stated in the literature to affect political parties’ decisions to use either of 
these linkages will be evaluated.  
 
 
2.1.1- Ideological Mobilization: Programmatic Linkage 
 
 
 
The first brand of studies analyzing the political parties’ mobilization strategies 
focuses on the responsive government model where political parties are evaluated by 
voters through the policies they formulate and apply.  Although these studies mostly do 
not focus on political parties electoral mobilization strategies (Rorschneider, 2002) or 
examine the electoral process and voters’ choice, they provide a fruitful ground in 
understanding how political parties try to attract voters.  As such, this literature provides 
valuable insights into understanding political parties’ strategies to mobilize voters. The 
common ground of these studies is their reliance on the programmatic linkage as a way 
to persuade voters. Within this respect, political parties are taken responsible through 
the policies they formulate and apply. 
Within this respect, the general literature on vote choice can be analyzed from the 
standpoint of two general approaches: historical comparative and rational choice 
approaches. Apart from their divergence on how political parties’ mobilization 
strategies affect voters’ electoral preference both approaches are commonly used in 
evaluating political parties’ responsiveness and accountability. Both approaches see the 
interaction of voters and elected officials on the base of policy formulation. The 
relationship is shaped on the preferences of voters and parties that position themselves 
along cleavages or issue dimensions. Mostly deriving from the political development of 
Western democracies, responsiveness of the party to the voters is assured through the 
policies it formulates. In both approaches, voters evaluate the political parties not only 
through declared future but also past policies. 
Their main difference lies on their diverging perception of the factors that are 
thought to be decisive in explaining vote choice. Socio-psychological approaches link 
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voting decision to longer process of evaluations where positioning on long standing 
cleavages in the society and partisanship to a party explains voting preferences. 
Accordingly, vote choice is the product of long-term social and psychological 
attachments (Campbell 1960, Lipset & Rokkan 1967, Thomassen 1977, Lijphart 1979, 
Mair 1997, Bartolini 2002 Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu 2007)3. While some studies have 
focused on the role of party identification, others have highlighted the importance of 
social cleavages in shaping voters’ choices. According to these studies, individuals 
assess political parties and their policies through the party identities that they develop 
mostly at youth and which are shaped by the characteristics of the family and social 
environment in which they live in. The voters’ perceptions and preferences on political 
parties do not easily change across elections. The amount of party identification by the 
voter to a political party is positively correlated with his/her likelihood to vote for a 
party. This is why content or positions taken by parties during the electoral campaigning 
periods affect voters’ choice very poorly since these are mostly addressed to a partial 
audience that sees the debates between political parties from a partisan lens.  
Studies of programmatic mobilization based their assumptions on the researches 
of the spatial modeling evaluated by Downs (1957) and later developed by Hinich and 
Pollard (1981), Enelow and Hinich (1984), Hinich and Munger (1994). The importance 
of this model is that it provides explanation for both vote choice and party competition 
(Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, p: 165). Incorporating the model of Hotelling (1929) 
on firm competition to political science, Downs analyzed vote choice of utility 
maximizing individuals and competition of vote maximizing political parties on a 
single-issue space. According to Downs, each voter has a most preferred position in a 
single-issue space. Vote maximizing political parties take a certain position on this issue 
space. Accordingly, based on political parties declarations individuals decide which 
position is closer to their most preferred position by calculating the distance of their 
ideal position and the parties’ positions.  
Later, Hinich and Pollard (1981), Enelow and Hinich (1984), Hinich and Munger 
(1994) elaborate the model of Downs to have a more realistic depiction of the actual 
political context. According to them given the fact that the context of political 
competition is not based on a single issue but on multiple issues, there is an uncertainty 
                                               
3 There has been a great quantity of Study in the Turkish Context that implemented the Michigan model. 
Some examples are Ergüder (1980), Esmer (2001), Çarkoğlu & Toprak, (2000) 
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about both the voters’ positions and the political parties’ positions in the political space 
for all of the issues under observation. The authors suggest that, under uncertainty, 
political parties inform voters on their position under specific ideological dimensions 
through the programs they prepare.  On the other hand, instead of evaluating the 
political parties’ positions on each issue; by labeling them, voters position political 
parties on ideological dimensions. They position political parties on these ideological 
dimensions not only through political parties’ declaration but also past political 
behaviors. Then, the voters decide which party to vote depending on the importance 
they give to each of these dimensions, their saliency during the electoral campaigning 
period, their positions on these dimensions and their perceptions on the positioning of 
the political parties in these dimensions in order to overcome uncertainty about the 
political parties’ policies after they have been elected.  
Downs suggests that political parties will move in the issue space where they 
perceive the majority of the voters’ most preferred position are to be found (median 
voter theorem) (Hinich and Munger,1994, p: 35). Nevertheless, since voters perceive 
political parties through their ideological positioning from their previous policies, even 
if the political party changes its position it will not be able to convince all the voters in 
this position, since voters evaluate political parties’ positions through past policies 
(Hinich & Pollard, 1981). 
 
 
2.1.2- Particularistic Distribution of State Resources: Programmatic and 
Clientelistic Linkages 
 
 
 
The distribution of resources may be one dimension where political parties 
mobilize voters. In fact, a great number of studies put much effort into understanding 
whether political parties use state resources for electoral purposes. Most of these studies 
have identified the tactical distribution of resources by political parties for political 
ends. The literature on this subject is large which covers analysis of some western 
democracies such as US (Cox & McCubbins, 1986, Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987; Dixit 
and Londregan, 1996), Denmark, Austria (Denemark, 2000; Margit Tavits, 2009) 
Sweden (Dahlberg and Johanssen, 2002) as well as democratizing countries like Mexico 
(Molinar and Weldon, 1994; to Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast, 2000; Rocha-
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Menocal, 2001; Estéves, Magaloni & Diaz-Cayeros, 2001; Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 
2003; Diaz-Cayero, 2008), Argentina (Brusco V. et al, 2004; Calvo and Murillo, 2004; 
Weitz-Shapiro, 2006) Peru (Graham and Kane, 1998; Schady, 2000), Venezuela 
(Penfold-Becerra, 2007, Hawkins, 2010)  Albania (Case, 2001), Russia (Treisman, 
1996). Nevertheless, voters may evaluate political parties’ performance on the 
distribution of resources through different voter party linkages in which programmatic 
and clientelistic accountability are two distinct forms.  
Although the distribution of programmatic nature may be carried through policy 
formulation to all citizens or different groups in the society, they may also be 
implemented particularistically in the policy application realm. The mostly used kind of 
programmatic distribution in the literature is pork barrel defined as a particularistic form 
of distribution carried geographically in return for vote, or spending that is intended to 
benefit a geographic unit in return for political support. Within this respect, Pork-barrel 
benefit can easily be identified as distinct from ideological mobilization and as 
particularistic in character.  
A large literature indicates the particularistic distribution of resources 
clientelistically as a strategy commonly used by political parties in order to mobilize 
voters (Kaufman, 1974, Rosenstone & Hassen 1993, Auyero 2001, Kitschelt & 
Wilkinson 2007, Epstein, 2009). Diverging from early studies that perceived clientelist 
ties as a pre-modern phase that would disappear in the later stages of development 
(Duverger, 1966; Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco, 1988), recent studies have mentioned 
the existence of this kind of accountability in a large number of countries, including the 
advanced industrial democracies (Cornelius 2004, Stokes 2005, Schaffer 2007; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Gans-Morse at al 2009).  
Clientelistic mobilization is a more effective strategy than programmatic 
mobilization. The literature focusing on different strategies on the distribution of state 
resources perceive mobilization through programmatic distribution of state resources as 
a strategy containing a specific risk that political parties tries to overcome by the use of 
diverse mechanisms. Under programmatic exchanges through policy formulation or 
application political parties create beneficiaries or losers without verifying whether the 
winning group will deliver their votes. As a result, benefits are distributed to a large 
group where only an unknown fraction of this group will actually support the party. 
Thus, politicians enter in a non-contingent, indirect political exchange, which is 
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accompanied neither by monitoring nor by the knowledge on who will vote for them. 
Clientelistic exchange is a more safe investment since its benefits are tied to the 
delivery of political support in exchange for material benefits. Put it differently it is 
conditional. Under clientelistic distribution, the party distributes the benefits to smaller 
and identifiable groups of members who have delivered or promised to deliver their 
support in return for vote. Monitoring the voters’ conduct is an important aspect that 
differentiates clientelistic linkage from programmatic linkage. 
This study suggests that apart from its safety on electoral outcomes, clientelistic 
linkage provides political parties a certain amount of flexibility for positional changes in 
the ideological spectrum (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 852).  Since it creates a different linkage of 
accountability, which is based on the provision of the benefit, position changes will less 
translate into possible loss of votes. For example, Levitsky (2003) suggests that 
clientelistic linkage carried through flexible party organization was a advantage for the 
party in designing a radical reform package to overcome the economic crisis in 
Argentina.  Within this respect, although programmatic distribution is carried to larger 
groups, its effect on electoral outcome is less predictable. Although the outcome of 
clientelistic exchange is more predictable, its efficiency is based on the voter’s type and 
the party’s ability to assure compliance.   
Although scholars agree on the effectiveness of clientelistic vis-à-vis 
programmatic linkages, they greatly diverge in terms of deferentiating between the 
programmatic and clientelistic distribution of material resources. A considerable 
amount of scholars differentiates each distribution according to the types of goods a 
party has at its disposal for distribution. Scholars (Estéves, Magaloni & Diaz-Cayeros, 
2001; Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 2003; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Calvo and 
Murillo, 2010) classify the goods distributed by political parties under three broader 
umbrellas defined according to the amount of voters they target. These are public 
individual, and club goods. On the one extreme of the types of goods are public goods 
that are desired by everyone in the society and no one can be excluded from their 
benefits. Among these types of goods that cannot be used selectively, are economic 
growth, full employment, low inflation, clean environment etc.  On the other extreme lie 
individual goods with material or immaterial nature that can be selectively distributed to 
individuals.  Distribution of cash money, clothing, food, jobs, public houses, education 
benefits, social benefits, aid packages, grants, contracts may be defined under the 
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material types of individual goods (Cornelius 2004, Stokes 2005, Schaffer 2007, 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Gans-Morse at al 2009).  
On the other hand, Müller (2006) identifies the use of non-material types of 
goods. According to him, non-material goods that cover the know-how for dealing with 
authorities are used by political parties to assist people on the effectuation of 
bureaucratic advances such as how to apply for a grant, social assistance programs etc. 
In return, club goods provide benefit for a subset of citizens. Citizens outside 
some defined group boundaries can be excluded from the benefit of such goods.  It 
mostly takes the form of the procurement of social services such as school, hospital 
building or development of infrastructures such as roads, water or other services 
depending on the demands of the targeted community. The distribution of municipal 
budget by the state can also be included within these types of goods.  Within this 
respect, according to some authors, political parties will distribute public or club goods 
on programmatic ground since individual exclusion from these goods is not possible, 
while individual goods will be distributed on clientelistic ground (Estéves, Magaloni & 
Diaz-Cayeros, 2001; Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 2003).  
According to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), although the type of good may 
under some circumstances differentiates between different types of linkages, they are 
not the primary criterion since most of these goods may be distributed through either of 
these linkages. For example, public goods, by nature may, not be divisible and can only 
be distributed through programmatic linkages. On the other hand, although individual 
goods signal a certain amount of clientelistic distribution they may also be distributed 
on programmatic ground without the condition of electoral support. Similarly, club 
goods, which mostly consist one of the largest type of investment of governments, may 
either be distributed through programmatic or clientelistic linkage (p. 11).  
 Clientelistic linkage is defined by Kitschelt and Wilkinson as a particular mode 
of exchange that represent a transaction: “The direct exchange of citizens votes in return 
for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods and services”. Previous 
studies identified clientelism as a durable, face to face, hierarchical and asymmetrical 
exchange between patrons and clients.  (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Schmidt, 1977; 
Scott, 1972, Kaufman, 1974). According to Kaufman clientelism is a special type of 
dyadic exchange which is characterized by unequal power and status between actors, 
reciprocity- a self regulating exchange- and particularistic and private relationship. 
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Recent scholars argue that under democratic institutional settings, clientelism evolve 
into a more symmetric, intermittent, instrumental-rational and broker mediated 
exchange (p: 4). As a result, it is a hard to enforce contract between independent patrons 
and clients since each of them may more easily retreat from the bargain. Within this 
respect, clients or patrons may more easily retreat from the bargain. Furthermore, 
relations between the patron and the client is no more direct, but carried through brokers 
at different levels of the organizational structure (Szwarcberg, 2009).  Thus, modern 
clientelism requires specific conditions to be effective (Calvo & Murilo, 2010).  
Authors such as Stokes (2005), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) argue, other things 
being equal, what lies in the center of the decision of political parties to mobilize voters 
to programmatically or clientelistically is dependent on their ability to make voters 
comply. One defection of clientelistic linkage is the interdependency of its success on 
the condition that both voters and political parties keep their promises. However, either 
of them may renege from the deal after they receive the promised benefit. 
Yet, the conditionality of clientelistic linkage greatly diverges according to the 
perception on its nature. While one group of scholars, focus on the ad-hoc base of 
clientelism where only potential swing voters are targeted to increase support in the 
short-run, others define it as a long term strategy that has the objective to increase 
support on a longer period of time where different types of voters are also targeted. 
Separately, while some focus on the coercive nature of compliance (Stokes 2005 Brusco 
et al, 2004), others highlight its voluntary nature (Auyero, 2000; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 
2007). Each approach has a different perception of conditionality, which makes the 
definition of clientelistic linkage more difficult. Given the fact that each of these 
mechanisms can be used by political parties, this study prefers to differentiate it from 
programmatic linkage according to its discretionary and individual characteristics. It 
adopts a more thin definition of conditionality in which political parties formulate long-
term strategies where they target different types of voters and assure their compliance 
voluntarily.  Yet, as it will be evaluated in the next sections, this study also suggests that 
political parties will have a tendency to rely more on long-term strategies since it is 
more effective. The next sections evaluate each of these arguments. Since such a 
strategy requires identifying voters on an individual base, it necessitates a mechanism 
where political parties can directly contact the voters. As it will be discussed in the next 
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section, according to this dissertation strong party organizations provide such kind of a 
mechanism. 
 
 
2.1.3- Types of Voters Political Parties Target 
 
 
  This study defines the clientelistic network as consisting of a set of concentric 
circles where different types of voters have different access to goods and services and 
different degree of contact with the party brokers. Such a definition is also supported by 
existing studies that highilight the mobilization of different types of voters, core, swing 
and opposition through material distribution.  For considerable number of scholars, the 
decision of political parties on which strategy to rely more on is based on the 
predictability of the voters’ elasticity and on their compliance (Stokes 2005, Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson, 2007). Voters elasticity is identified as the degree which the clientelistic 
exchange affect the decision of voters to vote or not to vote for a political party 
(Kitschelt & Wilkinson, p. 12). One major source of elasticity is the political 
preferences of voters. The socio-economic status of an individual is defined as being 
important in the degree of voters’ elasticity. Under, low socio-economic status even a 
low amount of inducement would affect voter’s decision. As socio-economic status 
increases, the amount of inducement to affect voter’s decision will increase. So 
clientelistic distribution is expected to be carried to socio-economically lower status 
individuals (Kitschelt, 2000; Schady, 2000; Estéves et al, 2001; Penfold-Becerra’s, 
2007; Calvo & Murillo, 2010).    
Yet, studies mainly focus on another source of elasticity, which is related to the 
voters’ political preferences. Gary W. Cox and D. McCubbins (1986) identify three 
different types of voters: core, swing and opposition voters.  Support voters are the ones 
who have consistently supported the party and will support him in the future, swing 
voters are those who have neither consistently supportive nor consistently hostile to the 
party while opposition voters who have consistently opposed the party (p: 376). Other 
things being equal, a considerable number of studies suggest that political parties will 
target swing voters (Stokes, 2005; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, Diaz-Cayeros & 
Magaloni, 2003). According to these studies, Political parties will not enter in 
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clientelistic exchange if the voter will vote for them anyway, or the inducement is not 
effective enough to change a voter’s decision. Then, if political parties distribute 
inducement to core or opposition voters, it will probably waste its scarce resources. 
Such mobilization will be more effective on voters who are ideologically indifferent 
between competing parties. According to Kitschelt (2000) mobilization through the 
distribution of state resources is an important tool for political parties especially in the 
actual political context witnessing a decreasing trend in the importance of ideologies. 
Calvo and Murillo (2010) show how the difference in ideological proximity of the 
political parties differently affects the use of ideology or redistributive strategies by 
political parties to mobilize voters in Chile and Argentina.   A similar suggestion is 
cited by Stockes who proposes that as the ideological distance between political parties 
shrinks, the probability of vote buying increases (2005, p. 321).  
Nevertheless, some of these scholars have suggested the long-term perception of 
mobilization where opposition voters are also targeted to be turned into potential swing 
voters through the course of their interaction with the party activists (Auyero, 2001, 
Thachil, 2011; Cammett & Issar, 2010, Stockes, 2005). ) According to Auyero, the 
clientelistic network can be identified as a problem solving network which consist of a 
set of concentric circles around the broker, that have different access to goods and 
services and different degree of contact with the broker. Some studies illustrate 
circumstances where political parties distribute some of the resources also to opposition 
voters (Thachil, 2011; Cammett &Issar, 2010, Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, Sigelman 
2002, Penfold-Becerra’s, 2007, Hawkins, 2010). Other have indicated the attempts of 
political parties of avoiding the possibility to be blamed of favoring only their own 
supporters (Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, Sigelman 2002) or distribution for populist 
purposes to increase support in general  as rational of the parties to distribute resources 
to also opposition voters.    Michael Penfold-Becerra’s (2007) and Hawkins (2010) find 
in their studies the distribution of different types of good to different types of voter; 
core, swing and opposition for different purposes.  
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2.1.4- How Political Parties Control Compliance 
 
 
This dissertation suggests that how political parties assure voters’ compliance 
influences the effectiveness of the strategy since it affects the ability of the party to use 
both programmatic and clientelistic mobilization linkages at the same time. Szwarcberg 
(2009) differentiates between coercive and persuasive strategies. She defines a strategy 
coercive when the broker signals that failing to attend to a rally will imply being 
stripped from a promise and persuasive when she tries to convince voters to attend to a 
rally and do not monitor her actions. Within this respect, authors diverge on how 
clientelistic networks increase stability.  
Based on this distinction, while some focus on the coercive nature (Stokes 2005 
Brusco et al, 2004), others highlight the voluntary nature of the compliance (Auyero, 
2000; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). This study suggests that political parties will rely 
more on persuasive strategies since they are more effective in consolidating the votes 
for the party in the long run. This section will briefly evaluate each of the approaches 
and their effect on vote consolidation. Although the first strategy of monitoring is 
always costly, in the other its cost decreases over time.  Furthermore, the effect of each 
one is different on the relationship they developed between benefit and support.  In the 
first type, the support is instrumental and expected to decrease when benefit is not 
distributed. In the second type, support is more emmotional and may continue even 
when benefit is not distributed. On the other hand, the length and degree of the 
interaction of the party with the voters affect which strategy a political party will use. 
Scholars such as Auyero (2000) and Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007) focus on the 
voluntary compliance of the clientelistic exchange, which is based on the formation of 
common shared values in the long run. According to these authors, consolidation does 
not come from monitoring but voluntary compliance through the development of widely 
held cognitive expectations about the appropriate behavior (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 
2007, 18). Time of the interaction between the party and the voter is an important 
variable in understanding the development of the voluntary compliance.  According to 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), clientelism involves a complex web of relations where 
monitoring and enforcement are carried through an indirect and concealed fashion 
43 
 
where both patrons and clients do not explain the relation as the material distribution of 
scare goods but  as an enactment of community relations and civic solidarity (p. 19).  
Similarly, Auyero suggests that what is important is not only whether aid is 
provided or not but how this aid is provided. “What is being given (and received) and 
how it is being given (and received) are equally important elements in the operation of 
political clientelism” (Auyero, 2000, p. 175). According to Auyero, although the major 
aim for brokers is to gain votes in return to their help and for the voters it is to meet 
their needs by using their votes, this exchange is done indirectly. The political machine 
“fulfills the important social function of humanizing and personalizing all manner of 
assistance to those in need” (Merton 1949, p. 49 in Auyero, 2000, p. 175). “Trust, 
solidarity, hope for future, familiaristic orientation and reciprocity (see Roniger 1990, 
Güneş-Ayata 1994, Scott 1977) do exist in the relationship established between and 
verbalized by patrons, brokers and clients” (Auyero, 2000, p. 176). Within this respect, 
the importance of the mechanism does not derive from its ability to monitor voters on 
the short run but to create a common identity of shared values and increase party 
attachment in the long run. As the interaction is carried repeatedly, compliance 
continues voluntarily without any effort of control for both parties and voters.  Activists 
are perceived as people that sacrifices themselves for the behalf of people. (Auyero, 
127) Auyero suggests that “what appears from the outside as an exchange of votes for 
favors is seen by the inside in many different (and, sometimes, antagonistic) ways: as 
either manipulative or altruistic, as interested actions (politics, calculated exchange) or 
disinterested action (friendship).” (Auyero, 2000, p. 155-6). Within this respect not 
only instrumental but also emotional considerations shapes the linkage.   
Scholars like Stokes (2005), Brusco et al (2004) stress the importance of repeated 
action in the party’s ability to identify and punish cheaters. According to them, the 
consolidating effect of the repeated actions comes from the monitoring ability of the 
brokers by identifying voters’ past behavior. Political machines provide brokers with 
this kind of monitoring power. This suggestion derives from the basic observation that 
the party activists monitor voters’ behaviors. Thus, if political parties monitor voters, 
compliance should be coercive in nature. Political parties would not have to monitor 
voters in a transaction repeated over time if compliance was voluntarily assured. Brusco 
et al (2004) also give a similar suggestion, when they emphasize the stability of 
clientelism through its ability to effectuate direct monitoring on voters’ conduct. 
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According to the authors defending coercive mobilization, when the broker monitors the 
client, compliance increases as it creates a perception that the party can know his/her 
conduct and will punish him/her if he/she renege from the deal. Since voters believe 
they are being watched, they rarely disobey (Szwarcberg 2009, Stockes 2005, Brusco et 
al, 2004). It is this fear, not the actual capacity of the broker to monitor compliance that 
makes clientelistic exchange stable.  
If repeated interaction increases voluntary compliance, why political parties 
monitor voters’ past conduct even in long time repeated interactions where brokers have 
reputations? Szwarcberg (2012) suggests that monitoring may not be carried to threaten 
people, but to have an objective evaluation on voters’ types and needs so to more 
specifically decide how different types of resources will be distributed to different types 
of voters. Within this respect, despite compliance may not be coercive in nature, 
monitoring may be applied so as to evaluate different levels of support to the party, 
enabling the party to make more specific targeting.  
The effectiveness of voluntary compliance through the clientelistic network is not 
only on its diminishing effect on monitoring cost but also its ability to increase the 
effectiveness of programmatic mobilization, party attachment, or even party 
identification in the long run. Within this respect, the success of clientelistic exchange 
in consolidating votes does not derive from its instrumental character, the distribution of 
resources to meet the needs of voters, but its emmotional character, increasing 
attachment to the party through the formation of common values.  
Assuring compliance through the formation of common shared values may also 
enable a political party to ideologically mobilize voters, since it creates positive 
connotation with the party. Under circumstances where voters evaluate shared values 
with the party activists they will be more inclined on the accuracy of the given 
messages. Such a situation is not expected to develop under coercive compliance since 
the relationship is built upon negative connotations such as fear and punishment. Within 
this respect, clientelistic mobilization through the local organizations may be an 
effective strategy for political parties to turn ideologically swing voters into core 
supporters or opposition voters into swings. In fact, some studies have illustrated how 
this kind of positive connotations through clientelistic exchange may change the 
perception of opposition voters on the party in the long run (Thachil, 2011; Cammett 
&Issar, 2010). In the implementation of such a strategy by the party may give flexibility 
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to change its position in any salient programmatic dimensions to mobilize other voters 
without loosening its support among clientelistically mobilized voters. 
Szwarcberg (2009) argues that political parties use both types of compliance to 
mobilize voters. She suggests that the decision of a broker’s to use either coercive or 
persuasive compliance is influenced by the repeated character of the interactions. What 
differentiates between the two strategies is the reputation of the broker in delivering the 
goods and the voter to deliver his/her vote. When the broker and the voter have enough 
reputation, he/she no more has to threaten and punish voters. Since reputation is built 
over the number of the interaction, then, the sequence in which broker mobilize voters 
is effective in explaining which strategy a broker will use. Which strategy a party will 
use is based on the mechanism through which the party contacts the voters. The nature 
of the mechanism will condition which type of voter it will target and how it will assure 
compliance.  
 
 
2.6- Strategies to Identify and Monitor Voters: The Role of Party Organizations 
 
 
There is evidence in the literature that parties use both programmatic and 
clientelistic linkages in order to mobilize voters and prefer to apply a portfolio 
diversification where both mobilization strategies is used (Kitschelt 2000, Estéves,  
Magaloni & Diaz-Cayeros, 2001; Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 2003; Alberto Diaz-
Cayero, 2008,  Calvo and Murillo 2010). Yet, clientelistic mobilization necessitates the 
party to directly contact the voters on a repetitive course of interaction to individually 
indentify their type and increase trust. This study suggest that the presence of 
mechanism to overcome the lack of information, gets informed on the voters’ elasticity, 
predicts their conduct and ensures compliance is important in shaping a political parties 
decision on which strategy it will rely more on when mobilizing voters.  
Auyero (2001) suggests that for a clientelist exchange to be strong, access to 
information on the needs, demands and preferences of the voters is a necessity. Yet 
given the fact that most political settings are information scare on voters’ preferences 
and conduct, political parties may not always acquire the necessary information. Since 
mobilization is costly and parties are constrained in terms of the resources at their 
disposal, they would probably rely on certain mechanisms to overcome the lack of 
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information and ensure compliance. (Calvo & Murillo, 2010). In the absence of such a 
mechanism, political parties would rely more on programmatic linkage strategies in a 
hope to attract as more voters as possible.  
The literature states two different mechanisms used by political parties to 
overcome the lack of information: the electoral results that and the party organization 
provide opportunity to predict voters’ compliance. With this respect, this study suggests 
that among these two strategies the party organization is the most effective mechanism 
not only in preventing the political parties to waste their scarce resources through 
enabling specific targeting at a very individual level, assuring compliance but also 
consolidating on voters’ preferences in the long run. Furthermore, even under 
circumstances where it is mainly been established for clientelistic purposes, the party 
organizations may successfully be used by political parties to mobilize voters on 
programmatic ground, increase party attachment and identification in the long run.   
 
 
2.2.1- Electoral Results and their Effect on Mobilization of Voters 
 
 
According to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), at a minimum, only when the 
predictability of the voter’s conduct is high, political parties will prefer clientelistic 
mobilization, in contrast when predictability is low they will rely more on the 
programmatic distribution of resources to larger groups. One option to indentify voters 
elasticity and predict compliance is to use electoral results so as to focus on certain 
regions in order to target voters that have the potential to support them (Bartolini 2002: 
93; Karp and Banducci 2007: 218). Within this respect, Weitz-Shapiro suggests that 
geographical targeting may be a useful strategy for parties that have restricted access to 
the voters by other means. Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2003) who assert that 
geographical characteristics may solve the commitment problem also develop a similar 
suggestion.  Within this respect, some studies have identified the use of geographical 
indicators to be effective in political parties’ strategies.  These studies have found that 
the party’s mobilization strategy change according to the trends in the electoral support 
for political parties and socio-economic indicators of electoral regions.  
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Within this respect, a considerable amount of studies argues that political parties 
concentrate their efforts in electoral regions with low socio-economic indicators 
(Schady, 2000; Estéves et al, 2001; Penfold-Becerra’s, 2007; Calvo & Murillo, 2010).  
On the other hand, others have found that political parties target swing districts (Anne 
Case, 2001, Denemark, 2000, Rocha-Menocal, 2001, Margit Tavits, 2009; Graham and 
Kane, 1998; Schady, 2000; Molinar and Weldon, 1994; Diaz-Cayero, 2008). Albeit, the 
studies have different conclusions on which type of voters political parties target, for the 
purpose of this section, their importance derives from their findings that electoral 
characteristics are influential in political parties’ decision on who to target. These 
studies have used different electoral characteristics to understand the political parties 
strategies.  Examples for these kinds of studies are vast in the literature. Relating the 
distribution of resources to the vote shares an incumbent receives in a geographical unit 
in an election; scholars like Anne Case (2001), Denemark (2000), Rocha-Menocal 
(2001), Margit Tavits (2009) have found a relationship between the amount of the 
electoral competition in resource distribution. On the other hand, studies of scholars 
such as Graham and Kane (1998), Schady (2000), Molinar and Weldon (1994), Diaz-
Cayero (2008) indicates a relationship between the volatility in vote shares of the party 
across elections and distribution of resources.  Estéves et al (2001), Alberto 
Diaz-Cayeros and Beatriz Magaloni (2003), Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast 
(2000) argues that a risk-adverse incumbent will prefer to rely to more on clientelistic 
exchange focusing on the inducement of private or club goods to consolidate its votes 
since it is a less risky strategy. But, unless incumbents are completely safe and there 
exists an electoral competition, the incumbents will diversify their portfolio to include 
programmatic mobilization in order to increase their vote shares (p.6). They conclude 
that incumbents rely more in clientelistic distribution in districts dominated by poverty 
and have a low level of competition and high loyalty to the party. As poverty, margins 
of victory and the size of core voters’ decrease politicians rely more on programmatic 
distribution.   
These studies confirm the presence of a relationship between electoral 
characteristics and political parties’ strategies. Yet, the distribution of resources through 
electoral characteristics is based on the effectuation of rewarding and punishing on a 
geographical base according to the electoral results. Within this respect, political parties 
distribute resources based on a probabilistic calculation of the voter’s type according to 
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the electoral results of the region the voters reside.  They do not individually identify 
specific types of voters. As a result, there is still a high probability to make inefficient 
targeting especially under circumstances where competition is high. Although political 
parties try to overcome this problem by mobilizing clientelistically only core 
geographical units, there is still the probability that a party distribute resource to an 
opposition voter in this unit.  Furthermore, political parties cannot differentiate between 
core districts that support the party on ideological or materialist grounds.  Then they 
have the probability to use their resources ineffectively. As a result, mobilization 
strategy through the use of geographical characteristics seems still to be an inefficient 
strategy for political parties, especially when compared with the effectiveness of 
distribution through the clientelistic network deeply penetrated in the society.  
 
 
2.2.2- Strong Party Organization and Effective Mobilization of Voters 
 
 
The study suggests that strong party organization provides a suitable mechanism 
for the party to increase the effectiveness of its mobilization strategy. Scholars 
analyzing the mobilization of voters through clientelistic exchange emphasize the role 
of strong party organizations in providing the necessary mechanism for indentifying 
different types of voters and monitoring their conduct (Auyero, 2001; Kitschelt, 2000; 
Kirschelt and Wilkinson, 2005; Stokes, 2007). Calvo and Murillo (2010) focus on the 
importance of size and structure of the local organizations in understanding the 
effectiveness of the clientelistic linkage. Within this respect, the effectiveness and use 
of clientelistic exchange is tied to strength of prior partisan linkages to the 
constituencies (Calvo & Murillo, 2004).  
According to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2005), the organizational structures which 
organize upon very low geographical units such as neighborhoods enable individual 
targeting. A similar suggestion is given by Stokes (2007, p. 324) when she asserts that 
political machines and clientelistic parties are effective to the extent they insert 
themselves into the social network of the constituents. When they are deeply penetrated 
into the society, they do not only distribute resources but also consolidate support for 
the party in the long run. Its effectiveness derives from the fact that mobilization is 
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conducted a very local level at by known people on repeated course of interaction and 
through a large number of activists having close coordination. Within this respect, two 
characteristics of a strong party organization contribute to the effectiveness of the 
mobilization strategy. The first one concerns the quality of the relationship it creates 
with the voters: the level through which it makes the contact and its intensity.  Deeper 
rooted the party organization into the society greater will be its capacity to deal with the 
information problem, identify different types of voters and specifically target them. 
Even more important, this dissertation suggests that what makes the clientelistic 
exchange through a strong party organization a stable strategy is not its effect in 
increasing the party’s ability to monitor voters conduct but in the creation of a system of 
shared values, that promotes voluntary compliance and attachment with the party.  The 
second contribution concerns the internal functioning of the party in terms of its breath: 
the number of activists and the degree of coordination between them that assure 
information flow.  The number of activists and mechanism of information flow among 
them increase the number of identified voters. Within this respect, higher will be the 
number of the activists, greater will be the channels of information between them higher 
will be the scope of the consolidated clientelistic linkage. This section will briefly 
evaluate the effect of the later two characteristics of the party organization in identifying 
different types of voters and assure compliance .  
 
 
2.2.3- Level and Intensity of the Interaction and Effective Mobilization 
 
 
It has been suggested that clientelistic mobilization is more effective when it is 
carried on a long-term base and through voluntary compliance.  Scholars mostly focus 
on the repeated character of the personal connection between the parties and the voters 
in explaining the increasing ability of political parties to identify different types of 
voters and building trust. 
 This study suggests that strong party organization provides a political party the 
opportunity to increase the clientelistic network by decreasing the costs of identification 
and enhancing repetitiveness of the interaction by conducting mobilization through 
known people sharing the same social environment.  As member of the same social 
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environment, activists have the chance to observe voters they know during daily social 
interactions. A party activist will probably get more informed on the needs, electoral 
preferences or past electoral behavior of someone he/she regularly contacts than a 
person who he meets only once. Stockes (2005, p: 317-8) suggests that political 
machines are good at gathering information about the voters’ actions and types. They 
successfully identify voters’ actions- which party they vote for, their type – their 
partisan predispositions, discern their need and deliver it efficiently. They can also 
detect which party the voters have supported in the elections, enabling them to control 
compliance.  So parties can distinguish more easily between those who oppose the party 
strongly, moderately and who are loyalist or indifferent to the party. This would enable 
them to target people more efficiently or prevent them to waste their resources. With 
this kind of information, local branches would be able to detect ideologically core or 
swing voters and mobilize each of them selectively, through ideological or economic 
means, depending on their diverging preferences and their types. Similarly, they will 
also be able to discern voters that are sensitive to material benefits from opposition 
voters that would not vote for the party anyway. This provides the political parties to 
opportunity to concentrate on mobilizing through clientelistic accountability only to 
voters that are elastic. Then contacting through the local organization would enable the 
party make specific targeting and prevent political parties to waste their resource and 
time.  
Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007) argue that political parties mostly rely on group 
monitoring so as to facilitate the provision of information. Within this respect, 
mobilization by people from the same social environment is argued to decrease the cost 
of identification and persuasion. Kitschelt & Wilkinson suggests that incorporation of 
the members of different groups dominant into the society will increase the party’s 
capabilities to identify voters and increase compliance. At the local level, contacting 
and mobilization is expected to be more influential when activists are members of the 
sub-groups the party intends to mobilize. This study suggests that the characteristics of 
the activists at the local level are vital in understanding mobilization efforts. These 
characteristics have two important functions. First, it decreases the cost of acquiring 
information for the party. Second, it increases the persuasiveness of the promises and 
messages given to the voters. As a result, both parties and voters tend to be more 
confident on the party’s reputation to keep its promise on a shorter period of time. 
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Within, this respect, the formation of the voter/party linkage through known activists 
decrease the length of the contact required to identify different types of voters and form 
voluntary compliance.   
The characteristics of the person who initiates the contact - i.e. party volunteer 
versus someone in individual’s social network also affect the power of the activists to 
persuade voters (Çarkoğlu, 2010, p.10). Specifically, individuals may be more inclined 
to be persuaded if they are contacted via someone they know.  Mobilization will 
probably be more influential when the voter is contacted by a person with the same 
socio-economic status, a known person, a neighbor, a relative or a friend. While direct 
contacts by the party via a stranger who knocks on the person’s door may be less 
effective, indirect contacts in social and political networks by known individuals 
sharing the same ethnic identity, close friends or family should be more effective in 
developing trust. For clientelistic exchange, it increases the reputation of the activist or 
party in keeping the promises.  A considerable number of studies analyzed how social 
networks affect voters choice, is more effective in persuading people and increasing the 
reach of the organization (Wilson and Orum, 1979; Snow, Zurcher & Olson 1980, 
Knoke & Wood, 1981; Ferree & Miller, 1985).   In fact, Stokes suggests that when 
parties not integrated into the social networks try to buy vote via private inducement 
voters evaluates their efforts with skepticism, decreasing its effect on vote direction 
(2005, p. 318). Similar observations have also been found in studies analyzing the effect 
of party canvassing in persuading voters (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Frendeis et al, 
1990; Coleman, 1996; Hill and Leighley, 1993; Beck, at al, 1997). 
Furthermore, the strong party organization does not only increase the 
effectiveness of clientelistic exchange, studies explaining vote choice provide valuable 
information on how the nature of long-term voter/party linkage and functions of local 
organizations would affect programmatic mobilization.  For them, the role of the party 
organization in increasing party identification is decisive (Duverger, 1966; Panebianco, 
1988; Mair, 1997; Bartolini, 2002).  According to Panebianco (1988, p. 208) the party 
organization played a crucial role in explaining why electoral divisions were frozen for 
a relatively long period in Europe. Whiteley and Seyd (1994, p. 251) suggest that, party 
identification is dependent on the role of local party organizations and activist. Then, 
political parties will have a tendency to mobilize swing voters clientelistically through 
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the clientelistic network with persuasive strategies, but the party’s ability to do so is 
influenced by the level and intensity of the interaction.     
 
 
2.2.4- Breath and Coordination of the Organization and Effective Mobilization 
 
 
The second contribution of a strong party organization is related to the functioning 
of its internal organizational structure in terms of number of activists and the 
mechanisms of interaction between them.  The number of activists and mechanism of 
information flow among them increase the number of identified voters. Within this 
respect, the higher will be the number of the activists, the greater will be the channels of 
information between them, and the higher will be the scope of the consolidated 
clientelistic linkage. High number of activists functioning in the system certainly 
increases the scope of the mobilization through repeated interaction but coordination 
between these activists is more important in increasing its efficiency. Given the fact that 
party organizations function at different levels of geographical organization, 
cooperation for information flow becomes a necessity to assure the permanency of the 
formed linkages and distribution of the resources at different levels. In its absence, 
continuity of the linkage will be very sensitive to activists’ changes or especially under 
circumstances where resources are extracted at the higher levels of the organizational 
structure provision of the promised benefit will certainly be more difficult.    
Kaufman suggests that clientelistic systems are based on the ability of the leaders 
to control the resources and their capacity to use these resources on face-to-face 
exchanges with their clients. According to Kitschelt (2000) modern clientelism is 
different in performing this function than the traditional clientelism based on face to 
face relations between patrons and clients. The main difference between the two is the 
large-scale character of the latter one.  In this new form of clientelism, regulation of the 
material resources is a very complex one where on one hand, the level which the 
patrons access to resources and distribute them are different and on the other the 
number of clients are too many for the patron to effectuate directly face to face contact 
with them. Large-scale clientelism represents a network, which is characterized by a 
personal relationship between the patron and the brokers on one hand and the brokers 
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and the clients on the other. The broker has no resources but get resources from the 
patron that he/she distributes to the clients. The relationship in a party organization can 
cover different levels resulting in a hierarchical network system based on geographical 
units (Jansen, 2006; Muno, 2010, Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Kaufman indicates 
two types of large-scale clientelistic relations: clientelistic clusters and clientelistic 
pyramid. While he defines the first as structures where many clients attach themselves 
to one leader, the second are formed when the leaders of various patron/client clusters 
establish clients themselves with still higher-level status. It is this type of organization 
that makes possible clientelism to be carried on large scale (1974, p. 291).  
One problem of large-scale clientelism is to assure the circulation of information 
and goods among different level. To solve this problem political parties need 
mechanisms where they can effectively distribute these resources and circulate 
information at different levels. Kitschelt (2000, p. 849) argues that clientelistic parties 
have mostly solved the complexity of material resources flow by heavily investing on 
administrative infrastructures of multi-level political machines that functions from the 
national unit to the most local geographical unit of the organizational structure through 
intense network of interaction. 
On the other hand, the complexity of the clientelistic exchange creates a second 
problem for the political parties: to prevent inefficiency in identifying voters and to 
assure the continuity of the linkage at the lowest level of the organizational structure. 
Although existing studies mostly relies on the direct relationship between the broker 
and the client in understanding the efficiency of the clientelistic linkage, the presence of 
a mechanism that assures intra or inter-level information flow on the types and 
compliance of the voters is also important in understanding efficiency by decreasing the 
cost in maintaining and enlarging the network.  Recall that the stability of the linkage is 
based on the repeated nature of the interaction. Thus, continuity of the interaction is an 
important aspect. The stability of a network created through the interaction with a voter 
through only one individual activist is very sensitive to the circulation of activist within 
the party. By creating spaces where activists and voters interact regularly, the personal 
relationship between an individual activist and a voter transforms into a relationship 
between the party and the voter. Furthermore, functioning through large number of 
activists increases the probability of different activists to contact the same voter. Such a 
situation will decrease efficiency since each activist will independently try to identify 
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the voter. The presence of a space where activists share the information they acquire 
will decrease the possibility of such inefficiency.  
Let me identify the problem with a concrete example. Suppose that a voter 
support a party through a stable relationship he/she has developed with one activist and 
know no one else.  He/she will probably stop supporting the party if the relationship 
disappears because of either the removal of the activist from his/her position or his/her 
promotion to another position.  Now suppose that another activist also contacts or 
knows this same voter. After identifying him/her as swing, she also try to assures her 
support by providing her benefit. In either of the cases, the efficiency of the 
mobilization will decrease.    
A strong party organization with high number of activists and intense 
coordination mechanisms will increase the efficiency of the mobilization by assuring 
the information flow on both demands and types of voters and transforming the personal  
attachment of the voters with the activist into a more general attachment to the party.   
 
 
2.7- Ethnic Mobilization and Diverging Support for Political Parties 
 
 
The study argues that members of an ethnic group are rational actors that decide 
on which party to vote depending on evaluating political parties’ performance through 
either programmatic or clientelistic linkages. Through which linkage he/she will 
evaluate the party’s performance is related to whether he/she is incorporated into the 
clientelistic network of the party.  Recall that the breath of the network is a function of 
the strength of the party organization.  Nevertheless, strong party organization may not 
be a sufficient condition to incorporate voters of a distinct ethnic group through 
clientelistics network. The study suggests that dynamics will induce political parties to 
mobilize voters from an ethnic group through co-ethnics that members of the social 
network: high ethnic consciousness, weak inter-community relations and potential for 
violence.   
 
 
 
55 
 
2.3.1- Ethnic Consciousness and Support for Political Parties 
 
 
Studies on the rise of ethnic consciousness have analyzed the issue from two 
different perceptive. The first attempts to explain the rise of ethnic demands in a certain 
geographical unit mostly focused on the cultural dimension and interpret the rise of 
ethnic consciousness as the result of the failure of modernization and the state building 
process (Deutsch 1954; Gellner 1964; Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Horowitz). According 
to the first perception, the formation of ethnic parties is related to persistence of the 
center-periphery cleavage even after the nation building process due to inability of the 
center to penetrate in regions that have distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics.  Due 
to the heavy concentration of the counter-culture in a region, organized resistance 
develops to the penetrating attempts of the center. The failure of state penetration and 
integration process results in the persistence of a distinct ethnic consciousness in the 
specific region having different values, cultures and opposing to the dominant value 
system constructed by the nation state.   
Yet, other approaches, which our study is built upon, perceive the rise of ethnic 
consciousness in function of the rising competition between different ethnic groups on 
the distribution of material resources.  They evaluate ethnic identity as a constructed 
concept where people choose to identify on ethnic grounds as an alternative to other 
possible identities (Hechter, 1978, Nielson, 1985, p. 135; Schildkraut, 2005). According 
to these approaches, the persistence of the center-periphery cleavage does not result 
from the failure but from the success of the modernization process itself. It is the 
competition on the distribution of resources between citizens during the modernization 
process that politicize ethnic identities.  In fact, there is a large literature examining how 
competition over the resources between different ethnic groups increases ethnic 
consciousness and affect conflict in different states around the world (Michael  Hechter, 
1978; Liefer, 1981, Nielson; 1985, Michael Hechter & Margaret Levi, 1994, Olzak 
1983, Yavuz, 1998; Cornell 2001 ; Kirişçi &  Winrow, 2008, Cohen, 1974, Hannan, 
1979, Despres, 1975, Fearon, 1999; Gallego, 2012, Otite, 1975, Skinner, 1975, Despres, 
1975).  
Within this respect, citizens’ decision to organize on ethnic lines should be 
understood within the attempt of members of an ethnic group to solve the collective 
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action dilemma to have better access to the material resources inherited not only in 
clientelistic exchanges but also programmatic ones (Olson, 1965). As a specific type of 
resource distribution, clientelistic linkage also motivates voters to increase their power 
of punishing a political party if it reneges from the deal. 
The study suggests that the relationship of ethnic consciousness and the increase 
in electoral support for ethnic parties has a complex nature and should not be evaluated 
as a direct function of the rise in ethnic consciousness. Saliency of ethnic identity and 
support for ethnic parties are two distinct processes. Although, homogeneity in terms of 
cultural traits, high social network, geographical concentration, labor segregation is 
highlighted to increase competition for the scarce resources on ethnic grounds, the main 
factor affecting a voter’s decision to switch its votes to an ethnic party should not be 
evaluated as an automatic process.  Decision on which party to vote may be an easy 
decision for partisan supporters, for swing voters the nature of the decision making 
process may be quite complex.  
 Recall that any given swing voter is faced with two kinds of accountability. First, 
he/she can evaluate the performance of a multi-ethnic party on programmatic ground 
through the policies it formulates and implements. Studies explaining the rise of ethnic 
parties mentions the inability of multi-ethnic political parties to meet the demands of 
ethnic group as the major cause for the rise of ethnic parties (Horowitz, 2000; Chandra, 
2004, 2010; Michael  Hechter, 1978; Hetcher and levy 1985: 141; Michael Hechter & 
Margaret Levi, 1994,  De Winter 1998: 216). Within this respect, the voter will decide 
which party to vote based on his position on the salient dimensions and perceived 
positions of competing parties. Under this evaluation, the saliency of each dimension 
and the changing positions of political parties on these dimensions will be decisive in 
explaining vote changes across elections. On the other hand, the voter may evaluate the 
performance of the party through clientelistic accountability.  
The study suggests that the decision to evaluate a political party by either of these 
linkages is based on the voter’s perceived distance to the clientelistic network. If the 
voter is incorporated into the clientelistic network of a multi-ethnic party, his/her 
probability to switch his/her vote for an ethnic party will decrease even if his/her ethnic 
consciousness is high. High ethnic consciousness will more rapidly translate into ethnic 
support when the voter does perceive his/her distance to be far from the network.  
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2.3.2- Group Characteristics and Ethnic Mobilization: 
 
 
Recall that the use of a clientelistic exchange by a political party is based on two 
conditions. It necessitates the ability to identify different types of voters and monitor 
voters compliance.  From the point of view of a multi-ethnic political party that has the 
objective to mobilize voters, the presence of a mechanism through which it can identify 
these voters is an important condition affecting its responsiveness on the diverse 
demands of the ethnic group in concern and control their compliance. At the local level, 
the effectiveness of a mobilization strategy to identify different types of voters among 
the members of the group and get informed on their basic needs is based on the 
formation of communication channels through which information is extracted. Recall 
that party organizations were more successful to reach and persuade voters when they 
infiltrated into the existing social networks in the society.  
Group monitoring may take different forms. The form it will take mostly depends 
on the characteristics of the existing groups in the society. Ethnic identification among 
various possible identities is especially expected to be used by political parties in 
heterogeneous societies where ethnic consciousness is high (Bates, 1983; Fearon & 
Laidin, 1996; Fearon, 1999; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Chandra, 2004). Within this 
respect, political parties are expected to incorporate co-ethnics within the clientelistic 
network to decrease the cost of indentifying different types of voters and assure their 
compliance.  
  Why political parties, decide to use ethnic markers in order to monitor groups? 
Ethnic groups constitute one of these social networks especially when ethno-cultural 
social separation in terms of area of residence, physical appearance, social networks or 
labor market segmentation facilitates organization on ethnic grounds (Hetcher, 1975; 
Bates, 1983; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2005,).  Then, the greater is the group’s 
homogeneity in terms of cultural traits, the denser is its social networks, the higher they 
are geographically concentrated and the greater is the market segmentation; the higher 
is the probability of both political parties and voters to politicize on ethnic grounds. 
Mobilization of members of an ethnic group through activists outside the group will be 
less effective under these circumstances since cost of identifying voters and assure 
repeated actions to increasing voluntary compliance will be low. 
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One rational of this suggestion is that mobilization through ethnic markers 
decreases information costs for both voters and political parties especially where co-
ethnics organize in ethnic ground through dense social networks (Kitchelt and 
Wilkinson, 2007). Authors such as Hetcher (1975, 1978),  Leifer (1981), Bates (1983), 
Levi and Hetcher (1985) suggest that the formation of collective organizations in order 
to solve the collective action dilemma necessitates certain conditions through which 
voters can organize: a common goal, certain degree of relations etc. According to 
Hetcher (1978), the rise of ethnic consciousness in competition for resources should be 
understood in relation the presence of a distinct identity and dense social networks that 
increase interaction. A similar suggestion is given by Bates (1983) who highlights the 
importance of geographical concentration and similar linguistic and cultural traits in 
organizing on ethnic grounds.  According to authors such as Ragin (1979), Hanan 
(1979), Despress (1967), Nielson (1978), Olzak (1982) ethnic resurgence occurs when 
cultural division of labor breakdowns, inequalities between different ethnic groups 
diminishes. Under such circumstances, organization on ethnic grounds is adopted so as 
to more effectively compete with members from different ethnicities for the same 
resource.   
For political parties social networks provide readily usable channels through 
which voters can be identified, requests transmitted and benefits distributed (Chandra, 
2004, p. 71). Members of the same ethnic group tend to interact more frequently with 
one another than with outsiders and get more easily informed on each other’s conduct. 
This, in return, decreases the cost of building trust and reputation between political 
parties and voters necessary for a more effective clientelistic linkage. According to 
Fearon and Laitin (1996) ethnic groups are marked by highly developed systems of 
social networks that allows cheap and rapid transmission of information about 
individuals and their past histories (p. 718). According to Kitschelt (2000,p. 865) 
ethno-cultural social separation in terms of area of residence, physical appearance, 
social networks or labor market segmentation facilitates the contracting, monitoring and 
enforcing of clientelistics exchange between the co-ethnic brokers and the voters.  On 
the other hand, Fearon (1996) suggests that, the decision of a political party to distribute 
resources on ethnic ground is the result of its desire to limit the size of the winning 
coalition. Since ethnic identity is not easily chosen and changed, political parties will 
limit the probability of free riders to benefit from the reward.  
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Chandra (2004) suggests that the presence of social networks is not a necessity for 
voters to organize and political parties to mobilize on ethnic grounds.  In an 
environment of limited information ethnic identity, which is easily detectable, serve as a 
costless information mechanism through which people easily identify each other. Given 
the fact that voters evaluate parties’ promises through past records of transaction, ethnic 
classification would be an effective strategy for distinguishing between multiple 
individual transactions in an environment of information constraint (p. 54-58). As 
costless information, easily identifiable by appearance, ethnic markers become the main 
criteria through which people evaluate the beneficiaries of past transactions. According 
to the author, it is this costless information, at first place, that orient people to form 
social networks on ethnic grounds. Thus, the main cause in the rise of ethnic 
identification is the costless information it provides for members of an ethnic group in 
classifying people. Then, performing clientelistic exchange through ethnic identity 
provides a ground for evaluating the sincerity of the promises of the political parties on 
the distribution of benefits. 
Given the fact that voters are biased toward the distribution of benefits on ethnic 
categorization, political parties will favor co-ethnics for the distribution of resources as 
way of signaling and persuading the voters that their interest will be met by the party (p. 
56,67).  The presence of a co-ethnic within a party’s rank will persuade voters on the 
sincerity of the messages of the party. Then, when co-ethnics are not represented into 
the party, even if the party promises benefits to the members, these promises will 
simply not be credible for out-groups (Fearon, 1999). Scholars like Shaw et al (2000) 
and Michelson (2003) suggest that mobilization by co-ethnics is also more effective for 
programmatic mobilization  since voters are more easily persuaded on the sincerity of 
the political parties messages when informed co-ethnics. 
 
 
2.3.3- Inter-group Relations, Potential for Violence and Ethnic Mobilization 
 
 
This study suggests that the nature of inter-group relations is also important in 
understanding the effectiveness of mobilization through co-ethnics (Fearon & Laitin, 
1996).  Especially, in political context where inter-group relations are low or 
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nonexistent successful mobilization can be attained through the incorporation of co-
ethnic within the party’s ranks. Furthermore, when ethnic movements have potential for 
violence, infiltrating into the daily networks through co-ethnics may be the only 
available tool for political parties to mobilize ethnic voters in a shorter run. This section 
will be a detailed evaluation of these arguments in the light of the existing studies on the 
issue.    
Scholars (Chandra, 2004; Kitschelt &Wilkinson, 2007) argue that incorporation of 
the co-ethnic within the party is especially important in mobilizing ethnic groups in 
macro level political settings where party organizations are weak. On the other hand, 
incorporation of ethnics may not be a necessity in micro level political settings since 
they are information rich where people develop face-to-face relations, know each other 
personally and engage in repeated transactions (Chandra, 2004, p: 67-68).  
Yet, it is suggested in this study that the way the inter-group relations are shaped, 
in-group and out-group boundaries are set, greatly affects the ability of the members of 
a party to reach voters from different ethnic origins even in micro level political 
settings. Under conditions where inter-group relations are nonexistent or conflictual, 
identification and monitoring may not be possible through activists from different ethnic 
groups, making it difficult to apply specific targeting and assure voluntary compliance 
at the individual level even in the presence of a strong party organization. According to 
Fearon & Laitin (1996) mobilization through co-ethnics will be more effective even 
under the absence of social networks. Knowledge of cultural habits and signs of their 
own ethnic groups will facilitate the co-ethnic activists to identity the disposition of 
his/her co-ethnic than an activist outside the group.  
Furthermore, when the group boundaries are sharply defined, politicians would 
compete for supporters only from their groups rather than across groups (Kitschelt, 
2000), leaving members of the other ethnic group outside of the network. This 
dissertation argues that a political party may decide to mobilize these ethnic groups via 
its existing activists, but such a strategy would necessitate great efforts in term 
resources and time. Building trust through repeated actions would take time when 
relations are irregular and infrequent. Furthermore, according to Fearon & Laitin (1996) 
such a tendency is expected to apply when some of the members of a different ethnic 
group comprise of opportunistic voters that have the potential to renege from the deal. 
Under such circumstances, party members from the other ethnic group will have a 
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tendency to evaluate all the voters of the other ethnic group as opportunistic and would 
be reluctant to mobilize them. The result would be the exclusion of the members of the 
ethnic group from the benefits regardless of their type.   
Recall that for Chandra mobilization through co-ethnics may be effective even 
when dense social network are nonexistent since political parties would signal the 
voters that they will be rewarded through publicly declaring the presence of co-ethnics 
functioning in the party. Under such circumstance, the party activists and voters from 
the same ethnic-group do not have to personally know each other. Yet, the study 
suggests that when there is potential for violence in the ethnic group, the public 
mobilization by unknown members may become harder. The potential for violence may 
create fear among activists and voters increasing their reluctance to expose themselves 
publicly. Under these circumstances, identification may only be conducted in more 
private settings where activists and voters know each other through regular interaction.  
Yet, in the nonexistence of inter-group relations, the mobilization of voters from one 
ethnic group through activists from another ethnic group will be ineffective.    Under 
such circumstances, mobilization through co-ethnics that are members of the ethnic 
social networks and known by the group may become the only strategy for the party to 
incorporate the members of an ethnic group into the network since these social networks 
provide the necessary private setting to identify the type of the voter.   
Based on these suggestions, this study argues that if a political party decides to 
mobilize swing members of an ethnic group, mobilization would be more effective in 
the short run when conducted by co-ethnics especially under circumstances where 
ethnic consciousness is high and inter-group relations are absent. When the party 
mobilizes voters by infiltrating in their daily activities through the social networks, its 
effectiveness is expected to be even higher. Furthermore, when ethnic consciousness is 
accompanied by potential for violence, mobilization through known activists who are 
members of the social network may become the only option for the party. Under such 
circumstances, incorporation of known co-ethnic from the ethnic social network will 
affect the party’s ability to easily identify swing voters in the group and decrease 
reaction in the long run. This in return is expected to stabilize the support for the party 
in the long run even under conditions where the party programmatically positions 
towards the opposing end of the salient dimension. As a result, number of activists and 
amount of coordination between them being equal, the effectiveness of mobilization 
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through clientelistic network is expected to be influenced by two factors: time of 
incorporation of co-ethnics and intensity of the contact conducted by the party 
organization.   
 
 
2.4- Explaining Divergence in the Strength of Party Organization and 
Incorporation of Co-ethnics 
 
 
The previous section has discussed how on one hand the level and intensity of 
contact conducted by the partisan network, on the other the number of activists and 
cooperation mechanisms between them increase the effectiveness of mobilization of 
swing voters on clientelistic accountability. It has been illustrated that the effectiveness 
of the mobilization of members of an ethnic group through clientelistic exchange is 
based on the presence of co-ethnics within the party’s ranks.   
Nevertheless, the mobilization of swing voters through such kind of a clientelistic 
linkage necessitates a great motivation for both existing and new activists, members of 
different ethnic groups included, to work actively for the party. Recall that mobilization 
of swing voters in clientelistic exchange is carried through material inducement. Such a 
strategy should also successfully function for the mobilization of activists, albeit at a 
higher cost. Then, the presence of a deeply penetrated party organization with 
successfully incorporated co-ethnics should be a function of the party’s desire and 
ability to motivate the activists through material inducement at each level of the 
organizational pyramid.  
Some studies argue that a party’s decision to strengthen its organization and 
incorporate new activists is a function of the electoral competition it faces.  Others 
argue that the amount of resources available to a party may prevent parties to fulfill 
such a function even it desires to do so. Building upon Chandra’s work, the study relates 
the ability of the party to motivate its activists to the presence of a competitive rule of 
intra-party advancement. The scarce nature of the benefits, either in terms of material 
incentive such as jobs, social assistance or immaterial incentives designed to distribute 
the scarce resources such as party posts, creates a problem of exclusion for any political 
parties. The allocation of new incentives to new entering activists means the 
displacement of existing activists. Then existing activists will resist new entry. Chandra 
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suggests that other things being equal a competitive rule of intra-advancement in the 
party solve this problem .Within this respect, this dissertation argues that the formation 
of such a mechanism is difficult in centralized party organizations due to the path 
dependent nature inherent in organization that make change of the organizational order 
difficult once the party is established.  Yet, such a change may be realized through a 
critical juncture accompanied by an organizational crisis that would reset the 
organizational order of the party. On the other hand, the ability of the party to set the 
rule of competitive intra-party advancement is a function of the experience of the new 
leaders. The next section will elaborate each of these arguments in greater detail.  
    
 
2.4.1- Material Incentive and Mobilization of the Activists 
 
 
Given the fact that political participation is costly, in such a system, how brokers 
(activist) in the party organization are motivated becomes an important subject of 
concern.  Literature on political participation cites diverse motivational purposes in 
voters’ decision to actively participate in politics among which ideological commitment 
and material interest are important ones (Olson, 1965; Conway & Feigert, 1968; 
Kandermand & Oegema, 1987; Panebianco, 1988; Seyd & Witheley, 1992; Whiteley, 
1995). Within this respect, a political party may decide either of the strategies to 
motivate activists in each level. Nevertheless, in a political system where party 
identification and ideological orientation is low mobilizing through ideology may not be 
a very effective strategy. The study suggests that the motivation of members of any 
ethnic group with low ideological orientations to politically participate not expected to 
be different from any other members.  
Although former studies on the clientelistic linkage have mainly focused its use 
for electoral purposes, they also provide a ground to solve the issue. By classifying 
party activists between believers and careerists, Panebianco (1988) highlight the 
important of incentives in motivating participation.  According to him, careerists “are 
active members primarily interested in selective incentives” (p. 27). Thus, their 
motivation is based on a political party’s ability to distribute incentives in the form of 
either material or status. In fact, recent studies analyzing the attempts of political parties 
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to strengthen their organizations have borrowed from the clientelistic linkage to solve 
the problem. These studies have highlighted the growing effectiveness of patronage to 
motivate activists at different levels of the party organization to actively work for the 
party in the light of decreasing party identification and ideological attachments (Müller, 
1989;  Bolleyer, 2006, 2009, Scherlis, 2009; Kopecky, Spirova and Scherlis, 2011), 
Spirova, Van Biezen (2003). According to Scherlis (2011, p. 6), in an environment 
where party identification, ideology or values are down, the reliance of political parties 
on patronage distribution for dealing with the issue of membership and activism is an 
effective strategy. Similarly, Müller (1989) states that when there is no ideological 
motivation or traditional sense of belonging patronage becomes a useful resource to 
deal with the issue of membership. Then, motivating both existing and new entering 
activists at the local level where the party directly connects the voter through patronage 
or other kind of resources may be an effective strategy to enlarge the clientelistic 
network.  Besides enabling the whole structure to work, in a highly competitive 
environment the incorporation of activist through patronage may also provide political 
parties ideological autonomy and flexibility, which they probably would not have with 
ideologically motivated individuals (Bolleyer, 2006; 2009).  
 
 
2.4.2- Nature of the Competition and Motivation of the Activists 
 
 
One possible explanation in the difference in the incorporation of new activists 
may be related to the electoral competition the party faces. This suggestion derives from 
the studies that try to explain different strategies of incumbents in mobilizing core or 
swing supporters. Although these studies directly deals with the mobilization of voters, 
given the fact that strong party organization and incorporation of co-ethnics is a 
function of increasing the party’s support, they provide an important ground in 
understanding the logic of political parties recruitment strategy. These studies suggest 
that a political party’s strategy to mobilize swing groups is a function of the electoral 
competition it faces. Political parties with the objective to increase their electoral 
support will tend to target groups outside their traditional electoral base. Diaz-Cayero 
(2008), suggests that the extent of electoral competition is important in understanding 
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the diversification of incumbents’ strategy. The political parties tend to motivate first, 
their supporters but when these supporters are not large enough to win an election, 
parties will also target swing supporters. Concerning the strategy of incumbents related 
to core or swing supporter the author concludes that their strategy depends on the status 
of their incumbency. When they have a long lasting hegemony, the incumbent invests 
more on core supporters, where as when incumbents try to increase their electoral 
strength they invests more on swing voters. Within this respect, an incumbent that has a 
safe majority in the elections will target geographical units with core supporters in order 
to consolidate it votes while an incumbent that has the objective to increase its votes or 
will diversify its strategy concentrating on geographical units with swing voters.  A 
similar suggestion is given by Federico Estéves, Beatriz Magaloni and Alberto Diaz-
Cayeros (2001).  According to them, a risk-adverse incumbent will prefer to 
clientelistically motivate its traditional electoral base. However, unless incumbents are 
completely safe and there exists an electoral competition, they will not only rely on their 
core supporters but also swing ones in order to increase their vote shares. As margins of 
victory and the size of core voters’ decrease and as a result competition increases; 
politicians rely more on swing supporters.  
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Beatriz Magaloni (2003) argue that the strategy of an 
incumbent will diverge according to its probability to lose or win the elections. Recall 
that strong party organization and incorporation of new activists is a suitable strategy to 
increase the party support through clientelistic linkage. Then, difference in strength of 
party organization and incorporation of members of an ethnic group is related to the 
party decision to increase its network. Within this respect, this study suggests that a 
party will only increase its organization and incorporate new activists if the electoral 
competition necessitates doing so. Then difference in strength of party organization and 
incorporation of new activists within different party branches may be the result of the 
diverging electoral competition the branches faces in each geographical unit. 
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2.4.3- Distribution of Resources and the Motivation of the Activists 
 
 
Suppose that both geographical units have a similar nature of electoral 
competition. Then, the ability of the party to motivate activists should be effective in 
explaining divergence. Given the fact that participation is costly, a materialistically 
motivated activist will actively participate if the rewards he/she receives exceed the 
costs. If he/she does not receive any reward than he/she will probably not actively work. 
(Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Gallager et al, 2002).  Nevertheless, political parties face a 
dilemma where they need to control large amount of resources to put together a 
complex organizational structure on one hand and the scarcity resources at the party 
disposal on the other. Since parties cannot distribute resources to all of their activists, 
strengthening of the organization via selective inducement creates a problem of 
exclusion which destabilizes its effectiveness (Bolleyer, 2006). Studies indicate two 
sources of the problem of scarcity of resources and exclusion. Some focus on the 
external constraints on the party ability to distribute the resources, while other emphasis 
the internal constraints put by the party as major factors negatively affecting the use of 
them for organizational purposes (Bolleyer, 2006; Kopecky, Spirova, Scherlis, 2011).  
According to the first set of studies, in such a system, the resource an 
activist/voter receives from his/her patron (or higher level broker) is first based on the 
amount resources available to his patron. If this amount is scarce, existing and new 
entering lower level brokers may not benefit from the valuable resources. The exclusion 
of activists from rewards may increase the frustration of the present activists or the 
involuntary of new activists to enter to the party. Thus, the problem of exclusion can be 
solved by increasing the resources distributed. According to Calvo & Murillo, 2004, the 
efficacy of political patronage is based on the accessibility of political parties on public 
jobs at different level of the government. Nevertheless, for authors such as Müller 
(1989), Kristinsson (2012), Shefter (1994) and Chandra (2004) political parties face 
major problems in controlling these resources. The declining amount of goods available 
to the parties, pressure of market forces, change in incumbency and media control over 
distribution of resources has been stated as main factors affecting the supply side of 
distributing the resources. 
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Although such an argument seems compelling, literature states a considerable 
number of means political parties uses to overcome the limited amount of resources. 
There are a growing number of studies analyzing how political parties use patronage in 
order to guaranty their access to state resources. According to these studies political 
parties appoints their supporters in key positions where resources are distributed, in 
order to provide benefits to strengthen their party organizations (Kopecky and Sherlis, 
2008; Sherlis, 2009;  Kopecky and Mair, 2011). In fact, Kopecky and Sherlis (2008, p. 
363) indicates that scholars such as Pappas (2006), Jalali and Lisi (2006) have found the 
use of patronage for such a purpose in Greece and Portugal.  Similar results have also 
been found by Kopecky & Spirova (2011) and Kopecky, Spirova & Scherlis (2011) in 
countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Ghana and South Africa, albeit 
changing in degree.     
Bolleyer (2006) indicates another strategy of political parties to overcome the 
problem of the scarcity of resources. According to her by “ transforming non-materially 
valued positions into a stepping stone to achieve material compensation” (p. 19) 
political parties increase the effectiveness of the resources at their disposal. A similar 
suggestion is made by Panebianco when he asserts that one function of the internal 
hierarchy is to regulate the distribution process by tying selective incentives to the posts 
in the party hierarchy (p. 27).  With such a strategy, members at either level of the 
organizational structure may actively work so as to be able to attain the valued 
resources through promotion. By the use of such a strategy, political parties may be able 
to motivate quite large number of activists for only one post. This is a fairly more 
effective strategy than directly distributing the post to only one activist. Furthermore, 
state resources are not the only available resource for political parties. The distribution 
of other private sector jobs or valued immaterial goods other than position may well 
transform into valuable resources where parties can motivate their activists.   
The second set of studies relates the limited nature of the resources to the decision 
of the party leaders to distribute fewer resources. Some studies suggest that decreasing 
return of clientelistic distribution is a major problem political parties have to cope with. 
Irrespective of the access problems, reliance on distribution of resources for 
organizational purposes triggers an increasing demand because when resources are 
distributed extensively, their effectiveness on the motivation of the activists decrease 
since they become devaluated (Bolleyer, 2006; Panebianco, 1988). A similar suggestion 
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is also given by Panebianco for the amount of posts distributed. According to him too 
many post to be distributed would decrease the effectiveness of promotion as a way to 
motivate the activists. Thus, even if political parties ties the attainment to certain 
material goods to certain positions, the problem of exclusion still persist since political 
parties are forced to find equilibrium between the amount of posts/resources distributed 
and their effectiveness in motivating the activists. Another internal constraint is 
highlighted by Kemahlıoğlu (2005) who argues that intra-competition between higher 
and lower level activists may create incentives for the latter one to distribute less 
resources for organizational purposes. According to her when the posts of the higher 
degree activists are not safe, lower level activists will distribute fewer resources to 
signal the former that he is not a threat.  Under these circumstances, the mechanisms 
through which the resources or the posts to attain these resources are distributed 
becomes a major issue of concern. This issue is related to internal functioning of the 
party organization that would be discussed in the next section.  
 
 
2.4.4- Internal Structure of the Organization and Motivation of the Activists 
 
 
How the posts/resources are distributed becomes vital in understanding the 
motivation of the activists. Even under large amount of resources, the problem of 
distribution is still present. The amount of resources available to a higher-level activist 
and his/her decision on how to use these resources are two distinct processes. Although 
an activist may have large resources at his/her disposal, he/she still have different 
options on how to distribute these resources. First, he/she may decide not to distribute 
them to new comers, or, second, favor some activists vis-à-vis others at the lower level. 
Note that the same problem is still inherent when access to certain resources is tied to 
specific positions. Instead of deciding how to distribute the resources, the higher-level 
activist will decide on how to distribute these posts.  
Panebianco (1988) asserts that a certain procedure must be set for selecting 
leaders for the various organizational levels so as to regulate the distribution of 
incentives. According to Bolleyer (2006), the problem can be solved by the capacity of 
the party to find an efficient mode of distribution, which can assure organizational 
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stability and enlargement.  This study adopts a similar approach. Within this respect, it 
suggests that the motivation of existing and new activists is based on the formation of a 
mechanism that assures a high probability to attain these resources/posts for both of 
them. It is the internal structure of the party organization that would affect the ability to 
form such a mechanism. Thus, the solution of the problem is tied on the procedure 
through which posts are distributed into the party and the division of power between 
different hierarchical units. This in return is based on how political parties 
institutionalize. Differentiating between organizational construction through territorial 
diffusion and penetration, Panebianco (1988) emphasizes the different power structures 
of these types of organizations. In political parties organized through diffusion the sub-
units are fairly independent from the center, thus power is diffused between different 
hierarchical units. The formation of leadership cadres is decentralized and semi-
autonomous from the center. On the other hand, political parties organized through 
penetration have powerful centers at the formation stage that control stimulate and 
directs the selection of the leadership. Within this respect, the power is concentrated in 
the center.  By analyzing the ability of the Peronist Party in Argentina to adopt its 
organization in the economic crisis, Levitsky (2003) argues that weakly structured party 
organizations are better equipped to adapt and survive crisis than highly 
institutionalized party organizations.   
Based on this classification, the model developed by Chandra on the incorporation 
of new elites in patronage democracies provides a suitable solution to the problem. 
Although she mainly focus on the incorporation of new elites, her model also is suitable 
to explain how the party may motivate both existing and new activists to work actively. 
According to her (2004; 2010) the institutional design of the party is decisive in 
explaining its ability to create such a mechanism.  Her argument is based on the basic 
assumption that both existing and new activists have an incentive to acquire post in the 
party in the long run and are rationally instrumental.  Within this respect, the decision of 
an activist to join a party is based on its probability of obtaining office.  In return, the 
probability for an activist in obtaining office is the product of two independent 
probabilities: first, the probability of a party to win elections and his/her probability to 
obtain a position in the party. In a predominant party system, since the incumbent will 
have steady access to state resources the second probability is more decisive. For 
instance, in his analysis of Mexico, Greene (2007) shows how dominant parties turn 
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public resources into patronage goods to increase the cost for activists to join an 
opposition party. By using their incumbency advantage, they attract and retain all 
careerist politicians who want to win office.  Thus, in predominant party systems, 
probability of obtaining office and resources tied to these offices, for new activists, it is 
the function of their expectations on how high they can advance in the party. For 
existing activists already in a position it means the high probability of return once 
she/he is displaced. Given the fact that these posts are limited, such a situation seems 
impossible, since existing activists would resist the entry of new ones that would 
threaten their positions. According to the model, the ability for any party to incorporate 
new elites and motivating existing ones is based on the creation of a mechanism that 
would tie the interest of existing elites on the incorporation of new elites.  For Chandra 
competitive party organizations, which execute open membership policies and 
intraparty elections for all organizational posts, would assures such kind of a 
mechanism. Intraparty elections would motivate higher-level activists that want to 
assure their posts or promote to higher ones to increase the size of their coalition. On the 
other hand, open membership policies would enable present activists to increase their 
coalition through the incorporation of new activists in the party. Note that a party should 
assure both of them at the same time. A system of competitive intraparty advancement 
without open membership policies would result in inter-elite circulation, while the 
opposite would not allow advancement for the new elites.  
Although not highlighted by Chandra, the system does not only solve the problem 
of incorporation but incentive for different level of activists to actively work for the 
party and cooperate with each other.  An activist having such a purpose will have a 
strong incentive to work harder to increase his/her support base and share information, 
resource with lower level activists. The same logic will prevail within all levels of the 
organizational structure until the activists at the lowest level of the organizational 
structure where the party directly contacts the voter will work harder to identify 
potential supporters and distribute the rewards at his/her disposal to core or swing voters 
to increase his/her own reach. This will result in an increasing network, which in return, 
will increase the electoral support for the party. It is important to note that, competitive 
party organizations provide a self-regulating mechanism in solving the problem of 
motivation where no one is frustrated from the procedure. 
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2.4.5- Centralized Party Organization and Motivation of the Activists 
 
 
Based on the established fact that regulations on the formal rules of intra-party 
advancement cannot easily be changed (Pierson, 2000, p. 259), the question suggests 
itself whether a centralized party organization can establish a competitive intraparty 
advancement mechanism if it is exogenously forced to do so?  The literature suggests 
that intraparty advancement in centralized political parties is mostly in the hands of the 
top leaders, in which loyalty is the main criterion of distributing the posts (Özbudun, 
1979; Sayarı, 1977; Chandra, 2004).  Then, in such a system personal relations with the 
leaders is more decisive in attaining a post than the presence of a large coalition. As a 
result, activists will not be concerned in increasing their coalitions even if the party has 
an open membership policy since their probability to attain a post is not tied to 
elections. The focus of the activists would be to show their loyalty to the leaders rather 
than efficiently work to increase their coalition. Besides, in such a system higher level 
activists will resist the powering of both existing and new lower level activists since 
they would be evaluated as threat to their existing position.  
Therefore, the decision of top leaders to set such kind of a mechanism is the 
decisive factor in the ability of a party to form a competitive intra-party advancement 
rule under a centralized party organization. Can leaders in a centralized party 
organization set such a mechanism when they are exogenously forced to do so? 
Adopting a rational institutionalist approach, Chandra suggests that only when they are 
secure from losing their positions, rationalist leaders would decide that interest of the 
party requires the incorporation of new activists and set competitive criteria for 
attaining rewards.  According to her, the decision of leaders to adopt such a strategy is 
influenced by exogenous factors shaping the circumstances. Centralized party 
organizations can institutionally have certain functioning rules to overcome the 
problems of motivation. Yet, in all of these mechanisms, the decision to who the post 
will be distributed is again tied to the decision of the top leaders. Within this respect, 
leaders may impose a number of mechanisms to give access to these posts to strengthen 
the organization and incorporate new activists.  To ensure circulation, they can create a 
rotation system in the distribution of the posts; ensure lower-level representativeness in 
higher-level decision-making organs etc. For incorporating new elites, they can 
72 
 
forcefully appoint members of the new group into the party’s rank. In fact, this 
coincides to what Panebianco calls amalgamation when he explains change in the 
dominant party system without the restructuring of the organizational order (p. 247). 
Note that such a change may assure the incorporation of new elites in the party but 
would not motivate the activists to work actively. For such a change to happen the rules 
of intraparty advancement should be changed.  
Thus, a more effective strategy may be the settlement of a competitive rule of 
advancement where increase in electoral support, membership, time of devotion to the 
party work may be taken as reference. Such a strategy seems a logical solution to the 
problem.  At this point, the study deviates from Chandra’s rational institutionalist 
argument and adopts a more historical institutionalist approach which focuses not only 
on exogenous factors in shaping the leaders decisions but also indigenous ones that 
derives from the nature of the organizational order of the party (Colier and Colier, 1991; 
Pierson, 1993, Thelen, 1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Katznelson & Berry, 2005).  
Historical institutionalist approaches suggest that leaders’ decisions are also 
shaped by the rules of the institutions in which these leaders function, since the actors 
internalize these rules as appropriate ways of behavior.   Although, exogenous factors 
mainly affect the organizational design during the initial phase of formation of 
institutions (Thelen, 1999, p. 387); once they are designed institutions independently 
affect to the ability of the party to adapt its self when the conditions that shapes them at 
first place change.  This suggestion derives from the path dependent nature inherent in 
all institutions.  The ability of political structures to adapt themselves in changing social 
environments they function is deeply dependent to the characteristics of the same 
structure. According to Thelen (1999), “Politics involve a political of... choice, but once 
a path is taken, then it can become ‘locked in’, as all the relevant actors adjust their 
strategies to accommodate the prevailing pattern” (p. 385). Such dependence is the 
result of the ability of institutions to shape the actors’ perceptions by creating self-
reinforcing positive feedbacks (Krasner, 1988, p. 83). According to Pierson (2000), 
“understanding of the political world should themselves be seen as susceptible to path 
dependence” (p. 260). As a result, it may be difficult to change the structure itself since 
the perceptions of actors on the political world are also shaped by the previously set 
rules. From this perspective, the historical legacy of the party may not always enable the 
leaders to change the rules of advancement once they have been established. 
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Panebianco (1988) suggests organizations can effectively be analyzed by rational 
model only during their foundation phase. The author suggests that the size of the 
organization is dependent on the decision of the leaders that establish the organization. 
On the other hand, in its foundation phase, the main factors affecting the organizational 
structure and the composition of the leaders, as he calls “dominant coalition”, is a 
function of the objective of the party, its ideology,  support base and the competition it 
faces.  Yet, as institutionalization begins, we note a qualitative leap. As he states: 
 “The organization will certainly undergo modifications and even 
profound changes in interacting throughout its entire life cycle with the 
continually changing environment. However,  the crucial political choice 
made by its founding fathers, the first struggle for organizational control, 
and the ways in which the organization was formed will leave an indelible 
mark” ( p. xiii).  
 
The effect of the organizational design of the party in shaping future activities has 
also been confirmed empirically. Hunter (2007) shows how the historical legacies of 
Worker party in Brazil between 1989 and 2002 prevented the party to adopt its strategy 
to changing electoral competition. Katzenstein’s analysis illustrates how collective held 
norms define the appropriate conduct, shape actors identities and influence their 
behavior and interest (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 23).  By treating the party’s internal 
structures as intervening variable that mediate their responses; a similar approach is 
adopted by Levitsky (2003) in his analysis of the ability of the Peronist Party in 
Argentina to adapt its organizational structure to environmental changes. Then the 
ability of the political leaders in a centralized party organization to change the 
promotion mechanism is based on the nature of the previously set mechanism, mostly 
during its founding phase, which the leaders themselves have also experienced.  In a 
political party where the rule of advancement is loyalty change in the advancement rule 
would probably be met with resistance from the activists, may even result with splits of 
the activists deprived of their post from the party.  
Based on the works of scholars such as Pierson (1993, 1996) and Thelen (1999), 
Panebianco (1988), the study suggests that a stable change in the party organization 
would mostly occur through a critical juncture that would disrupt the rules of the 
institutions and give the opportunity for the resettlement of new ones. According to 
Panebianco ( p.243), a critical event such a organizational crisis resulting from the joint 
74 
 
force of exogenous with indigenous factors, give opportunity to re-organize the party on 
the new rules set by the leaders.   
In our case, this would be the resettlement of the dominant coalition by change in 
the posts on the basis of the rules of intra-party advancement. In fact, although not 
theoretically founded by Chandra, the different representational profile of the Congress 
Party in the Indian district of Karnataka is tied to such kind of critical juncture where 
the party experienced a major split, resulting in a change in its leadership and the 
reformulation of the main coalitions of the party in the district (p. 253).  It is important 
to note that the presence of a critical juncture may not automatically lead to change in 
the organizational order but would create an opportunity to do so. Two factors seem to 
be effective in the party’s ability to create this change. The experiences of the new 
leaders would be effective in the successful incorporation of new groups and the 
implementation of competitive intra-party advancement rules. Change would be more 
probable when the new leaders come outside the dominant coalition of the party and 
have the necessary organizational experience to set competitive intra-party advancement 
mechanisms.  Second, the circulation in the posts in one level of the organizational 
structure through new rules of in-party advancement also is based on the availability of 
sufficient number of lower level activists to fulfill these posts.  Under the absence of a 
sufficient number of activists, the party will forced to uses existing activists who would 
probably resists to the changes. Under such condition, the party may not be able to 
immediately increase its network even if its leaders desire to do so.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
IDENTIFYING THE NATURE OF THE COMPETITION IN 
ELECTORAL TERMS 
 
 
 
 
This study rests on the main assumption that first, AKP and BDP are the main 
competitors among citizens of Kurdish origin. Second, it suggests that a large amount of 
citizens of Kurdish origin constitutes a common electoral base for AKP and BDP. 
Third, it argues that the competition between the two parties is characterized by 
volatility. Put it differently there is a considerable number of voters of Kurdish origin 
that switches their votes from one party to another across elections. As illustrated in 
Chapter 2, existing studies confirms these arguments. Studies analyzing the nature of 
the competition mainly focus on the programmatic positioning of both parties in 
understanding the electoral changes. The major aim of this chapter is to test the nature 
of the electoral competition and its relationship with the programmatic mobilization by 
analyzing the electoral results for both parties across elections in the light of the policies 
of AKP on the Kurdish issue and the economic realm. This analysis will be carried in 
three levels: national, regional and provincial. This would provide the opportunity to 
track major differences at each level on the nature of the electoral competition. This is 
why, after briefly evaluating the move towards a dominant party system with AKP and 
BDP’s electoral trajectories, this section will try to illustrate this competition by 
analyzing the programmatic position of AKP on the issue and the voting patterns in the 
Kurdish speaking provinces of Turkey in each general election after 2002. Three major 
points will be highlighted.  
First, the difference in the competition AKP faces in the region from the rest of 
Turkey will be illustrated. Then the study will electorally show the emergence of AKP 
and BDP as the major rivals among citizens of Kurdish origin. Lastly, different electoral 
patterns at more local level will be analyzed in order assess whether they support our 
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expectation on the presence of a volatile electorate. Although the main assumptions of 
the study  are tested in the province of Istanbul, as it will be illustrated in detail, this 
chapter mainly focuses on the provinces where the citizens of Kurdish origin constitute 
the majority. With its estimated non-Kurdish population of nearly 87%, Istanbul has 
been excluded from these analyses to have a better account of the voting behavior of 
citizens of Kurdish origin.   
 
 
3.3- Turkish Party System: Towards A Predominant Party System? 
 
 
Recent studies (Çarkoğlu, 2012a; Sayarı, 2007, Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012) 
on the electoral outcomes indicate the move to a predominant party system. In fact, the 
political landscape after 2011 general elections is quite different from 1990s, which was 
characterized by high level of instability, volatility and great fractionalization4.  The 
2002 general elections made sign of the entering of the Turkish party system into a new 
decade with the victory of AKP at the ballot box gaining 34.28% of the support of the 
Turkish electorate.  The particularity of the developments taking place after 2002 
general elections in the Turkish electoral scene highlights two important tendencies on 
AKP’s electoral success. First, AKP has been the second party in Turkey’s democratic 
history that could gain the necessary majority to form the government in three 
consecutive elections. A similar success was gained by in 1950’s by the DP 
(Democratic Party – Demokrat Parti) who managed to gain the necessary majority of 
the votes in 1950, 1954, 1957 general elections to form the government on its own.  
What is more impressive and what differentiates AKP from DP  is the ability of the 
party not only to gain the necessary votes to form the government on its own but also to 
increase its electoral support among Turkish voters after each consecutive election. 
Although DP was successful in gaining the necessary majority of the votes by acquiring 
52.7%, 57.6% and 47,9 % of the eligible votes it did not manage to steadily increase 
them.   Within this respect, AKP can be defined as ‘su-generis’ case since it is the only 
                                               
4   For more information on the historical account of party system indicators consult Çarkoğlu, A. (1998, 
2012a); S.Sayarı (2002,2007), Arıkan & Şekercioğlu (2008) . 
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party that managed to both win the necessary majority of the votes and increased its 
votes shares from 34.3 %, 46,5 and 49,9% in  2002, 2007 and 2011 general elections.   
An important characteristic of this emerging predominant party system concerns 
the composition of the opposition parties and the fluidity in the electoral preferences 
among them. Studies highlight (Çarkoğlu, 2007, 2011, 2012; Sayarı, 2007; Şekercioğlu 
& Arıkan 2007, 2012) the formation of a party system where four blocks of political 
parties are functioning effectively. Decreasing volatility among these block indicates the 
stabilization of the competition in the system.  
  This part will built upon the evaluation of the developments taking place in the 
Turkish party system.  Within this respect, first, a brief electoral account on support 
gained by political parties across elections will be evaluated in light of the general 
political context. Second, based on existing literature, the main characteristics of the 
new emerging predominant party system will be highlighted.    
 
 
3.1.1- Increasing Electoral Support for AKP 
 
   
The closure of the political Islamist Party FP (Fazilet partisi- Virtue Party) for 
anti- secular and   anti-Republican activities was an important  turning point in Turkey’s 
political life since it resulted in the split of the more moderate generation of the 
members of the National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş hareketi) from FP to form a 
new political party. Within this respect AKP was established on August 14, 2001 by, as 
Kalaycıoğlu (2010) calls, ‘the Young Turks’ of the movement who became the key 
leaders of the party and shaped the ideology of the party contributing to its electoral 
success.  
Although coming from the Milli Görüş Movement, as the party expressed in its 
official ideological stands, it came evident that, with its more moderate tone, AKP 
diverged from its precedents concerning its attitude on salient issues of Turkish politics 
(Özbudun, 2006, Özbudun and Hale, 2010). AKP’s decision to adopt a more moderate 
strategy seems to lie in the experiences of its precedents that have been closed several 
times, de-legitimized from the system, accused and sentenced for their anti-secular 
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actions and witnessed decreases in their electoral support5.  Actually, strategy to be 
adopted was the main line of conflict between the two cadres and the cause of split of 
the young leaders who defended a more moderate approach to gain legitimacy and 
support within the system. Whatever the motivation behind such a strategy, the 2002 
general elections has changed the political landscape of politics in Turkey where a 
newly formed party has managed to gain the necessary votes to form the government on 
its own after long years of experience of coalition governments.  
 AKP entered the 2002 general elections as a rightist but moderate, untried 
political party representing the peripheral forces historically opposing the Republican 
Center in a political context of instability characterized by an economic crisis, tensions 
between the partners of  the coalition government mainly around the reforms to be 
carried for EU membership.   The third column of table 3.1 and graph 3.1 show the vote 
shares of each party’s in the 2002 general elections. AKP became the first party gaining 
34,43%, CHP became the second party gaining 19,47% of the eligible votes. Although, 
DYP became the third party, by gaining only 9,54%, it  could not enter to the parliament 
( TGNA-Turkish Grand National Assembly) failing to pass the 10% national threshold 
required to get representation in the parliament.  The election results were rather 
negative for the former partners of the coalition government. The vote shares of DSP, 
ANAP and MHP respectively decreased from 22,10%, 13,22% and 17,98% in 1999 to 
1,22%,   5,11% and 8,35% in 2002 elections. This was especially a punishment for 
DSP, the grand partner of the coalition government. Only two parties, AKP and CHP 
could be represented in the parliament with respectively 365 and 177 seats creating a 
46,19 % of unrepresented votes in the parliament as a consequence of the 10% 
threshold. Although this favored AKP, who gained nearly 67% of the seats with 34,43% 
                                               
5 Established after the 1980 Military coup RP (Refah Partisi, Welfare Party) succeeded to gain 21,38% of 
the national votes in 1995 general elections and has managed to form the Refahyol coalition government 
with DYP. This coalition governed the country from June 1996 until the demission of Erbakan, president 
of the party and prime minister of the government in June 1997, as the result of serious pressures to the 
party as the result of ‘Process of February 28’ launched by the state authorities where the Military was the 
most dominant actor. The accusation of the party due to its anti-secular and anti-republican action 
violating the basic principles of the Republic resulted in the closure of the party in January 1998 and the 
ban of its leaders to enter the elections for 5 years period.  In electoral terms, the effect of this process was 
tremendous. Entering the 1999 general elections under the name of the newly established FP (Fazilet 
Partisi, Virtue party), the party obtained 15,41% of the votes with a decrease of 5,97% of its vote shares 
compared to 1995 general elections. Changing its name to SP (Saadet Partisi, Felicity Party) because of 
its closure in June 2011, the success of the party heavily decreased due to the split of an important 
number of its cadres to form AKP.   
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of the votes, it also created the risk of delegitimizing the policies of the party. In fact, 
one of the major claims of CHP concerning the conflict in the election of the president 
prior to 2007 general elections was based on this aspect of the electoral results. 6    
 
Political parties electoral vote shares across elections (%) 
  2011 2007 2002 1999 1995 
AKP* 49,95 46,58 34,43 15,41*  21,38* 
DSP 0,25 ---- 1,22 22,19 14,64 
MHP 12,98 14,27 8,35 17,98 8,18 
SP* 1,25 2,34 2,49 15,41* 21,38* 
DP** 0,65 5,42 14,65** 25,23** 38,83** 
ANAP ---- ---- 5,11 13,22 19,65 
DYP ---- ---- 9,54 12,01 19,18 
CHP 25,94 20,88 19,41 8,71 10,71 
BDP*** 6,58 5,32*** 6,14*** 4,75*** 4,17*** 
GP ---- 3,04 7,25 ---- ------  
others:  2,4 2,15 6,06 5,63 2,08 
Table3.1: Political parties’ vote shares across elections 
*AKP and SP were founded as the result of the division of FP in 2002 who entered the elections 
under the name of RP in 1995 and FP in 1999 general elections. So the vote shares of AKP and SP for 1999 
and 1995 general elections are the vote shares of these parties.  
**DP has been established in 2007 with the unification of ANAP and DYP. Votes of DP for 2002, 
1999 and 2007 general elections is the sum of the votes shares of these two parties.  
*** BDP is the successor of the pro-Kurdish parties DTP, DEHAP, HADEP. So the votes shares of BDP in 
the table are those of DTP for 2007, DEHAP for 2002 and HADEP for 1999 and 1995 general elections.    
 
AKP entered the 2007 general elections in a highly polarized political context 
where a major tension occurred between the AKP as the representative of the periphery 
and secular bureaucracy on the election of the new president of the Turkish Republic. A 
second development, prior to the elections were the attempts of the center right parties, 
namely ANAP and DYP, and center left parties CHP and DSP to unify. These attempts 
have been unsuccessful for the center right. DYP entered the elections under the newly 
formed party, purposefully named as DP (Demokrat Parti, Democratic Party) 
emphasizing the heritage of the DP of 1950’s. On the Left side of the center, a pre-
election coalition has been formed between CHP and DSP who entered the elections 
under the name of CHP. A third development prior to the elections was the decision of 
the Pro-Kurdish party DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi-Democratic Society Party) to 
enter the elections with independent deputy candidates to overcome the barrier of the 
                                               
6 The election of the president of the Turkish Republic one the major cause of AKP’s decision to go the 
elections earlier than scheduled. The crisis began when the term of 10th president Necdet Sezer ended in 
August 2007 and AKP put the candidacy of Abdullah Gül, the most important personality in the party 
after Erdoğan. One of the most important claim of CHP was the problem of legitimacy it would cause if  
the president was to be elected by a parliament where AKP was represented far above its electoral vote 
shares.    
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10% national threshold.  It is in this context that AKP managed to increase its vote 
shares from 34.3 percent in the 2002 general elections to 46.5 percent in the 2007 
general elections and again obtained an overwhelming majority in the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (TGNA). Other political parties that found representation in the 
parliament were CHP, MHP and the Pro-Kurdish Party DTP obtaining 20,88 %, 14,7% 
and 5,32% of the vote shares. The poor performance of DP which votes shares 
decreased to 5,42% was an important outcome of the elections. While CHP was able to 
increase its vote shares only by 1%, MHP managed to capture 14,27% of the votes. 
Another interesting outcome was the decrease in vote shares of DTP although the party 
had for the first time the potential to enter the parliament by bypassing the 10% national 
threshold. Nevertheless, the allocation of the seats in the parliament was 341, 112, 71 
and 26 for AKP, CHP, MHP and DTP. The amount of un-represented vote in the 
parliament decreased approximately to 13%.  With this figure, the parliament was 
composed of groups with very different and contrasting ideological positions. The 
performance of the parliament that was composed of AKP and CHP located in opposite 
side of the Secular/Anti-secular axis, MHP and DTP located in the opposite side of 
Turkish/Kurdish nationalism axis was a general concern.7 
The political context prior to the 2011 general elections was characterized on one 
hand by the increasing violence of the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK, the 
government’s harsh stand on representatives of the Kurdish movement and the Kurdish 
problem in general  and on the other hand by the making of a new constitution after the 
elections. After the stillborn attempts to launch a “democratic opening” package to gain 
the support of voters of Kurdish origin in 2010, AKP seemed to have returned to MHP 
supporters to increase its electoral base. Meanwhile, MHP suffered from scandals as the 
result of the leak of a number of cassettes on the sexual relationships of some of its 
deputy candidates to the Media. The winds of change in CHP that began with the 
election of its new leader Kılıçdaroğlu on May 22, 2010 after the resignation of Baykal 
due to a similar cassette scandal was an important development in the center left which 
                                               
7 These two axes are identified as the two salient dimensions of Turkish Politics (Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 
2006). For more information on the dominance of the center/periphery mostly measured in terms of 
religiosity consult Ergüder,1980-81;  Esmer, 2002  ; Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, 1999 ; Çarkoğlu  & Kalaycıoğlu, 
2007, 2009. The Turkish/Kurdish nationalism axis is identified to be effective especially after 1990s for 
more information Consult, Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006; Kalaycıoğlu,1999.  
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raised unrealistic expectations on a large increase in the party’s vote shares.8 From the 
part of AKP, gaining 320 of the 550 seat was put as an objective to attain the necessary 
majority to make a referendum for the approval of a new constitution. Furthermore, the 
pro-Kurdish party, BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi-Peace and Democracy Party)9 once 
again decided to enter the elections with independent deputy candidates in the provinces 
it has strong electoral base.  Constant conflict between the Prime Minister Erdoğan and 
CHP’s president Kılıçtaroğlu during the electoral campaigning period, decision of the 
High Election Board (YSK-Yüksek Seçim Kurulu) to annul some of the candidacies of 
the pro-Kurdish party BDP and the debates in its aftermath contributed to the 
polarization that was existent in the system.     
 
 
Graph 3.1: Political parties’ vote shares across elections 
*AKP and SP were founded as the result of the division of FP in 2002 who entered the elections 
under the name of RP in 1995 and FP in 1999 general elections. So the vote shares of AKP and SP for 1999 
general elections in the table are the vote shares of these parties. 
**DP has been established in 2007 with the unification of ANAP and DYP. Votes of DP for 2002, 
1999 and 2007 general elections is the sum of the votes shares of these two parties. 
*** BDP is the successor of the pro-Kurdish parties DTP, DEHAP, HADEP. So the votes shares of BDP in 
the table are those of DTP for 2007, DEHAP for 2002 and HADEP for 1999 and 1995 general elections.   
 
The result of 2011 general elections was not very a surprise but a disappointment 
for both AKP and CHP. By gaining 49,95% of the votes and 326 of the seats in the 
                                               
8 After having important positions in the party, Deniz Baykal has been elected as the president of CHP in 
September 1992. He remained on the post until he resigned in May 2010 when a cassette on his sexual 
relationship with a female deputy candidate was published on internet. Kılıçtaroğlu has been selected as 
the new president of the party on May 2012. 
9 BDP has been founded in May 2008 after the decision of the Constitutional Court to close DTP due to 
its organic link with the terrorist organization the PKK. 
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parliament, AKP lost the possibility to approve the new constitution on its own. CHP 
managed to increase its votes to 25,95%, a percentage below the expectations, and got 
represented in the parliament with 135 deputies. Both MHP and BDP were able to 
increase their votes gaining respectively 12,98%; 6,58% of the votes and 53, 36 seats in 
the parliament. Representativeness in the parliament increased as the percentage of 
unrepresented vote decreased to 4,55%. The result was once again a parliament 
represented by 4 ideologically opposed groups that has on its main agenda the making 
of a more democratic constitution.  
 
 
3.1.2- Evaluating the General Trend of Competition in the Turkish Party System 
 
 
Although the 2011 general election did not satisfied the major players, namely 
AKP and CHP, it provides important clues on the changing nature of the competition in 
the Turkish party System.  The data from 2007 to 2011 indicates a growing 
consolidation of the Turkish electorate around 4 political parties. Based on existing 
literature Çarkoğlu (2012a) defines the new system as predominant in terms of electoral 
vote shares, composition of the opposition and period of incumbency. With its 
fragmented opposition composed of CHP, MHP and BDP who are not real competitors 
for incumbency, its increasing victory in three successive elections and large electoral 
margin of victory, he suggests that AKP fulfills Sartori’s (1976) criteria of predominant 
party system.  Within this respect, the Turkish party system can defined as moving 
towards a predominant party system where electoral votes are divided between four 
political blocks: AKP as the dominant party, CHP as the main opposition party in 
ideological terms, MHP as the representative of the more nationalists and BDP as the 
representative of the Kurdish rights. The diverging positions of the parties forming the 
opposition on salient issues with their different ideological positions increase their 
division and make it difficult for them formulate a common position. This in turn 
strengthens the policy margins of AKP.   
 An important trend concerning the nature of the composition is the changing 
landscape of the ideological composition of the system. Within this respect, the system 
witnesses the gradual change in composition of the left-right ideological camps. A trend 
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that is suggested by Arıkan and Şekercioğlu (2008) to begin by 1990s and largely 
favoring AKP. The study adopts the classification made by Çarkoğlu (2002) based on 
the historical roots of the parties in order to assess the general trends. Within this 
respect, having their roots in the socialist parties of 1970s the pro-Kurdish parties are at 
the end of the left direction representing the extreme left. As previously highlighted 
between 1995 and 2011 four pro-Kurdish parties which kept changing names in order to 
survive, were banned. These parties are HADEP, DEHAP, DTP and BDP respectively. 
The BDP emerged from the ashes of the banned Democratic Society Party (DTP, 
Demokratik Toplum Partisi) at the end of 2010, DSP and CHP are positioned in the 
center of the left due to their common historical roots10 although DSP has a more 
nationalist tone.  
 
National level ideological shifts (1995-2011) 
  1995 1999 2002 2007 2011 
AKP* 21,38* 15,41* 34,43 46,58 49,95 
Center-Left  25,35 30,9 20,63 20,88 26,19 
AKP + Center right 60,21 40,64 56,33 55,04 50,6 
Center right 38,83 25,23 21,9 8,46 0,65 
Extreme Right  29,56 33,39 45,27 63,19 64,18 
Extreme Right without AKP 29,56 33,39 10,84 16,61 14,23 
Extreme left  4,17 4,75 6,14 5,32 6,58 
others  2,09 5,63 6,06 2,15 2,4 
Table 3.2: National level ideological shifts (1995-2011) 
*AKP was founded as the result of the division of FP in 2002 who entered the elections under the name of RP 
in 1995 and FP in 1999 general elections. So the vote shares of AKP for 1995 and 1999 general elections in the table 
are the vote shares of these parties. 
 
Three parties are positioned on the center-right, namely ANAP, DYP and GP 
(Genç Parti-Young party). Both ANAP and DYP possess a common historical root as 
they both claim to be the successors of AP (Adalet partisi- Justice Party) of 1960s, 
1970s and the DP of 1950s. The non-ideological nature of GP makes it difficult to be 
classified but as it shares the same electoral base with ANAP and DYP it has been 
classified as a center-right party. DP, as the successor of DYP, has represented the 
center right after 2007 general elections. On the extreme right lies pro-Islamist parties 
coming from the Milli Görüş tradition, MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi, National Order 
                                               
10 DSP leader Bülent Ecevit led CHP for a long period in the 70s and oriented the party towards a more 
left-wing policy stand. In the aftermath of the 1980 Military Coup, he spitted from CHP and entered 
politics by establishing DSP (Çarkoğlu, 2002, p. 125).  
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Party) and MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi-National Salvation Party) in 1970s and RP 
(Refah Partisi-Welfare party) after the 1980 military coup founded by Necmettin 
Erbakan. After the closure of FP in 2001, the movement spitted and continued under 
two different parties: SP and AKP. It should be mentioned that a considerable number 
of scholars investigating the ideological foundation of AKP, positions the party on the 
center-right of the ideological spectrum (Özbudun, 2006; Çınar, 2006; Dağı, 2008, 
Özbudun and Hale, 2010). In fact, the electoral results also support such a suggestion 
since the party has been successful in gaining the center-right vote. Although supporting 
these arguments, the study has preferred to classify it under the pro-Islamist umbrella so 
as to be able to show the shift from center-right parties to these parties in electoral 
terms.   
 
 
Graph3.2: National level ideological shifts (1995-2011) (%) 
*AKP was founded as the result of the division of FP in 2002 who entered the elections under the name of RP 
in 1995 and FP in 1999 general elections. So the vote shares of AKP for 1995 and 1999 general elections in the table 
are the vote shares of these parties 
 
Table 3.2 and Graph 3.2 illustrate the change in the vote shares of each 
ideologically distinct party group. The changing vote shares of AKP alone have also 
been included to show how much AKP benefitted from these shifts. Although macro 
level data is not appropriate to understand individual level changes in preferences, it 
provides important clues on the possible direction of this change.  First, the data show 
the gradual erosion of the center-right parties. Their vote shares from 1999 to 2011 are 
25,23 %, 21,9%, 8,46% and 0,65%. The total lost from 1999 to 2011 general elections 
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is 24,58 % .  The votes shares of the center left is 30,9%, 20,63%, 20,88% and 26,19 % 
from 1999 to 2011 general elections. Although CHP seems to be able to gather some of 
the votes shares of other center left parties, 4,71% of previous center-left votes seems to 
be have shifted to other parties from 1999 to 2011. The extreme-right parties 
respectively received 33,39%, 27%, 63,19%,64,18% in 1999, 2002, 2007 and 2011 
general elections. This coincides with an increase of 30,79% from 1999 to 2011 general 
elections. In overall, the data confirms previous studies that mention the shift towards a 
more rightist electorate in Turkey that began with 1990’s. (Sayarı, 2007; Arıkan & 
Şekercioğlu, 2008; Çarkoğlu, 2012a, 2002).  
While the ideological shift in the preferences of the electorate is an important 
dimension of the competition, researches on party system indicators, indicates a 
stabilizing competition in the Turkish Party System that began with the elections of 
2002. Effective number of parties and volatility index are usually used in the literature 
to measure the amount of stability in the system. While effective number of parties 
gives a measure of the number of the parties competing within the system, volatility 
index provide information on the number of voters that switch their preferences across 
elections, providing a measure of potential swing voters in the system.  
 
  
Comparison of ideological shifts across elections 
   
  
2011-
2007 
2007-
2002 
2002-
1999* 
2011-
2007 
2011-
2002 
2011-
1999* 
AKP* 3,37 12,15 19,02 3,37 15,52 34,54 
Center-Left  5,31 0,25 -10,27 5,31 5,56 -4,71 
Center right  -7,81 -13,44 -3,33 -7,81 -21,25 -24,58 
Extreme Right  0,99 17,92 11,88 0,99 18,91 30,79 
Extreme Right without AKP -2,38 5,77 -22,55 -2,38 3,39 -19,16 
Extreme left  1,26 -0,82 1,39 1,26 0,44 1,83 
others  0,25 -3,91 0,43 0,25 -3,66 -3,23 
Table 3.3: Comparison of ideological shifts across elections 
*AKP was founded as the result of the division of FP in 2002. So the vote shares of AKP for 1999 general 
elections in the table are the vote shares of these parties 
 
 Within this respect, in Turkey, the picture after 2011 general elections seems to 
be considerably different from the instability of the 1990’s characterized by high 
volatility and fragmentation (Çarkoğlu, 1997; Sayarı, 2002).  This trend has been 
evaluated by a considerable number of scholars as a shift in the Turkish party system to 
a more stable one with votes consolidated mainly around one predominant party and 3 
minor opposition parties (Çarkoğlu, 2007, 2011, 2012; Sayarı, 2007; Şekercioğlu & 
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Arıkan 2007, 2012).  A gradual decrease in effective number of parties and volatility 
rates 11 are major findings of these studies. Although the main motivation behind the 
application of the 10% threshold after 1980 military coup was to bring stability to the 
system by decreasing the number of parties represented in the parliament. Only after a 
decay of the military coup and two consecutive elections, the effective number of 
parties gradually began to increase making its peak with 6.73 in 1999 general elections. 
After 1999 general elections, a sharp decrease in 2002 general elections that continued 
through 2007 and 2011 can be observed. The effective number of parties after the 2011 
general elections is 2,96 which has been attained without any formal changes in the 
electoral laws. The amount of this decrease in such a short period is remarkable. In 
terms of competition, this translates to around three parties effectively competing in the 
system.  
A similar pattern can be observed for the volatility index in the system that 
measures the shifts in electorate’s party preferences across two elections. After the 
military coup of 1980, a gradual increase in the electoral volatility index can be 
measured. On the other hand, the increase has its top from 1999 to 2002 when AKP 
entered the political space. What is interesting is the sharp decrease after 2007 and 2011 
general elections. While previous patterns represent a great shift in voters’ preferences 
on parties, the last outcome indicates a process of consolidation of votes around the four 
parties entering the parliament with the dominance of AKP.   
AKP’s increasing dominancy can also be observed when the geographical support 
for the party is analyzed. A gradual expansion of AKP’s support base across elections in 
most of the provinces of Turkey is an important observation. Studies on regional 
electoral outcomes divides the Turkish provinces in three regions with different 
electoral patterns and socioeconomic characteristics (Çarkoğlu & Avcı 2002, Çarkoğlu 
2000).  The first region covers the coastal provinces, while the second region consists of 
Kurdish populated eastern provinces. The last region consists of large number of central 
provinces lying between the others (Çarkoğu divides this region into three sub-regions 
due to different competition patterns, Çarkoğlu, 2002).  In 2002 general elections, AKP 
was able to become the first party in 50 of the total provinces, mostly in the third region, 
                                               
11 Çarkoğlu calculates these indexes as follows. The volatility index (V) is calculated with the following 
formula where i=1,…N parties in the system : Vt=(1/2) Σ(Vote%i,t – Vote%i,t-1). Effective number of 
parties  is calculated by using again N parties in the following Formula Ft: 1/Σ(Vote%i,t)2. See Pedersen 
(1979) for volatility index and Laakso and Taagepera for the effective number of parties (1979).   
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while CHP became the first party in 15 coastal provinces. The support in 12 provinces 
in the Southeast region of Turkey was in favor of Pro-Kurdish party HADEP. The 2007 
general election was characterized by the shrinking of both first and second region in 
favor of AKP. While CHP managed to win the elections only in four provinces namely, 
Izmir, Edirne, Kırklareli and Tekirdağ, the independent candidates of HADEP became 
the first in only 6 provinces, namely Iğdır, Muş, Diyarbakır, Tunceli, Şırnak, Hakkari. 
MHP managed to be the first party in the provinces of Osmaniye and İçel.  AKP has 
managed to become the first party in all other provinces which total number is 69. The 
2011 general elections are characterized by a similar picture but with some variations. 
CHP managed to gain the province of Aydın, Muğla and Tunceli and became the first 
party in seven provinces. Similarly, the independent candidates of the pro-Kurdish party 
BDP became the winners in seven provinces, losing Tunceli and gaining Mardin and 
Van from AKP.  What is interesting is the increasing vote shares of AKP in the coastal 
provinces where CHP has been the winner. Nevertheless, this success seems to have 
come at the expenses of the party’s vote lost in the 9 Southeastern provinces in the 
Kurdish populated region. Within this respect, this region seems to have different 
competition patterns than the rest of Turkey.  
The electoral outcomes from 1999 to 2011 general elections and party system 
indicators show two important trends in the Turkish party system. First, it indicates the 
move towards a predominant party system where AKP managed to consolidate its 
leadership by increasing its vote shares in each consecutive election. Second, an 
important characteristic of this emerging predominant party system is the relative 
weakness of the three opposition parties, namely CHP, MHP and BDP vis-à-vis AKP.  
Furthermore, decreasing volatility among these block indicates the stabilization of the 
support for the four blocks. For the purpose of the study this outcomes signals the low 
probability of change in the system that could decrease the party’s control over the state 
resources unless it faces an unexpected organizational economic crisis.  Yet, the 
stabilization of the system also reveals the difficulties the party may face in increasing it 
electoral support. Under these circumstances, the party may decide to mobilize 
ideologically swing voters through the distribution of the state resources to increase its 
support.   Within this respect, as it will be evaluated in the next section the nature of the 
competition the party faces with BDP among voters of Kurdish origin makes these 
voters  potential targets.  
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3.4- Identifying Electoral Competition between AKP and the Pro-Kurdish 
Parties 
 
 
This section builds upon demonstrating first, how AKP and BDP become the two 
major competitors among voters of Kurdish origin from 1990’s until the general 
elections of  2011. The second objective is to depict the volatility of the votes among 
these voters for the two parties. The study will depict a historical account of the election 
results within two periods in the Kurdish populated region. The first covers the period 
beginning with the formation of the first pro-Kurdish party in 1990 until the 2002 
general election where AKP entered the electoral scene. The second period will be an 
analysis of the developments until the 2011 general elections. Then, the changing 
electoral competition in the region will be analyzed through basic indicators such as the 
ideological shift, volatility index, effective number of parties and margin of victory will 
be evaluated. A similar analysis will also be conducted for each of the provinces. This 
analysis is carried to be able to show two patterns. First, it will demonstrate the high 
magnitude of the volatility of the votes that regional indicators do not capture. Second, 
it will indicate that AKP and BDP are also the main competitors in each of the 
provinces expect for Tunceli and Iğdır capturing to gather nearly all of the votes. The 
provinces included for the measurements consist of provinces specified in table 3.4. The 
basic criteria of selection were first demography; second the presence of deputy 
candidates of BDP in 2011 general elections. Although the field research of the study 
has been conducted in Istanbul and BDP entered the elections with independent deputy 
candidates, the province has been excluded from the calculations as it deviates in terms 
of the percentage of the Kurdish population residing in these provinces. Such a decision 
was the natural outcome of the objective of this section, which aims at evaluating the 
electoral preferences of voters of Kurdish origin by analyzing aggregate data. The 
incorporation of Istanbul that has a large quantity of non-Kurdish voters would increase 
the specific risk of miscalculating the electoral preferences of voters of Kurdish origin.   
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3.2.1- The Pro-Kurdish Parties Entering the Competition (1990-2002) 
 
 
Support for pro-Kurdish parties began in 1995 general elections when DEP 
decided to enter the elections in the region on its own. The party managed to get 
24,67% (see table 3.5) of the votes in the region, but it could not get representation in 
the parliament, gaining  4,5% of the national vote shares, a percentage far below the 
10% national threshold. The regional electoral performance of the party was not 
uniform and diverged between two groups of provinces. Its electoral votes shares was 
high and the party was the first in provinces such as Hakkari,  Diyarbakır, Batman, Van, 
Şırnak, Mardin gaining respectively 54.2%,  46.34%, 37.24%, 28%,  25.95% and 
21.95% of the vote shares. On the other hand, the party’s vote shares were moderate in 
provinces such Bitlis, Bingöl, Kars where its support was 10%, 7.11% and 7.77% (for 
the parties vote shares in each province consult table 1.5). The second party was RP that 
received 23.48% of the total votes, while DYP and ANAP were respectively the third 
and fourth parties gaining 16,27% and 15,97% of the vote shares. The bad performance 
especially of CHP compared with 1991 general elections indicates how poor the true 
electoral base of the party was in the region. The inability of HADEP to enter the 
parliament created a representational bias in favor of other political parties; namely RP, 
DYP and ANAP.   
HADEP entered the 1999 general elections in a political environment of 
increasing tone of Turkish nationalism due to the arrest of the PKK  leader Öcalan in 
Kenya and his return to Turkey under the responsibility of the government led by DSP. 
DSP and MHP were among the winners of the elections at the national level. They were 
even able to moderately increase their vote shares in the southeast province. Gaining 
nationally 4,75 % of the support HADEP once again could not pass the 10% threshold 
and stood out of the parliament.   Nevertheless, the real winner in the region was once 
again HADEP increasing its vote shares to 29,32% in nearly all provinces except 
Şırnak. This was especially the case, in provinces such as Muş, Ağrı and Kars where the 
party’s performance was moderate in 1995 general elections (see table1.5). The party 
also gained considerable number of votes in the coastal provinces of Mersin and 
Istanbul raising its electoral support to 8.8% and 4 % respectively. The decrease in the 
support for FP which could only receive 15,49%  of the votes, was another important 
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outcome.  The two parties were followed by DYP and ANAP gaining 15.31% and 
12.65% of the votes. As in the 1995 general elections RP, who gain 22 out of 70 seats 
with 15,49% was the party that benefited from the inability of HADEP to pass the 10% 
threshold.  
 
 
Provincial Level Vote Shares for AKP and BDP in (1995-2011) 
    AKP* Pro-Kurdish Parties 
Province 
est . 
Kurd. 
Pop. 
AKP 
2011 
AKP 
2009 
AKP 
2007 
AKP 
2002 
FP 
1999 
RP 
1995 
BDP 
2011 
DTP 
2009 
DTP 
2007 
DEHAP 
2002 
HADEP 
1999 
HADEP 
1995 
Hakkari 89,47% 16,5 15,1 33,5 6,8 9,9 6 79,8 80,2  6, 45,1 46,1 54,2 
Şırnak 79,03% 20,6 42,6 26,9 14 11,14 8,3 72,3 53,7 51,8 45,9 24,1 25,9 
Siirt 78,78% 48 45,8 48,8 84,8 13,4 28 42,5 49,4 39,5 0 22,1 26,6 
Batman 76,81% 37,1 36,7 46,4 20,6 13,9 25,8 51,5 59,7 39,4 47,1 43,4 37,2 
Bingöl 76,63% 67,1 42,8 71,1 31,7 24,4 51,6 23,9 33,8 14,3 22,2 12,9 7,1 
Mardin 74,84% 32,2 45 44,1 15,4 11,8 20 60,9 36,3 38,8 39,6 25,3 22 
Diyarbakır 72,78% 32,2 31,3 40,9 16 14,6 18,8 61,7 65,6 47 56,1 45,9 46,3 
Van 70,70% 40,2 39,2 53,2 25,9 18,9 23,8 49,5 53,5 32,6 40,9 35,7 28 
Ağrı 70,45% 47,6 39,6 63 17,7 12,8 30,7 43,4 32,4 24,4 35,1 33,7 17,9 
Muş 67,75% 42,8 37,2 38,6 16,9 10,9 29,7 44,3 50,5 45,8 38,1 31,8 16,7 
Bitlis  64,03% 50,7 43,1 58,8 17,7 20,8 29 40,2 34,4 21,8 29,6 13,7 10 
Tunceli 55,90% 15,8 21,6 12,3 6,7 2,4 2,7 22,2 30 60 32,5 13,4 16,9 
Şanlıurfa 47,84% 63,5 39,3 59,8 22,9 21,4 26,2 27 10,5 20,1 19,3 16,6 13,7 
Iğdır 19,02% 28,3 30,5 28,9 6,5 12,9 9,4 31,5 39,6 40,5 32,7 29,7 21,6 
Kars 19,02% 42,6 32,7 41,2 17,2 9,8 20,5 19,2 14,7 15,6 19,6 17,5 6,8 
İçel 9,71% 32 21,3 27,2 18,1 5,2 10,7 9,7 17,5 6,6 9,5 8,8 7,9 
İstanbul 8,16% 49,4 44,2 45,2 37,2 21,3 23,9 5,3 4,6 5,9 5,5 4 3,6 
Table 3.4: Provincial electoral vote shares of AKP and pro-Kurdish parties (1995-2011) 
*AKP was founded as the result of the division of FP in 2002 who entered the elections under the name of RP 
in 1995 and FP in 1999 general elections. So the vote shares of AKP for 1995 and 1999 general elections in the table 
are the vote shares of these parties. 
 
At the provincial level, HADEP managed to be the first party in Iğdır, Ağrı, Muş, 
Diyarbakır, Van, Hakkari, Batman, Mardin, Şırnak and Siirt.12 The second party was RP 
in the first seven provinces while in the last three provinces HADEP was followed by 
DYP and ANAP. Kars, Bitlis, Bingöl, Adıyaman and Ş.Urfa was dominated by RP, 
followed by DYP and ANAP, while HADEP’s performance was poor.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
12 In his study where he effectuates a cluster analysis Çarkoğlu (2000) finds three different clusters where 
the electoral results diverges. He separates Mardin , Şırnak and Siirt as in contrast to the other 7 provinces 
the party that follows HADEP is DYP or ANAP instead of RP. 
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3.2.2- Entering of AKP in the electoral scene and Changing competition after the 
2002 general elections 
 
 
The reluctance of major political parties and state institutions to recognize 
HADEP as the legitimate representative of the Kurdish issue and as a result, attempt to 
push the party out of the system by emphasizing its relationship with PKK was still a 
major problem the party faced when 2002 general elections were approaching. As a 
result of the possible closure of HADEP, the party entered the general elections under 
the name of DEHAP which was established in 1997.  Gaining 6,14% of the national 
vote shares  DEHAP once again remained out of parliament while significantly 
expanding its electoral base when compared with the 1995 and 1999 elections. Its 
support rose to 36,10% in the region and only in Hakkari did DEHAP obtain a slightly 
lower level of support than HADEP gained then. In all other provinces, DEHAP 
increased its vote shares by an average of about ten percentage points. The second party 
in the region was AKP who gained 20,45% of the votes, a performance above its 
precedent’s in 1999 elections but still below 1995. Nevertheless, AKP expanded the 
votes of former FP in all the provinces in this region except Bitlis, Hakkari and Igdır.13 
DYP and ANAP, which respectively gained 9.25% and 6.38%, lost half of their support 
in the region. Another, remarkable outcome outside of the region was the moderately 
increasing trend in DEHAP’s vote shares in the province of Mersin and Istanbul where 
it gained 9,5% and 5.5 % of the total votes.    
 
Electoral vote shares of political parties (Southeast Region) 
  1995 1999 2002 2007 2009 2011 
AKP  ------  ------ 20,45 47,96 34,00 42,10 
BDP 24,67 29,32 36,10 34,70 43,00 46,78 
CHP 4,09 5,08 8,70 4,96   4,38 
MHP 5,17 6,41 4,82 4,25   3,28 
SP 23,48 15,49 3,30 1,30   0,50 
DP  ------  ------  ------ 4,72   0,35 
GP  ------  ------ 1,51 0,48   0,00 
DSP 3,27 5,67 0,88 0,00   0,34 
ANAP 15,97 12,65 6,38  ------    ------ 
DYP 16,27 15,31 9,25  ------    ------ 
Independents 4,20 4,70 5,87       
Others 2,87 5,38 2,73 1,64   2,19 
Table 3.5: Regional level electoral vote shares of political parties 
                                               
13 Similar results were found by Çarkoğlu (2002)  
92 
 
In terms of the winners at provincial level, once again two different clusters could 
be identified. The first cluster consisted of 13 provinces Ağrı, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, 
Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Batman, Şırnak, Iğdır, Kars where DEHAP 
was the first party and AKP the second party. Compared to 1999 general elections 
DEHAP managed to take from the pro-Islamist FP the provinces of Bitlis, Siirt and 
Şırnak (see table 3.4).  Only in two provinces Şanlıurfa and Bingöl AKP managed to be 
the first party but its votes share were still very low.14 Although elections results was a 
success for DEHAP, the national threshold  left the party out of the parliament and 
worked in favor of AKP who gained 40 of 64 parliamentary seats from the region with 
20,45% of the votes. 
Stability was the main characteristics in the economic field of Turkey before 2007 
general elections. Inflation dropped steadily since 2002 and was accompanied by 
considerable economic growth (Çarkoğlu, 2012b).  In contrast, the 2007 general 
elections took place in a highly polarized political environment characterized by the 
conflict between AKP as the representative of the common people constituting the 
periphery and the state institutions as the defenders of the Republican Center. The 
capture of the presidency by the periphery, a position designed as the representative of 
the center in the 1982 constitution, was at the heart of the debate. The elections was 
perceived in a way as the struggle between the representative of the peripheral forces, in 
which the Kurdish population constitutes one of the important players, in favor of 
change and the central forces that defended the status-quo. Both developments seem to 
have contributed to the electoral support for the party at national, regional and 
provincial level.    
The positive stand of AKP towards the Kurdish problem, during the first period of 
its incumbency, increased sympathy for the party among citizens of Kurdish origin. The 
democratic reforms carried within the cadre of the EU accession program accepted in 
August 2002 were important dimensions of this support. Changes carried within this 
framework were, the lifting of the emergency rule over 13 Kurdish populated provinces, 
the introduction of broadcasting and right of education in the mother tongue on a 
limited basis and the realization of necessary amendments to release imprisoned former 
                                               
14 For more information on the difference in the performance of other political parties consult Çarkoğlu’s  
(2002) Cluster Analysis. 
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HADEP deputies15. As Larabee and Tol (2011, p. 146) point it out, although these 
reforms initially helped the AKP to improve its political support among the Kurds, they 
were hindered by bureaucratic obstacles. The speech of Erdoğan in August 2005 in 
Diyarbakır was in a sense the declaration of AKP’s position on the Kurdish issue. While 
proclaiming that he was against regional or ethnic separatist movements, the prime 
minister defined past policies of state bureaucracy as a mistake and asserted his support 
for cultural pluralism tolerant to minority cultures (Efegil, 2011, 31).  
 Meanwhile, the pro-Kurdish party HADEP faced the same destiny with its 
processors and was closed by the constitutional Court in 2003. The movement entered 
the 2007 general election under the newly formed DTP. For DTP the 2007 general 
elections was a turning point, since the party attempted to circumvent the 10% threshold 
by running the elections with independent candidates in the Kurdish populated region 
and the coastal provinces of Istanbul and Mersin. Although the party managed to enter 
the parliament, as Arıkan and Şekercioğlu (2008) points it out, one of the most 
important results of the 2007 general elections has been the penetration of AKP in the 
Kurdish populated region. The votes shares of DTP, decreased only by 2 %, but AKP 
managed to increase its support to 47,96% in the region. In the provinces of Diyarbakır, 
Mardin, Batman, Van, Ağrı, Bitlis, Bingöl and Kars the vote shares of DTP decreased 
between 3 and 9 %. On the other hand, AKP increased its support in all 15 provinces 
except Siirt (see table 3.4). While DTP got the largest electoral support in the provinces 
of Hakkari, Şırnak, Diyarbakır, Iğdır, Tunceli, Muş followed by AKP, AKP gained the 
highest vote shares in the provinces of Mardin, Batman, Van, Ağrı, Siirt, Bitlis, Ş.Urfa, 
Bingöl and Kars.16  Representing the center right DP’s vote shares shrunk to 4,72%. 
MHP and CHP gaining each less than 5% faced similar results.  DTP managed to gain 
22 of 70 parliamentary seats, while AKP obtained 45 of them. Still, this representation 
was far below DTP’s electoral vote shares, thanks to the 10% threshold forcing the 
party to enter the elections with independent candidates.  DTP’s performance in the 
coastal provinces was divergent. While its vote shares were nearly constant in Istanbul 
with 5.9%, in Mersin the party experienced a considerable decrease of 3% gaining 6.6% 
                                               
15 The rule had been in place for more than 15 years and was blamed for huge human rights violations 
against the citizens living in the region.  Although the constitutional amendment permitting the mother 
tongue broadcasting was carried during the former government, AKP managed to overcome bureaucratic 
resistance to its implementation (Kirişçi, 2011,p. 340) 
16 For more details on a cluster analysis of the region consult Arıkan & Şekercioğlu (2008) 
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of the total vote shares. Nevertheless, the party managed to gain two seats in the 
parliament from Istanbul.   
AKP’s success in the region in the 2007 general elections meant that the 
government would have to address the Kurdish question if it wanted this support to 
persist. In fact, the sharp decrease in the party’s votes in the 2009 municipal elections 
(see table 3.4) was an important signal sent to the government in this sense since the 
party’s support decreased to 34% in favor of DTP. Çarkoğlu (2009a, 2009b) suggests 
that decrease in AKP’s vote shares not only in the Kurdish populated region but also at 
the national level was also affected by the decreasing economic performance of the 
party.  Having pretty well understood this message, AKP decided to take a huge step on 
the Kurdish issue on October 2009 by not only giving a series of rights to the citizens of  
Kurdish origin but also initiating several attempts to solve the problem of PKK under 
the so called the ‘democratic Opening’ package. Differentiating between the Kurdish 
issue and PKK terrorism, the major aim was to increase the legitimacy of the state in the 
region through the improvement of economic, social and cultural conditions and the 
amendment of constitution. Indeed, several steps have been taken before the declaration 
of the “democratic opening” package such as the repeal of the ban on Kurdish, the 
implementation of the decision taken in 2002 to lift emergency law, permission for 
broadcasting in Kurdish in 2004, and the opening of public TV in Kurdish-TRT 6 in 
2008 (Kirişçi, 2011). Concerning the PKK terrorism, an important step was the 
government’s attempts of amnesty and permission to 34 PKK members from PKK’s 
Kandil and Makhmour Camps situated in Iraq to return to Turkey. Polarization between 
the citizens of Kurdish origin who interpreted this as a victory and reaction from 
Nationalist circles forced the government to retreat from its policy, end the democratic 
opening even before it has actually started. (Çiçek 2011, p.15) 
Developments after the stillborn democratic opening package have been largely 
characterized by the attempts of both AKP and state institutions to delegitimize the DTP 
as the representative of the citizens of Kurdish origin. Growing polarization between the 
two parties was in a sense in accordance with AKP policy to proclaim itself as the only 
legitimate party capable of solving the Kurdish issue. The closure of DTP in December 
2009 by the Constitutional Court and the political ban put to important names of the 
party for 5 years was another important development, confirming once more the state’s 
unchanged position towards the pro-Kurdish parties. This resulted in the expulsion of 
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two deputies of DTP, co-presidents of the party at the same time, Ahmet Türk and Aysel 
Tuğluk, from the parliament on the grounds of supporting and maintaining organic links 
with the PKK. The DTP was replaced by a new pro-Kurdish political party called the 
Peace and Democracy Party (BDP-Barış ve Democracy Partisi) led by Selahattin 
Demirtaş. The arrestment of about 1,500 Kurdish politicians, including mayors, vice 
presidents, former MPs and directors of central and local branches of the DTP (Çiçek, 
2011) as a result of the operations against the Union of Communities in Kurdistan 
(KCK) increased polarization concerning the Kurdish issue. It was under these 
circumstances that Turkey entered the 2011 general elections. The main agenda of the 
elections set by AKP was the making of a new constitution for a more democratic 
Turkey. During the electoral campaigning period, declarations of Erdoğan on the 
Kurdish issue had sometimes a tone so harsh that some authors have introduced it as a 
u-turn in AKP’s policy (Arıkan Akdağ, 2012; Şekercioğlu & Arıkan, 2012). 
In this political context, the result of the 2011 general elections in the region was 
an increase in the vote shares of BDP.  While BDP increase its votes to 46.78%, AKP’s 
electoral support decreased to 42.10 %. These results coincide respectively to nearly 
12% higher for BDP and 5% lower for AKP when compared with 2007 general 
elections. When vote shares at provincial level are analyzed, we observe a considerable 
decrease in AKP’s support in most of the provinces except Muş, Siirt, Ş.Urfa, Tunceli, 
Kars while BDP increased its votes in 13 provinces. The exception was Tunceli and 
Iğdır, the only two provinces where a third competitor performed very well, 
respectively CHP and MHP. If these two provinces are excluded from the observations 
two clusters can still be identified even if number of provinces in each clusters have 
changed. BDP became the winner in seven provinces: Hakkari, Şırnak, Diyarbakır, 
Mardin, Batman, Van and Muş; while AKP saved its position in the provinces of Ağrı, 
Siirt, Bitlis, Ş.Urfa and Bingöl and lost its position in Mardin, Batman and Van. DYP 
and SP’s vote shrunk even more in size decreasing each to less than 0.5%. CHP and 
MHP managed to save their considerably small vote shares. The allocation of the seats 
was once again favoring AKP who got the right to be represented in the parliament with 
37 seats.  The allocation of the remaining seats was 30 for BDP, 2 for CHP from 
Tunceli and 1 for MHP from Iğdır. The performance of BDP in the provinces of 
Istanbul and Mersin was 5.3% and 9.7%. With these electoral results, the party managed 
to gain one seat from Mersin and threes parliamentary seats from Istanbul. 
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Graph 3.1: Regional level electoral vote shares of political parties (1995-2011) 
 
 
3.2.3- Analysis of the General Trend in Party System Indicators in the Region. 
 
 
The electoral characteristics from 1991 to 2011 reveal an important change in the 
nature of the competition in the Kurdish populated region. In the first period between 
1991 and 2002 the region face a multiplicity of competitors as pro-Kurdish and RP 
enter the scene as real challengers to the existing parties, DYP and ANAP. The second 
period that begins with the entering of AKP into Turkish politics indicates the beginning 
of the stabilization of the system around two forces that represent the periphery, AKP 
and pro-Kurdish. This trend coincides with a considerable shift in the ideological 
composition of the vote preferences similar to the rest of Turkey.  Nevertheless, the 
picture at region differentiates from the whole of Turkey in two senses. First, Although 
AKP faces relatively weak opposing forces at the national level, in the Kurdish 
populated region it has to compete with a strong opposition. Second, although at 
national level the electoral base of the four parties functioning effectively in the system 
seems to be stable, the provincial electoral shifts from 2007 to 2011 general elections 
indicate the competition of two parties for a considerably large common electoral base. 
This section will evaluate in detail these major trends in the party system characteristics 
at both regional and provincial level.  
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Regional level ideological shifts (1995-2011) 
  1995 1999 2002 2007 2011 
AKP 20,45 47,96 42,10 
Center-Left  7,36 10,75 9,58 4,96 4,71 
Center-Right  32,25 27,96 17,15 5,20 0,35 
Extreme-Right  28,65 21,90 28,58 53,51 45,89 
Extreme-Right without AKP 28,65 21,90 8,12 5,55 3,78 
Extreme-Left 24,67 29,32 36,10 34,70 46,78 
others  8,07 27,96 15,64 0,00 0,00 
total right  60,90 49,85 45,72 58,71 46,23 
Total Left 32,03 40,07 45,69 39,65 51,49 
Table 3.6: Regional level ideological shifts (1995-2011) 
 
 
Graph 3.4: Regional level ideological shifts (1995-2011) 
 
Table 3.6 and Graph 3.4 show the percentage of the support to each ideological 
group of parties in the region. The erosion of the support for the center-right parties 
throughout the period under investigation is one of the most important trends. While in 
1995 these parties gained 32,25% of the support, this share gradually decreases across 
elections and finally reaches 0,35% in 2011 general elections. Nevertheless, in contrast 
to the national level tendencies this decrease seems not only to favor pro-Islamist (RP, 
FP and AKP) but also pro-Kurdish parties. Graph 3.5 illustrates the vote shares in terms 
of left and right scale. An interesting observation is the shifts between the two poles 
across elections. From 1995 to 2002 one can observe increase in the left spectrum at the 
expense of the right. Nevertheless, the 2007 general elections are critical in the sense 
that the right recaptures an important amount of the votes. On the other hand, the 2011 
general elections is characterized by an opposite direction. Although AKP becomes the 
only representative of the extreme right in the region where both SP and MHP have 
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considerably poor support, it seems that, as the representative of the extreme-left, 
especially in 2011 general elections BDP managed to gain an important portion of the 
right support. This means that although support for AKP is high for 2007 and 2011 
elections, when it is compared with the total vote shares of the right in 1995 general 
elections, a considerable amount seems to have shifted to the left in favor of the pro-
Kurdish parties, especially in 2011 general elections. When we compare the total vote 
shares of the left (center left + extreme left) we see an increase of nearly 18% from 
1995 to 2011. 
 
 
Graph 3.5: Regional level left/right shifts (1995-2011) 
 
 The effective number of parties supports the diverging trend in terms of 
fragmentation in the region. The increasing fragmentation in the region between 1995 
and 1999 general elections is also reflected in the effective number of parties.  
Furthermore, the declining trend in effective number of parties after 2002 signals the 
presence of a competitive system dominated by two ideologically opposed groups on 
the left/right dimension, each represented by one party. Within this respect, as 
illustrated in table 3.7, Although AKP and BDP took together nearly 57% of the total 
votes in the region in 2002 general elections, this amount got larger in 2007 with 82,5% 
and has its peak in 2011 where the two parties got 89% of the total votes.  The effective 
number of parties gradually decreased from 6.08 in 1995, 4.99 in 2002 to 2.8 in 2007 
and 2.5 in 2011 (see Table 3.6).  It should be taken into account that this number can 
even be lower if Iğdır where MHP is traditionally strong and Tunceli where CHP’s 
support is high is excluded from the observations. Within this respect, low level of 
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fragmentation is an important characteristic of the electoral competition in the region. 
As Şekercioğlu & Arıkan ( 2012) points it out unlike in the Western Anatolia where AKP 
has one strong or moderately sized opposition (either CHP or MHP), in the East and 
Southeast apart from the independents AKP has no real competitors.  
 
Regional level total electoral support for AKP and pro-Kurdish parties 
(1995-2011) 
 
1995* 1999* 2002 2007 2009 2011 
*AKP + pro-
Kurdish parties 48,15 44,81 56,56 82,65 77,00 88,88 
Table 3.7: Regional level total electoral support for AKP and pro-Kurdish parties (1995-2011) 
* The vote shares of AKP for 1995 and 1999 general elections in the table are the vote shares of RP for 1995 
and FP for 1999 general elections. 
 
 
When the regional trend is compared with the national trend, we can observe a 
similar pattern at both levels. 1999 was the election the most fragmented of all elections 
at both national and regional level where respectively 6.73 and 6.08 effective parties 
were competing in the system while the decreasing general trend after 1999 general 
elections is similar. What differentiated the regional as opposed to national level 
fragmentation is the lower level of effective number of parties in the Kurdish populated 
region which are 4.99, 2.80 and 2.50 compared to 5.41, 3.46 and 2.96 at the national 
level for 2002, 2007 and 2011 general elections. 
 
 
Graph 3.6: Effective number of parties (Regional vs National) (1995-2011) 
* The formula used by Çarkoğlu has been selected for calculating the effective number of parties and 
Volatility index. The basic motivation was being able to compare the results.17 
                                               
17 For detailed information on the calculation of effective number of parties and volatility index consult 
footnote 11.   
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Graph 3.7 illustrates the regional and national pattern of volatility index, which 
shows the amount of the shift in voters’ preferences for parties across two consecutive 
elections. Although there is no available data at individual level to confirm this trend, 
regional level indicators reveal different patterns across elections. Within this respect, 
2002 and 2007 general elections seems to be critical in the changing preferences of 
voters; whereas in 1999 and 2011 general elections, voters’ preferences at regional level 
seem to be considerably more stable. This is an interesting outcome when the strong 
opposed position of AKP to the Kurdish problem during the elections is taken into 
consideration. Within this respect, when compared with national level volatility index 
throughout the period one can observe a different trend. Although 2002 is characterized 
by a sharp increase in the volatility (0,44) at national level, this trend was lower for the 
region. On the other hand, while the decrease in volatility index to 0,18 in 2007 at the 
national level indicates a stabilization at national level in terms of party preferences, this 
seems not to be true for the region. Voters’ preferences in this election have once again 
shifted. 
 
Graph 3.7: Volatility index (National VS Regional)  (1995-2011) 
 
The effective number of parties and volatility index together indicate the 
formation of an electoral context with two competing parties that have considerably 
solid block of supporters.  Nevertheless, one should be careful in evaluating the regional 
level effective number of parties and volatility index since a different picture may be 
inherent at lower levels.  
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Although the effective numbers of parties at provincial and regional level indicate 
a similar competition, the volatility index reveals greater shift in the vote shares 
between AKP and BDP that cannot be observed at the regional level. When the 
effective number of parties in each province is analyzed decreasing amount of effective 
number of parties across elections and a stabilization between 2 and 2,50 after the 2011 
general elections seems to be a common characteristics. This signifies a major 
competition between AKP and BDP.  This is in conformity with regional level data.  
Kars and Iğdır with around 3.5 point are exceptions. Table 3.9 illustrates the total of the 
votes gained by AKP and BDP in each of the provinces across elections. In all the 
provinces, the two parties together have managed to gain nearly 90% of the votes in 
both 2007 and 2011 general elections with the exception of Tunceli, Kars and Iğdır. 
Provincial results also confirm the suggestion that the competition is mainly between 
AKP and BDP in all the provinces.  
 
Provincial level total electoral support for AKP and 
pro-Kurdish parties(1995-2011) 
Province 2002 2007 2009 2011 
Hakkari 51,9 89,7 95,3 96,3 
Şırnak 59,9 78,7 96,3 92,9 
Diyarbakır 72,1 87,9 96,9 93,9 
Mardin 55 82,9 81,3 93,1 
Batman 67,7 85,8 96,4 88,6 
Van 66,8 85,8 92,7 89,7 
Muş 55 84,4 87,7 87,1 
Ağrı 52,8 87,4 72 91 
Siirt 84,8 88,3 95,2 90,5 
Bitlis  47,3 80,6 77,5 90,9 
Iğdır 39,2 69,4 70,1 59,8 
Şanlıurfa 42,2 79,9 49,8 90,5 
Bingöl 53,9 85,4 76,6 91 
Tunceli 39,2 72,3 51,6 38 
Kars 36,8 56,8 47,4 61,8 
Table 3.8: Provincial level total electoral support for AKP and pro-Kurdish parties (1995-2011) 
 
In contrast, although regional level volatility index signals low level of shift in 
voters’ preferences, provincial level data indicates a divergence in this pattern. While in 
some provinces such as Muş, Siirt, Bingöl, Ş.Urfa, Kars the volatility index in 2011 
general elections is about 0.10, in other provinces such as Hakkari, Diyarbakır, Şırnak, 
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Mardin, Ağrı, Van, Batman, Bitlis the index is between 0.16-0.24.18 This means that in 
the first group of provinces, the parties have been able to keep an important amount of 
the vote shares compared to 2007.  The situation in the second group of provinces is 
different. The high level of volatility signifies the larger shifts in voters’ preferences 
from one party to the other.  
 
Provincial volatility index (1999-2011) Provincial effective number of parties (1999-2011)  
  2002-1999 2007-2002 2011-2007 1999 2002 2007 2011 
Hakkari 0,30 0,40 0,24 3,68 3,64 2,32 1,51 
şırnak 0,26 0,29 0,21 6,77 3,85 2,83 1,76 
Diyarbakır 0,20 0,31 0,16 3,77 2,84 2,55 2,06 
Mardin 0,31 0,34 0,23 6,17 4,61 2,83 2,10 
Batman 0,17 0,32 0,16 4,06 3,50 2,66 2,45 
Van 0,19 0,30 0,17 5,02 4,02 2,54 2,44 
Muş 0,19 0,36 0,09 5,96 4,79 2,74 2,61 
Ağrı 0,21 0,48 0,21 5,56 5,40 2,17 2,40 
Siirt 0,79 0,46 0,06 6,60 1,35 2,52 2,42 
bitlis 0,34 0,47 0,20 6,77 5,90 2,47 2,38 
Iğdır 0,18 0,36 0,21 5,78 5,62 3,57 3,37 
Şanlıurfa 0,19 0,44 0,12 6,06 6,75 2,45 2,09 
Bingöl 0,28 0,44 0,11 7,03 5,41 1,88 1,96 
Tunceli 0,34 0,34 0,45 7,09 4,92 2,45 2,47 
Kars 0,35 0,36 0,09 7,29 7,25 3,92 3,62 
Istanbul 0,10 0,23 0,47 5,43 4,58 3,35 2,80 
Table3.9 : Provincial level volatility index and effective number of parties (1999-2011) 
 
When the electoral votes shares of AKP and BDP across provinces for the 2007 
general, 2009 municipal and 2011 general elections is analyzed the changing nature of 
the vote shifts is interesting. Although the general decrease of AKP vote shares in the 
region for 2009 municipal and 2011 general elections compared to 2007 general 
elections is explained in terms the shift in AKP’s position and policies on the Kurdish 
issue, the provincial level results are not similar to this trend. As it can be seen from 
table 1.4 illustrating provincial level AKP and BDP votes, three diverging trends are 
present. While in provinces such as Şırnak, Mardin, Tunceli AKP’s vote shares 
decreased, it increased in the provinces of Muş, Ağrı, Siirt, Bitlis, Şanlıurfa, Bingöl, 
Kars and remained constant in Hakkari, Diyarbakır, Batman, Van, Iğdır.   
A considerable number of studies use the margin of victory defined as the 
difference between the two main competitors as an indicators of degree of competition 
                                               
18Iğdır and Tunceli have not been taken into consideration since the nature of the electoral competition is 
different. In Tunceli, where large number of citizens of the Alevi Islamic Sect resides, the votes shifted to 
CHP whose new president is from the same sect. In Iğdır MHP had a very stong candidate and managed 
to be the winner of the elections.  
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in a geographical unit. This may provide a reliable data to understand the diverging 
nature of competition between AKP and the pro-Kurdish parties at provincial level. 
Table 3.10 indicates the margin of victory for each of the provinces in the region. These 
values have been calculated simply by subtracting the pro-Kurdish parties’ vote shares 
from AKP vote shares for each general election. When the number has positive signs, 
the pro-Kurdish parties are the winners in the province while the negative sign means 
AKP is the winner. Furthermore, as the number decreases so does the margin of victory 
that indicates an increasing competition. Although 2009 elections are municipal and 
expected to be shaped by local factors as well, it has been indicated to give an idea of 
the competition. According to the table, in provinces of Hakkari, Şırnak and Diyarbakır 
where BDP has traditionally been the winner, the 2007 was critical in the sense that the 
margin of victory between the two parties drastically decreased, where as in 2011 
general elections it raised nearly at the 2002 level.   A similar pattern may be observed 
for the provinces of Mardin, Batman, Van, Ağrı and Bitlis where the ranking changed 
between the pro-Kurdish parties and AKP across elections. This is an expected outcome 
since AKP’s stance towards the Kurdish issue was different in each of the elections. 
What is interesting is the nearly constant nature of the margin of victory in provinces of 
Şanlıurfa, Bingöl, Kars and Siirt19 (except for 2002 in Siirt where AKP gained 87% of 
the votes) even in the polarized environment of the 2011 general elections. The decrease 
in the margin of victory in the provinces of  Muş and Iğdır in 2011 general elections 
where BDP was well ahead AKP in 2002 general elections is an even more interesting 
outcome. This divergence in the nature of the competition may indicate the possible 
effect of more provincial level parameters that have affected AKP’s mobilization 
strategy and voters preferences, independently from national level parameters. A 
diverging pattern can also be observed in the Western provinces of Mersin and Istanbul. 
Although margins of victory do not provide an appropriate tool to understand the shifts 
in votes since the change in AKP’s electoral support may have different sources, 
volatility of BDP vote shares may provide a certain measure. When the party’s votes 
shares are analyzed one can see the divergence between Istanbul where vote shares are 
stabilized to nearly 5.5 % and Mersin where BDP witnesses an increasing electoral 
support shifting from 9.5 in 2002 to 17.5% in 2011 (See table 3.4).  
                                               
19 This province deviates for the elections of 2002 where AKP gained nearly 85% of the votes. This is 
probably due to the circumstances specific to this election probably related with the candidate of AKP.  
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 Margin of victory between the pro-Kurdish parties-AKP  in 
each of the provinces (2002-2011) 
  
Province 2002 2007 2009 2011 
Hakkari 38,3 22,7 65,1 63,3 
Şırnak 31,9 24,9 11,1 51,7 
Diyarbakır 40,1 6,1 34,3 29,5 
Mardin 24,2 -5,3 -8,7 28,7 
Batman 26,5 -7 23 14,4 
Van 15 -20,6 14,3 9,3 
Muş 21,2 7,2 13,3 1,5 
Ağrı 17,4 -38,6 -7,2 -4,2 
Siirt -84,8 -9,3 3,6 -5,5 
Bitlis  11,9 -37 -8,7 -10,5 
Iğdır 26,2 11,6 9,1 3,2 
Şanlıurfa -3,6 -39,7 -28,8 -36,5 
Bingöl -9,5 -56,8 -9 -43,2 
Tunceli 25,8 47,7 8,4 6,4 
Kars 2,4 -25,6 -18 -23,4 
Table 3.10: Margin of victory between the pro-Kurdish parties-AKP  in each of the provinces 
(2002-2011) 
 
A detailed analysis of the vote shares at regional and provincial level our 
argument that AKP and the pro-Kurdish parties are the major competitors in nearly all 
of the provinces in the region while other political parties have poor performance with 
the exception of Iğdır and Tunceli. Yet, although at regional level 2011 general 
elections seems to indicate stabilization in terms of volatility, this stabilization seems to 
be lower when provincial level votes shift are taken into account. Volatility can also be 
traced in geographical subunits as lowest as neighborhoods. Furthermore, margins of 
victory at provincial level also indicate changes in the nature of the electoral 
competition between the two parties across provinces and elections. When the direction 
of this change is analyzed, discrepancy with the programmatic positioning of AKP can 
be observed. This, in turn, supports our expectation that besides its programmatic 
positioning, part of this change can be explained by clientelistic mobilization conducted 
at a more local level. Yet, a more detailed analysis should be conducted to draw an 
empirically valid conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SELECTION OF THE CASES 
 
 
 
 
The study aims at understanding the mobilization strategy of the party to 
consolidate or increase its votes among citizens of Kurdish origin and identify the 
factors affecting the implementation and effectiveness of this strategy. The previous 
section has identified the main hypothesis of the study. Within this respect, it has been 
suggested that clientelistic linkage provides an alternative source of accountability other 
than programmatic linkage for voters. Mobilization through the clientelistic network is 
expected to be especially important for consolidating or increasing ethnic votes in the 
elections of 2011 since the AKP positioned itself far from the Kurdish cause and closer 
to the ideological stand of MHP supporters. 
It has been suggested that the clientelistic linkage is expected to be more effective 
when carried through a party organization which is in repeated interaction with the 
voters since it increases identification of different types of voters and assure voluntary 
compliance. Nevertheless, the mobilization of citizens of Kurdish origin is argued to be 
different from other ideologically potential swing voters due to the potential of violence 
among Kurdish voters and the weakness of inter-community relations. Within this 
respect, mobilization is argued to more effective when carried through activists of 
Kurdish origin since they can more easily identify potential swing voters. Then the 
study suggests that effectiveness of mobilization, measured in terms of support for AKP 
among voters of Kurdish origin across the elections is based on the intensity of the 
interaction of the organization and the time of incorporation of activists of Kurdish 
origin into the network.   
The second hypothesis concerns the explanation of why not all district branches 
carry such a strategy if the intensity of the interaction of the organization and the 
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incorporation of citizens of Kurdish origin is a more effective strategy. Basing its 
assumption that most activists are motivated by selective incentive, the study suggests 
that the internal structure of the party organization, which regulates the distribution of 
these incentives, affects the ability of the party to adopt the necessary strategies to 
increase its network.  Even when it is electorally required to do so, centralized party 
organizations where power is concentrated at the higher levels of the organizational 
structure prevent the formation of a competitive rule of intra-party investment that 
motivate both present and new activists to work more actively for the party. On the 
other hand, the study suggest that such a change can only be carried when the district 
organization phases a critical juncture that for it to reformulate the horizontal and 
vertical power relations in the party.     
Since the major aim of the study is to measure the effect of such a network on 
mobilizing citizens of Kurdish origin and identify factors affecting the formation of 
such a network at the neighborhood level, it uses the method of similarity to select the 
districts where deeper analysis will be conducted, so as to control factors that can 
independently affect the mobilization strategy. AKP should first have an incentive to 
mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin. The party is expected to formulate such a strategy 
in districts where it would make a difference in the electoral outcomes. Then, the 
analysis should be conducted in districts where, AKP would have the incentive to 
mobilize these citizens. For the mobilization of citizens of Kurdish origin to be 
electorally efficient, first, there must be a considerable number of citizens of Kurdish 
origin that would affect the electoral outcome. Second, mobilization itself should have 
an effect on changing the preferences of the voters. Parties are expected to use material 
inducement when voters have lower socio-economic conditions since this makes them 
more sensitive to the provision of such an inducement. The amount of the competition 
the party faces is also expected to be effective in the decision of the district branches to 
increase their networks.  Other studies mention the amount of resources available to the 
political parties as a factor affecting different abilities of the political parties to motivate 
their activists (Calvo & Murillo, 2004, Chandra, 2004). Within this respect, all districts 
in Istanbul will be classified in terms of the estimated percentages of Kurdish origin, 
socioeconomic indicators, electoral competition and amount of resources available to 
the party so as to be able to select similar districts that diverge in terms of the electoral 
support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish origin. The next step has been to classify 
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the districts according to the dependent variable of the study: the effectiveness of 
mobilization of voters of Kurdish origin through clientelistic linkage. In order to 
measure the effectiveness of the mobilization strategy  the study uses the amount of 
support for BDP across elections in each of the districts.   
 Within this respect, this section will mainly focus on the classification of districts 
for case selection, according to the percentage of citizens of Kurdish origin, socio-
economic characteristics of citizens of Kurdish origin, amount of municipal resources 
and electoral patterns at district level. The last part, explains the logic behind the 
selection of Sancaktepe, Beyoğlu and Beykoz on the bases of method of similarity to 
test the main hypothesis of the study.   
 
 
4.7- Citizens of Kurdish origin in Istanbul: Size and Geographical Distribution 
across Districts 
 
 
The first assumption of the study is that the number of the citizens of Kurdish 
origin living in the district is an important indicator in AKP’s decision to formulate a 
mobilization strategy towards citizens of Kurdish origin. Furthermore, it also suggests 
that the strategy the party uses to mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin will diverge from 
the rest of the population. Within this realm, the first step in the study is to classify the 
districts in Istanbul according to their percentages of residents of Kurdish origin.  
The main difficulty in studying ethnic groups is the ambiguity in the definition of 
ethnicity (Sirkeci, 2000, p. 151).  Increasing number of works highlights the social 
relativity of ethnic identities. According to these studies, how a person defines 
him/herself is not constant and may change in the course of time and space (Hechter, 
1978, Nielson, 1985, p. 135; Schildkraut, 2005).  Nevertheless, the mostly used criterion 
in the literature to define these groups has been objective and measurable components 
such as language (Hutchinson & Smith, 1993; İçduygu, Romano & Sirkeci, 1999, 
Sirkeci, 2000 ; Koç, Hancıoğlu & Cavlin, 2008, p. 448; Kalaycıoğlu, 2010, p. 34,). A 
similar definition has been adopted in this study where ethnicity is measured by 
reference to mother tongue and knowledge of any sect of the Kurdish language. The 
general perception of the study towards ethnic identities does not contradict the social 
character of ethnicity. Quite to the contrary, by evaluating why some Kurdish-speaking 
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citizens tend to switch their votes to ethnic parties while others do not, the study 
sustains the social relativity of ethnicity and aims at transposing some of its possible 
causes.   
The major difficulty in the calculation the numbers of residents of Kurdish origin 
in each district is the lack of availability of this kind of data at national, municipal or 
district level. Although there are some considerable studies that have mostly used 
mathematical estimations, nearly all estimated the citizens of Kurdish origin at the 
national level.  Another major characteristics of these studies is the diversity in their 
estimation ranging from 7 to 20 million (Özsoy et al, 19992; Bruinessen, 1998; Sirkeci 
2000, Koç, Hancıoğlu & Cavlin, 2008, p. 449). Even if these studies merits attention 
they unfortunately do not provide a useful framework for the purpose of this study since 
it is impossible to extract the number of citizens of Kurdish origin at the district level. 
The only useful data is the estimations of Servet Mutlu (Mutlu, 1996) published in 1996 
which provides information on the percentage of Kurdish-speaking residents in each 
provinces of Turkey. Mutlu bases his estimation on the national census conducted in 
1935 and 1965, which provides the number of citizens of Kurdish origin according to 
their mother tongue.  By using provincial natural population growth rates and migration 
rates, the study pictures the distribution of Kurdish-speaking citizens for the year of 
1990 at the provincial level.  
As highlighted in the previous chapters, the data indicates the concentration of the 
Kurdish-speaking citizens in provinces of East and Southeast region of Turkey. 
Unfortunately, the estimated percentage of Kurdish population of provinces such as 
Aksaray, Ardahan, Bartın, Batman, Bayburt, Düzce, Iğdır, Karabük, Karaman, Kilis, 
Kırıkkale, Osmaniye, Şırnak,  Yalova which are provinces created after 1990, were not 
available in Mutlu’s estimations. These missing values have been calculated by taking 
the mean of the Kurdish population percentages of the provinces from which they have 
administratively been separated.20   
Since this data does not provide on its own the necessary information for 
estimating the percentages of citizens of Kurdish origin at district level an alternative 
strategy has been adopted. Data on the citizens’ province of registry, which is available 
at district level in Turkish Statistical Institute website, have been used for such a 
purpose. The necessary data has been calculated combining Mutlu’s estimations with 
                                               
20 These province have been formed after 1990. For more details on the calculation  see Appendix B. 
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2010 district level data on the distribution of province registry of the citizens in each 
district. Within this respect, the estimated number of Kurdish residents in each district 
has been calculated by summing the number of citizens registered to each provinces 
multiplied by the estimated percentage of Kurdish citizens in that province. The formula 
used is  
෍ܺ݅. ܻ݅
௡
௜:ଵ
 
In which  “n” denotes each provinces in Turkey; “Xi” is the number of residents 
in the given district that are registered to “n” the province  and “Yi” is the number of 
estimated percentage of Kurdish population in the “n” province. The estimated number 
of Kurdish-speaking residents of each districts of Istanbul is highlighted at table 4.2. 
 A possible criticism for this measurement can be the use of the data of 1990 for 
the estimated percentage of Kurdish citizens in each province instead of updating the 
data for 2009. This could have been a possible step since necessary variables for 
updating are statistically available.  In fact, the 1990 data has intentionally been used in 
the study.  The main logic derives from the fact that the province of registry of the 
residents in each district is expected to be slightly unchanged even if large amount of 
migration flow have occurred after 1990’s from the Kurdish-speaking region. Thus, 
although the actual demographic characteristics are expected to have changed due to 
large migration flows, these changes are not expected to be followed by a similar shift 
in the registration records.  This expectation is due to the fact that in Turkey, most 
residents do not transfer their registration records to the provinces they migrate, 
preferring to remain registered to their hometown province. As a result the 1990 data is 
expected to be a more accurate variable of measurement. 
Table 4.1 shows the estimated percentage of citizens of Kurdish origin, which is 
the result of the division of the estimated numbers of Kurdish citizens by the total 
population of each district in Istanbul. Concerning the calculations computed several 
remarks have to be made. First, in each district large numbers of citizens are registered 
to the province of Istanbul. These citizens are mostly the ones whose hometown origin 
is Istanbul since transfer of registration records is low among immigrants. Even if some 
citizens of Kurdish origin have the possibility to have transferred their records, it is 
impossible to distinguish them in that category. Furthermore, even if Mutlu found 8% of 
citizens of Kurdish origin residing in Istanbul, there is no information on which 
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province these citizens are registered to Istanbul or to their hometown origin. This 
creates the possibility of miscalculating the number of citizens of Kurdish origin 
especially in districts with high residents registered to Istanbul. In order to overcome 
this shortcoming the estimated number of citizens of Kurdish has been calculated in two 
different manners. First, a normal calculation has been conducted; then, the percentage 
of citizens of Kurdish origin living in Istanbul has been excluded from the calculation 
for each district. The first and second columns depict the estimated percentage of 
Kurdish citizens including and excluding the residents whose province of registry is 
Istanbul respectively for each district. Results especially diverge for districts with low 
percentages of estimated Kurdish population like Çatalca, Şile, Beşiktaş or Kadıköy. In 
contrast for districts with high percentages such Sultanbeyli, Sancaktepe, 
Küçükçekmece, Esenler or Beyoğlu the difference is less than 1%. Since the study will 
mainly focus on the districts with higher percentages of citizens of Kurdish origin, the 
possibility of over-estimation greatly decreases, strengthening the significance of the 
conducted estimations. Yet, at the cost of under-estimating the percentage of citizens of 
Kurdish origin, the study will take into account the second column for the classification 
of the districts.  
Furthermore, the calculation is based on the assumption that immigrants reflect 
the demographic composition of their provinces of origin in terms of the shares of the 
citizens of Kurdish origin in the population. For example, the immigrants in each 
district from Bingöl which has 76.63% of its population from Kurdish origin are 
assumed to have the same demographic composition. In reality, the immigration flows 
from the region beginning with 1990s, witnesses an over representation of the citizens 
of Kurdish origin.  As a result, the actual number of these residents in each district may 
be higher than the estimated ones.    Second, it is important to note that this calculation 
does not provide a precise number of the residents of Kurdish origin, but it provides an 
objective base for an accurate comparison and classification of the districts in terms of 
their residing citizens of Kurdish origin which is a sufficient condition for the purpose 
of the study.  
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% Estimation of citizens of Kurdish origin in each district for 2009 
District 
Normal 
Estimation Ist. %0 District 
Normal 
Estimation Ist. %0 
Çatalca 9,58 4,02 Ist. Mean 13,10 11,88 
Beykoz 6,99 4,33 Ümraniye 13,21 12,19 
Şile 9,51 4,59 Tuzla 13,76 12,89 
Beşiktaş 8,62 5,66 Avcılar 14,47 13,12 
Kadıköy 9,38 6,54 G.osmanpaşa 15,53 14,14 
B.paşa 9,20 7,03 Beyoğlu 15,68 14,38 
Sarıyer 9,09 7,31 K.çekmece 15,73 14,73 
B.çekmece 10,07 8,01 Arnavutköy 16,35 15,34 
Bakırköy 11,34 8,30 Sancaktepe 16,00 15,58 
Silivri 11,80 8,43 Bahçelievler 17,12 16,09 
Şişli 10,61 8,70 Fatih 18,32 16,29 
Üsküdar 10,49 8,77 Esenler 16,94 16,38 
Eyüp 11,13 9,35 Güngören 18,09 17,01 
Ataşehir 10,63 9,56 Esenyurt 17,85 17,17 
Maltepe 11,05 9,59 Bağcılar 18,76 18,21 
Pendik 10,61 9,80 Sultangazi 18,91 18,41 
Adalar 13,29 9,87 Başakşehir 19,32 18,47 
Çekmeköy 11,51 10,18 Z.burnu 20,14 18,54 
Beylikdüzü 12,82 11,01 Sultanbeyli 20,25 20,01 
Kağıthane 12,24 11,38 
Kartal 13,13 11,83 
Table 4.1: Estimated percentage of citizens of Kurdish origin in the districts of Istanbul 
for 2009 
 
According to the calculations, approximately 11% of Istanbul’s population is from 
Kurdish origin. This corresponds to a population of 1,470 million out of 12.867 million 
for the year of 2009. The results indicates diversity in terms of residents of Kurdish 
origin in each districts ranging from 4% to 20 %  and concentrating in certain districts 
such as Gaziosmanpaşa, Beyoğlu, Küçükçekmece, Arnavutköy, Sancaktepe, 
Bahçelievler, Fatih, Esenler, Güngören, Esenyurt, Bağcılar, Sultangazi, Başakşehir, 
Zeytinburnu and Sultanbeyli having between 14-20% of residents of Kurdish origin. 
Where as in districts such as Çatalca, Beykoz, Şile, Beşiktaş their percentage is below 
6%. In fact, the identified districts with higher number of citizens of Kurdish origin is 
sustained by the work of Çelik who states districts such as Ümraniye, Bağcılar, 
Sultanbeyli, Gaziosmanpaşa, Küçükçekmece, Sarıyer and Beyoğlu as districts where 
large number of Kurdish citizens have immigrated after 1990s (Çelik, 2002, p:116). It is 
important to note that the districts of Arnavutköy, Sancaktepe, Esenyurt, Sultangazi, 
Başakşehir are absent in Çelik’s work. Yet, the main reason is the establishment of 
these districts in 2008 after her study. Similarly, the Kurdish population of Fatih has 
increased after it has unified with Eminönü in 2008.  Within this respect, the study 
expects AKP’s district branches to try to mobilize the citizens of Kurdish origin 
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especially in the first group of the districts where estimated percentages of citizens of 
Kurdish origin is high. Although the data gives a useful account of the geographical 
dispersion of the citizens of Kurdish origin across districts, how this relates to socio-
economic characteristics should also be evaluated. This is conducted in the next section.  
 
 
4.8- Socio-economic Indicators of the Districts 
 
 
Studies suggest that both ideological and material mobilization is more effective 
among voters with low socioeconomic conditions. Ideologically mobilization is 
expected to be important to convince confused voters unable to discern between the 
different positions of the political parties on different issues due to the decreasing 
differences in political parties’ ideological appeals, decreasing party identification, 
inability to understand complex messages the political parties give, or simply lack of 
interest in politics. These mobilization efforts are expected to be higher especially 
among voters with low socio-economic status as these messages are especially less 
understood among them (Verba et al, 1995) 
Similarly, materially, studies suggest that it is a more efficient strategy for 
political parties to distribute selective incentives to groups with lower socio-economic 
conditions since they are more sensitive to these kind of incentives and cheaper to 
persuade (Molinar and Weldon, 1994, Graham and Kane, 1998, Schady, 2000; 
Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, 2003; Stokes, 2007;  Penfold-Becerra, 2007). Furthermore, 
the literature suggests that, citizens of Kurdish origin with lower socio-economic 
condition tend to support more BDP (Sarıgil’s, 2010). Then, socio-economic indicators 
may lead to diverging electoral outcomes.   
Generally, the Turkish literature has focused on variables such as income, 
education, percentage of drinking water from pipes, sanitation conditions, number of 
people per sleeping room, availability of durable consumer goods to measure individual 
level socio-economic indicators (Sarıgil, 2010, p. 540; İçduygu, Romano & Sirkeci, 
1999, p. 1005). Separately, a large number of variables such as per-capita income, 
illiteracy rate, infant mortality rate, fertility rates, life of expectancy, number of people 
per specialist doctor have been used as a measure of geographical level socio-economic 
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indicators. (Çarkoğlu, 2002, p. 150, İçduygu, Romano & Sirkeci,1999; p. 1002, poverty 
indicator). The only publicly available data on socio-economic indicators at the district 
level is the illiteracy rate, which is available at the Turkish Statistical Institute database 
on population and demography for the year of 2009.  Yet, illiteracy rate should provide 
accurate information on the socio-economic indicators in geographical terms. 
 
Illiteracy rates for each district (%) 
District % District % 
Beşiktaş 0,0153 Mean 0,0507 
Bakırköy 0,0169 Pendik 0,0515 
Kadıköy 0,0183 Ümraniye 0,0515 
Beylikdüzü 0,0229 Fatih 0,0529 
Maltepe 0,0330 Beykoz 0,0539 
B.çekmece 0,0342 Başakşehir 0,0551 
Adalar 0,0348 Şile 0,0565 
Silivri 0,0350 Çekmeköy 0,0569 
Üsküdar 0,0358 K.çekmece 0,0578 
Çatalca 0,0367 Zeytinburnu 0,0589 
Sarıyer 0,0372 G.paşa 0,0622 
Şişli 0,0380 Esenyurt 0,0684 
Avcılar 0,0433 Bağcılar 0,0689 
B.paşa 0,0439 Beyoğlu 0,0702 
Tuzla 0,0471 Esenler 0,0730 
Eyüp 0,0477 Sultangazi 0,0748 
Ataşehir 0,0479 Sancaktepe 0,0813 
Güngören 0,0483 Arnavutköy 0,0951 
Kağıthane 0,0483 Sultanbeyli 0,1056 
Kartal 0,0498     
Bahçelievler 0,0499     
Table 4.2: Illiteracy rates in the districts of Istanbul for 2009 
 
Since the study’s main focus is on citizens who are eligible to vote, which is the 
age of 18 in Turkey, only citizens older than 18 have been included in the measurement. 
Furthermore, missing values in the data on the level of education of the residents has 
also been excluded from the calculations. Table 4.2 shows the illiteracy rate of each 
district in Istanbul. While the overall illiteracy rate for Istanbul is 0.05%, the data 
illustrates a great variation in the distribution of the districts in terms of illiteracy rate 
ranging from 0,01% to 0,1 %.  Within this respect, one can observe that 21 district are 
below the average with district such as Beşiktaş, Bakırköy and Kadıköy having an 
average close to 0,01% while 10 districts are over the average with districts such as 
Beyoğlu, Sancaktepe, Arnavutköy, Sultanbeyli with an average close to 0,1%.  
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Estimated share of citizens of Kurdish origin VS Illiteracy rate 
District est. Kurd Illiteracy* District est. Kurd Illiteracy* 
Çatalca 4,02 0,0367 Ist. Mean 11,88 0,0507 
Beykoz 4,33 0,0539 Ümraniye 12,19 0,0515 
Şile 4,59 0,0565 Tuzla 12,89 0,0471 
Beşiktaş 5,66 0,0153 Avcılar 13,12 0,0433 
Kadıköy 6,54 0,0183 G.osmanpaşa 14,14 0,0622 
B.paşa 7,03 0,0439 Beyoğlu 14,38 0,0702 
Sarıyer 7,31 0,0372 K.çekmece 14,73 0,0578 
B.çekmece 8,01 0,0342 Arnavutköy 15,34 0,0951 
Bakırköy 8,30 0,0169 Sancaktepe 15,58 0,0813 
Silivri 8,43 0,0350 Bahçelievler 16,09 0,0499 
Şişli 8,70 0,0380 Fatih 16,29 0,0529 
Üsküdar 8,77 0,0358 Esenler 16,38 0,0730 
Eyüp 9,35 0,0477 Güngören 17,01 0,0483 
Ataşehir 9,56 0,0479 Esenyurt 17,17 0,0684 
Maltepe 9,59 0,0330 Bağcılar 18,21 0,0689 
Pendik 9,80 0,0515 Sultangazi 18,41 0,0748 
Adalar 9,87 0,0348 Başakşehir 18,47 0,0551 
Çekmeköy 10,18 0,0569 Z.burnu 18,54 0,0589 
Beylikdüzü 11,01 0,0229 Sultanbeyli 20,01 0,1056 
Kağıthane 11,38 0,0483   
Kartal 11,83 0,0498       
*Colored districts are the ones above the average illiteracy rate for Istanbul 
Table 4.3: Estimated share of citizens of Kurdish origin vs illiteracy rate in districts of Istanbul for 
2009. 
 
When estimated percentage of citizens of Kurdish origin and illiteracy rate at 
district level is analyzed, the aggregate results support the general suggestion that 
citizens of Kurdish origin reside in socioeconomically worse conditions.  As table 4.3 
displays, 14 of the districts having an estimated Kurdish population over the Istanbul 
average are among districts with higher illiteracy rate with the exception of Tuzla, 
Avcılar, Bahçelievler and Güngören.  Similarly only 4 districts, namely Beykoz, Şile, 
Pendik and Çekmeköy with low percentage of estimated Kurdish population are above 
the Istanbul average in terms the illiteracy rates.  Citizens of Kurdish origin are very 
low in districts with very high socio-economic indicators such Beşiktaş, Kadıköy, 
Bakıköy, Sarıyer. This supports previous studies’ findings on the high correlation 
between socio-economic indicators and density of residents of Kurdish origin at district 
level. 
A detailed analysis of the districts highly populated with citizens of Kurdish 
origin demonstrates two different patterns in terms of socioeconomic indicators. While 
in districts such as Sultanbeyli, Sultangazi, Esenler, Sancaktepe, Arnavutköy, Beyoğlu 
illiteracy rate is considerably high, in districts such as Zeytinburnu, Başakşehir, Fatih, 
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Güngören, Bahçelievler Küçükçekmece, Tuzla, Avcılar, Ümraniye illiteracy rate is very 
close to the Istanbul mean.  
Two kinds of explanation can be given to this situation. First, it can be suggested 
that citizens of Kurdish origin in the first groups are in worse conditions than their co-
ethnic in the second group. As an alternative, this result can be linked to the presence of 
an inequality in terms of the conditions of the residents in the districts. Such a situation 
could have been tested with neighborhood level data but unfortunately, there is no 
available quantitative data to test the socio-economic differences across neighborhoods. 
Indepth interviews conducted with AKP representatives and personal observations 
during visits performed to these districts support the later explanation. In the districts 
such as Başakşehir, Küçükçekmece, Bahçelievler, Zeytinburnu, less in Beyoğlu and 
Fatih, there is a considerable socio-economic gap between neighborhoods, which 
disfavors especially the ones where citizens of Kurdish origin reside. In contrast, in 
districts such as Sancaktepe, Sultanbeyli, Esenler, which are formed by immigrants, the 
socio-economic gap between neighborhoods is less evident. Yet, such variation is not 
observable within the neighborhoods in neither of the districts.  On the overall, these 
observations strengthen the study’s expectation that citizens of Kurdish origin have 
similar socioeconomic conditions in these districts. After having evaluated the 
relationship between socio-economic indicators and percentage of estimated citizens of 
Kurdish origin at district level, the next step of the study is to compare the district 
according to the municipal resources that are the party’s district branch disposal.  
 
 
4.9- Municipal Resources of the Districts: 
 
 
The study mainly focuses on the use of state resources as a mean to increase 
political support. Within this respect, the literature suggests that the amount of the 
resources at the party’s disposal is effective in increasing electoral support. In Turkey, 
important units where state resources are distributed at most local level are district 
municipalities. For AKP district branches to have access to these resources, control of 
the municipality by a co-partisan is a necessity. Control of the municipality is an 
important factor independently affecting the party’s strategy on distribution since it 
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determines the amount of resource available to the party. As a result, the district level 
mobilization strategy of AKP towards citizens of Kurdish origin may heavily be  
influenced by its control over the municipality and amount of resources at the latter’s 
disposal.  
Table 4.4: District level municipal resources (2010) 
*2011 realized budget has been taken since 2010 was not available 
**The expected budget has been taken the realized budget was not available 
***Budget data was not available for these districts 
 
Table 4.4 shows municipal incumbency after the municipal elections of 2009; the 
realized budget population size and budget share per citizens of each municipality 
governed by AKP for the year of 2010. The ranking of the districts have been conducted 
according to their estimated percentages of citizens of Kurdish origin. Within this 
respect, the districts in the left group of columns are below while the districts in the 
right group of columns are above the Istanbul average in terms of estimated percentages 
of Kurdish citizens. Furthermore, grey colored districts have an illiteracy rate above the 
Istanbul average. The district municipalities governed by other parties have been 
excluded since one should probably observe no cooperation between CHP governed 
municipalities of Beşiktaş, Çatalca, Kadıköy or DSP governed Şişli and AKP district 
branches. AKP governs 27 out of 39 municipalities in Istanbul.  While the number of 
  
2009 
Mun.  2010 Mun. 
2010 Size 
of 
Mun. 
Budget/   
2009 
Mun.  2010 Mun. 
2010 
Size of 
Mun. 
Budget/ 
District  Incum. Budget the District  Pop. District 
 
Incum. Budget 
the 
District Pop. 
Çatalca CHP   62.001 Ümraniye AKP 168.911.276 603.431 279,92 
Beykoz AKP 89.700.000 246.136 364,43 Tuzla AKP 79.073.361 185.819 425,54 
Şile AKP 14.608.370 28.119 519,52 Avcılar CHP   364.682 
beşiktaş CHP   184.390 G.osmanpaşa AKP 83.207.260 474.259 175,45 
Kadıköy CHP   532.835 Beyoğlu AKP 98.680.381 248.084 397,77 
B.paşa AKP 75.579.804 269.481 280,46 K.çekmece AKP 200.247.472 695.988 287,72 
Sarıyer CHP   280.802 Arnavutköy AKP 61.964.995 188.011 329,58 
B.çekmece CHP   182.017 Sancaktepe AKP 110.213.557 256.442 429,78 
bakırköy CHP   219.145 Bahçelievler AKP 103.393.264 590.063 175,22 
Silivri CHP   138.797 Fatih AKP 166.367.326 431.147 385,87 
Şişli DSP   317.337 Esenler** AKP 98.500.000 461.073 213,63 
Üsküdar AKP 166.831.060 526.947 316,60 Güngören AKP   309.624 
Eyüp AKP 108.128.277 338.329 319,60 Esenyurt AKP   446.777 
Ataşehir CHP 79.073.361 375.208 210,75 Bağcılar AKP 173.000.882 738.809 234,16 
Maltepe CHP   438.257 Sultangazi * AKP 104.507.510 468.274 223,18 
Pendik AKP 128.254.087 585.196 219,16 Başakşehir* AKP 62.319.811 248.467 250,82 
adalar CHP   14.221 Z.burnu AKP 99.286.863 292.430 339,52 
Çekmeköy AKP 62.250.832 168.438 369,58 Sultanbeyli AKP 61.779.467 291.063 212,25 
Beylikdüzü AKP 87.720.180 204.873 428,17           
Kağıthane AKP 97.028.939 416.515 232,95 Ist. District mean   2580628335 9.764.801 264,28 
Kartal CHP   432.199           
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municipalities with an illiteracy rate lower than Istanbul average governed by AKP is 
10, this amount is 17 for the municipalities with higher illiteracy rate.  Furthermore, as 
it can be seen from the table, all municipal districts, except Avcılar, with a higher 
percentage of Kurdish citizens were controlled by AKP during the period between 2009 
and 2011. 
Among these districts, only 3, namely, Tuzla, Bahçelievler and Güngören have an 
illiteracy rate lower than the Istanbul average. The average of municipal resource per 
citizen for AKP governed municipalities of Istanbul is 264.28 Turkish Lira. 15 
municipalities have municipal budget per citizen above this average.  8 of the 
municipalities, namely Ümraniye, Tuzla, Beyoğlu, K.Çekmece, Arnavutköy, 
Sancaktepe, Fatih, Zeytinburnu have number of Kurdish citizens higher than Istanbul 
average. In the overall, there is a considerably high variety in the municipal budget per 
citizens of the districts with higher percentages of citizens of Kurdish origin and 
illiteracy rate ranging from 279,92 for Ümraniye and 429,78 for Sancaktepe. This 
divergence may have an effect on the success of the mobilization of the citizens of 
Kurdish origin by AKP’s district branch. The next section will be the evaluation of the 
districts’ electoral characteristics and its possible relationship with independent 
variables defined by the study.  
 
 
4.10- Degree of Electoral Competition and Population Size 
 
 
Who a political party targets has been a major debated issue in the political 
science literature on the distribution of selective incentive. The debate has developed 
around whether political parties target core, swing or opposition voters. Studies have 
independently found either core or swing voters to be targeted by political parties (Cox 
and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; 
Graham and Kane, 1998; Case, 2001; Matz Dahlberg and Eva Johanssen, 2002;  Weitz-
Shapiro, 2006; Stockes, 2007; Tavits, 2009,). Incorporating the degree of competition in 
their analysis, a considerable number of studies have highlighted that the degree of 
competition a political party faces affects who the party targets (Molinar and Weldon, 
1994; Schady, 2000; Estéves, Magaloni and Diaz-Cayeros, 2001; Alberto Diaz-Cayeros 
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and Beatriz Magaloni, 2003; Diaz-Cayero, 2008). Within this respect, parties tend to 
use funds first to reward their supporters but when these supporters are not large enough 
to win an election, parties will also target swing voters. Within this respect, a district 
that has strong support may not target citizens of Kurdish origin even if such a strategy 
may have an effective outcome. As a result, in districts where the party’s support is 
safe, shift in electoral preferences may not be due to the party’s inability but reluctance 
to mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin. The study controls such a possibility by selecting 
districts where AKP faces relatively more competition.  
 
  
2009 
Mun. Mu 
2010 Size 
of 
2007 
AKP  
2007 
Marg.   
2009 
Mun.   
2010 Size 
of 
2007 
AKP  
2007 
Marg. 
District  Incub.   
the 
District  
vote 
Shares 
of 
votes District  Incub.   the District 
vote 
Shares 
of 
votes 
Çatalca CHP 0,00 
 62.001 
27,13 -1,65 Ümraniye AKP 279,92 
 603.431 
56,61 37,29 
Beykoz AKP 364,43 
 246.136 
47,86 27,60 Tuzla AKP 425,54 
 185.819 
45,92 19,86 
Şile AKP 519,52 
 28.119 
43,33 24,26 Avcılar CHP 0,00 
 364.682 
38,33 3,81 
beşiktaş CHP 0,00 
 184.390 
18,62 -35,30 G.osmanpaşa AKP 175,45 
 474.259 
53,30 37,05 
Kadıköy CHP 0,00 
 532.835 
22,13 -31,25 Beyoğlu AKP 397,77 
 248.084 
47,56 24,79 
B.paşa AKP 280,46 
 269.481 
50,37 32,88 K.çekmece AKP 287,72 
 695.988 
43,07 14,80 
Sarıyer CHP 0,00 
 280.802 
36,97 2,45 Arnavutköy AKP 329,58 
 188.011 
55,14 45,38 
B.çekmece CHP 0,00 
 182.017 
41,46 11,12 Sancaktepe AKP 429,78 
 256.442 
51,62 26,44 
bakırköy CHP 0,00 
 219.145 
22,56 -27,06 Bahçelievler AKP 175,22 
 590.063 
48,47 23,07 
Silivri CHP 0,00 
 138.797 
31,29 -2,08 Fatih AKP 385,87 
 431.147 
46,93 24,87 
Şişli DSP 0,00 
 317.337 
32,05 -6,62 Esenler** AKP 213,63 
 461.072 
60,53 47,06 
Üsküdar AKP 316,60 
 526.947 
46,26 18,16 Güngören AKP 0,00 
 309.624 
50,90 28,81 
Eyüp AKP 319,60 
 338.329 
45,42 19,22 Esenyurt AKP 0,00 
 446.777 
45,50 18,75 
Ataşehir CHP 210,75 
 375.208 
43,22 10,99 Bağcılar AKP 234,16 
 738.809 
56,98 41,08 
Maltepe CHP 0,00 
 438.257 
38,24 0,98 Sultangazi * AKP 223,18 
 468.274 
57,11 37,53 
Pendik AKP 219,16 
 585.196 
51,96 31,26 Başakşehir* AKP 250,82 
 248.467 
46,90 23,62 
adalar CHP 0,00 
 14.221 
23,96 -18,13 Z.burnu AKP 339,52 
 292.430 
46,93 27,74 
Çekmeköy AKP 369,58 
 168.438 
49,22 27,22 Sultanbeyli AKP 212,25 
 291.063 
67,16 59,64 
Beylikdüzü AKP 428,17 
 204.873 
40,70 9,19             
Kağıthane AKP 232,95 
 416.515 
52,96 33,22 Ist. District mean   264,28 339.889 49,4   
Kartal CHP 0,00 
 432.199 
41,82 10,34             
Table 4.5: Classification of the districts according to control variables 
 
The literature have measured the degree of competition in several ways such as 
the vote shares of a party in a specific election (Anne Case, 2001; Penfold-Becerra’s, 
2007), the margin of victory (Denemark, 2000; Rocha-Menocal, 2001; Weitz-Shapiro, 
2006) and volatility of its votes shares across elections (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and 
Weingast, 2000, Schady, 2000; Estéves, Magaloni and Diaz-Cayeros, 2001;). This study 
has classified the districts according to the first and second criteria (see table 4.5) since 
the steady increase of AKP vote shares across elections prevent us to use the volatility 
as a sign of competition. 2007 general elections have been used for measurement, since 
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the party’s strategy before 2011 general elections is expected to be influenced by these 
results. Yet, the margin of victory for each election seems to be highly related with 
AKP’s vote shares, which makes the use of either of the variables appropriate for 
comparison. As it can be seen from table 4.5, the degree of competition the party faces 
varies greatly even in the districts municipally governed by AKP. While in districts like 
Sultanbeyli, Esenler support for the party is above 60%, in districts such as Şile, 
Beykoz, Tuzla, Küçükçekmece the party’s support is below 52% for 2007. The party’s 
strategy to target potential swing voters is not expected to be identical in the two groups 
of the districts.  
Population size may affect the percentages of voters the party reaches via its 
partisan network. This is why the study has preferred to select districts whose sizes are 
relatively at average and similar to each other. Third column of 4.5 indicates the 
population size of the district for the year of 2010.  As it can be seen from the data there 
is great divergence among districts in terms the population size they have.  The District 
of Adalar is the smallest with a population size of 14.221, while Bağcılar has the largest 
with population size of 738.809.    
 
 
4.11- Effectiveness of the Mobilization Strategy 
 
 
Recall that most of the studies evaluate the nature of the competition between 
AKP and the pro-Kurdish parties in terms of the positioning of AKP on the Kurdish 
issue. Yet, Chapter 2 has demonstrated that there is a divergence in more micro level 
vote shifts from one party to the other across elections, which is hardly explained by the 
programmatic positioning. This study suggests that the mobilization of the voters of 
Kurdish origin by AKP through clientelistic linkage may explain divergence in the 
shifts in the electoral preferences of voters of Kurdish origin. Under such conditions, 
shifts in electoral preferences should be a function of the type of the mobilization 
strategy. As a result, divergence in the shift in the support for AKP among voters of 
Kurdish origin across elections is used as a proxy to measure the effectiveness of 
clientelistic mobilization. The objective of this section is to identify first, the overall 
support of each party among citizens of Kurdish origin. The second and more important 
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aim is to classify the districts according to their divergence in terms of support for the 
pro-Kurdish parties across elections.  
A major difficulty in identifying support for AKP among voters of Kurdish origin 
derives from the fact that these citizens to do not constitute the entire population of the 
districts. Although, support for pro-Kurdish parties among citizens of Kurdish origin 
can be analyzed by their vote shares, vote shifts from one party to the other are more 
difficult to be observed. Nevertheless, this section mainly focuses on change in BDP’s 
vote shares to understand the changing nature of the competition between the two 
parties. Such a strategy seems logical since previous chapters have successfully showed 
that AKP and the pro-Kurdish parties take nearly the entire of the votes while other 
parties performs very poorly in the Kurdish populated region. As a result, an increase in 
the support for pro-Kurdish parties is interpreted as a decrease in AKP’s support among 
citizens of Kurdish origin or vice versa. One objection to such an assumption, may 
derive from the possible fact that change in the vote shares of pro-Kurdish parties may 
not result from change in AKP’s support among citizens of Kurdish origin but change in 
number of these citizens in given districts from one election to the other. Nevertheless, 
it will be demonstrated in the next chapters that such kind of a situation is not present in 
the selected districts. 
 The third group and fourth group of column of Table 4.5 demonstrates the 
electoral vote shares of AKP and the pro-Kurdish parties in each district for 2011, 2009, 
2007, 2002 and 1999 general elections. Some important notes should be made on the 
calculation and interpretation of the data before evaluating the results. Although the 
2009 elections are municipal, they have also been included in the analysis. Given the 
fact that the pro-Kurdish party, DTP was not in a position to win the municipality in any 
of these districts, support for the party in these elections may be introduced as a reaction 
of ideologically motivated voters to AKP. Additionally, the election results of 1999 
have been added only for reference and have not been included in the analysis since it 
was FP and not AKP, which was established only in 2001, who ran in the elections.  
Similarly, the name of the pro-Kurdish parties has changed across elections due to 
their closure by the constitutional Court. Although legally, it is not proclaimed, these 
parties are perceived to be each other’s successors.  Within this respect, the pro-Kurdish 
party entered the 1999 general elections as DEP, the 2002 general elections as HADEP 
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and the 2007 general elections as DTP. With the closure of DTP in December 2009 the 
party has been reestablished under the name of BDP.  
It has been indicated in the previous chapters that BDP entered the 2007 and 2011 
general elections via independent deputy candidates. For the 2007 general elections, 
these candidates were Ufuk Uras for the first electoral region, Erbaş Doğan for the 
second electoral region and Sebahat Tuncel for the third electoral region. For 2011 
general Elections deputy candidates were Sabahat Tuncel for the first electoral region, 
Sırrı Süreyya Önder for the second region and Abdullah Levent Tüzel for the third 
electoral region. As a result, the strategy used to calculate support for the pro-Kurdish 
parties was as follows: the vote shares of each independent deputy candidates in the 
electoral regions of Istanbul that the parties have declared support have been taken as 
the party’s vote shares.21  
 Third, vote shares of AKP and the pro-Kurdish parties have been recalculated for 
certain districts due to changes in their administrative frontiers. Ataşehir, Başakşehir, 
Beylikdüzü, Çekmeköy, Esenyurt, Sancaktepe and Sultangazi became legally districts 
while Eminönü was unified with Fatih in 2008; so their vote shares for 1999, 2002 and 
2007 general elections have been re-calculated based on the Act on the Reorganization 
of the Administrative Borders of the Districts.22 This was accompanied by a parallel 
recalculation for the vote shares of districts such as Eyüp, Fatih, Gaziosmanpaşa, 
Kadıköy, Kartal, Kağıthane, Küçükçekmece, Ümraniye from which the new districts 
have been administratively separated.23 The calculation of the electoral results has been 
difficult for some of the districts. In most districts division has been carried on 
neighborhood level whose electoral results are publicly available but in few instances, 
neighborhoods have been divided into two, or some streets have been separated from a 
neighborhood and tied to another one. It has been impossible to conduct the identical 
                                               
21Although data from the Turkish Statistical Institute does not differentiate the vote shares among 
independent deputy candidates , their separate vote numbers  in each polling stations can be find in the 
website of the High electoral Board for 2007 and 2011 general elections. The study has used the second 
data in order to have the precise vote shares of BDP’s deputy candidates. 
22 For detail on the act 5747 accepted on 6 march 2008 and the administrative frontiers of the districts see 
Apendix 3. This act is available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5747.html (consulted on 
08.11.2010).  
23Detailed data at neighborhood level on 2011, 2007,  2002 and 1999 general elections results is available 
at the websites of YSK (High Electoral Board) and TUİK (Turkish Statistics Institute).  
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recalculation for the data. The followed strategy was to divide the vote shares for each 
party or neglect such a separation in reorganizations where it was minor. 
The variation in the estimated percentage of Kurdish citizens makes the 
comparison of AKP versus BDP support among citizens of Kurdish origin within each 
district difficult. To be able to make a systemic account of the electoral results, the 
percentage of BDP support among the citizens of Kurdish origin for each district has 
been calculated for the elections of 2011, 2009, 2007, 2002 and 1999.24 The first group 
of columns of table 4.6 indicates the percentage of BDP support among the estimated 
percentage of Kurdish citizens in each district for the elections of 2011, 2009, 2007, 
2002 and 1999. 
Although the evaluation of the outcomes of the elections mostly focuses on the 
districts that are above the average in terms of percentage of citizens of Kurdish origin a 
few observations should be highlighted for the other districts. As it can be seen from 
table 4.6, the high increase in BDP votes in districts such as Kadıköy, Şile, Ataşehir or 
Adalar with low numbers of Kurdish citizens for the elections for 2007 general 
elections, Beşiktaş and Şişli in 2011 is possibly due to the candidacy of Ufuk Uras and 
Sırrı Süreyya Önder in the region who were also popular among non-Kurdish citizens. 
These kinds of variations should not be taken into consideration. 
When support for pro-Kurdish parties in each district is analyzed two important 
trends indicating the nature of the competition between the two parties can be observed. 
The first one is the difference in the support for pro-Kurdish parties and estimated 
percentage of Kurdish citizens within each district, which indicates the magnitude of the 
estimated electoral support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish origin. The second one 
concerns the divergence of the districts in terms of shifting support for the pro-Kurdish 
parties across elections.  
Given the fact that the competition for the electoral support of citizens of Kurdish 
origin is between AKP and the pro-Kurdish parties, this means that in all districts there 
is a considerable number of citizens of Kurdish origin that vote for AKP. Furthermore, 
although this trend can be observed for all the districts, support for pro-Kurdish parties 
among citizens of Kurdish origin greatly diverges across districts for each of the 
                                               
24 The Formula used is: BDPi / EPKSi*100 for each district where BDPi is BDP’s electoral vote share for 
district i and EPKSi is the estimated number of Kurdish citizens for district i. 
123 
 
elections. In districts such as Ümraniye, Tuzla, Avcılar, Fatih, Güngören, Bahçelievler 
their support among citizens of Kurdish origin is nearly 30% while this support  
Table 4.6: District level electoral indicators across elections (2011-1999) 
*Colored districts are the ones above the average illiteracy rate for Istanbul 
** The votes shares of FP has been used for 1999 general elections 
 
 
Electoral votes shares of AKP and BDP across districts (1999-2011) 
  est. 
BDP 
2011/ 
est. 
DTP 
2009 
/est 
DTP 
2007/ 
est. 
DEHAP 
2002/ 
est. 
HADEP 
1999/ 
est. 
 
AKP * 
(%)   
  
 
Pro-Kurdish Parties 
(%)  
    
District 
 Kurd 
(%) 
 Kurd 
(%) 
Kurd. 
(%) 
 Kurd 
(%) 
 Kurd 
(%) 
 Kurd 
(%) 2011 2009 2007 2002 1999* 2011 2009 2007 2002 1999 
Çatalca 4,02 21,65 0,00 11,87 40,51 34,92 38,28 28,60 27,13 16,43 7,42 0,87 0,00 0,48 1,63 1,40 
Beykoz 4,33 44,16 30,05 53,63 76,79 55,62 52,60 37,30 47,86 42,32 22,51 1,91 1,30 2,32 3,32 2,41 
Şile 4,59 39,90 0,00 149,92 42,67 35,90 52,17 50,90 43,33 33,48 12,74 1,83 0,00 6,88 1,96 1,65 
Beşiktaş 5,66 39,41 0,00 4,22 27,76 15,43 20,28 15,80 18,62 13,95 7,35 2,23 0,00 0,24 1,57 0,87 
Kadıköy 6,54 28,45 1,53 54,79 31,41 19,16 24,54 21,90 22,13 17,44 9,23 1,86 0,10 3,58 2,05 1,25 
B.paşa 7,03 26,61 24,19 22,44 31,46 27,30 54,31 44,50 50,37 43,42 24,85 1,87 1,70 1,58 2,21 1,92 
Sarıyer 7,31 33,94 20,53 13,37 53,53 40,02 40,32 31,80 36,97 32,81 18,16 2,48 1,50 0,98 3,91 2,92 
B.çekmece 8,01 26,85 7,49 21,61 60,51 36,42 45,19 43,80 41,46 31,44 12,74 2,15 0,60 1,73 4,84 2,92 
Bakırköy 8,30 20,12 27,71 15,92 21,01 14,98 26,13 23,80 22,56 15,82 7,15 1,67 2,30 1,32 1,74 1,24 
Silivri 8,43 35,96 48,66 20,48 41,64 37,22 41,35 40,00 31,29 18,93 8,35 3,03 4,10 1,73 3,51 3,14 
Şişli 8,70 44,95 22,99 15,43 30,12 18,96 35,77 18,70 32,05 25,20 12,86 3,91 2,00 1,34 2,62 1,65 
Üsküdar 8,77 22,46 17,10 34,90 39,97 28,34 49,93 37,90 46,26 39,10 22,80 1,97 1,50 3,06 3,51 2,49 
Eyüp 9,35 29,74 24,60 21,57 40,40 28,85 48,66 37,20 45,42 39,01 23,61 2,78 2,30 2,02 3,78 2,70 
Ataşehir 9,56 30,45 30,35 50,83 63,88 50,05 45,59 39,70 43,22 37,22 22,22 2,91 2,90 4,86 6,10 4,78 
Maltepe 9,59 22,20 21,89 33,47 43,53 31,27 42,12 37,90 38,24 33,22 17,39 2,13 2,10 3,21 4,18 3,00 
Pendik 9,80 29,59 27,55 28,21 49,20 37,95 56,39 43,30 51,96 44,81 25,41 2,90 2,70 2,76 4,82 3,72 
adalar 9,87 42,36 0,00 83,05 31,52 20,08 32,55 36,00 23,96 16,37 7,08 4,18 0,00 8,20 3,11 1,98 
Çekmeköy 10,18 36,13 35,35 31,56 74,01 61,53 53,81 43,40 49,22 43,61 24,91 3,68 3,60 3,21 7,54 6,27 
Beylikdüzü 11,01 23,52 16,35 17,28 37,13 31,55 43,78 32,10 40,70 30,80 13,93 2,59 1,80 1,90 4,09 3,47 
Kağıthane 11,38 33,58 33,40 23,09 42,95 30,32 55,08 43,10 52,96 43,62 25,16 3,82 3,80 2,63 4,89 3,45 
Kartal 11,83 26,29 26,20 34,88 45,37 31,88 45,51 37,90 41,82 35,20 20,52 3,11 3,10 4,13 5,37 3,77 
Ist. mean 11,88 44,63 38,73 50,32 46,38 33,64 49,40 44,20 45.20 37,18 21,22 5,30 4,60 5,98 5,51 3,99 
Ümraniye 12,19 28,47 30,36 35,40 52,54 40,68 57,86 43,90 56,61 48,89 29,76 3,47 3,70 4,31 6,40 4,96 
Tuzla 12,89 27,69 1,55 32,80 51,07 36,20 51,55 40,60 45,92 37,50 19,94 3,57 0,20 4,23 6,58 4,67 
Avcılar 13,12 28,96 23,62 25,96 43,01 30,21 42,56 37,40 38,33 29,19 13,79 3,80 3,10 3,41 5,64 3,96 
G.osmanpaşa 14,14 38,39 31,11 27,63 42,71 33,53 57,07 44,30 53,30 43,50 26,21 5,43 4,40 3,91 6,04 4,74 
Beyoğlu 14,38 57,59 46,60 34,41 44,26 31,22 50,65 37,40 47,56 39,71 24,62 8,28 6,70 4,95 6,36 4,49 
K.çekmece 14,73 38,35 40,72 33,82 49,70 32,15 46,32 47,20 43,07 36,44 16,61 5,65 6,00 4,98 7,32 4,74 
Arnavutköy 15,34 43,88 76,94 36,75 73,47 59,36 61,86 41,60 55,14 43,88 20,22 6,73 11,80 5,64 11,27 9,10 
Sancaktepe 15,58 48,15 57,78 44,70 80,10 65,84 52,06 39,90 51,62 42,24 27,31 7,50 9,00 6,96 12,48 10,26 
Bahçelievler 16,09 31,88 36,05 28,84 40,89 30,03 51,75 47,50 48,47 39,40 22,67 5,13 5,80 4,64 6,58 4,83 
Fatih 16,29 30,32 24,55 18,42 26,46 23,22 51,71 42,80 46,93 37,81 26,41 4,94 4,00 3,00 4,31 3,78 
Esenler 16,38 37,19 39,69 30,50 41,93 31,07 64,71 47,50 60,53 53,72 32,73 6,09 6,50 4,99 6,87 5,09 
Güngören 17,01 27,39 32,33 22,91 30,54 21,63 55,63 43,80 50,90 43,04 25,25 4,66 5,50 3,90 5,20 3,68 
Esenyurt 17,17 50,21 85,63 43,21 89,96 73,41 48,58 42,20 45,50 34,11 17,82 8,62 14,70 7,42 15,44 12,60 
Bağcılar 18,21 39,97 50,51 35,80 50,26 37,99 60,42 49,20 56,98 48,95 29,78 7,28 9,20 6,52 9,15 6,92 
Sultangazi 18,41 36,99 37,48 26,22 44,06 37,43 59,76 48,40 57,11 47,72 32,80 6,81 6,90 4,83 8,11 6,89 
Başakşehir 18,47 41,86 53,07 45,39 84,55 73,87 51,55 39,00 46,90 34,85 20,11 7,73 9,80 8,38 15,61 13,64 
Z.burnu 18,54 44,78 34,53 29,99 31,82 21,52 51,56 44,40 46,93 41,10 22,40 8,30 6,40 5,56 5,90 3,99 
Sultanbeyli 20,01 47,34 60,98 33,04 72,81 72,81 68,85 51,00 67,16 50,28 41,96 9,47 12,20 6,61 14,57 14,57 
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increases to nearly 50% in districts such as Beyoğlu, Sancaktepe, Esenyurt for 2011 
general elections.  Similar variations can also be found for districts with lower shares of 
residents of Kurdish-origin. Although the amount of citizens of Kurdish origin in each 
districts are not absolute but estimated percentages which may diverge from the actual 
situation, it can be suggested that the overall support for AKP among citizens of 
Kurdish origin is considerably high, even for the 2011 general elections. 
When electoral results across the elections are analyzed, although similar patterns 
can be observed for the 2002 and 2007 general elections, it is evident that the patterns 
diverge for the elections of 2009 and 2011. The first pattern concerns AKP vote shares 
which steadily increases across the general elections of 2002, 2007, 2011 in all the 
districts. The 2009 general election is characterized by a deviation from these results 
where support for AKP is lower than both the 2007 and 2011 general elections with the 
exception of Çatalca, Şile, B.Çekmece, Bakırköy and Silivri where the increase 
continued, and Adalar and K.Çekmece where the party gained the highest vote shares in 
2009 compared to 2011 and 2007 general elections. This decrease is probly related to 
the economic considerations (Çarkoğlu 2009a, 2009b).  
When a similar analysis is conducted for the electoral support of pro-Kurdish 
piarties among citizens of Kurdish origin, one can observe an interesting phenomenon. 
In all districts, except Sultanbeyli, their vote shares have increased from 1999 to 2002 
general elections but have re-decreased in 2007 general elections following two distinct 
patterns. In districts such as Ümraniye, Tuzla, Avcılar, Sultanbeyli, Başakşehir, 
Esenyurt, Sancaktepe, Arnavutköy, Ümraniye its votes shares in 2007 general elections 
seems to have decreased considerably below 1999 general elections, while in other 
districts the party’s vote shares for 1999 and 2007 general elections are very close. One 
should be careful in evaluating this trend because the first group of districts has 
witnessed high increase in number of eligible voters between 2002 and 2007. 
Unfortunately, there is no available information on either the main cause of this increase 
or change in the percentage of citizens of Kurdish as a result of this increase. One 
probable cause may be the increase of the population as a result of both internal and 
external immigration. Actually, population growth was the main cause of the 
reorganization of these districts as distinct administrative units in 2008. Another 
possible cause may be the increase in the eligible young first time voters. However, it is 
still impossible to discern how much of this increase results from either of these causes. 
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Furthermore, the percentage of citizens of Kurdish origin among these new voters can 
neither be estimated. Statistical data is not available for the immigration flows from the 
Kurdish-populated region to neither Istanbul nor its districts for the years between 2002 
and 2007, making difficult to assess the share of citizens of Kurdish origin.  
Nevertheless, available data shows that from 2007 to 2011 Istanbul received 
310.22225 immigrants from the provinces of the Kurdish-speaking region. If a similar 
flow is expected to be experienced between 2002 and 2007, this makes approximately 
387.770 people from the region migrating to Istanbul between 2007-2011. Since these 
districts are the ones witnessing large migration flows from the Kurdish-speaking 
region, the shares of Kurdish population among these new voters should probably be 
high. In fact, most of the AKP representatives interviewed in the districts such as 
Sancaktepe, Sultanbeyli, Başakşehir highlighted that their districts were formed by 
immigrants coming from different regions from Turkey where the citizens of Kurdish 
origin constituted one of the largest groups.  As a result, decrease in the electoral 
performance of pro-Kurdish parties in these districts can be evaluated as an actual 
decrease in the party’s support among the citizens of Kurdish origin and not only as the 
result of increase in non-Kurdish population.  Even if, we conclude that there is no 
difference in terms of electoral patterns in Kurdish-populated districts for the elections 
of 2002 and 2007, a clear distinct pattern can be observed when 2007, 2009 and 2011 
general elections, which are our main focus of analysis, are analyzed in terms of both 
percentage and magnitude of the votes of the pro-Kurdish parties.   
Table 4.7 illustrates the classification of the districts according to their electoral 
characteristics. The major classification criterion has been variation in the electoral 
results from 2007 to 2009 and 2009 to 2011. As indicated previously, the 2009 
municipal elections provide significant data for understanding the change in support for 
pro-Kurdish parties. This is due to the fact that DTP was not in a position to win the 
municipality in any of the districts of Istanbul. Increase in support for the party in this 
election is probably the result of a reaction of ideologically motivated voters to AKP’s 
position on the Kurdish issue. Within this respect, we can observe 3 different groups of 
                                               
25 The provinces of origin for the migration flows to Istanbul for the years of 2007-2008, 2008-2009, 
2009-2010 and 2010-2011  is a published data by Turkish Statistical Institute. The migration flows from 
the Kurdish-speaking region is calculated by adding the flows from each provinces defined by the study 
as Kurdish-speaking for the four years period. Then this number has been divided by 4 (the number of 
years the period covers2007-2010) which gave an average of amount of migration flow per year. The 
number found has been multiplied with 5 (the number of years the period of 2002-2007 covers)  
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districts having different electoral patterns. In the first group  of districts such as 
Bayrampaşa, Fatih, Çekmeköy, Zeytinburnu, G.Osmanpaşa, Beyoğlu a steady increase 
in support for pro-Kurdish parties among citizens of Kurdish origin can be observed 
across 2007, 2009, 2011 general elections. In contrast, in the second group of districts 
composed of Bakırköy, Silivri, Tuzla, Güngören, Bahçelievler, Başakşehir, K.Çekmece, 
Ümraniye, Başakşehir, Esenyurt, Bağcılar, Esenler, Sultangazi, Sancaktepe, 
Arnavutköy, Sultanbeyli one can observe a reversed V shape where support for pro-
Kurdish parties increased in 2009 and re-decreased in 2011. Furthermore, in the districts 
of Ümraniye, Tuzla and Başakşehir this support in 2011 general elections is even at a 
lower level than 2007 general elections. The third group of districts is the ones where 
vote shares of pro-Kurdish parties have considerably decreased in 2009 municipal 
elections. This group consist of districts such as Beşiktaş, Kadıköy, Maltepe, 
Büyükçekmece, Adalar, Üsküdar, Çatalca, Sarıyer, Avcılar, Ataşehir, kağıthane, Kartal, 
pendik, Eyüp, Beykoz, Şile. These three groups of districts seem to have clearly 
different electoral patterns across elections. Given the fact that the pro-Kurdish parties 
have consecutively increased their vote shares vis-à-vis AKP in 2007, 2009 and 2011 
elections in the Kurdish population region, the results in the second group seem to 
deviate from the trend in terms of electoral outcomes.26  
Table 4.7 also provides information on the districts’ percentage of citizens of 
Kurdish origin, socioeconomic indicators and municipal budget per resident. As it can 
be seen from the table when the dispersion of districts is analyzed a systematic 
relationship between percentages of Kurdish citizens, socio-economic indicators, degree 
of electoral competition, population size and electoral shift is not very evident 
especially in differentiating the first from the second group.  The third group 
differentiates from the first and the second in terms of both socio-economic indicators 
and percentages of citizens of Kurdish origin. The districts in the third group are the 
ones with low percentage of Kurdish citizens except for Avcılar. Nearly all of these 
districts, have mostly low level of illiteracy rate except Pendik, Beykoz and Şile which 
are close to the Istanbul mean and where support for the pro-Kurdish party DTP in 2009 
elections is very low.  
 
 
                                               
26 For more detail on the electoral trend in the region consult Chapter 2 
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1.st 
group 
          2nd .group         3.rd group         
district Est. 
Kurd. 
il. 
rate 
Pop. 
Size 
d. 
Com
p. 
Mun.
Bud 
./Pop 
district Est. 
Kurd. 
Pop. 
Size 
d. 
Com
p. 
il. 
rate 
Mun
.Bud 
./ 
Pop 
district Est. 
Kurd. 
il. 
rate 
Pop. 
Size 
d. 
Comp. 
Mun.
Bud./
Pop 
B.düzü 11,01 0,022  204.873 40,70   bakırköy 8,30  219.145 22,56 0,016   beşiktaş 5,66 0,015  184.390 18,62   
Sarıyer 7,31 0,037  280.802 36,97   Silivri 8,43  138.797 31,29 0,035   Kadıköy 6,54 0,018  532.835 22,13   
Şişli 8,70 0,038  317.337 32,05   Tuzla 12,89  185.819 45,92 0,047 425 Maltepe 9,59 0,033  438.257 38,24   
B.paşa 7,03 0,043  269.481 50,37 280 G.gören 17,01  309.624 50,90 0,048   B.çekmece 8,01 0,034  182.017 41,46   
Fatih 16,29 0,052  431.147 46,93 385 B.evler 16,09  590.063 48,47 0,049 175 adalar 9,87 0,035  14.221 23,96   
Eyüp 9,35 0,053  338.329 45,42   K.çekmece 14,73  695.988 43,07 0,057 287 Üsküdar 8,77 0,036  526.947 46,26 316 
Ç.köy 10,18 0,056  168.438 49,22 369 Ümraniye 12,19  603.431 56,61 0,051 279 Çatalca 4,02 0,037  62.001 27,13   
Z.burn
u 18,54 0,058  292.430 46,93 339 B.şehir 18,47  248.467 46,90 0,055 250 Avcılar 13,12 0,043  364.682 38,33   
G.paşa 14,14 0,062  474.259 53,30 175 Esenyurt 17,17  446.777 45,50 0,068   Ataşehir 9,56 0,048  375.208 43,22   
Beyoğl
u 14,38 0,070  248.084 47,56 397 Bağcılar 18,21  738.809 56,98 0,068 234 Kağıthane 11,38 0,048  416.515 52,96 232 
  
 
        Esenler 16,38  461.072 60,53 0,073 213 Kartal 11,83 0,050  432.199 41,82   
            S.gazi 18,41  468.274 57,11 0,074 223 Pendik 9,80 0,051  585.196 51,96 219 
            S.tepe 15,58  256.442 51,62 0,081 429 beykoz 4,33 0,054  246.136 47,86 364 
            A.köy 15,34  188.011 55,14 0,095 223 Şile 4,59 0,056  28.119 43,33 519 
            S.beyli 20,01  291.063 67,16 0,105 212             
Table 4.7: Classification of the districts according to the independent and dependent variables 
*The districts having an illiteracy rate above the Istanbul average have been lightly colored. Similarly, the 
districts where percentage of citizens of Kurdish origin is higher than Istanbul average have been darkly 
colored. 
 
The interpretation of the relationship between the socio-economic indicators and 
shift in support for pro-Kurdish parties or AKP among citizens of Kurdish origin for the 
first and second group is more complicated. Although, according to the data the two 
groups seem to slightly diverge in terms of the number of districts with different 
socioeconomic indicators, such a result should be interpreted very carefully. Socio-
economic indicators seem to have an effect of electoral shifts, yet other variables for 
these districts seems also to be in power.  Increase in pro-Kurdish parties vote shares 
from 2009 to 2011 is witnessed in districts with lower illiteracy rate where as decrease 
in their votes shares from 2009 to 2011 is witnessed mostly in districts with higher 
illiteracy rates  
When a more detailed analysis on the socio-economic conditions of citizens of 
Kurdish origin in each district is conducted the role of socioeconomic indicators 
decreases even more.  As identified in previous sections, most of the residents of 
Kurdish origin in districts from the first group such as Fatih, Zeytinburnu, Beyoğlu and 
the second group such as Sancaktepe, Başakşehir, Sultanbeyli have similar 
socioeconomic patterns since they are late immigrants with lower socio-economic 
conditions. As a result, the variation in vote shifts across elections is difficult to be 
interpreted as the results of different socio-economic conditions, decreasing the 
explanatory power of socioeconomic indicators. Even after taking into account the 
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shares of Kurdish population, socioeconomic characteristics, degree of the electoral 
competition, population size and municipal budget per residents, district level voting 
behavior of Kurdish population shows variation that needs further explanation. The next 
section will be the selection of the districts where a deeper analysis will be conducted to 
identify AKP’s diverging mobilization strategy for citizens of Kurdish versus non-
Kurdish origin and main factors affecting a successful mobilization strategy on Kurdish 
supporters. 
 
 
4.12- Selection of the Cases 
 
 
The previous section focused on the classification of districts first, according to 
the variables that may affect AKP’s decision to mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin via 
selective incentive. The districts have been classified according to their estimated 
percentages of Kurdish origin, socio-economic indicators, municipal resources per 
residents, degree of the political competition the party faces and their population size. 
The next step was the classification of the district according to the dependent variable: 
efficiency of the party’s mobilization strategy measured in terms of changing electoral 
support for the pro-Kurdish parties across elections.  Since the study has the purpose of 
first understanding the main difference in the party’s strategy to mobilize Kurdish as 
opposed to non-Kurdish citizens, the first selection criterion has been the percentage of 
Kurdish citizens. Based on the second purpose of the study, which is to understand the 
effectiveness of such a strategy the selection criteria has been divergence in the electoral 
support for the pro-Kurdish parties across elections. Within this respect three districts, 
Beyoğlu, Sancaktepe and Beykoz that are similar in terms of socio-economic indicators, 
municipal budget per resident, the degree of electoral competition the party faces and 
population size have been selected to effectuate a deeper analysis. In order to test the 
role of the clientelistic network in explaining vote shifts two districts, Beyoğlu and 
Sancaktepe that have high and similar percentages of Kurdish citizens, illiteracy rates, 
electoral competition patterns  and municipal resources per resident but greatly diverge 
in terms of electoral outcomes across elections have been selected. In order to 
understand the difference in mobilizing citizens of Kurdish origin from their non-
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Kurdish counterparts, Beykoz with low percentage of Kurdish citizens has been selected 
as a control case. The electoral trends in support for pro-Kurdish parties have not been 
taken into consideration for this selection.  I have been careful to select districts that 
have high illiteracy rates, high electoral competition, high available amount of  
municipal resources and average population size. The major objective of such a 
selection was to increase the probability of occurrence of my tested variables, since I 
expect the party to clientelistically target the voters of Kurdish origin under these 
circumstances.   
The estimated percentages of citizens of Kurdish origin for the districts are 4.33%, 
14.38 % and 15.58 % for Beykoz, Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe respectively. Furthermore, 
most of the residents of Kurdish origin of these districts have migrated after 1990, 
witnessing similar experiences and socio-economic difficulties. In electoral terms, each 
district coincides to one of the groups of districts in table 4.8. AKP vote shares have a V 
shape in these districts, where 2009 municipal election is the lowest. In contrast, the 
shifts in the vote shares of the pro-Kurdish parties among citizens of Kurdish origin are 
divergent. Although they have considerably increased in Beyoğlu from 34.41% to 
46.60% and 57.59% across 2007, 2009 and 2011 elections, in Sancaktepe its vote shares 
are 44.70%, 57.78% and 48.15% for these elections. The overall illiteracy rate for 
Beykoz, Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe are 0.053%, 0.070% and 0.81% respectively. Albeit, 
the illiteracy rate of Sancaktepe is considerably high when compared with the other two 
cases, I have preferred to select this district since it is similarly close to Beyoğlu in 
terms of the other control variables. Furthermore, conducted interviews confirm that 
residents of Kurdish origin in both districts have similar socio-economic conditions. 
Both districts constitutes of late immigrants of Kurdish origin with low socioeconomic 
conditions. As a result, I would expect voters of Kurdish origin to be equally sensitive 
towards material incentives. On the supply side, the municipal budget per resident of all 
three district are above the Istanbul average with 397,77 TL for Beyoğlu, 429,78TL for 
Sancaktepe and 364,43 for Beykoz.  Additionally, they are also similar in terms of 
variables that may independently affect the district level mobilization strategy of the 
party such as, the population size of the districts, the degree of competition the party 
faces. As it can be seen from the table there is great divergence in the population size 
where in districts such as Ümraniye, K.çekmece, Bağcılar this amount attains to nearly 
600.000 residents. With their population size of 246.136, 248.084 and 256.442 Beykoz, 
130 
 
Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe are districts with similar and considerably medium population 
sizes. Within this respect, the vote shares of AKP for the 2007 general elections in the 
selected districts are considerably low and close to each other respectively gaining 
47,86%, 47,56% and 51,62% of the votes in Beykoz, Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe. A 
similar situation can be observed for the margin of victory of the districts which are 
27.60, 24.79 and 26,44 (see table 4.9).    
This chapter has mainly focused on the explanation of the logic behind the basic 
selection criteria of districts in Istanbul as units where a deeper analysis to understand 
the factors contributing to AKP’s ability to formulate a successful mobilization strategy 
towards citizens of Kurdish origin.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE MAIN DISTRICT LEVEL ORGANS RESPONSIBLE OF THE 
MOBILIZATION OF THE VOTERS 
 
 
 
 
As it has been discussed in Chapter 2, not yet illustrated, the internal 
organizational structure of the party is important in increasing the effectiveness of the 
mobilization strategy. First, the number of activists and the level of contacts with the 
voters contribute to a more effective strategy by increasing the scope of the mobilization 
and decreasing the cost of identifying different types of voters and conducting 
compliance. Second, the mechanisms of information flow between different organs 
responsible for strategy formulation and redistribution of resources are important in 
decreasing the cost of identifying voters and contributing to the party’s responsiveness 
on voters’ demands by providing arenas where activists cooperate with each other and 
share information. Last, the intra-party advancement rule is argued to be effective in 
motivating the activists to cooperate with each other and increase their support 
coalition. Within this respect, the way through which posts are acquired and 
mechanisms to evaluate the performances of the activists are important in understanding 
the motivation of existing and new activists to actively work for the party.          
Based on these arguments, this chapter evaluates the formal design of the party. 
The first section defines the main decision-making organs at the district level, their 
organizational structures and functions. Nevertheless, distribution of incentives does not 
only consist of the identification of the mechanism where decisions are taken but also 
the mechanisms through which information between different units circulates. This is 
why, the second section mainly focuses on the mechanisms, which assure the 
circulation of information between different units. The last section is an analysis of the 
centralized nature of the party organization and the mechanisms available to the party 
132 
 
for evaluating the performance of the activists to understand how the structure affects 
the intra-party rule of advancement in the party.  
 
 
5.5- Main Decision Making Organs at the District Level 
 
 
According to the 29th Article of the Party’s Inner Organization Act,  ‘The party 
organization signifies a whole which is composed of people from all hierarchical and 
horizontal degrees from the bottom to the top that are legally hierarchically and 
spiritually voluntarily bound to each other’.27 The Party Regulation defines a very 
institutionalized party organization where the responsibilities of each organ are 
precisely specified.  The structure of the party is a complex network composed of 
different organs functioning at different levels that are deeply penetrated into the society 
at the most local level and intensely tied to each other within and among each level. One 
of the main principles upon which the organization structure is built is its ability to 
penetrate in the society to make direct contact with citizens possible. Another important 
principle is the responsiveness of the party to the demands and preferences of the voters.   
Officially, the main organ responsible for the formulation and application of 
mobilization strategy is the district branch of the party. The neighborhood organs 
provide the mechanism through which the party systematically contacts the voters and 
functions as brokers that circulate all kind of information between the party and the 
voters. More importantly, it is the neighborhood organization, which increases solidarity 
among existing members of the network and incorporate new members. The next 
sections are a brief analysis of the structure and functions of each of these organs.  
 
 
5.1.1- District Level Organizational Structure of the Party 
 
 
As illustrated in the party’s Inner Party Regulation, the legal party organs are 
formed at national, provincial and district levels, reflecting the geographical 
                                               
27 (translated by the author) AK parti Tüzüğü, available at AKP’s web site. Consulted on 26.07.12  
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administrative structure of the Turkish state. In terms of its legal organizational 
structure, AKP does not differ from other Turkish political parties. The real difference 
lies in what the regulation calls the auxiliary organs, which are geographically the 
neighborhood and polling station administration boards. The district organization is the 
most local decision making unit that formulates the party’s mobilization strategy for the 
district. It is the official representative of the party in its relations with other 
organizations and institutions, the municipality included. Besides, it is the main unit that 
controls the resources and decides their distribution within the party’s lower ranks. The 
party performs these functions through official organs that are defined by the Party’s 
Inner Organization Act.   
Horizontally, in order to perform a more efficient targeting, the party is organized 
at each level around three different branches; main, woman and youth. Legally, 
according to the 29th Article of the Party Inner Organization Act, the main branch is the 
official representative of the party while the women and youth branches function as un-
official auxiliary organs that are tied to the former. In practice, women and youth 
organizations are autonomous and are not responsible to the main branch of their 
geographical unit but directly to their own branch’s higher organ. Nevertheless, as it 
will be illustrated later, all three organizations work in tight coordination with each 
other in all organizational levels under the responsibility of the district president.    
The district organization in the three horizontal branches -main, women and youth 
are composed of 4 official organs: The District Congress, the District President, the 
District Administrative Committee, and the District Executive Committee. This 
organizational structure is similar at the higher official levels -provincial, and center. 
The main function of the District Congress is to coordinate of the process of the 
elections to select the president and the administrative committees. The three other 
organs are responsible of the functioning of the party at the district level. Women and 
youth branches are organized in a similar way each having their own 4 organs at the 
district level. The district functions through the Administrative and Executive 
Committee under the responsibility of the District President.  The Administrative 
Committee is officially composed of 4 to 30 members depending on the district 
population and has an Auxiliary Committee composed of the same amount of members. 
Since all observed districts have a population higher than 100.000, the district level 
administrations and their auxiliary committees are each composed of 30 members. 
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Furthermore, the district organization has an executive committee of 13 members.  The 
total number of formal activists functioning under the district organs is 90, all three 
branches included. In practice this number is higher since there are also other activists 
outside the district organs who work for the party.   
  The main responsibilities of these organs are divergent, and are strictly defined 
in the party’s Inner Organization Regulation. The president, who is elected by the 
District Congress delegates, is the highest official representative of the party in the 
district who regulates its relations with all private and official institutions and 
organizations. Its main responsibility is to coordinate and control the overall functioning 
of the district party organization, including the coordination between the deputies of 
electoral region, members of the provincial council, district mayors, members of the 
municipal council and the party organization.  
 The formal responsibility of the Administrative Committee is to formulate 
policies and activities to be carried at district level and control their conformity to the 
party’s regulation. It is the main decision-making organ of the organization. The 
Executive Committee, which is composed of 13 members, including the district 
president, has the main responsibility to execute the policies set by the Administrative 
Committee. The members of the committee who work as vice presidents have the 
responsibility to execute policies through 12 functional units. Each of these functional 
units mostly works with experts and professional under the approval of the district 
president. These units are Vice Presidencies of Political and Legal Affairs, 
Organizational Affairs, Electoral Affairs, Accounting, Municipal Affairs, Secretary, 
Advertisement and Media, External Affairs, Social Affairs, Economic Affairs, Public 
Relations, Research and Development. The Vice Presidencies of Organization, Political 
and Legal Affairs, Electoral Affairs, Accounting and Secretary are responsible for the 
main functioning of the party organization.  Among these units, the vice presidencies 
the Organization in all geographical level is vital for the party’s organizational design. 
While Vice Presidencies of Political and Legal Affairs, Accounting and Secretary are 
responsible for dealing with legal issues, financial issues and circulation of information 
concerning the party’ activities respectively; the Vice Presidency of Electoral Affairs 
has the main responsibility to prepare and implement the electoral campaign.  Among 
this responsibility is to establish the Elections Coordination Center, which is in charge 
to coordinate and implement whole activities during the electoral campaign.    
135 
 
The Vice Presidencies of Advertisement and Media, Foreign Relations and 
Economic Affairs are the main organs that are responsible for preparing the content of 
the information prepared for mobilization. The main activities of the former are to 
prepare the propaganda material to inform people on the party’s policies, coordinate 
publicly open meetings, panels, and conferences.  The second has the responsibility to 
inform the party organization and voters on national and municipal economic policies, 
while the main responsibility of the latter is to introduce the foreign policy of the 
government to the party members and voters.   
The activities of the Vice Presidencies of Advertisement and Media, Economic 
Affairs and Foreign Relations focus on more programmatic nature of the party’s 
policies. On the other hand, the Vice Presidencies of Social Affairs, Public Opinion and 
Municipalities are important for the service-based mobilization of the voters, since they 
are the organs that collect information on voters’ material demands and provide access 
to the necessary resources to meet these demands. The Vice President of Social Affairs 
is responsible to identify the social problems such as the helpless people in the district, 
report them to higher organs and prepare projects and programs for the amelioration of 
their conditions. To contact and prepare joint activities with social and cultural non-
governmental organizations in the district, to inform the party organization and voters 
on the social policies of the government on family, health, education, work, culture and 
environment are among its other responsibilities. The Vice President of Municipal 
Affairs is responsible of all kind of coordination and activities related to the 
municipality. Its main responsibilities include ensuring the harmonious, effective 
functioning of the party organization together with the district municipal mayors, 
members of general municipal assembly of the district and province, identifying the 
local demands and expectations of the voters, and  finding solutions to their problems. 
In practice its one of the main organ where municipal resources are provided.  
 
 
5.1.2- The Neighborhood Organization 
 
 
The neighborhood organizations are the most important organs for the successful 
functioning of the mobilization strategy since it is mostly through them that the party 
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effectuates regular direct contacts with the voters, identifies the types of voters, gathers 
information on the voters’ needs, demands, preferences and disseminates information 
on the policies and issue stances of the government and municipality. In the presence of 
a clientelistic network, it is through these organizations that the resources are distributed 
and control on compliance is assured.  
At the neighborhood level, the organization usually consists of two different 
organs: polling station administrations and the neighborhood administrations formed for 
each polling station and neighborhood respectively.  Members of these organizations 
are selected from the party members and have to be composed of at least 3 
representatives. For the selection, primacy is given to the representation of main, 
women and youth branches each with at least one representative. While the polling 
station administration board functions through the neighborhood administration, the 
neighborhood administration is directly responsible to the district president. These 
organizations are defined as subsidiary non-formal organs, tied to the district, 
functioning under its supervision, established to perform activities set by the district at 
the neighborhood level.  
According to the 19th article of the Party Inner Organization Regulation, the main 
avenue for the party’s activities is the polling station. The polling station administration 
consists of a total of 9 members in which the main, youth and women branches each has 
3 representatives.  One of the members is the president who is responsible for 
designation of the voters under the responsibility of each member and supervision of 
their activities. According to the Party Inner Organization Regulation, formally, the 
polling station administration comprises the most local level of the party organization 
where the party directly connects to the voter. Given the fact that each polling station 
consist of approximately 250 to 300 voters, such an organizational design provides deep 
party penetration into the society where each party representative is in active contact 
with 30-35 voters. The function of the polling station administration is defined as 
contacting citizens and members to inform them on the party’s policies, provide 
solution to their problems, ensure the participation of the members to party activities, 
and recruit new members. Nevertheless, in practice, the polling station administration 
mainly functions as information provider on different types of voters, their needs and 
transfers this information to the neighborhood organization which is the most the active 
organ in the neighborhood.  
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Each branch; main, women and youth; are legally represented with an 
administration of at least 11 members in neighborhoods with 4 to 30 polling stations 
and 15 members in neighborhoods with 30 to 45 polling stations. One of these members 
is the president of the neighborhood branch, who has the main responsibility to 
coordinate all activities to ensure the successful functioning of the organization at the 
neighborhood level. This, besides the polling station administration, makes at least 33 
activists functioning as the representative of the party at the neighborhood level. This 
number increases as in most of the neighborhoods; especially where the party’s 
electoral support is high; other volunteers are included in the administration.   
In addition, each of the three branches functions through an executive committee.  
The Committee is chaired by the neighborhood president and comprises of 6 vice 
presidents each responsible of the Organization, Electoral Affairs, Advertising and 
Media, Social Affairs, Municipal Affairs, Public Relations, Accounting and Secretary. 
In theory, although each of the vice presidencies has specific functions to fulfill, in 
practice the neighborhood president and his/her vice president responsible of the 
organization perform most of these functions. Other members mostly act as information 
providers.  
The president is the main representative of the party and holds the most important 
post at the neighborhood level. His/her main responsibilities are preparing activities to 
introduce the party and its policies, to control the formation of the polling station 
administration and to assure their continuous functioning, realize the weekly meeting of 
the neighborhood administration, program the necessary activities to increase the 
number of the party members, determine problems and demands in the neighborhood 
and solve and report them to the district president. In practice, based on information 
provided by other members and the strategy of the party, he/she holds the main 
responsibility on formulating the targeting strategy of the party, deciding the content 
and places of the visits, realize the weekly meetings, house meetings, distribute the 
resources and control the conduct of the members.    
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5.6- The Municipal Organization 
 
 
Officially, the main organ responsible for the formulation and application of 
mobilization strategy is the district branch of the party, but in practice, the municipality, 
which mostly provides the necessary material resources, also plays a very important part 
in both processes. The ability of the Municipality to formulate strategies to distribute 
the resources is based on the formal design of its main decision organs. Yet, through 
these main decision organs, the municipality possesses many kind of resources that can 
be used for political purposes. This section discusses these two aspects in more detail.   
 
 
5.2.1- Main Decision Making Organs of the Municipality 
 
 
Material resources available to the incumbent party in Turkey are diverse and 
distributed at different levels of the state institutions. Appointment in job posts in the 
public sector, green card provision for health assistance, social assistance programs are 
among the resources mostly used by incumbents for political ends all around the world 
as well as in Turkey. The greater the control of the state over the economy, the larger is 
its resources available for distribution. Although district branches may have access to 
resources extracted in the higher levels of the state institutions through their connection 
with higher ranks in the party administration, resources distributed at the most local 
level are expected to be more effective since they are more easily and systematically 
accessed, coordinated and distributed. The resources available for distribution at district 
level are also diverse in nature, enclosing not only public but also more private 
resources from companies, charity organizations etc… In municipalities where the 
presidency is controlled by a co-partisan, the distribution of municipal resources can 
provide a great advantage for the party since the party and the municipality have mostly 
a common electoral base and common goals (Kemahlıoğlu & Özdemir, 2012). Each 
municipality has a budget in order to fulfill its main responsibilities, which is mainly 
transferred from the tax revenues of the central government. Given its large magnitude, 
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the use of these revenues for political purposes may affect the mobilization strategy and 
its success in terms of electoral outcomes.28 
The ability of the municipality and the party organization to use these resources 
for political purposes is also based on the municipality’s autonomy in deciding on the 
priority given to the distribution of each type of resources. According to Article 14 of 
the law amended in 2007, priority in providing these services is based on the financial 
situation of the municipality and the urgency of the service. It is under the function of 
the municipal mayor to decide the types of services to be provided through the strategic 
plan and under the responsibility of the Municipal Council to approve them. Within this 
respect, the main executive organ of the municipality is the mayor that shares this power 
with the vice presidents he/she selects. The mayor works through the strategic plan that 
it declares at the beginning of each year.  
The main organ that decides and controls the provision of the municipal services 
is the Municipal Council which meets once a month (articles17- 25). Members of the 
Municipal Council are directly elected by voters through a closed list proposed by each 
party in the municipal elections.  Each party is represented in the council according to 
the vote shares it receives from the municipal elections. The municipal council controls 
the municipal activities through different mechanisms. First, it has the responsibility to 
confirm the strategic plan and the budget at the beginning of each year. Second, it has 
also the right to control the activities of the mayor through the Auditing Commission 
that it elects among its members at the end of each year.  Rights of question, demand for 
general meeting and interpellation (article 26) are other mechanisms through which the 
council can affect the mayor’s policies. Therefore, the ability of the municipality to 
strategically distribute the resources is expected to be influenced by the composition of 
the Municipal Council. Higher is the electoral support and, as a result, the number of 
members representing the party, higher is the municipal mayor’s margin of maneuver.  
The Municipal Presidency and the Municipal Council are important actors in the 
formulation and implementation of large-scale policies, but most resources they can use 
for political purposes are small in scale. For example, although they have an important 
say in deciding on the share of different services in the budget, the construction of huge 
community projects or change in the construction plans; daily routine activities such as 
                                               
28 For more information of the revenues of the municipality consult, Mutluer and Öner 2009, 
Kemahlıoğlu and Özdemir, 2012.  
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the distribution of the social assistance, construction of roads, pavements, distribution of 
different kind of permits are carried by the lower degree employees. Mostly, these daily 
activities of the municipalities are carried through different functional directorates that 
are tied to the vice presidents and that consist of employers from different levels such as 
directorate presidents, chiefs, functionaries and workers.  Important directorates that 
control the distribution of the goods are the directorates of Social and Cultural Affairs, 
Social Assistance, Infrastructure and Construction, Health Affairs and Cleaning Affairs. 
The municipal staffs working in these directorates are effective in shaping the way 
resources are distributed.   
Yet, the literature suggests that another factor that may be effective in distributing 
the resources is the capability of the decision organs to retreat the resources and 
redistribute it whenever it is need. In Turkey, the procedure through which social 
assistance and job are distributed gives the municipalities a strong control power in the 
redistribution of the benefits. Although there are certain objective criteria to be met for 
applying to social assistance, these criteria are so strict that the voters can easily violate 
them. The last decision on whether the resident has right to these aids is under the 
responsibility of the field staff of the municipality who checks their economic 
conditions and regularly carries controls. The economic conditions of residents being 
equal, it is the decision of these personnel to decide who will benefit. Once the 
personnel decide the resident does not meet the conditions, the assistance is canceled. 
Unofficially the party activists are also responsible to control the economic conditions 
of the residents. In lots of occasions, activists reported the cancelation of some 
assistance because of their intervention.  Furthermore, the distribution of some kind of 
irregular assistances such as the Ramadan packages is under the responsibility of 
neighborhood activists. In all the neighborhoods, presidents were personally entitled to 
decide who would benefit from the food assistance. 
 A similar situation is also valid for job post. Most of the municipal personnel 
work through contracted private companies. These personnel does not benefit from the 
rights of the functionaries. Engagement and discharges can be made on very subjective 
criteria. A considerable number of the field personnel of the municipalities are 
employed through these contracts. A similar situation was also valid for the activists of 
the party working in the municipality of Beyoğlu, Sancaktepe and Beykoz. The 
president of the department of general services of the municipality of Beykoz highlights 
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that approximately 25% of their budget is personnel expenses of contracted workers, 
except workers for garbage collection which is paid by another budget (Interview 
conducted on 20.03.2012, Beykoz). A large amount of jobs is provided through these 
contracts.  Furthermore, the municipality employs lots of seasonal workers for periods 
of 6-12 months.   Circulation on these kinds of jobs is very high; increasing the control 
of the party on the redistribution of these jobs.  
 
 
5.2.2- Resources Available to the Municipalities 
 
 
Municipalities are currently governed under the Law Number 5393, which was 
introduced in 2005. The resources available to them consist of different types of 
services that they are responsible to provide by law. In this respect, the municipality is 
defined as a public cooperation established to furnish the common needs of the residents 
under its area of jurisdiction. The law identifies a great variety of services that the 
municipality is responsible to supply (under articles 14-15). Some of these services are 
development of the urban infrastructure, promotion of the environment and the 
environmental health, of recreation places; of culture and art, sport, social assistance, 
professional and social skills, economy and trade in areas under their jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, it has also the duty to assist to the ministerial services in constructing 
schools, health center and provide them with basic equipments.  
Therefore, the municipality can provide access to different types of goods. 
Budgetary decisions on the amount and type of these goods within each municipality 
are expected to be influenced by political considerations of both political parties and 
municipalities since they would probably be allocated with respect to the residents 
needs to increase their effect on electoral outcomes. The consecutive three groups of 
rows in table 5.1 identify the shares of different types of goods in the expected budget 
and their absolute amount per resident for the election year of 2011 in the districts of 
Sancaktepe and Beyoğlu. As it can be seen from the table they diverge both interms of 
the quantity and type of each goods.  
The main resources that can particularistically be distributed by the municipality 
may be classified under two different types. The first one, identified by the literature, as 
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pork barrel goods that by nature cannot individually be retreated once distributed. On 
the other hand, private goods such as cultural activities, social assistance and jobs are 
individual in nature and can by definition be distributed.  
The first type of individual goods that the municipalities provide are social 
assistance such as food or cloth provision, meal distribution, health screenings; cultural 
events such as trips, meetings, festivals or educational activities such as professional 
training, seminars, conferences etc and jobs. In fact, all municipalities in Istanbul 
provide social assistance to the poor families defined according to some specific 
criteria. These assistances, which mainly consist of food, cloth provision, are mostly 
distributed on a regular basis. Similarly, organization of cultural activities in terms of 
touristic trips, festivals, dinners is also carried on a regular basis.  
In addition, although it is not directly one of its services, the municipalities also 
provide a considerable number of jobs since effectuation of these services require a 
large staff. These jobs diverge from full-time positions or contracted jobs to part-time or 
seasonal jobs.  Given the fact that job provision is a very valuable individual good for a 
political party, although scarce in quantity, it is expected to be politically very effective 
(Kemahlıoğlu, 2005, 2012). Although the amount of official job posts for each 
municipality is publicly available, it comprises a small quantity of actual posts provided 
by them. Most of the posts were provided by Contracted Private companies. 
Unfortunately, their amount is not publicly available. As most of the interviewed high 
post municipal representative have stated, the cost of these staff are classified under the 
budget of goods and services which is publicly available. 
Nevertheless, municipalities invest a great quantity of their resources to the 
second types of goods, namely club goods such as construction of  recreation places 
such as parks, picnic places; basic infrastructural investments such a road, pavement, 
drainage construction, environmental services such as garbage disposal, environment 
cleaning and community projects for social and cultural services such as sport 
complexes, conference halls, guest houses, etc. The construction of community projects 
such as huge sport complexes, health centers, conference halls have become important 
services that the municipalities provide with the material assistance from the central 
government.  
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Amount of Expenditure Budget per resident 
 
Beyoğlu Sancaktepe Beyoğlu Sancaktepe 
individual goods (TL) 3.561.000 8.018.000 14,37 29,79 
İnvidual asistance (%) 2,40 5,18   
social assist. 2011(TL) 2.335.000 1.883.000 9,38 7,29 
cultural events 2011 (TL) 1.219.000 1.285.000 4,90 4,98 
education 2011 (TL) 7.000 4.850.000 0,03 18,78 
job provision 
    budget of goods and services (2010) 48.228.830 46.045.345 194 178 
budget of goods and services (2010) (%) 48,87 41,78 
  budget of goods and services (2011) 60.542.789 58.045.351 243 225 
budget of goods and services (2011) (%) 40,72 37,49 
  job post (2010) 462 359 0 0 
investments (club goods) (TL) 29.627.603 37.127.500 119,54 137,93 
Club Goods (%) 19,93 23,98 
  recreation investment (2011) 5.747.360 8.800.000 23,09 34,08 
expected infrastructural investment (2011) 7.362.750 13.835.000 29,58 53,57 
expected environmental services (2011) 16.163.493 13.207.500 64,93 51,14 
expected cultural and social services 
infrastructural investment (2011) 354.000 1.285.000 1,42 4,98 
types of assistance (individual goods) 
    assistance (food) (number of family for 2010) 2.978 9.462 
  assistance (food) (number of family for march 
2012) 4.500 7.500 
  meal (number of person 2010) 738.000 270.000 
  regular meal (number of family, per day 2010) 2.000 150 
  clothing (number of family 2010) 2.978 3.380 
  job provision (number of person 2010) 
 
578 
  check assistance (number of family 2010) 
 
240 
  coal (number of family 2010)* 2.834 1.407 
  edu assist. (number of students) 250 5.000 
  Health Scan 
 
3.176 
  Patient Transportation 
 
3.405 
  home furniture (number of family 2010) 83 82 
  cloth washing (number of family 2010) 117 
   Table 5.1: Allocation of the municipal budgets (2009-2012) 
*carried under the collaboration with the State district office 
 
 
When we compare the districts according to total individual assistance per 
resident, we see that Sancaktepe is higher than Beyoğlu. Nevertheless, this difference is 
due to higher investment of this district to educational activities. Many of the 
neighborhood presidents I have interviewed indicated that they entered the party in 
order to be informed on activities organized by the municipality. Thus, these goods 
seem to be a motivation resource for not only voters but also activists. When compared 
in terms of provision of social assistance, which targets socioeconomically poorer 
residents and is expected to be more important in effecting especially voters and low 
rank activists; Beyoğlu is higher, albeit closely followed by Sancaktepe. While this 
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assistance is based more on food assistance in Sancaktepe it is more based on meal 
assistance in Beyoğlu. 
On the other hand, the public good services comprise an important share of the 
budget when compared with individual good services. Similarly, a considerable number 
of activists I have interviewed highlighted that they joined the party to contribute to the 
construction of schools, health centers etc. So, they should also have an effective on the 
motivation of both voters and the activists. This type of goods has the highest budget 
share in Sancaktepe when compared with Beyoğlu with 23.98% and 19.93%. 
Infrastructural investment per resident is also higher in Sancaktepe than Beyoğlu. Given 
the fact that this district is newly developing area when compared with Beyoğlu, this 
difference seems to be logical. Although variations in terms of type of goods distributed 
are present for each of the districts, they do not distinctly diverge from each other in 
terms of share of municipal resources for distribution. 
 
 
5.7- Ability to Meet the Demands:  Information Flow between Different Organs 
 
 
This section defines the general mechanisms established in the party to assure the 
information flow from the voters or activists to different organs of the party and the 
municipality. The most important mechanisms used to regulate the communication 
flows within each and between different organs are the realization of regular meetings 
and the creation of intermediary posts.  
Intra and inter level meetings of the party organization are mostly carried to 
ensure coordination and the flow of information within different organs of the party 
organization. While inter-level communication is carried to have a coherent strategy 
within each unit, the purpose of intra-level communication is to ensure the information 
flow from the highest to the lowest level of the organizational pyramid and vice versa. 
In addition, their regularity and frequency motivates the activists, bind them together 
and reinforce internal cohesion. These meetings also function as arenas for inner-party 
education since participating activists are routinely informed on the policies and 
activities of the government. There are different kinds of meetings in which information 
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circulates. The first kind of meeting is the one carried within each level of the 
organizational structure, while the second consists of inter-level meetings. 
The information flow is mostly regulated through the first type of regular 
meetings, which is carried on a regular basis. What assures the information flow 
through these regular meeting are the created intermediary posts that bound each level 
to each other. Each lower level unit is represented in the upper level unit of decision-
making organ, which ensures the two-way flow of information.  
The owners of these posts have the responsibility to attend the meetings of each 
level they bind. The party regulation strictly necessitates attendance to these meetings 
so as to assure the circulation of information.  According to the article, membership in 
any level executive committees ends in case of non-participation without excuses to 3 
consecutive scheduled meetings or to a total of 6 scheduled meeting within a year 
(under article 50). In fact, attendance is taken in all of these meetings and reported to 
the higher administrative organs. These attendances can be supervised by these organs 
via a computer program where all provinces and districts are expected to enter all 
realized party activities, party meetings included, names of activists and number of 
voters attending to these activities. The format of these meetings, their frequency and 
characteristics of people attending to these meetings are important in understanding 
information flow on voters’ types and access of the neighborhood organizations to the 
resources. 
Although the legal institutional framework of the party strictly defines the 
functions of each unit and regulates their relations through formal institutions, it is the 
informal web of connections between different organs that makes the party more 
responsive. As stated by Levitsky (2003) for the Peronist party in Argentina, these 
informal webs of connections provide flexibility in increasing the effectiveness of its 
mobilization efforts by increasing the information flow between different units.   
 
 
5.2.1- Information Flow within the Organization 
 
 
At the lowest level of the organization are the meetings of the polling station 
administration, which is carried at least twice a month in order to assess previous and 
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future activities.  These meetings provide ground to the gathering of the information 
extracted by each polling station member from his/her own area of jurisdiction. Each 
polling station is under the supervision of one of the members of the neighborhood 
board appointed by the neighborhood president (under article 87). Information flow 
between the polling station administrations to the neighborhood administration is 
carried through this member.  Named as the polling station coordinator, his/her main 
responsibility is to circulate a two-way flow of information between the polling station 
and the neighborhood organization. The polling station president has the responsibility 
to regularly report the neighborhood member in charge on important issues concerning 
the polling station under its jurisdiction once a month. On the other hand, the polling 
station coordinator has the responsibility to transmit to the polling station administration 
party policies coming from the neighborhood or the district.  
The neighborhood administrations of each branch; main, woman, youth meet once 
a week and each of its members who are polling station coordinators have the obligation 
to attend to these meetings. Furthermore, information flows between the main, woman 
and youth organizations at each level is ensured through the participation of a 
representative of women and youth organizations, mostly the president, to the weekly 
meeting of the main branch. Especially at the neighborhood level, variations has been 
observed where in some neighborhoods the main branch president participated in the 
meetings of the other branches or especially in neighborhoods where the neighborhood 
administrations had difficulties to function, all branches carried a common meeting. 
In addition, each neighborhood is under the responsibility of a district level 
coordinator (under article 87). Although this coordinator is appointed by the district 
president from the executive board; under circumstances where the number of 
neighborhoods in the districts is high, this responsibility is also given to the members of 
the administrative board. Rotation is a commonly used procedure for this post, where 
people are mostly appointed for a period of 6 month. Such a strategy is designed so as 
to increase the coordination of the neighborhood branch with different activists in the 
districts (Interview carried on 08.04.2011, Beykoz). Although the Party Inner 
Organization Regulation does not specify how the coordinator would fulfill these duties, 
he/she usually attends all the neighborhood and district meetings. All the neighborhood 
meetings attended during the electoral campaigning period were headed by the 
neighborhood coordinators in charge of the neighborhoods.  
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As the polling station coordinator, the specific function of the neighborhood 
coordinator is to assure two-way information flow: to gather information on the 
neighborhood in order to transmit it to the district branch and to inform the 
neighborhood administration on major strategies and policies of the district branch. The 
general format of a neighborhood meeting chaired by the neighborhood coordinator is 
as follows: The neighborhood coordinator first asks justification for the absent 
members. Control on participation is so tight that, the coordinator calls the members in 
order to ask them to attend to the meeting. Then, the meeting begins. Usually the vice-
president responsible of the organization notes all discussed issues and the names of the 
participants on ‘the event report sheet’ filled for all kind of activities to be transmitted to 
the district. Meanwhile, the coordinator informs the members on the agenda and asks 
them to transmit this agenda to the polling stations under their responsibility so as to be 
communicated to the members and the voters. In return, members of the neighborhood 
administration express major problems that need to be solved by the district coordinator 
or transmitted to the district. In the end of the meeting, all participants sign the event 
report, which is taken by the district coordinator to be transmitted to the district. 
The executive and administrative boards are the main organs to which this 
information is translated through the neighborhood coordinators. Since each 
neighborhood is represented in the executive and administrative committees by the 
neighborhood coordinator, decisions in these boards are expected to reflect the interest 
of each neighborhood in the district. In return, this is expected to provide equal reach to 
the resources distributed by the party since information extracted by the neighborhoods 
are compiled in these organs and circulated to the responsible vice-presidencies. Yet, in 
practice as it will be revealed in detail, equality is mostly a function of the motivation of 
the district coordinator.   
The frequency of the meetings of the two main district organs differs. While the 
administrative committee meets once a month to decide the major strategies in 
accordance with the provincial level directives and the reports of the neighborhood 
administrations, the executive committee meets once a week to plan the implementation 
of these strategies. Both meetings provide ground for the dissemination of information 
between different levels through the district coordinators. While the coordinators inform 
the administrative and executive board on important issues on the neighborhoods under 
their responsibility, they also get informed on the agenda of the party in order to 
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transmit it to the neighborhood organization. Since main decisions are taken in these 
two organs, in theory the coordinators assure the formulation of policies that best suits 
their interest.  Although these meetings are closed to public, I have been able to 
participate in two kinds of monthly meetings at different levels and branches. The first 
one was the monthly meeting of the Istanbul main branch executive committee with the 
district presidents. The main participants of the meeting were the provincial president 
with its executive board, the municipal women, youth presidents and presidents of all 
districts. The second one was the weekly meeting of the woman executive branch of the 
district of Sancaktepe. The main participants in that meeting were the district woman 
branch president and the committee members who among them were the coordinators of 
the neighborhoods. In both of the meetings held during the electoral campaigning 
period, major issues discussed were the electoral messages, mobilization activities of 
the party and the municipality. The assessment of political agenda, the interpretation of 
the political messages of the leaders of the party, investments made by the municipality 
covered the content of these messages. Participants were given directions on the 
activities they have to perform while they also informed their superiors on problems 
they face. In both meetings, attendance was strictly controlled as in the neighborhood 
meetings.  
Information flow from the neighborhood to the district is also assured through the 
realization of inter-level meetings. The first one is the monthly meeting of the executive 
board of the district with the neighborhood presidents of different units (under article 
75). The other is the monthly meeting of the vice presidents of each functional 
Committee with the member of the neighborhood committee responsible of the same 
function.  These meetings not only provide a ground for the neighborhood 
representatives to inform their superiors on important issues in the neighborhood, but 
also serve as an arena for the education of the presidents on the party policies 
concerning their domain.  
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5.2.2- Coordination with the Municipality 
 
 
Studies suggest that the effectiveness of material inducement on electoral support 
and motivation for participation is based on the ability of the party to respond to the 
voters’ preferences and demands. This necessitates intense coordination between 
different party organs and the municipality. Especially, in party structures where 
contacting voters and formulating the strategy are in the responsibility of different 
organs at different levels, as in the case of AKP, these mechanisms are vital in 
increasing effectiveness. Then, an important aspect is the mechanism through which 
communication takes place between the party organization and the municipality.  The 
formulation and implementation of a joint strategy and transmission of information 
from one organ to the other affect the party’s mobilization strategy and increases its 
effectiveness.  
 Legally, the party and municipal organ are separately functioning bodies. 
However, in practice, by providing resources to the party for electoral and 
organizational purposes, the municipality is an important institution in the mobilization 
strategy of AKP. The importance of the coordination with the municipality in 
formulating the mobilization strategy of the party is highlighted by representatives 
within different ranks of the party organization. According to the head of Electoral 
Affairs of the Istanbul province, the party formulates its mobilization strategy within 
each district under the intense cooperation of the party organization with the 
municipality. As he declares:  
“After each election, we begin to formulate our strategy for the next elections. As 
the head of the elections affairs, we have already realized separate meetings with the 
presence of not only the district presidents of each branch but also our partisan district 
mayors in order to assess our main defects within each district and formulate our action 
plan so as to increase our votes for the next elections” (Interview carried with the 
president of the Elections Coordination Center of Istanbul, 23.03.2011). 
Similarly, the vice president responsible of the organization of the district of 
Beyoğlu states that they work under close coordination with the municipality. By 
declaring that ‘there can be no organization without a municipality and no municipality 
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without an organization’ (Interview conducted on 23.03.2011, Beyoğlu), he confirms 
the indispensability of this coordination.     
Coordination between the party organization and the municipality takes place at 
different levels. The highest level of this coordination is between the municipal mayor 
and the party’s district president. The Party Inner Organization Regulation assures this 
coordination through two mechanisms. The first one is the municipal mayor meetings 
(under article 73) held under the chair of the party’s province president once a month 
with the participation of co-partisan municipal mayors,  members of the provincial 
executive Committee and district presidents of co-partisan mayor of the party. 
Presentation of actual municipal services and discussion of the future ones are the main 
themes of these meetings. Informally, as indicated previously, each district’s party 
presidents of the three branches and co-partisan mayors meet under the chairmanship of 
the Provincial Vice-president of Electoral Affairs in order to prepare the joint strategy 
of the party in each district. Although the regulation gives the duty to coordinate the 
relations between the party and the municipality to the district president, it does not 
clearly specify how he/she would carry this duty. Nevertheless, during the electoral 
campaigning period, in all the districts under investigation meetings between the 
municipal mayor and district presidents of each branch were realized at least once a 
week.  
Legally, the party group in the municipal council is the platform where the routine 
coordination for a joint strategy between the party and the municipality is assured.  The 
Group of Municipal Council consists of the mayor and co-partisan members of the 
Municipal Council (under article 96).  According to article 97 of the Regulation, the 
district president is given the right to convoke a meeting to the members of the 
provincial and municipal council in order to define the local policies of the party, to 
overview the activities and ensure information. Furthermore, the group is expected to 
attend to the meetings of the district Executive and Administrative Committees. It is 
under the responsibility of the district vice-president of Municipal Affairs to ensure 
their regular participation to the meetings, which are realized respectively once a week 
and once a month.  
Another arena where the municipal organs meet the party organization is the 
meetings of the Advisory Council that are realized once a month under the 
responsibility of the district president.  Participants to these meetings are all high rank 
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party representatives residing in the district such as the district main, woman and youth 
branches Administrative Committees, municipal mayor, members of the Municipal 
Council, members of the provincial Council, members of the neighborhood 
administrations, previous municipal mayors and invited party members (under article 
76-77). The aim of this council is to overview party activities, increase coordination 
between different organizational levels; analyze problems, and overview municipal and 
national services.  Monthly reports of party and municipal activities are presented to the 
participants, so as get all party activists informed on the activities.  
In addition, the district president has the right to form the Advisory Council for 
Municipal Affairs (under article 79) in which the activities of the municipality are 
discussed between party members from different organizational ranks including 
deputies, the municipal mayor, the members of the Municipal Council the district 
Administrative Committee, women and youth presidents to the neighborhood 
presidents.   The meeting of this council provides a platform where information on 
municipal activities is transmitted to the activists from different ranks. They can also 
provide ground for information flows not only for policy coordination but also for the 
selective distribution of the services, which requires cooperation. I was in the district 
building when such kind of a meeting was held in the district of Küçükçekmece. While 
the meeting was continuing in the meeting hall, activists from different ranks were 
making personal conversations. Among them where a neighborhood activist was 
introducing a member he brought with him, to a municipal personnel and ask for a job 
post in the municipality (Visit made on 19.03.2011, Küçükçekmece).  Party and 
Municipal coordination is also assured through the vice presidencies of the municipal 
affairs and social affairs, which are in constant contact with the Municipal organs. 
Legally, the information flow between the municipality and the neighborhood is 
indirect and takes place through the district organization.  Although the formal 
mechanisms that ensure the coordination between the party and the municipality are 
important in understanding access of the party organization in municipal resources, the 
organic link between these two decision-making bodies is also vital in increasing the 
party’s responsiveness towards the diverse demands of the voters as well as the party 
members. Nevertheless, since the services available for distribution are provided on a 
daily basis, it is mostly through the informal network between the two sets of organs 
that resources are accessed and distributed. One informal procedure is the assignment of 
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each neighborhood under the responsibility of a member of the Municipal Council. 
Through these assignments, the neighborhood presidents and coordinators can directly 
contact the members of the municipal council to solve major problems in these 
neighborhoods concerning the municipality. This provides the opportunity to the 
activists to bypass the hierarchical procedure and increase the responsiveness of the 
party.  
Although the municipal council is responsible of the general policies in the 
municipality, it is not directly responsible of the distribution of individual and public 
services.  The presence of activists occupying the post that control the distribution is 
also vital in understanding the access of the party to the municipal resources. In fact, the 
importance of the closeness of the municipal personnel to the political party in 
increasing control over the resources can also be seen from the discourse of the 
activists.  In fact, a considerable number of activists highlighted the importance of such 
an organic link with the municipal personnel and disadvantages of the presence of 
supporters of other parties within the personnel. A district representative in Sancaktepe 
working in the field team of the Women Coordination center states that each municipal 
personnel is the representative of the municipality. Their behavior is an important 
indication for the citizens on the general attitude of the municipality and the party in 
control of the municipality. She complained that some of her colleagues close to CHP 
purposefully maltreated some citizens so as to damage the image of the party, or others 
create difficulties in resolving the affairs of AKP supporters and activists.  One district 
representative in Beykoz complained about the reluctance of the municipal personnel 
closer to CHP to cooperate with them. Another member of the women branch 
Administrative Committee of Beyoğlu declared that most of the activists in Sancaktepe 
were working at the municipality and this, according to her, created a great advantage 
for the district of Sancaktepe in mobilizing the voters since they more easily responded 
to the voters’ demands (Electoral Campaigning activity19.05.2011, Beyoğlu). 
A large number of the district activists work in different departments of the 
municipality under different posts. This creates an informal and constant coordination 
between the party and the district branch for meeting demands. The distribution of 
individual and public goods is mainly under the responsibility of the directorate of 
Social and Cultural Affairs, Social Assistance, Infrastructure and Construction. The 
Parks and Gardens, Security, Cleaning departments provide great quantities of jobs. In 
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all of the three districts the major posts in these departments are occupied by the party 
activists of the district. In Beykoz, the Women Branch District president is also the 
responsible of the White Desk. In Sancaktepe the functionaries and field personnel of 
the department of social assistance, supervisors of Security; Parks and Gardens are also 
activists from the party. In Beyoğlu most of the members of the woman branch 
administrative committee works as the coordinators of the Neighborhood Halls (Semt 
Konakları) or field personal responsible to control the condition of citizens applied for 
social assistance.  Unfortunately, there is no available data to compare the magnitude of 
the link within each district, but the field research confirms that the district party 
activists can easily meet the demands of the voters through the party’s informal network 
with the municipality in all the three districts. 
  The municipal staff residing in the neighborhood also gives great advantage to 
the neighborhood organization in meeting the voters’ demands. These connections are 
widely used by party activists in order to solve problems under their unit of jurisdiction. 
In fact, as it will be highlighted in the next sections, in most of the occasions activists 
preferred to solve the problems through their personal connections, only when these 
connections were not useful, they put in operation the formal produce of the party. In 
one of the women branch neighborhood meetings, the neighborhood coordinator 
directly called the women district branch president working in the municipality to solve 
the problem of a citizen who attended the meeting with the intermediary of the 
responsible polling station coordinator. Such a connection has also been used by a 
neighborhood president during a visit realized to check the economic situation of a 
resident. The president working in the municipality directly contacted the municipal 
department of social affairs to get informed on the voter’s economic situation and gave 
the necessary directives to send them food and coal assistance.  
Even if these procedures are not always properly applied, especially at the 
neighborhood level, the mechanisms through which the party operates form a huge 
organizational network where all kinds of information is communicated between 
different organizational units via a large amount of representatives of the party who 
have direct links to the voters.  Although the legal framework set by the party provides 
the minimum ground for cooperation, in practice, the extent of the network exceeds this 
legal framework. Given the fact that most members in the district, as well as in the 
neighborhood level live in the same social environment as fellows in the neighborhood, 
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at work, and in associations, the actual connections between different activists is even 
more complex. These connections are successfully used by party activists at different 
levels as a mean to bypass any lack of communication under circumstances where the 
legal system does not function properly. As a result, even if the polling station and 
neighborhood coordinators provide a minimum ground for these purposes, the presence 
of other activists occupying important posts at both levels increases the ability of the 
polling stations and neighborhoods to affect the higher decision-making process. 
How information flows from the bottom to the top and vice versa through these 
mechanisms may better be explained by concrete examples.  Suppose that the 
municipality schedules an event, opens a new recreation place, or is in need of 
personnel for some posts. The members of the Municipal Council give this information 
to the district presidents through the weekly Executive Committee meeting of the main 
branch. The presidents of the women and youth branches who attend the main branch 
meeting transmit this information to their executive. Neighborhood coordinators of each 
branch share this information with the neighborhood administration in the weekly 
neighborhood meeting.  Then, polling station coordinators who are in charge to inform 
the members of the polling station administration inform the members under their 
responsibility. Similarly, suppose there is a drainage problem in one of the 
neighborhoods. This information is transmitted to the neighborhood administration and 
neighborhood coordinator during the meeting. The neighborhood coordinator transmits 
the problem to the member of the municipal council responsible from the neighborhood 
or someone he/she knows in the municipality who can solve the problem. At the same 
time, she transmits the problem to the district president and vice-president responsible 
of the municipal affairs in the district meeting or by phone if urgent. Then, this problem 
is transmitted to the municipality, or directly to the vice-president of the municipal 
mayor who informs the relevant municipal units so that they would provide a solution to 
the problem.  
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5.8- Rules of Intra-party Advancement in the Party 
 
 
Although the functioning and organizational structure of the party provides a 
suitable ground for formulating an effective mobilization strategy, a well functioning 
and strong party organization that increases the ability of the party to motivate the 
activists to actively work and cooperate with each other is also necessary in order to 
consolidate and increase the party’s support base. It has been argued in Chapter 2 that 
such a motivation is based on the probability of the all activists to attain, either directly 
or through a post in the party, the incentive they desire. Given the fact that these 
incentives are scarce in nature, this probability is strongly influenced by the internal 
structure of the party. This study suggests that the presence of a competitive intra-party 
rule of advancement is very conducive to motivating all activists, since it provides a 
high probability of attaining inducement. Yet, this mechanism is difficult to be attained 
in centralized party organizations where advancement is decided by the leaders and is 
mostly distributed on the basis of loyalty. The literature suggests such a mechanism can 
be attained in centralized party organizations when the leadership is safe enough and an 
objective mechanism to evaluate activists’ performance is present.  This section 
describes the formal rules set by the party to regulate advancement in order to 
understand the formal structure under which such motivation is provided. First the 
formal intra-party advancement rules of the party and the safety of the leader will be 
revealed. Second, major mechanisms available to the party to evaluate activists’ 
performances will be illustrated.  
 
 
5.3.1- Centralized Nature of the Party and Safety of the Leadership Cadres 
 
 
  The aim of this section is to define the formal internal organs responsible to 
distribute posts in the organizational structure of AKP. According to Kaufman (1974), 
Özbudun (1985), Sayarı (1975) an important dimension that differentiates centralized 
political parties from competitive ones is the control of the distribution process to the 
posts in the party by superior cadres. The process through which posts are distributed 
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within the district organization is therefore important in understanding the centralized 
nature of the party. On the other hand, the safety of the leader is based on the procedure 
through which he/she acquires this post. The leader can be defined as safe when his 
survival is independent from the preferences of the members situated in the lower level 
of the organizational structure. Within this respect, this section analyses two aspects of 
the organization: it demonstrates, first, the monopoly of the district president in defining 
the intraparty advancement rule through his/her power on appointment and second, how 
this monopoly contributes to the safety of the presidency post. 
The organizational design of Turkish political parties is strictly regulated by the 
Turkish Law on Political Parties. As a result, all political parties have similar 
organizational patterns and AKP is not an exception. Legally, the party regulation 
indicates a competitive party organization, where the district president and the 
administrative committee come to office by the election of the congress consisting of 
the delegates of each neighborhood. The party holds regular congresses every three 
years where leaders at different levels of the organizational structure are elected by 
lower level leaders. However, in practice, the position of the president is safe since all 
the inferior posts are distributed through appointment and not election. This coincides to 
a system where the president is elected by the members whom he appoints himself. 
District president controls the appointment procedure at both district and neighborhood 
level. This same procedure is valid for all the three branches: main, women and youth. 
At the district level, the control of the president is exercised through a 
considerable number of rights attached to his post. First, he/she proposes the list of the 
administrative committee for election and has the power to partially or totally change its 
members.  Second, he appoints the executive committee with the approval of the 
members of the administrative committee he selects.  
The control of the leaders on the posts at the neighborhood level is even more 
direct. None of the posts at the neighborhood level is acquired through elections since 
they are legally defined as auxiliary organs where selection procedure is not regulated 
under The Turkish Law of Political Parties.  These posts are also decided by the 
cooperation of the neighborhood and district president. Normally, the neighborhood 
president is the responsible body that selects the neighborhood administration. 
However, the district leaders control the process indirectly since the neighborhood 
president is proposed by the vice president responsible for the organization and 
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approved by the district president. The neighborhood president selects the other 
members in the neighborhood administration, with the approval of the vice president 
responsible for the organization. Furthermore, he/she also appoints the presidents and 
members of the polling station administration. The neighborhood coordinator is directly 
appointed by the district president from the members of the executive or administrative 
board. These activists recruit new members who elect the neighborhood delegates 
responsible to select the president. The delegates mostly consist of activists of the 
neighborhood organization. In a sense the president is elected by the delegates who he 
has appointed. It is this procedure that makes the president safe.  
As a result, AKP’s Party Regulation creates a hierarchical structure, where the 
immense organizational network is under the tight control and supervision of the 
president at each level of the organization. Even though in theory the district president 
and its administrative committee is responsible to the congress who elects them, in 
practice, the monopoly of the president in distributing the posts creates an organization 
that has total submission to the president. As a result, the district president, in practice, 
is safe from the preferences of the members that elect him.  
Nevertheless, the hierarchical structure of the party organization makes the district 
president responsible to the administrator situated in the higher level of the 
organizational structure, which for the district it is the members of the provincial 
organs. In this structure, the safety of the leader is tied to the decision of the higher 
authorities and change in the leadership cadre at the district level occurs mostly as the 
result of the decisions taken at the provincial level. The regular Congress of 2012 
successfully illustrates how the system works in practice. Each district president has 
first asked the approval of the provincial president before declaring his/her candidacy. 
Then, the president decided on the members of the administrative board.  Members in 
each neighborhood have elected the neighborhood delegates who have announced their 
candidacy after the approval of the district president. Then, as neighborhood delegates, 
they elected the district presidents who were the only candidates. An exception was the 
district of Ümraniye, where the co-partisan mayor supported the candidacy of his vice-
president without the approval of the provincial president. The emerging crisis was 
resolved by the cancelation of the Congress and the direct appointment of the district 
president by the provincial organization. It is important to note that circulation is 
possible in such a system. Yet, it is not tied to the strength of the support coalition of the 
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members but to the perception of his/her superior. In fact, some of the presidents at 
different levels of the organizational structure were asked not to be a candidate. An 
important example was the change in provincial women branch president of Istanbul 
during the 2012 Congress. Activists from different levels declared that she was 
personally asked by Erdoğan not to put her candidacy and let her post to her new 
colleague nominated by the province.        
This creates a very centralized system where the attitudes of the administrators at 
each of the organizational level of the party organization are heavily influenced by the 
attitudes of the administrators at the higher level.  I have personally faced the 
difficulties arising from the centralized nature of the party as soon as I began contacting 
the district presidents in order to realize the field research.  When I first began the 
interviews nearly all main and woman branch presidents asserted me that they would 
not be able to let me contact their activists or participate to their activities unless I have 
the approval of the provincial presidents of their own branch. In one of my interviews, 
the district president told me, “I am sorry but I cannot let you interview my 
neighborhood activists. Their political opinion may not be the same as the party. I don’t 
want any misunderstandings.” (Interview conducted on 08.02.2011). It was only after I 
contacted the provincial main and women branches’ presidents and got their approval 
that I could start the fieldwork. After the province president invited me to attend their 
monthly meeting with the district presidents, introduced me and asked them to assist 
me, the attitude of the same district president immediately changed. He apologized and 
told me,  
“We can never be sure of the intention of the people we don’t know. Lots of 
opposition supporters try to observe the activities of our party, that is why 
we have to be precocious as you have the approval of the party we will 
happily help you” (Interview conducted on 22.03.2011).  
 
In fact, I received great assistance in this district and was able to freely conduct 
my field research after this approval.  
The centralized design of the inner party organization creates a district leadership 
that has total control on the appointment process of the inferior posts. On the other 
hand, the safety of the leadership is not tied to the preferences of the members at the 
lower level but to the administrator at the higher level of the organizational pyramid. As 
a result, the internal organizational structure gives power to the district leader in 
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deciding the procedure through which posts are distributed.   Formally, the safety of the 
leader gives him the power to change the intra-party rule of advancement whenever it is 
necessary. Yet, as this study argues, in practice realizing such a change is not only a 
function of the formal structure, but also of the accustomed informal rules of internal 
functioning mostly inherited from the founding phase of the organization.    
 
 
5.3.2- Mechanisms to Evaluate Performance 
 
 
Even if the leader has the power to set a competitive intra-party rule of 
advancement, its ability to implement it, is based on the presence of a mechanism that 
objectively measures performance. Thus, the organizational structure of the party 
requires the measurement of the performance of activists at a very micro level. So, 
perhaps the inability of the leaders to create a competitive intra-party advancement 
mechanism may be the lack of an objective mechanism to measure performance. 
Nevertheless, both the electoral results and use of technological tools provide this 
objective mechanism for the leaders.  
 One method through which leaders may obtain information on the activists’ 
performance is identifying support from below through the electoral outcomes. In the 
Turkish electoral system, electoral results are calculated through the count of votes in 
each polling station consisting of 300 voters at most. For example, people residing in 
the same building or street mostly vote in the same polling station. The data for the 
results of each polling station is publicly available. Formally, the data does not indicate 
the geographical location of any of the polling stations.  The only data available on the 
geographical location of the polling stations are the electoral lists that are made public 
during the elections to inform people. Albeit providing very detailed information on the 
addresses, province of registry of the voters, these lists are not publicly available.  
However, political parties have legal access to the electoral lists, which give them a 
very detailed picture of the electoral distribution in very narrow geographical units, one 
or two streets in cities, or an entire village. In fact, the interviews point out that such 
information is greatly used by AKP activists to formulate their mobilization strategy. 
The president of the Elections Coordination Center of Beykoz highlights, “we formulate 
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such a deep strategy… we have analyzed the results of the polling stations with each of 
the polling station presidents to see how we can increase our votes” (Interview 
conducted on 18.03.2011, Beykoz). The president of the newly formed district of 
Sancaktepe proclaims,  
“We have difficulties in attaining the results of the polling stations from 
previous elections, this is a defect for our strategy we do not have detailed 
information on previous preferences and it makes it difficult to guess where 
we have to focus to increase our votes.” (Interview carried  on 22.03.2011, 
Sancaktepe). 
 
A similar observation on the importance of the election results was also made by 
the Elections Coordination center of Beyoğlu, who was very proud of their analysis of 
the electoral results. (Interview carried on 19.04.2 011, Beyoğlu).  The electoral lists do 
not only provide information on the geographical location of each polling station but 
also on the place of registry of each of its voters. Thus, political parties know the 
hometown origin of the voters and their electoral preferences in one polling station, 
which comprises 300 voters. Given the fact that hometown origin is one the most 
important social identification in the society, this information may be very valuable in 
identifying the existing and potential supporters for the party.  In fact, this can 
genuinely be used by parties for identifying the groups that are closer to them or check 
the compliance of specific groups under each polling station. When these two data are 
unified district branches can very successfully estimate which activist has managed to 
attain greater support for the party.  
The participation of the members in party activities is a second important 
mechanism where performance may be evaluated. In fact, the party also uses this 
mechanism to identify hard working activists from the free riders. This is made possible 
by using a computer program where attendance to activities as well as the number of 
contacted possible core, swing, opposition voters and recruited members are entered by 
the district administration.  Through this program, which gives each organization the 
right to collect necessary information in their area of jurisdiction, party managers can 
observe the overall performance of each individual member or administrative unit. In 
return, leaders can genuinely use this information for punishment or reward. The 
identification of activists participating in the electoral campaigning activities was one of 
the most important responsibilities of the district Center of Electoral Coordination. All 
activists were tasked by the Center to participate in certain campaigning activities. In all 
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the activities of both women, main and youth branches attendance was reported to the 
district, which was transmitted it to the Istanbul Center of Electoral Coordination 
through this computer program. Attendance was also taken very seriously by the 
activists themselves. In lots of instances, activists complained about the non-
participation of the tasked people and proclaim that this should be reported to the 
province organization. Lots of disputes emerged between them on this issue. The main 
complaint came from neighborhood activists who routinely worked for party. They 
blamed district level activists, who did not participate in routine activities of the 
organization, of participating to the activities of their neighborhood only for show 
during the electoral campaigning period. This computer program was widely used by 
the district activists to evaluate the activities in the neighborhoods. This computer may 
effectively be used to evaluate the personal performance of activists based on the 
amount of activities they perform, voters they reached, number of new membership they 
made. 
 This section has illustrated that the internal design of the party provides ground 
for a mobilization strategy that deeply penetrates into the society where functions of 
each units responsible of the mobilization are formally set. Furthermore, the structure 
also provides formal arenas for increasing cooperation and information flow between 
different decision-making organs. The party has a centralized institutional structure 
where the intraparty advancement mechanism is given under the control of the district 
president who has access to objective criteria to measure performance.  So, the formal 
internal structure of the party allows the district president to set the intraparty rule of 
advancement whenever it is necessary.     
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
DEFINING THE MOBILIZATION STRATEGY AT THE DISTRICT 
LEVEL  
   
 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the main characteristics of the mobilization 
strategy formulated by AKP to consolidate or increase its electoral support. This study 
suggests that regardless of their type (i.e. clientelistic, mass, catch-all, cartel, ethnic, or 
hegemonic) or functions (government, opposition, tribune, systemic, un-systemic etc.), 
all political parties have vote maximization as their major objective and they compete 
with each other in order to achieve this goal. So, what are the strategies and mechanisms 
used to achieve this end? It has been suggested in Chapter 2 that political parties use 
different resources in order to convince voters including those that are ideological or 
economic in nature. Which resource it will rely more on is based on the ideological 
composition of its supporters and the party’s electoral objective. When the core 
supporters of a party are not ideologically different from other political parties, the use 
of economic tools for political means is a rational strategy for the party to perform its 
electoral objective. On the other hand, the literature on the tactical distribution of 
resources, as one of economic tools, focuses on the nature of the linkage through which 
political parties distribute resources. Differentiating between programmatic and 
clientelistic linkages, this study argues that political parties use both strategies. Scholars 
suggest that the latter is more effective than the former. It is the individualist and 
conditional nature of clientelistic linkage that makes it a safer strategy in shaping voters 
preferences. The study mainly focuses on the long-term clientelistic linkages that are 
developed in the course of repeated interaction. It suggests that the repeated nature of 
the clientelistic linkage affects who the party targets and how it assures compliance. 
Perceiving clientelistic linkage on an ad-hoc base, recent studies argue that political 
parties target either core or potential swing voters that would immediately affect the 
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amount in the support of the party (Anne Case, 2001, Denemark, 2000, Rocha-Menocal, 
2001, Margit Tavits, 2009; Graham and Kane, 1998; Schady, 2000; Molinar and 
Weldon, 1994; Diaz-Cayero, 2008). On the other hand, mentioning the long-term nature 
of the clientelistic network some studies indicates the use of material incentive for 
mobilizing, not only core or potential swing supporters but also opposition voters 
(Thachil, 2011; Cammett &Issar, 2010, Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, Sigelman, 2002). 
Under these conditions, the bargain is not a process of a short run interaction that has 
immediate consequences, but rather of long run where people’s perceptions are changed 
over time. The party does not only target swing voters but also some opposition voters. 
A long term clientelistic network also affects the nature of the mechanisms 
through which political parties control compliance. Scholars like Stokes (2005), or 
Brusco et al. (2004) stress the coercive nature of compliance where the party controls 
compliance through punishing the cheaters. On the other hand, some studies focus on 
assuring compliance through the formation of a system of common shared values and 
voluntary compliance (Auyero, 2001; Kischelt & Wilkinson, 2007).  
The study assumes that a long-term clientelistic network where different types of 
voters are mobilized and compliance is assured clientelistically is a more effective 
strategy in consolidating or increasing the vote of the party. This chapter, therefore, 
builds upon identifying first, the content and type of linkages AKP uses to influence 
vote choice. It demonstrates the tendency of AKP to use both clientelistic and 
programmatic linkages to mobilize voters, albeit relying more on the former. The 
second aim is to identify the nature of this network focusing on the type of voters the 
political party targets and how it assures compliance. Within this respect, the network 
can be identified as a problem-solving network composing of different types of voters, 
where compliance is assured voluntarily by creating a system of common identification 
where ideological mobilization is also conducted. The first section shows that both 
ideological and material mobilization strategies are used by the party, and the second 
section focuses on defining the main characteristics of the network.  
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
6.3- Content of the Mobilization Strategy to Persuade Voters 
 
 
This section will mainly focus in identifying the content of the mobilization 
strategy used by the party in order to persuade voters. The study argues that political 
parties use both programmatic and clientelistic linkages to mobilize voters. As rational 
actors, political parties formulate strategies that have the most efficient outcome for 
them. Accordingly, the type of strategy AKP would use is based on its perception on the 
factors affecting voters’ preferences. Actual studies on Turkish politics, analyzing 
programmatic accountability, have found the importance of both ideology, lift-right self 
placement and economy in shaping voters’ political preferences.  On the ideology 
dimension, center-peripheral positioning measured in terms of religiosity has been 
highlighted by a great number of empirical studies as decisive in explaining support for 
AKP (Ergüder 1981; Esmer 2001, 2002, Esmer &Sayarı 2002; Kalaycıoğlu 1994, 1999; 
Çarkoğlu, 1998, 2002, 2007a, 2007b, 2010a, 2011b; Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000; 
Çarkoğlu & Kalyacıoğlu, 2007, 2009; Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006). Recent studies 
(Başlevent, Kırmanoğu & Şenatalar, 2005; Çarkoğlu, 2008) conducted on AKP’s 
electoral success have mentioned the growing importance of economic evaluations as a 
further determinant in explaining AKP’s electoral success. On the other hand, the 
existence of patronage or clientelism as a tool used by political parties to gain votes has 
also been mentioned in the literature (Sayarı, 1977; Özbudun, 1981; Schuler, 1998; 
Sunar, 1990, Heper & Keyman, 1998, Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Özbudun, 2005; Ayşegül 
Komşuoğlu, 2009; Kemahlıoğlu, 2005, 2012; Sayarı, 2011). 
Based on the literature, the content of the strategy will be evaluated under two 
different groups. This first one concerns the programmatic nature of the mobilization 
where deputy candidates and activists inform the voters on the policies of the party. 
These have been grouped according to the dimensions that are defined as decisive in 
shaping voters’ preferences. The first one is the center-periphery dimension where the 
democratization process in state society relations and religious affairs comprise 
important policy dimensions. The second one is the economic dimension where 
information on the policies of the party on issues such as economic development, state 
services, social justice, municipal investments are covered. The clientelistic dimension 
covers all kind of material and immaterial inducements, demanded by the voters or 
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distributed by the party during these activities. These comprise of different types of 
public or individual goods. They have been identified as clientelistic as they are 
conducted through individual linkages.  
The content analysis is based on the messages given in the party activities during 
the electoral campaigning period. These messages have been extracted from the 
participant observations of 26 days realized during the electoral campaigning activity 
between 20 April and 11 June 2011 in the districts of Sancaktepe, Beyoğlu and Beykoz. 
The importance of these electoral campaigning activities is the presence of 1 or 2 
deputy candidates from the electoral region under investigation. During these activities, 
I have been able to observe the discourses of 32 different deputy candidates. These 
discourses are expected to reflect the party’s official stances since these people are 
trained on the policies of the party before they are sent in the field. In fact, as it will be 
illustrated, they all have similar stances on major issues, although they also focused on 
different kinds of policies. Two types of activities provided the opportunity to collect 
the necessary data for the purpose of the study. The first kind of activities were the 
door-to-door canvassing and household visits where the deputy candidates listened to, 
tried to find solutions to the voters’ problem and answered their questions. The second 
types of activities were the small meetings held in the contact offices and houses of the 
party members where the deputy candidates find the opportunity to introduce party 
policies.  
The observations made on the perceptions of the activists, attitudes of the voters 
and activities carried by neighborhood organizations confirm that a service based 
mobilization strategy is very effective in gaining voters’ support. In fact, the strategy the 
party uses can be identified as service based mobilization especially in gaining the 
support of the potential swing voters. Nevertheless, programmatic mobilization is also 
used during the process of contacting where voters are informed on the party’s policies. 
In all the districts under investigation, the party uses both ideological appeals and 
distribution of material resources in order to persuade voters. Yet, although the party 
uses its communication channels to also strengthen the positive image of the party 
through informing people on party policies, mostly local issues and problems dominate 
the agenda. As a result, the party’s main strategy in consolidating and increasing its 
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electoral is based on mobilization through clientelistic incentives mostly in the form of 
municipal resources.  
 
 
6.1.1- Programmatic Mobilization 
 
 
While the distribution of material incentives is the main dimension of 
mobilization, programmatic mobilization, where the party informs people on the 
government policies and municipal services, is also used by the party. In fact, according 
to the party activists, by contacting the voters, they can change their perceptions. A 
district branch member emphasizes the importance of contact in changing voters’ 
perception by expressing: 
“When you contact people everything changes. People do not understand 
the policies of the government or the municipality. They have a prejudice 
towards them but when they are persuaded that they benefit from these 
policies, their attitudes change. Think that you blow out a full glass of water 
and you re-fill in, it creates problems when you blow it out but when you re-
fill it people understand your goodwill.” (Interview carried on 03.05.2011, 
Beyoğlu).  
 
According to a another district member responsible of the district of Paşabahçe in 
Beykoz; 
“People tend to be very reactionary, but this is changing because people see 
what the party realizes and we do our best to inform everyone on the 
services of the government and the municipality. We tell them it is great 
advantage to have AKP in the government, in the municipalities of Istanbul 
and in Beykoz, and then we ask them to support AKP to take benefit from 
this advantage in terms of services.” (Interview carried on 09.04.2011, 
Beykoz) 
 
The representatives from different ranks consistently mention that they aim to be 
in touch with the voters  not only for helping them to attain their basic needs but also to 
inform them on the party policy positions and services of the municipality. Most of 
these services are defined as local ones, which mostly consist of municipal services 
facilitating the daily lives of the citizens. In lots of occasions, the party activists 
highlighted that people mostly tend to vote on the basis of material interests, which are 
mostly local ones. The women branch president of Beyoğlu highlights that this is why 
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they mostly inform voters on the activities of the government and the municipality. 
(Interview carried on 05.04.2011, Beyoğlu). A similar observation is made by a district 
member from Sancaktepe when he highlights the changing behavior of voters after 
immigration, “although before migrating to large cities people vote traditionally, once 
they migrate to large cities they vote according to the services provided to them. 
Provision of services is vital in this sense.” (Interview carried on 12.04.2011, 
Sancaktepe). A district member in Beykoz suggests,  
“The low educational profile of the voters is evident; they do not understand 
foreign policy or national politics. Their main concern is how much the 
party serves, and solves the problems in their neighborhoods. You have to 
know local issues such as the opening of a building, activity of the 
municipality very well when you contact voters.” (Interview carried on 
09.04.2011, Beykoz).  
 
During the electoral campaign, the party representatives widely informed people 
on the services of the municipalities where huge park-barrel project and social services 
were continuously highlighted.  The discourse of the deputy candidates during the small 
meetings and door-to-door visits prior to the 2011 general elections suggests that the 
economic dimension dominates the agenda. In all the small meetings, it was the first 
dimension that the deputy candidates informed voters on. The policies of the 
government on economy, social services and municipal investment were the main issues 
discussed in the meetings. The party activists and deputy candidates highlighted that the 
elections were general ones and that the voters should decide on whom to vote based on 
the national performance. They interpreted the policies of the government especially on 
the social services in the domain of health, education, rights of social insurance of 
women, handicaps, children etc… The empowerment of services provided by the 
hospitals, attaining medical assistance, the unconditional right of all children under 18 
to benefit from health care was among the main issues in the domain of health. In the 
realm of education, the increasing share of education in the budget, the opening of new 
schools, the ameliorated conditions in teaching were highlighted. An important message 
of nearly all of the deputy candidates in this domain was the necessity to encourage the 
youth to continue their education or learn a profession. The parents were urged to 
strictly control the educational path of their children. The economic performance of the 
government in fighting against inflation and unemployment and in the economic growth 
attained during the incumbency of AKP were also among the important messages.  
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Furthermore, the candidate deputies informed people on the community projects 
realized by the government and the municipality. They mostly highlighted that AKP 
was the only party that had the ability to solve these problems. The social assistance 
provided by the government to different segments of the society especially in the 
domain of social insurance was also an important message. Nevertheless, voters, 
especially women were encouraged to find a job and work. The policy of the 
government on the issue may be better explained by the discourse of a deputy candidate 
who also summarized the messages of other deputy candidates: 
“Force your children to take education. Under these circumstances, you 
have no excuses, the books are free of charge, and the government provides 
a pension.  If they seem not to continue to their education, send them to a 
vocational high school so that they can have a profession. There are huge 
demands for middle rank positions. They should not underestimate the jobs 
or the payments… I also worked as an intern after my education on law. I 
returned home at 21.00 in the night but my mother always told me that I 
should work… Of course, the government has provided you many social 
assistances but you cannot afford your life with these. Especially women 
have to find a job and work. The government provides opportunities of 
education and internship through The Job Creating Agency (İşkur)” 
(Electoral Campaign on 30.04.2011, Sancaktepe)     
 
The second dimension of the programmatic content was the center-periphery 
cleavage based on the general rights provided by the government, and the importance of 
the making of the new constitution. Religion was used through symbols, mostly realized 
through the discourses of the activists.  All were expressed as policies that benefit the 
whole society regardless of the political orientation of different groups, strengthening 
the non-discriminatory image of the party. The importance of the new constitution was 
expressed by focusing on the future of the children and giving the power to the party to 
make the necessary policy changes as the single governing party. The charismatic 
characteristics of the leaders blended with a nationalist tone was also a widely touched 
issue especially in the foreign policy domain, by emphasizing that these would be the 
politicians who would give the place Turkey deserve in international relations as a 
respected, strong country.  
When the tradition of the party and its widely debated position towards religious 
issues and its place in politics is taken into consideration, it is rather surprising that 
these issues did not directly dominate the agenda. The major focus was the party’s 
position as the representative of the people towards the authoritarian bureaucratic state 
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where religious rights were one of its facades. Nevertheless, the position of the party on 
the issue was stressed only through gestures and discourses of activists and these were 
mostly used to voters that are known to be closer to the party on ideological terms. In 
lots of occasions, activists used expressions that signal their position on the religiosity 
dimension. Some of these expressions commonly used during the electoral campaigning 
activities were: “With the permission of God” (Allahın izniyle), “Thank God” (Allaha 
şükür), “Good deed” (sevap) “we came first to have your prayer than your vote” etc... 
Another widely used gesture was to pray during condolence or special visits for ills, 
handicaps.  Such behaviors were commonly used by activists, especially in households 
known to be more religious. Nevertheless, more concrete political messages on the issue 
of headscarf, or religious schools did not cover the agenda. As a matter of fact, the 
major focus was materialist issues, which provided at the same time a means for the 
dissemination of ideological messages. 
 
6.1.2- Clientelistic Mobilization 
 
 
Besides informing people on the policies of the government, a commonly used 
mobilization tool is the distribution of different kinds of incentives, majority of which 
comes from municipal resources. As mentioned before, Kitchelt and Wilkinson (2007) 
suggest that what makes the distributed incentives clientelistic is not the type of the 
incentive but its conditionality. The mean through which both individual and club goods 
are distributed is important in defining the linkages used. One of the major activities of 
the party organization is to distribute the different types of incentives for electoral 
purposes. The distributed incentives cover very different types of goods ranging from 
individual and club ones such as community projects, jobs, social assistances or 
immaterial goods such as visits, dinners, information and assistances of know-how on 
the procedures of application for benefits provided by state institutions and 
municipalities.  
The inducement of club goods has constantly been used as a strategy by the 
party to gain support and by the voters to bargain and seems to have been effective in 
changing voters’ preferences. In most of the activities where the party activists met the 
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citizens, after the voters were informed on broader policies of the government, voters 
mostly expressed the municipal investments they desire in their districts or 
neighborhoods. Especially demands for infrastructural investment have been expressed 
in all the neighborhoods under investigation. Construction machines were working in all 
the neighborhoods during the electoral campaigning periods. The ceremonies for the 
opening or construction of new parks, different kinds of buildings ranging from huge 
sport complexes, conference halls to smaller social assistance buildings were routine 
activities of the electoral campaign. 
After a daily activity in one of the neighborhoods of Sancaktepe the women 
branch president informs her main branch associate on the negative effect of the 
hospital project in the neighborhood that could not still been constructed. She 
proclaims, “People ask about the hospital and tell they won’t vote for us unless they see 
the realization of the promised services” she added, “We should resolve this problem 
and begin the construction if we want to increase our votes in the neighborhood” 
(Interview carried on 24.04.2011, Sancaktepe). In a neighborhood meeting of one of the 
neighborhood in Sancaktepe the neighborhood president successfully informs the 
activists on the ability of the party to meet the demands of the contacted voters in 
gaining electoral support. He proclaimed; 
 “We have to solve the problems of people, notify them to higher authorities, 
control whether they have been done and inform people. If we do not do 
that, we will face the results at the ballot box. We should inform the 
authorities so that we can tell it to their face when they visit the 
neighborhood if they don’t solve the problems” (Electoral Campaigning 
activity, 13.05.2011, Sancaktepe).  
 
Beyoğlu district president highlighted that the municipality has made the opening 
of a “Semt Konağı” in the neighborhood of Hacıahmet and they will see whether it will 
have an effect on their vote shares in the neighborhood (Interview carried on 
24.05.2011, Beyoğlu). The use of community services of the municipality can also be 
traced from voters’ attitudes. In lots of occasions, they used their votes in order to 
receive municipal services. A similar situation of a smaller scale has been observed in 
the neighborhood of Veysel Karani where people informed the activists they would not 
support them unless their problem of draining is resolved or the pavements of the streets 
are repaired. In fact, both problems have been resolved during the electoral campaign by 
the municipality. 
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While this assistance consists of informing people on how to benefit on the 
social, economic or health services provided by both the municipalities and the central 
government, allocating economic aid is the most important part. How and where to 
apply for a wheelchair for the handicaps, ambulance services for the ill citizens, other 
application procedures for state services such as retirement, education, assistance 
programs, application for a green card to benefit from free health services, care services 
for elders, education assistance for mentally disabled etc are among major assistances 
the activists provide.  A district member highlights; 
 “helping people on state and municipal services is very important since 
people don’t know their rights, where and how to apply in order to benefit 
from them and when you help them on these issues they are grateful even 
when they could not benefit from the service. What is important is trying to 
help people.” (Interview carried on 18.05.2011, Beykoz).  
 
When demands for economic assistance are taken into consideration, the 
activists played the role of brokers that defend the individual’s right if the demands 
have been carried under their knowledge. It is interesting that most of the activists stated 
that the main cause they participated to the party was to help people in need. This shows 
that connection to the party provides an advantage in benefitting from these assistance 
programs.  
The provision of social aid assistance, employment or taking a construction 
certificate are the most widely clientelistically distributed individual municipal 
resources. One of the district members of Beykoz highlights that,  
“The most commonly raised issues during the activities are social assistance 
and employment. We direct them to the municipality, other state institutions 
or private companies. Of course some of them live in very poor conditions 
we collect contributions from members of the party organization to help 
them. Separately we direct them to other charity organizations” (Interview 
carried on 09.04.2011, Beykoz).  
 
The neighborhood president of one of the neighborhoods in Sancaktepe makes 
similar statements, albeit more clearly expressing the nature of the clientelistic 
exchange, “the main problem in the neighborhood is unemployment. I direct the one 
who demands a job to our main branch neighborhood president, he works at the 
municipality and easily solves these issues” (Interview carried on 10.05.2011, 
Sancaktepe). 
172 
 
The major content of both door-to-door visits and small meeting are demands of 
goods of individual or public type. Especially, in the meetings after the deputy 
candidate informed voters on the policies of the parties, participants began to express 
their demands and problems and asked for solutions. In fact, an important function of 
the activists is the provision of these kinds of incentives to the voters, which is not only 
specific to the electoral campaigning period.  
The most important individual type of incentive demanded and distributed is 
social and economic assistance to the citizens in need. In one of the neighborhoods, 
with the intermediary of the neighborhood representative, a woman informs the district 
member on her situation; “my social assistance that I benefited from a charity 
organization with the help of your activists has been cancelled; my husband could not 
find any job. I am in a very difficult situation”. The district members told her to come to 
the municipality where she works and she would look what she can do (Interview 
carried on 30.04.2011, Sancaktepe). In another instance, activists informed by the 
neighborhood president tried to find permanent shelter for a male citizen who was sent 
away from his house by his wife and children and found refugee in the one of the 
mosques of the neighborhood. They decided to contact the municipality (Electoral 
Campaigning activity on 12.05.2011, İnönü).  Especially, the vice presidents of social 
affairs were commonly contacted with the intermediary of other activists to find 
solutions to the problems of voters.  While I was waiting in the district building in 
Beyoğlu, the vice president of social affairs was arranging a job talk for a young man 
who came with a neighborhood activist (visit of the district center on 23.03.2011, 
Beyoğlu). In another occasion, upon the call of a member of the organization, the same 
vice president was trying to help a citizen who suffered from osteoporosis. He sent him 
to a doctor in a state hospital with his reference (Interview carried on 03.04.2011, 
Beyoğlu).   
As it can be seen from the previous examples, municipal services are not the 
only type of goods that activists provide. Assistance from the prefecture, private charity 
organizations mostly of religious bases, hometown associations, or businessmen where 
party activists have organic links through the party are widely used sources of material 
resources, albeit they remain smaller in magnitude. Almost all activists highlight that 
benefit from municipal and state assistance are tied to specific criteria and strictly 
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controlled. So, private resources are especially used to help people that do not fulfill the 
legal criteria to attain benefits. One activist says;  
   “The criteria to benefit from municipal or state assistance are clear, if you 
have an estate you are rejected, but buildings do not feed you. You can have 
a house but still no food to eat. Under such a situation we try to find private 
contributions.” (Electoral campaigning activity, 13.05.2011, Beykoz)  
 
The women branch neighborhood president of Hacıahmet informed that they 
have found funds to cloth children, furnish houses or provide food packages from 
businessmen last year. During the electoral campaign, many residents contacted the 
neighborhood presidents in order to attain economic assistance. The vice president of 
social affairs of the women branch of Sancaktepe expresses that they try to find help 
from all kind of channels. She adds, “I am working at a charity organization and I have 
lots of time provided assistance to the voters in need that I identify through this 
organization” (Conversation carried on 14.05.2011, Sancaktepe).   
In all the districts I have contacted, the district organization centers were full of 
people who tried to meet the district president to solve their problems with different 
state institutions or find a job. Most of these people came to the center accompanied by 
an activist who made the appointment. The change in the atmosphere of these centers 
from the day to the night was very interesting. While during the day, activities and 
mobility was in its minimum, especially after 18.00 o’clock one could observe a sudden 
increase in the number of people who mostly consist of voters trying to find someone to 
address their problems, mostly accompanied by a party neighborhood activist.   
In most of the district branches, there are human resources departments that 
collect the CVs of people applying the party for a job. The district president of 
Sancaktepe highlighted that they perform visits to the factories and businessmen in the 
district so as to be able to find employment for people. He adds, “When they contact us 
for any kind of position the human resource department sends them CVs”. I have 
witnessed such kind of processes during my visits to the district center. In one occasion 
in the district of Beykoz activists were informed to collect the CVs of people for jobs 
opening in the transportation department of the municipality. “We collect the CVs and 
send them to the municipal department in charge of hiring the person. Although we give 
reference, it is their decision to hire them. In a way we act as a broker,” says the vice 
president responsible of the organization (Interview carried on 18.03.2011, Beykoz). A 
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similar process took place in the district of Sancaktepe, where the secretary department 
collected CVs for job posts for a private company. All activists were informed on the 
presence of such job posts and many called to get informed on the nature of the job and 
to give the names of people applying through their connection. The vice president first 
was uncomfortable with my presence, but then he informed me that a private company 
would employ cleaners and they were collecting CVs for this position. He added that 
they act as a broker between private firms and citizens on the issue of employment. 
(visit on 24.04.2011, Sancaktepe)  Although the activists highlighted that the person to 
be employed was decided by the company itself and they had no influence in the 
process, it seems quite clear that CVs sent with their references would have an 
advantage compared to the other ones. In fact, the supervisor of the cleaning affairs of 
the municipality, a high rank activist of the party, clearly indicated during his talk with 
another party activist how party connections were important in the selection procedure;  
   “I have heard that your department is looking for cleaners, we have some 
friends who want to apply even if it is a provisional post” said the activist. 
The responsible answered, “People who enter to our department work for a 
long period of time, nearly 10-15 years.”, then he adds, “of course reference 
is very important in the decision process, acquaintance is a necessity, but 
afterwards, everything is up to your performance” (Visit  on 08.05.11, 
Sancaktepe)     
 
A widely used mechanism to materially persuade voters is to inform and invite 
them to events and trips organized by the party or mostly by the municipality. In all the 
districts, voters were invited to dinners, touristic trips, and picnics. Although a large 
number was directly held by the party, events organized by the municipality were also 
used as means to influence the voters. The attitudes of voters participating in these kinds 
of activities are an indication on their effectiveness in consolidating support or persuade 
potential swing voters by creating a sense of solidarity. In lots of occasions people 
asked activists to attend present or future activities. Given the fact that most of the 
voters in the district under study are deprived of the economic means to eat a dinner in a 
reputable restaurant in the district, see touristic places in or outside Istanbul, or afford to 
go to a picnic on their own where all kinds of food are serviced, such kind of activities 
were very popular among the voters.      
Activists highlight that other forms of inducement of immaterial nature are also 
effective in changing the perceptions of voters. Among these are the special visits 
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carried to opinion leaders in the district or certain voters in the neighborhood. Although 
these visits are used to get informed on the complaints of the citizens, their effect on 
voters is rather psychological. As one activist proclaims;  
   “People like to be considered as important. This is the case especially 
for poor people that no one cares. When you go to their houses, they get 
very proud and they try their best to please you. I have once gone to a 
house for an evening meal during Ramadan. This was an uninformed visit. 
The household was eating dinner; we also sat on the table. I cannot tell 
you the poor condition of the food at the table, probably collected from the 
trashes of the bazaar. However, we sat and ate with them. They were so 
happy. We changed their perception towards us” (Electoral Campaigning 
activity on 03.05.2011, Beyoğlu). 
 
During such kind of visits, it was visible that people were very happy to be 
contacted and listened. In most of occasions, they highlighted that even if the party 
could not find any solution to their problems, their presence and goodwill in listening to 
their problems was sufficient to gain their hearts. Nevertheless, activists worked very 
hard to immediately find a solution to their problems. Visits of elders, disabled, sick 
people, and funerals were important activities organized during the electoral campaign. 
All of these examples indicate the use of both programmatic and clientelistic linkage by 
party activists to gain support.  
 
 
6.4- Nature of the Clientelistic Linkage Developed by the Party 
 
 
The study argues that although material content comprises an important part in 
defining the mobilization strategy, the nature of the clientelistic network through which 
the party mobilizes the voters and persuades them is more important in understanding 
its influence on the types of voters. Within this respect, this section aims at defining the 
major characteristics of the clientelistic network developed by AKP. first, it 
demonstrates that the party perceives the mobilization of voters as a long term process 
where different types of voters, including opposition, are targeted through both 
materialist and ideological inducement. Second it tries to explain the logic behind the 
mobilization of opposition voters. Lastly, the study displays the voluntary nature of the 
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linkage through emphasizing the immaterial and persuasive character of assuring 
compliance.    
 
 
6.2.4- Long Term Mobilization of Different Types of Voters 
 
 
The study suggests that the clientelistic network can be identified as a network 
where different types of goods and different degree of programmatic doctrination are 
distributed to different types of voters through a repeated course of interaction.  As 
highlighted in Chapter 2, although some scholars suggest that political parties will target 
only core or potential swing voters (Stokes, 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007), there 
is also evidence that political parties distribute resources also to opposition voters.  
Although, the party’s main objective is incorporating, core and potential swing 
supporters into the clientelistic network through the distribution of incentives, 
opposition voters are also targeted. A neighborhood activist highlights, “of course 
priority is given to our supporters but we still do not discriminate. We also help people 
not supporting our party.” (Interview carried  on 11.05.2011, Sancaktepe). During 
another electoral activity, the vice president of the mayor informed activists that they 
were in the search for seasonal workers in the department of Parks and Gardens. He 
highlights, “we can find no one for the posts not only from our guys but from no one 
else. Please inform all people you know for the post” (Electoral campaigning activity on 
12.05.2011, Sancaktepe). In line with these observations, the network may be identified 
as consisting of different concentrated circles composed from different types of voters 
connected to each other with looser to tighter ties. Each circle has different 
responsibilities and access to the goods corresponding to these responsibilities where 
opposition voters are also contacted. Everyone contacted by the network can benefit 
from inducement depending on type and the extent of his/her services for the party.  
This system creates a pyramid where at the bottom are opposition voters and at the top 
are party activists from different organizational levels. Each level has access to different 
types of resources where the least valuable ones are distributed to the lowest level and 
most scarce ones to the few ones at the top.  
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Furthermore, in all the processes where the activists meet the voters, compliance 
is secured through a gradual persuasion accompanied with positive inducement and 
ideological mobilization. The same procedure applies to all types of voters, only the 
length of time of the persuasion process differs. The process of persuasion begins with 
the contact of one of the party representative with the voter for solving his/her problem, 
mostly during the routine activities of the neighborhood organization such as special 
visits, door-to-door visits, or other kind of social events taking place into the 
neighborhood.  
The activists behave differently according to the type of the voter who he/she 
contacts. If the voter is the loyal supporter of an opposition party, the activists mostly do 
not mobilize him/her programmatically but give him/her assistance of know-how 
including giving the name of the institution to apply, the general procedure of the 
application and names of people, mostly other party activists, who can help him/her.  
This helps him/her to develop an intimate relation with the voter through positive 
connotation and gratitude. In many occasions, I have witnessed such kinds of events 
where activists paid visits to the supporters of rival parties or help them to apply for 
assistance. When the voter is closer to the party, mostly, he/she is invited to an activity 
of the party to personally inform higher rank activists on his/her problem. These kinds 
of activities are mostly home talks or neighborhood meetings where ideological 
mobilization is systematically carried out. In these activities, people are first informed 
on the policies of the party and the municipality. Then, the voter is asked whether 
he/she wants to be a member of the party. The activists persuade the voters by insisting 
that there is no requirement for membership, but there are great advantages. Even when 
the voter replies negatively, the activists try to solve his/her problem. If he/she replies 
positively she/he becomes a party member.     
The way the process works may better be illustrated with a concrete example. In a 
neighborhood meeting in Beykoz a woman who was selling handmade furniture 
attended the meeting by the intermediation of the neighborhood board member. After 
she showed her furniture, she asked for a place to sell them or if possible to find her a 
regular job. The neighborhood coordinator proposed her to join the party so as she can 
sell these in the party meetings and signaled her that she should join actively participate 
in the party work to find a regular job by an example she gave.  She said, “participate 
with us, there is nothing you have to do, you can come to the meetings and sell these 
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there. People in our party like these kinds of things. We has a friend like you who 
needed a job, she joined the party, attended the regular meetings, meet everyone. At 
last, she found a good job through her connections during the activities.” (Interview 
conducted on 13.03.2011, Beykoz). After the woman rejected the offer, the 
neighborhood coordinator called the white desk of the municipality and asked for such a 
place. Then, after she gave the name of the person responsible to arrange such place, 
told her to go through her reference, she reminded her that she is always welcomed in 
the party if she changes her mind.  This example does not only reveal that party activists 
provide assistance not only to their core supporters, but also that certain kind of 
assistance are conditional.  
Membership is the way where party supporters are identified and incorporated 
into the network. This incorporation is provided through the distribution of several 
benefits to the members. These are the priority to acquire information circulating with 
the party organization. All members in a district have same access to some of this 
information through the computer program where all members’ names and contact 
information are accumulated. Then, through this program all kind of information are 
sent as a message to the mobile phones of the members. This information mostly 
consists of general activities of the party and the municipality, job posts where 
employees are searched etc. During the electoral campaigning period all party and 
municipal activities organized in Istanbul, in the specific district and neighborhood were 
sent to the members via their cellular phones.  Furthermore, the system is also used to 
inform people on job posts. In the district of Beykoz members were informed about job 
postings the municipality opened for drivers. Information on open job posts in 
Sancaktepe was also transmitted to the members through the system. Through this 
system, the members gain priority in attending the numerous activities carried by the 
party and the municipality, in applying for an assistance or job post.  One activist 
recommended me to add my phone number to the system if I wanted to be informed on 
the time and location of the activities organized in the neighborhood.  
People close to the party mostly accept becoming a member. Several activists 
highlighted that they became member of the party simply because they were asked to, or 
they wanted to be informed on the activities of the municipality and the party. When I 
asked one of the activist in a neighborhood of Sancaktepe why she joined party, she 
remarked; “The municipality and the party organize several events, but unfortunately 
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we cannot participate in them since we are not informed about them. I joined the party 
to get this information and share with my entourage.” (Interview conducted on 
10.05.2011, Sancaktepe) On the other hand, in most of these activities people are 
informed on programmatic issues such as the policies of the government and their 
purpose. The public performance of the activists in meeting voters’ demands increases 
their reputation, which motivates people to join the network. In fact, a great number of 
activists highlighted that people wanted to join the network to be able to attain what the 
party distributes.  
  Although membership acts as a way to control support to the party and have 
access to higher types of resources, it is the strategy of the activists after membership 
that consolidates voters’ compliance with the party. Members are contacted in every 
occasion to participate in the activities of the party in the neighborhood or the districts, 
are asked to organize a house meeting in their house where they invite their neighbors. 
Then, if they actively participate in these activities, they are offered to enter the 
administration in order to help people in their entourage. Dinners, touristic trips, 
picnics, sometimes job posts are routinely carried activities that serve as incentives to 
low level activists. However, their most important function is the regularity and 
intensity of the contact with the members, which increases the solidarity among the 
members and reinforces attachment to the party. Interpretation of the policies of the 
party in these activities serves as a venue to shape voters’ perception on party policies 
since they are regularly exposed to the same discourse. Krassa (1988) highlights it as 
the neighborhood effect and highlights it influence in changing the perception of voters 
in the long run. Given the fact that members are induced to introduce these policies in 
different occasions, they also have an indirect effect on other voters’ perception. In fact, 
it is an important tool of indirect mobilization used by party activists. As a result, the 
member becomes an activist of the party where in each step he/she is not only provided 
with incentives but also informed on the ideology of the party through the regular 
activities. 
Both interviews and participant observations confirms the studies expectations 
that the most scarce resources are distributed to the party activists at more important 
positions and act not only as an important motivation mechanism for these activists but 
also a way to control the resources for the party. Although, some of the neighborhood 
presidents have access to some jobs in the municipality, important ones are given to the 
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members of the district organizations. In fact, the campaigning activities provide an 
important ground for the activists to develop the required connections to get a job in the 
municipality, mostly through the recommendation of higher level activists.   
The field research confirms that the party network may be identified as consisting 
of different concentrated circles composed is composed of different types of voters tied 
to each other with looser to tighter ties. On the other hand, each circle has different 
responsibilities and access to the goods corresponding to these responsibilities.  
 
 
6.2.5- Explaining Why the Party Targets Opposition Voters 
 
 
The previous chapter has revealed that the party also target opposition voters and 
provides them some basic incentives, albeit its focus is core and swing voters. The aim 
of this section is to explain why opposition voters are also targeted by the party. 
According to the literature such a strategy may happen for two main reasons, the long-
term perception of the mobilization strategy (Auyero, 2001, Thachil, 2011; Cammett 
&Issar, 2010) and strengthening of the non-discriminative image of the party (Balla, 
Lawrence, Maltzman, Sigelman, 2002). In fact, both the discourse of the activists and 
their behavior signify that both changing voters’ perceptions in the long run and blame 
avoidance explain the strategy of the party in distributing some of the resources to 
opposition voters. 
The distribution of the less valuable resources also to the opposition voters seems 
to be a function of both the long-term mobilization perception of the party and its 
attempt to avoid blame. The relationship between distribution of material incentive and 
electoral support is mostly perceived as a long-term process, which does not is not 
expected to provide immediate results. Activists of different ranks express their 
awareness of the long-term function of such a strategy.  Although distance of the voter 
to the partisan network is the first dimension for developing a clientelistic linkage, the 
decision of the activists on which voters he/she will distribute -core, swing, opposition 
is another dimension. According to most of the activists, mobilization should not only 
be evaluated as a strategy that is effective in consolidating the votes for the party in the 
181 
 
short-run but also change the negative perceptions of opposed voters of the party in the 
long-run.   
  The discourse of the president of Istanbul Center of Electoral Coordination that 
provides help to voters summarizes the general perception of the party on the targeting 
of opposition voters,  
   “I cannot persuade a supporter of an opposition party to immediately 
vote for our party, but with my non-discriminatory image he/she will first 
tolerate my presence, and then have sympathy, sooner or later he/she or 
his/her children will vote for me” (Interview carried on 23.03.2012, 
Istanbul).  
 
After a visit in a voter’s house supporting the opposition, the main branch president of 
one of the neighborhood in Sancaktepe highlights; “These people are voting for CHP, if 
I help them, I will diminish their resistance against AKP and gain their sympathy. 
Today they will support the party but in the long run their attitude may change.” 
(Interview carried on 10.05.2011, Sancaktepe) Similarly, a neighborhood activist in 
Beykoz proclaims;  
   “We have Koran days in the neighborhood of course we also inform 
people on the policies of party, earlier our neighbors from CHP talked 
among them in such occasions, yesterday they just listened without saying a 
word, I hope in the future they will also share our views.” (Interview carried 
on 13.03.2011, Beykoz)  
 
This is a good example on the activists’ perception that repeated mobilization changes 
the perceptions of the voters.  Similar views are also expressed by higher rank activists; 
   “Ideologically opposed voters endorse the services we provide; 
furthermore, as we don’t try to change people’s preferences they do not 
react to us. We only inform them on who we are, we try to destroy their 
prejudice towards us. We try to show them that we only want to help people. 
It is a very important step in persuading people.” (Interview carried on 
01.04.2011, Beykoz) 
 
Providing assistance to opposition voters is also a function of the party attempt to 
avoid blame. In fact, all interviewed activists tried to convince the voters that they were 
indifferent towards different types of voters.   Within this respect, the general discourse 
of the party is dominated by non-discrimination among different types of voters 
connected to the network. The party denotes itself as the representative of all the 
members of the society and the provision of some of the incentives to opposition voters 
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strengthens this discourse.  In every occasion activists highlight that they help people 
regardless of their political orientations. A district member in Beykoz highlights; 
 “Our purpose is to serve people, when I say serve it is not in the meaning of 
vote buying but real service. Our party opposes the provision of services to 
people who do not need it but when someone needs help he/she will get it 
who ever he/she is.” (Interview carried 01.04.2011, Beykoz)  
 
A similar expression is also used by the president of the center of Electoral 
Coordination. He insists, “We try to make politics without personal interest. Our 
objective is to help people. Politics is the art to find a solution to the problem. Most of 
the problems we solve are local ones.” (Interview carried on 19.05.11, Beyoğlu) The 
women branch resident of Beykoz expresses, “We do not do not help people to gain 
vote, but to help them. The decision on who to vote is personal, we work to find solution 
to problems and when we find solutions we become influential.” (Interview carried on 
09.04.2011, Beykoz)   
An important observation is the activists’ insistence that their rejection of 
delivering services is only based on support for the party. The activists believe that such 
an act damages the party’s non-discrimination image. Yet, as highlighted non-
discrimination is mostly applied for know-how assistance or provision of the 
municipality assistance. The party strengthens its image of non-discrimination and 
decreases the possible blames of discrimination by allocating the incentives of social 
services to only the ones who are in need they are more openly distributed29 and large in 
quantity. Although officially, the control of the economic conditions of residents who 
apply for any kind of assistance is the responsibility of field employees of the 
municipality, party activists are influential in all the process of application, continuation 
or cancelations. The president of one of the neighborhoods in Beyoğlu expresses;  
 “I am very careful to help only people that are in need. I told my relatives 
that I would personally help them, but not report them to the district if they 
need something. I have prepared the list of the people to whom the 
Ramadan packages of the municipality will be distributed and I have 
scratched the name of all the people who do not need it. Whether he/she will 
vote for me is not my concern. If he/she really needs it, I provide it.” 
(Interview carried on 14.05.2011, Beyoğlu)    
                                               
29 Assistance of the municipality is distributed by the field personel of the municipality who delivers the 
benefits through the municipal car. When the personel visits an household, neighbors most of the time see 
the car and understand that the household benefit from assistance.  
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Many activists give examples of incidents where they have been influential in the 
cancelation of the services provided to their own supporters because they have 
determined that beneficiaries have done fake declarations about their economic 
situations. A district member in Beykoz states, 
 “Members of a family have their coalhouse with old stuffs and applied for 
municipal assistance although they have 3 floor building. One neighbor of 
this family has complained that we help them but they have a house on their 
own. I investigated it and found it to be true. I contacted the municipality 
and  canceled their benefit. It is because of these events that people says the 
party only helps its supporters. We should not tolerate such kind of events.” 
(Interview carried on 09.04.2011, Beykoz)  
 
A similar reaction was made in conversation with a neighborhood activist and a 
coordinator during a neighborhood meeting: “People are saying that citizens with good 
economic conditions also benefit from help,” says the activist. “It is not possible, the 
municipality is working very carefully on this matter,” answers one coordinator. The 
other coordinator adds, “Who are these citizens? Ask the people that informed you to 
identify these citizens so that we can go and check them.” The other coordinator warns, 
“A person may sit in a beautiful building but still pay rent.” The activist objected, 
“These people have a car. Last time they got a Ramadan package from us but this time I 
have not written their name on the list of food package assistance”. Then, the activist 
explains that the major problem in fighting against fake applications was that most of 
people were working without insurance and although their economic conditions are 
good, on paper, they have no resources. According to them, that is why they got 
assistance (Meeting on 13.05.2011, Sancaktepe). One week later when I asked the 
neighborhood coordinator whether they have controlled the economic situation of these 
residents, she answered me that they did. According to her, they were really benefiting 
from the assistance with fake declaration, so they informed the municipality.       
Activists also complain about the attitudes of the voters who openly bargain their 
vote in exchange for goods even if they do not meet the criteria only because they 
support the party. The vice president of Sancaktepe highlights: 
    “People are coming for help, I look at their situation, inform them on the 
procedure to apply, give the name of people they can contact. They tell me 
that they know the legal procedure and ask for another way to benefit from 
these assistances. I think they want me to go and apply for them or help 
them immediately, without any procedure. Perhaps they get used to such 
kind of help, but it is not possible to do something like that, they should be 
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able to prove their economic conditions.” (Interview carried on 12.04.2011, 
Sancaktepe)  
 
The women branch district president working in the assistance department of the 
municipality says,  
“Activists are used to give help to everyone who wants. They call me and 
say we need assistance to the following address. I tell them, it does not 
function this way. You have to send this person to the municipality, we do 
the controls and we give them assistance if they need, we have to follow a 
certain procedure to minimize discrimination.” (Interview carried on 
01.04.2011,Beykoz)  
 
Another neighborhood activist gives an example of how people try to use their 
connections to solve their problems through the party connection; 
 “One of my resident from my hometown origin came with the reference of 
my uncle. He could not find work for two years. He asked me if I could help 
him. I told him that I could only give his CV. I will not call someone from 
the district to find him a job. Our people want everything to be ready for 
them. Working for nothing is always better than doing nothing. The 
municipality has made an announcement for a three month job. No one has 
applied to it...” (Interview carried on 14.05.2011, Beyoğlu) 
 
The non-discrimination discourse is also connected to the religious dimension 
where discriminating between people who need help is a sin. One activist says, “Our 
president highlights that oppressed people have no language or religion, we try to 
implement this vision while we decide who to help.” (Interview carried on 07.05.2011, 
Beyoğlu) Another activist argues, “It is very difficult to determine the families where 
food assistance will be distributed in the month of Ramadan. If we distribute these food 
assistances to people who do not really need them, how we will deal with the sin we 
committed.” (Interview on 06.06.2011, Beyoğlu)  
Although the party constructs an image of a party sensitive to all voters, especially 
the lower level activists’ discourse reveals the conditional relationship between the 
provision of social assistance and electoral support. Such a discourse is expected to be 
more accurate, since they are less educated about the party’s policies. In one of the 
neighborhood meetings in the district of Sancaktepe, a discussion between activists 
broke out on whether voters benefiting from help should vote for the party or not. One 
activist says, “If they benefit from help they should vote for AKP. The municipality is 
also from AKP.” The other proclaims, “No, these are different things. Do we help 
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people to have their vote? No, then people do not have the necessity to vote for the 
party.” The main branch district president intervenes, “people do not have to support 
our party because we help them, but they should if they want the services to continue for 
a long time. It is the most rational strategy for them.” (interview conducted on 
10.05.2011, Sancaktepe). After another meeting with the voters, a district member 
highlights, 
 “people who are not voting for the party should not benefit from these 
social assistance. If I were them, I would not accept assistance from a party 
that I don’t support. I really do not understand how they can do this.” The 
other opposes her, “these are the services of the municipality, everyone can 
benefit”. (Interview conducted on 30.04.2011, Sancaktepe).  
 
Nevertheless, a great number of neighborhood activists highlighted that the 
district representatives always warn them not to discriminate among different types of 
voters for the provision of social assistance and they were very careful to comply with 
this warning even if they sometimes did not approve it. During our discussion, a 
neighborhood coordinator states,  
“There are lots of people who say they support our party, but I think some 
of them are lying. For example, there is a family whose members tell they 
support our party, we insisted to make them members but we have never 
been able to. We even found a job for their sons. At last, three members of 
their family became our member. While we were passing from their house 
there was a CHP flag. The women tried to rapidly put it down; she said that 
it was the kids who hang it.  But how can a CHP flag be hanged in the house 
of an AKP supporter? I told these events to the district president he told me 
that it was not important. He added that the party’s image was to help 
everyone. He warned me that we should not discriminate between people. I 
am doing what he told me.” (Interview conducted on 06.05.2011, 
Sancaktepe). 
 
The discourse of the activists on mobilizing opposition voters indicates that both 
the long-term perception of the party in persuading voters and attempt to avoid blame 
are effective. Yet, this study suggests that the effectiveness of long term mobilization is 
based on the ability of the activists to develop a linkage through persuasion and 
immaterial connotations.  The next section evaluates the nature of the mechanisms of 
compliance used by the party activists.  
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6.2.6- Assuring Compliance through Persuasion 
 
 
As identified in the previous section, it is not only what the network provides but 
also how it is provided that determines the consolidating effect of the clientelistic 
network on voters’ electoral preferences. The field research indicates that clientelistic 
linkage developed by the party is based on voluntary compliance rather than threat 
where solidarity between the voters and the party is enhanced by positively connoting 
the party’s image on the eyes of the voters. This increases sympathy to the party among 
opposition voters while increasing party identification among swing or core voters who 
are ideologically close to the party.  
 In the overall process, the party representatives project themselves and are 
mostly perceived by voters as people dedicating their times in helping people in need.  
How they behave to the voters may better be understood by a few examples witnessed 
during the field research. It was in the White Desk center of the municipality of Beykoz 
where the district woman branch president worked as the main official. A woman was 
waiting with her child in her arms to talk with her. She came, hugged her, and kissed 
her child. There was the affection of a mother in her face while she was gently palming 
her hair. Then, she asked, “How is your kid doing?”, the young women answered;  
“She is ill, we came here to see the doctor,”. “I understand, she has to be fed 
well, don’t worry I will send you a package of food from the municipality. 
Please call me if you need anything”. The young women thanked her with a 
sincere smile, “I don’t know what I would have done if I did not know you.” 
(Visit to the municipality on 09.04.2011, Beykoz)  
  
In a similar occasion in Beykoz, the same representative gave a visit to the house 
of a woman in one of the neighborhoods where the party carried its electoral campaign 
by the mediation of a party activist residing in the neighborhood. The woman was ill, no 
one worked in the family, and they were in very poor living conditions as the activists 
informed the president. The president asked her, “How are you ‘teyze’?” (an expression 
used in Turkey for elder people who are close to you which means aunt). “I am fine my 
dear daughter”, “Do you need anything Ashamed by her situation the women says “no” 
with a tearful tone. Understanding the situation the president says, “I see I will come as 
soon as possible to chat with you and share your problems, is there anything that you 
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want me to do until then?”, “no my daughter, God bless you”. After leaving the house, 
the president turns to me and says;  
“You see, people have many problems among them is poverty, and they are 
ashamed of asking something from you. The best we can do is to come, talk 
with them as friends, listen to their problems and find a solution. It is not 
only helping them that counts but acting as if they are our friends.” 
(Electoral campaigning activity on 18.05.2011, Beykoz)   
 
In all the events taking place, where activists visited voters, similar gestures were 
performed towards the citizens. In many occasions, non-material incentives such as 
visits, or know-how assistance were very important in increasing the image of the 
activist as a person sensitive to the voters, even under circumstances where the voters 
were very furious. Actually, some voters openly proclaimed that they voted for the party 
before requesting any help. Through their gestures and tones, they menaced the activists 
that they could not get support unless they listen and find a solution to their problem. 
Even under these circumstances, activists were very careful not to lose their temper and 
to behave kindly, albeit they were very uncomfortable with the voters’ direct attempts to 
bargain their votes.  
One voter in the neighborhood of Veysel Karani furiously blamed the activists; 
 “I have always supported your party. I have an ill sister at home and no 
one from your party has come and asked me if I need something. I want 
party activists to visit me, see my situation. If no one comes then you will not 
be able to have my support.” (Electoral campaigning activity on 14.05.2011, 
Sancaktepe). 
 
The activists apologized to the voter and asked her to come to the meeting the same 
afternoon to inform them on her condition. Two days later, when the deputy candidate 
went to a visit, her pleasure could be seen from her eyes. She informed the candidate on 
her problem, and the candidate asked the activists to help her. While we were leaving, 
the voter expressed her gratitude to the activist for their sensitivity.  Probably another 
vote was gained for the party. 
In another occasion during the electoral campaigning activity in Sancaktepe, an 
old woman supporting the party highlights, “you know this girl…” showing the 
neighborhood coordinator with her hand, “She was with me in my most difficult times. 
She came and visited me as much as she could; she helped me. How can I not vote for 
her party? If I do not support her, what would God say?” During one of the electoral 
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campaigning activities in a neighborhood of Sancaktepe, the discourse between the 
woman branch neighborhood coordinator and a female voter who contacts her to benefit 
for assistance also reveals how the activist are perceived by the voters. When the 
woman approached the convoys, before even the activists talked about her problem, the 
neighborhood coordinator addresses her;  
“Do not worry, I have not forgotten your request. I will figure out how I can 
help you, I try to find assistance from private organizations. But it will take 
a little time.” The voter answers, “I know you won’t forget me, you have 
always found a solution to my problems when I contacted you. And I am 
very grateful to you for that reason. Thank you very much.” (Electoral 
Campaigning activity, 26.05.2011, Sancaktepe)  
 
It is also important to note that activists do either perceive assisting voters in need 
as a materialist exchange for gaining votes. Furthermore, this perception is not only 
evident in their conversations with me but also among each other, where activists 
mostly highlight only the importance of helping people, and not its positive effect on 
electoral outcomes. In many occasions, activists highlight their happiness for helping 
someone in need. One activist proclaims, “Helping people is a religiously good deed, it 
brings you salvation, there is nothing more comfortable than helping someone in need.” 
(Interview on 07.05.2011, Beyoğlu). A conversation between two activists about a 
female resident who has lost her husband and who has to take care of 7 children 
illustrates the importance given to the non-material characteristic of the activity. While 
we were passing near the house, one activist addresses the neighborhood coordinator; 
 “You remember, I have mentioned you the situation of a women with 7 
children, she is living here. We have to do something; she really needs help. 
I’ve gone to visit her and I almost cried after I left.”  
 
The neighborhood coordinator answers; 
 “I know this woman. I provided her food assistance and cloth for her 
children. Nevertheless, we have to find a permanent solution for the sake of 
her children.  They are too young and they cannot even drink milk. Perhaps 
we can collect money so as to help her provisionally.” (Electoral 
campaigning activity, 26.05.2011, Sancaktepe)  
 
The activists in a neighborhood in Beyoğlu complained from the humiliating 
demands of the district branch who asked them to take photos of the families they help 
to put them on the web page of the party. One of the activists said; 
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 “The most valuable help is the one given discreetly. We informed the 
district organization that we would not do something like that. Can you 
think how humiliating it is for these people, everyone will know that their 
economic situation is not good? I personally cannot tolerate such an act for 
the sake of the advertisement of the party” (Interview conducted on, 
07.05.2011, Beyoğlu)  
 
The strategies of the party activists to make voters participate to the activities of 
the party also indicated the persuasive strategy of the party. During the electoral 
campaigning period, members were frequently asked to participate in meetings held in 
Istanbul. Most of the time, they tried to persuade voters and activists by using emotional 
discourses. “this party has served  us, we should show our gratitude”, “it is the most 
important time for our party, if we don’t help it now, when will we do it”, “We should 
talk in every place and demand vote for the party so that they serve better to us” were 
commonly used expressions. 
Although creating voluntary compliance through persuasion is an effective way in 
consolidating support and increasing reach for the party, its success is based on the 
amount of interaction among the voters and the party activists. In return, the amount of 
interaction is based on the length and intensity of the relationship developed between 
each other.  On the other hand, the development of such a relationship requires great 
efforts for the activists of the party. This is why AKP is expected to develop certain 
mechanisms to decrease the cost of such s strategy.  The next chapter explains how the 
party uses the local organizations in order to decrease the cost of contacting, identifying 
and persuading voters of both non-Kurdish and Kurdish origin.     
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
THE NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATION AND THE EFFECTIVE 
MOBILIZATION OF NON-KURDISH AND KURDISH VOTERS 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter has illustrated three important points concerning the 
mobilization strategy of AKP. First, it has been demonstrated that the party uses both 
clientelistic and programmatic mobilization, albeit the former is the major focus.  
Second, it has also been signified that the party functions through a network where 
activists mobilize different types of voters through different types of goods. Third, it has 
been illustrated that the party assured compliance through voluntary means, which also 
enhances the effectiveness of programmatic mobilization. Recall from Chapter 2 that 
the study suggests that this kind of a clientelistic network necessitates mechanisms 
where the party directly contacts the voter, on a repeated course of interaction.   
This study suggests that the neighborhood organization provides a suitable 
mechanism for the party to mobilize swing voters through this kind of a clientelistic 
network. Within this respect, apart from the number of activists, two characteristics of 
the neighborhood organization contribute to the effectiveness of the mobilization 
strategy. The first one concerns the repeated course of the interaction. The amount of 
activities of the neighborhood organization decreases the cost of mobilization by 
increasing trust and assures values, that promotes voluntary compliance through 
increasing attachment to the party. The second one is the characteristics of the activists. 
Mobilization is more effective when conducted by people known by the voters. When 
activists are intensively working for the party for a long period of time and they are 
members of the social network of the targeted society the effectiveness of the 
mobilization efforts is expected to be higher.  
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Yet, recall from Chapter 2 that the clientelistic mobilization of ethnic groups is 
even more effective when carried through known co-ethnics members of the social 
networks. Such an argument has four different logics. In an environment of limited 
information, it signals the members of an ethnic group that their interest will be 
represented (Chandra, 2004). Second, the ethnic social networks serve for the party as 
an avenue to decrease the cost to identify voters and assure compliance (Kitschelt & 
Wilkinson, 2007). Third, in the absence of intercommunity relations and presence of 
opposition voters among the group, it prevents the reluctance of activists from an ethnic 
group to identify all members as opportunist. Fourth, when the ethnic group has 
potential for violence, the presence of known co-ethnics members of the same ethnic 
social network is vital in incorporating them in the clientelistic network, since violence 
prevent both activists and voters to publicly declare their political preferences.   
Based on these arguments, this chapter analyses the strategy of AKP in increasing 
and consolidating its support among swing voters by incorporating them into the 
partisan network for voters of non-Kurdish and Kurdish origin.  Within this respect, the 
first section evaluates the strategy of the party to increase the scope and effectiveness of 
its clientelistic network for non-Kurdish voters. The second section highlights the main 
difference of the party’s strategy in mobilizing voters of Kurdish origin. 
 
 
7.2- Mobilization of Non-Kurdish Voters 
 
 
  This study suggests that the neighborhood organizations are important for the 
party’s mobilization strategy since it is through their routine activities that AKP assures 
voluntary compliance and increases the number of identified voters. The neighborhood 
organization fulfills these functions through the activities they perform and the 
characteristics of the activists working in the organization. Within this respect, this 
section illustrates how each of these factors increases the effectiveness of the 
clientelistic network by lowering the cost of identifying different types of voters, 
incorporating them into the network and building trust in order to assure voluntary 
compliance.    
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7.1.1- Activities of the Neighborhood Organizations and Repeated Interaction 
 
 
An important dimension of AKP’s mobilization strategy is to be in constant 
contact with the society. The district and the neighborhood branches are important in 
fulfilling this function. As expressed by most of the AKP representatives, the party’s 
mobilization strategy at the district level is based on regular and intense contacting of 
the voters by the party activists. The main branch president of Sancaktepe highlights, 
“our major aim is to make politics in touch with the society (Interview conducted on 
08.02.2011, Sancaktepe). Within this respect, the local branches, especially 
neighborhood organizations activities have one basic function for the political party: 
These activities serve as mechanisms that provide a permanent linkage between the 
party and the voters. This strategy, which reinforces AKP’s nationwide image as “the 
party representing the people and serving their interest”, is carried through the routine 
activities of the neighborhood organizations. It is these activities that increase the 
repeated course of interaction and the scope of the network.  
The neighborhood activities serve as channels through which party activists 
regularly contact the voters, get informed on their preferences enabling the party to 
formulate responsive strategies. Furthermore, they help to identify different types of 
voters for specific targeting, conduct compliance, consolidate the party’s votes, and 
increase solidarity among party activists, members and supporters. They also serve as 
means to change the perception of the voters on the party. As a result, through the 
activities of the neighborhood organizations the party fortifies its image as a party close 
to the citizens that works hard and continuously for this purpose. There is great variety 
in the activities the neighborhood organizations perform and their frequency, but the 
major aim is to repeatedly contact as much voters as possible to increase and 
consolidate the partisan network.  
The main activity of the neighborhood branch is the home talks carried by the 
neighborhood organization. The weekly meeting of the neighborhood administration, to 
which not only the administration but also all citizens can participate, is among an 
important type of home talk carried by the party. Although these meetings provide a 
regular base for such an activity other home talks are also realized by the party activists. 
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The home talks meetings mostly take the form of informal talks where the 
neighborhood coordinator or neighborhood president informs citizens on the party’s 
policies and notes different demands and problems, all mostly being local issues. The 
location of these meeting change greatly; they are mostly realized in a members’ house 
but any kind of occasional meeting in the neighborhood such as “Mevlüt” or Koran 
readings, women’s tea day is preferable if possible. Mostly the householder or other 
party members are asked to invite his/her neighbors, friends etc. to increase 
participation and contact as many members as possible.   For main and youth branch 
neighborhood organizations coffee houses are the most suitable places. These meetings 
are especially carried in areas frequented by lots of people. While increasing the number 
of the people informed on the party’s policies, these meeting also serve as mechanisms 
that reinforce the perception that the party is working hard. Indeed, lost of activists 
mentioned that they purposively made the meetings in crowded places to perform this 
end. Others highlighted that they preferred to realize home talks in the houses of 
respected residents of the neighborhood.  
Other forms of activities consist of participating in all social activities taking place 
in the neighborhood such as marriages, funerals, Koran readings, Mevlüts and visits of 
newborns, sick or aged residents, as the representative of the party. These visits are 
performed with some gifts such as cloths for baby, candy, tea or coffee.  Nevertheless, 
the members of the neighborhood organization use all aspects of the social sphere to 
contact people. These social spaces diverge from family visits to café houses etc… One 
activist highlights “we make politics everywhere, we talk everywhere we find someone 
to talk; houses, coffee houses, streets….” (Interview conducted on 08.05.11, 
Sancaktepe). While strengthening the bonds between activists as the representative of 
AKP and the citizens, the activities contribute to a positive perception on the party’s 
sensitivity towards the members and the society, and its overall performance. In fact, 
the effect of such activities on the voters’ perceptions seems to be very positive. 
Another important activity of the neighborhood organization is realizing voter 
surveys (Seçmen Taraması). This consists of door-to-door visits to get informed on 
voters’ electoral preferences, demands, problems etc….Albeit activists do not directly 
ask people on their political preferences, the reaction of the voters mostly give 
important clue on their orientations when they learn that the activists are coming from 
AKP. Major Questions asked are on the problems they face concerning the municipality 
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or state institutions.  Then brochures on the party’s policies are distributed to the voters. 
While these activities increase the party’s sensitivity towards the voters in the eyes of 
the latter, they also provide important information on the voters. Not only participating 
in but also inviting people for all social events organized by the municipality or the 
party district branch within the neighborhood or the district such as mass meetings, 
concerts, breakfasts, dinners, trips or picnics for the official members is another 
responsibility of the neighborhood activists.  
 
 
7.1.2- Characteristics of the Activists 
 
 
The formal organizational structure of AKP provides the necessary framework for 
a mobilization strategy deeply penetrated into the society, which is in constant contact 
with the voters. Nevertheless, it is not only the repeated course of the contact that 
increases persuasion and identification of different voters but also the party’s ability to 
realize this contact on a common ground of identification. This common ground 
decreases the length of the interaction necessary to build a relationship based on trust 
and solidarity. One activist states; “When you are in the field, you should behave as if 
you are one of them. If not, they will not be persuaded that you understand them, care 
about them or even find a solution to their problem.” (Electoral campaigning activity on 
04.06.2011, Sancaktepe) 
Although similarities such as hometown origin, profession, education, economic 
situation are also taken into consideration, AKP’s recruitment strategy is mainly based 
on geographical representation. In the organization, the equal identification of voters is 
provided through geographical representation.  Formally, equal reach is assured in the 
Party Inner Organization regulation through the obligation it sets on the members of the 
polling station administration to reside in the polling station under their jurisdiction.  
The same criterion is also applied for the polling station coordinator who should reside 
in one of the polling stations under his/her jurisdiction. At the neighborhood level, this 
coincides to the formation of a neighborhood administration where members residing in 
different polling stations of the neighborhood are purposefully incorporated. As a result, 
nearly all streets in the neighborhood are represented in the neighborhood 
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administration through the polling station coordinators. This strategy defined by the 
activists as “street representation” (since a group of polling stations coincides to a 
street in the neighborhood) is given great importance as declared by a considerable 
number of activists during the field research. All, the district presidents and vice-
presidents responsible of the organization highlight that their main criteria for 
recruitment is geographical and that the party increases its network street by street 
through incorporating an activist residing in that street.  
Within each organizational level, the district and neighborhood presidents pay 
attention to have activists residing in the geographical unit under their jurisdiction. As a 
matter of fact, the representative character of the activists is under the strict control of 
the district president and the vice president responsible of the organization. In all 
activities, party representatives contacting the society were very careful to go with the 
activists known by the neighborhood. Besides facilitating communication and affecting 
voters’ perception, this gives them the opportunity to be informed on the general 
attitude of the electorate, all events taking place and set regular channels of 
communication within the whole of the geographical unit under his/her responsibility. 
This decreases the cost of contacting, identifying and creating a relationship based on 
trust with the person contacted. 
  In fact, the characteristics of the person who initiates the contact (i.e. party 
volunteer versus someone in individual’s social network) may affect voter’s decision 
(Çarkoğlu, 2010, p.10). As one of the members of the district organization highlights, 
“We can change the perspective of people only when we find a common ground of 
identification with them” (Interview conducted on 09.04.11). The declaration of the 
party representatives and the main criteria upon which activists are selected confirm the 
presence of such a strategy in the party.  Furthermore, especially where the party 
activists develop a multifaceted and permanent linkage with the voters, the 
characteristics of the activist and whom he/she represents serve as a first step in 
developing intimate relations with the voters. 
Even more importantly, the characteristics of the activists who contact the citizens 
affect the voter’s perception towards the sincerity of the messages given to him/her. For 
the voters, representation provides a mechanism where they identify with the party since 
it helps them gather information on whose interest the party is representing and decrease 
the cost of building trust between the party and the voter. In lots of occasions when the 
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activists contacted the voter for the first time, they immediately tried to find a common 
ground before informing them on the party policies. Place of settlement, hometown 
origin are typically asked questions by the activists to create a positive interaction. The 
conversation between the municipal member and the owner of a shop during the 
electoral campaigning activity provides a good example on changing perception of 
voters. The owner seemed not very uncomfortable with the situation when we entered 
the shop. Activists asked him whether he has any complaints. He quickly answered that 
he has not and began to make its routine activities. It was only after the member of the 
municipal council asked him his hometown origin and informs him that they were from 
the same town that the owner began to talk sincerely. We stayed in the shop for 
approximately 5 minutes (Electoral campaigning activity, 21.02.2011, Sancaktepe).   
Activists highlight that the presence of people from their own street, 
neighborhood or district within the organizational structure increases the voter’s 
identification with the party.  The use of representational characteristics by the voters as 
a base to understand whose interest the party targets is especially more influential in 
political settings characterized by the lack of information on peoples’ identities. Under 
these circumstances, the representative characteristics of the party activists provide a 
first clue for the voters.  
 A woman branch district president highlighted that she purposefully visited 
people with the party activists that the voters know because it was only then that people 
tend to trust her and expressed themselves more sincerely. She says; 
    “If I knock the door as a stranger and ask them whether they have a 
problem or complaint, they would probably say nothing. But when I go 
there with someone they know, they will ask me to get inside and tell me 
their most intimate problems.” (Interview conducted on 06.05.2011, 
Sancaktepe).  
 
In fact, I have been able to witness the possible effect of such a strategy on voters’ 
behavior. In most of the households I have entered, it was only after I and other 
strangers were introduced by the known activists that people began to talk on their 
views or problems.   
The importance of being “the guy of our street”30 can also be traced in the 
performance of the activities of the party. In all activities taking place in the 
                                               
30 An expression used by most of the activists to define someone living in their street or neighborhood. 
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neighborhood, such as home talks, special visits etc the district branch is very careful to 
perform them under the presence of the neighborhood activists known by the voter or 
district representatives residing in the neighborhood. 
Recall that the lack of information on voters’ types and needs is a major problem 
that political parties try to overcome. In fact, it is not always easy to identify the type of 
the voters that you first meet. One activist proclaims; 
    “I try to guess voters’ preferences of people that I know by asking them 
how they are. If he/she tells me that he/she is happy, He/she probably 
supports AKP, in contrast, if he/she tells me that she is not well he/she 
probably supports another party. We express that we support AKP 
discreetly through our gestures, we show ourselves happy, pleased with our 
lives, and we smile to everyone.” (Interview conducted on 10.05.11, 
Sancaktepe).  
 
Within this respect, representation provides easy reach to the voters since activists 
perform their activities in their own social environment and as a result, can more easily 
communicate with people, identify them and participate in daily lives of the citizens as 
the representatives of the party. It decreases the cost of identifying the voters’ types and 
needs. All neighborhood presidents highlighted that they get informed on the voters’ 
preferences, problems by the intermediary of the members of the administration 
residing in the same street.   
Furthermore, all activists proclaim that they know people in their street, their 
problems, and electoral preferences. In lots of occasions where higher rank party 
representative attended the meeting, these activists informed them on the problems or 
party orientations of the participants. After a home talk carried in one of the 
neighborhood of Sancaktepe, the neighborhood activists informs the district activist on 
a woman who wanted help; 
    “This woman is from CHP. Her husband was working at the school but 
he left. She comes to every home talk to discreetly criticize the policies of 
the government. She tells that she could not benefit from the assistance of 
the municipality but it is a lie, I know she benefits”. (Electoral campaigning 
activities on 30.04.2011, Sancaktepe).  
 
During the electoral campaigning activities in one of the neighborhoods in 
Beyoğlu, a district member residing in the neighborhood tells me, “You see these 
teenagers right there. I know them; we are residing in the same street.  They are from 
the youth branch of BDP. They wait there in order to intimate us and observe 
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participation in our activities,” (Electoral campaigning activities on 03.05.2011, 
Beyoğlu). 
A neighborhood president from Sancaktepe highlighted how it is difficult for 
them to perform activities in the polarized parts of the neighborhood with activists 
unknown by the residents:  
   “It is very difficult to perform any activities in these streets if they don’t 
know you. Last time, two of our activists went to one of these streets and 
they were interrogated by some residents on their intention to come there, 
fortunately they have been able to return without any problem but they 
could not distribute the brochures.” (Interview conducted on 10.05.2011, 
Sancaktepe) 
 
A provincial responsible of the district of Beykoz strictly criticized the 
composition of the neighborhood organization, which was not established on the street 
criteria. She said; 
   “This is not right; there is a common criterion to form an organization. If 
you know how to do it, then, it is very simple to form it. The organization 
should know the neighborhood and the neighborhood should know the 
organization. In order to do that you should have representatives from each 
street so that you can regularly be informed on people”. (Interview 
conducted on 31.05.2011, Beykoz).   
 
Representation is also effective in shaping the relations of the party with activists 
and supporters of other parties.  One neighborhood president says; 
    “We do have problems with CHP or BDP activists during the electoral 
campaign but when the elections are over, all is forgotten since we are 
neighbors and share the same social environment, we have daily, face to 
face relations with most of them” (Interview conducted on 06.06.2011, 
Beyoğlu).  
 
Similarly, another activist proclaims; 
 “I live in the same building with the neighborhood president of BDP, we 
talk with each other. How much can she behave brutally? After the elections 
we will still be residing in the same building” (Interview conducted on 
03.05.2011, Beyoğlu)  
 
Since the functioning of the party requires an intense devotion of time and effort 
of the activists in party affairs on voluntary grounds, recruiting people that have time, 
are active, respected, dominant (mostly local elites) in their society, have good relations 
with the residents as a whole are further characteristics that the party pays attention. The 
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individual characteristics of the presidents and other representatives are vital in carrying 
on and increasing the party’s organizational strength at both district and neighborhood 
level, since their main function is to form the branch organizations and provide the 
coordination of their activities and relations between members.  Replacement of the 
neighborhood president is a very widely exerted procedure when the organization in the 
neighborhood is not functioning as desired. In neighborhoods where the neighborhood 
president is active and successfully forms its administration on representation principles 
the party is successful in reaching diverse voters on a regular base.  
This section has illustrated the role of the neighborhood organizations in 
increasing the effectiveness of the mobilization strategy both in increasing the scope of 
the interaction and its voluntary nature by using existing channel of interaction. It has 
illustrated that not only the number of activists but also the intensity of the 
neighborhood activities and their geo-graphical representativeness decrease the cost of 
identification and persuasion. Nevertheless, it is important to note that such a strategy is 
carried under areas where citizens of Turkish origin reside. In fact, areas where citizens 
of Kurdish origin reside, the party’s ability to reach, indentify and persuade the voters 
of Kurdish origin by the existing organization is more difficult. As a result, the party 
formulates a different strategy for their mobilization. The next section is a detailed 
evaluation of the major difficulties witnessed by the party in mobilizing citizens of 
Kurdish origin through street representation and identification of the strategy used by 
the party to overcome these difficulties.  
 
 
7.3- Mobilization of Kurdish Voters  
 
 
The previous chapter has illustrated that mobilization of non-Kurdish voters was 
mostly materialist albeit containing ideological aspects as well. In contrast to cultural 
theories on the rise in ethnic consciousness (Deutsch 1954; Gellner 1964; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967, Horowitz, 2000), rationalist approaches relate the rise in ethnic 
consciousness to the competition of different ethnic groups for material resources. 
Within this respect, if ethnic consciousness is a function of material distribution, the 
content of the mobilization strategy of AKP for voters of Kurdish origin is not expected 
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to greatly diverge from voters of non-Kurdish origin. As a result as a specific form of 
mobilization through particularistic distribution, clientelistic linkage is also expected to 
be effective in consolidating or increasing support for AKP among voters of Kurdish 
origin. The first section briefly focuses on the content of the mobilization when the 
party contacts Kurdish voters. 
Yet, the study suggests that the violent nature of the Kurdish movement, high 
ethnic consciousness, the weak and conflictual nature of the inter-community relations, 
presence of different types of voters among citizens of Kurdish origin makes their 
incorporation into the clientelistic network through street representation very difficult 
and ineffective, since it increases the costs of identifying different types of voters. 
Based on the discourse of the activists, the second section illustrates how potential of 
violence among voters of Kurdish origin, weak intercommunity relations and prejudice 
of non-Kurdish activists on the opportunism of voters of Kurdish origin makes the 
identification of different types of voters more difficult. The last section reveals that the 
party prefers to mobilize voters of Kurdish origin through known co-ethnic that are 
members of the ethnic social network.  
 
 
7.2.1- Content of the Mobilization Strategy 
 
 
The previous section has showed the use of both ideological and material content 
by AKP to mobilize voters. This chapter builds upon understanding whether the 
mobilization strategy of the party diverges when voters of Kurdish origin are concerned. 
It suggests that although activists also use ideological discourse when voters of Kurdish 
origin are contacted, the material content dominates the agenda. In fact, both activities 
during the electoral campaigning period and expressions of the party members support 
this suggestion. Nevertheless, party members highlight that they mainly focus on the 
mobilization through material incentive since it is perceived to be a more effective 
strategy for them. This section defines the perception of the activists on the content 
effective in persuading Kurdish voters and illustrates the use of both types of content to 
mobilize Kurdish voter.  
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Clientelistic Mobilization 
 
 
Material mobilization is expressed as the main strategy the party uses in order to 
mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin, albeit ideological discourses are also used. The 
explanation of the main branch president of Sancaktepe clearly illustrates how the party 
perceives the mobilization of voters of Kurdish origin. When I ask him how they try to 
mobilize them, he answers: “We have not much to tell them ideologically; at most we 
can say that we are not racists, that’s all. We inform them about our services, we try to 
persuade them by serving them” (Interview conducted on 22.03.2011, Sancaktepe). A 
similar perception is also visible for the main branch district president of Beyoğlu; 
    “The services provided by the municipality are an important dimension of 
our mobilization strategy. The neighborhoods where citizens of Kurdish 
origin are large in quantity are neighborhoods that benefit to most from 
social assistance program. Furthermore, the municipality opens 
Neighborhood Houses(Semt Konakları) where citizens can benefit from 
shelter, daily food, showers, washing machines etc” (Interview conducted 
on 09.12.2010, Beyoğlu).  
 
The main branch president of a neighborhood in Beyoğlu, highly populated by 
Kurdish citizens, expresses his view on the effect of social assistance on voters’ 
preferences, “They all change when you provide them assistance. I think social 
assistance is very effective, since they know that they should support the party if they 
want the benefits to continue.” (Interview conducted on 03.04.2011, Beyoğlu). The 
same president valued so much the effect of assistance that he showed me a 
questionnaire that he gave to voters on every occasions where questions on the socio-
economic condition of the voter, his/her problem and demands are asked. Activists 
highlight that they also use immaterial inducement such as visits or assistance for 
application and that this is effective in changing the perceptions among voters of 
Kurdish origin. 
The use of material incentive in order to mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin is 
also a strategy expressed by interviewed activists of BDP, albeit exaggerated, perceived 
to be very instrumental and used as a source of criticism. One of the Beyoğlu district 
members highlighted; 
    “Vote buying is very common for gaining support. Among the resources 
distributed are jobs in return for membership, the provision of meal 
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etc…Even cash money. The white desk of the municipality distributes checks 
in return for vote. They focus on uneducated poor people. Religion is also 
an important aspect, since most of the ‘Kurds’ are religious, AKP members 
contact them in mosques and Mescits ”.  
 
The activists indicated discriminative policy against citizens of Kurdish origin. The 
same member claims, “There was a ‘Kurd’ from Van in the former Municipal Council, 
he got in a dispute with the mayor proclaiming why there is no job for people from 
Kurdish origin” (Interview conducted on 09.12.2010, Beyoğlu). Similar observations on 
the use of material incentive have also been highlighted by the presidents of BDP in the 
districts of Zeytinburnu, Küçükçekmece, Sancaktepe as a mean to criticize the party’s 
policies.   
Another example of such a use was given by the president of BDP in the district 
of Küçükçekmece.  He illuminated with pride;  
“A woman helped one of our female supporters who had to migrate here due 
to violence in the ‘Kurdish Region’ and lost her husband in the ‘war. After 
thanking her, she asked the women who she was. When she learned that she 
was the district president of the woman branch of AKP, she gave back her 
the food package and said that it was because of the policy of her party that 
she was in this desperate situation.” (Interview conducted on 25.01.2011, 
Küçükçekmece) 
 
When an old resident who seemed to be from Kurdish origin reacted to a group of 
teenagers supporting BDP that harassed the AKP activists during the electoral 
campaigning activities, one of the teenagers shouted to him, “Uncle they deceive you 
with macaronis, and you support them. Be ashamed of yourself” (electoral campaigning 
activity on 21.05.2011, İnönü). 
 
 
Ideological Mobilization:  
 
 
Although during the electoral campaigning activities, the focus was given to the 
services of the municipality, the Kurdish question was also an issue touched upon. 
Within this respect, the deputy candidates were very careful to express a moderate 
position on the issue, claiming that AKP was supporting Kurdish rights. The Kurdish 
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problem was incorporated in the making of the constitution, which was defined as an 
important step to end violence.  
There was not direct reference to the solution of the Kurdish problem unless it 
was mentioned by the citizens. Yet, the problem was addressed under the broader 
center/periphery cleavage. The issue was integrated to the making of the new 
constitution that would enhance social and individual rights of the citizens vis-à-vis the 
state.  Major rights given by the government such as right of education in mother 
tongue, opening of the Kurdish TV and its attempts for the democratic opening was 
among important issues covered but no future policy was announced. One of the 
candidate deputies expressed,  
   “There was a huge problem in the Southeast region of Turkey. Up until 
now, the problem was seen as one of security. We delegated the issue to the 
military and police forces, we put ban, and we told them that they could not 
talk in Kurdish. The dying Kurdish children are also ours. As AKP, we 
initiated a project of unity to solve this problem. We have to inform people 
on these policies in pure calmness and with patience. Our policies have no 
beent yet perfect up until now but they will be. This is why we expect your 
votes” (Electoral Campaign on 12.05.2011, Sancaktepe).  
 
In a barbershop during the electoral campaigning activity in the neighborhood of 
Veysel Karani when an opinion leader of the neighborhood, defined as a BDP supporter 
by the activists, asks about the Kurdish problem, the deputy candidate was very careful 
to have a moderate answer. When he asks, “what the prime minister says is not very 
consistent. In one occasion, he declares that there is a Kurdish problem in Turkey, in 
another one, he says there is no Kurdish problem, but Kurds have problems. What 
would you say about that?” A little bit disturbed from the question the deputy candidate 
answers; “It is a misunderstanding. Many steps have been taken but all of them return 
from the Constitutional Court because of the present constitution. A new constitution 
will be made and many problems will be solved. A TV has been opened, people can 
learn Kurdish”. When the Kurdish opinion leader expresses that he wants to make 
science in his own language, the deputy candidate expresses, “It is also happening, it 
will happen” (Electoral campaigning activity on 14.05.2011, Sancaktepe).    
During his talk in the contact office of a neighborhood a deputy candidate defines 
the policy of the party on the Kurdish issue under two dimensions: the minority rights 
and economic distribution when he asserts; 
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 “Dark powers are trying to provoke people. Don’t be instruments in their 
hands. There are people from different origins among us, Turks, Kurds, 
Bosnians, Lazs….we all have sub-identities but we are all equal and we 
want a Turkey which is equal to everyone. We want every people, Turks, 
Kurds, Bosnians, Lazs without discrimination. We do the same investments 
in the West as in the East. There are no more villages without electricity in 
the East. Do you want all of these to continue? Then, you have to support 
us.” (Electoral campaigining activity, 14. 5.2011, Sancaktepe) 
 
The campaigners were very careful to separate the Kurdish citizens from PKK and 
BDP. BDP was indirectly criticized for increasing violence and was declared 
illegitimate. This tendency was also very apparent in activists’ attitudes towards the 
activists of BDP. During the campaigns although visits to contact offices of CHP were 
performed, they consciously changed their way in places were BDP opened its contact 
office. During the visits of the neighborhood, one deputy proclaimed to a voter from 
Kurdish origin asking about the violence in their neighborhood. She said; “This is why 
we are working very hard, so as to prevent the election of a women to the parliament 
who has clapped the face of a police officer”31 (Electoral Campaign on 12.05.2012, 
Sancaktepe). Nevertheless, the party also contacted voters known to be BDP supporters 
during the electoral campaigning activities. One incident in a neighborhood where the 
party could publicly function shows how activists were careful not to discriminate 
Kurdish voters. Although they had decided to finish the door-to-door visits, they 
continued when they realized that they arrived in the part of the neighborhood where 
Kurdish voters were in majority. 
Religion was not a directly used discourse in the mobilization strategy. However, 
a discussion between a AKP and BDP activist both from Kurdish origin after a dispute 
during the electoral campaigning activities, successfully reveals the perception of each 
party on the issue and how they mobilize voters of Kurdish origin.  The activist making 
the discussion informs me; “He asked me, as a Kurd, how I could work for this party. I 
told him you are a Sunni and the district president of BDP is an Alevi, how can you 
work for her?” (Interview conducted on 22.05.2011, Sancaktepe). As a matter of fact, 
BDP activists I have interviewed argued that the party used the religious places such as 
                                               
31 The woman that the deputy candidate indicated is the BDP independent candidate from the same 
electoral district Sebahat Tuncel. Approximately one week before the campaigning activities Tuncel 
appeared in the press while she was slapping a police officer in a protest where the police violently 
intervened with tear bombs and brutal use of force to the protestors. 
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mosques, Mescits where voters of Kurdish origin frequently go to contact and mobilize 
them. 
Both discourses of the AKP activists and electoral campaigning activities indicate 
that the party uses both ideological and material content to mobilize citizens of Kurdish 
origin as non-Kurdish potential swing voters. Nevertheless, this study suggests that the 
ability of the party to clientelistically mobilize them is based on the mechanisms 
through which the party incorporates them into its partisan network. When mobilization 
of Kurdish voters is concerned, the characteristics of the activists that initiate the 
contact are even more important for their mobilization through clientelistic linkage.  
The next section is a more detailed evaluation of the main differences of clientelistically 
mobilizing voters of Kurdish origin as opposed to their non-Kurdish counterparts.   
 
 
7.2.2- Ingroup and Intergroup Relations and Mobilization 
 
 
The previous section has identified the importance of neighborhood organizations 
in the formation of a service-based network functioning through different concentrating 
circles that positively affects voters’ perceptions on the party. Within this respect, the 
cornerstone of the function of the network has been identified as to consolidate and 
increase the party’s support through the incorporation of swing voters ideologically 
close to the party into the network. Yet, the success of the party to incorporate these 
voters into the partisan network and gain their support is based on the identification of 
different types of voters.  The previous section has illustrated that in non-Kurdish 
settings, the party performs this through the activities of the members of the 
neighborhood organization selected from the same neighborhood.  Identification is 
increased through extending the organization in each of the streets of the neighborhood. 
 Potential for violence, the presence of different types of voters among citizens of 
Kurdish origin and the weakness of inter-community relations make difficult to identify 
citizens of Kurdish origin through non-Kurdish activists. As a result, the street 
representation strategy that the party uses to increase identification is not an effective 
strategy for voters of Kurdish origin. This section illustrates how each of these  factors 
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makes the identification of voters of Kurdish origin through non-Kurdish activists a 
difficult task.  
 
 Risk of Violence and Fear 
 
The characteristic of the opposition voters is an important factor decreasing the 
effectiveness of the strategy. This is due to the violent character of the Kurdish ethnic 
movement that differentiates it from other opposition groups the party faces. Although 
the non-Kurdish opposition voters, namely the ones who vote for CHP, react to the 
activists of the party, this reaction is mostly through the discourse. During the electoral 
campaigning activities, many supporters of CHP have been contacted. These voters 
expressed their reaction through criticizing the government policy especially on the 
retirement, economy and privatization. Sometimes they refused to shake the hands of 
the candidate deputy, but in no circumstances, threatening behaviors have been carried. 
In one occasion, one citizen yielded to the activists in the street, ‘don’t come close to me 
if you are from AKP….off course I will vote for Kılıçdaroğlu’. When Kurdish voters are 
concerned the reaction has the possibility to go even further, including resorting to 
violence. Furthermore, not only opposition voters but also potential swing voters may 
use violence as well. Thus, identification of the opposition voters is especially decisive 
for the mobilization of Kurdish voters. 
In fact, such violence was widely used by BDP supporters to intimidate the 
activists and is proven to be successful. It increases fear among the non-Kurdish 
activists and force them to work discreetly.  The use of violence by Kurdish voters of 
the opposition has widely been reported by AKP activists and observed during the 
electoral campaigning period. As it will be exemplified in detail in the next section, 
harassment, harming the contact offices with Molotov cocktails, throwing stones have 
widely been carried. During a woman branch weekly district meeting neighborhood 
activists complained that they could not freely work in the neighborhood, that BDP 
supporters harassed them. One activist, proclaimed, “They are threatening us, we 
cannot work publicly, please do something”. (Meeting conducted on 04.05.2011). After 
we have returned from an electoral campaigning activity, activists were talking about an 
attack realized to the election bus of the party. Terrified, a woman activist from the 
district branch tells the incident; 
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    “We were waiting at the red traffic lights. Suddenly, someone threw a 
large stone to the front glass of the bus. The glass broke, I was at the front, 
and both pieces of the glass and the stone came to my back. I could not 
understand what happened, I was very afraid. We left the activities and 
directly came here” (Electoral campaining activity, 20.05.2011, 
Sancaktepe).  
 
In another occasion in Beyoğlu, a district activist informed me that their election 
bus was attacked in the region of Şark Sofrası known as place where there are lots of 
BDP and PKK supporters. “The driver left the bus and escaped. He would have been 
very badly beaten if he had not escaped. We have decided to suspend our activities” 
(Electoral Campaining activity, 02.06.2011, Beyoğlu). Such a violent act that I have 
been able to observe, happened during the door-to-door visits in the neighborhood of 
İnönü. A few teenagers supporting BDP began to harass one of the youth branch 
activists. The incident began after a group of teenagers comes together slowly as they 
followed the party convoy. After attaining a considerable amount of people, they began 
to shout, tear apart the brochures distributed by the party. One said, “We chase you from 
here, but you come again. How brazen you are. People are dying in the mountain who 
will take their responsibility? You are running after a few votes”, (electoral 
campaigning activity on 21.05.2011, İnönü) As they were approaching the convoy, the 
male activists told the female to enter immediately to the bus, then the car left as they 
also entered in. The bus immediately went to the district coordination center from the 
back streets of the neighborhood. The activities in the neighborhood have been 
cancelled.  
A woman branch neighborhood activist illustrates; 
   “We had lots of problems during the 2002 general elections; they told me 
that I would regret if I continued to work for the party. I tried to help a voter 
who had no ID number at the polling station. The males walked on me, I 
became so little among them. Our friends come (indicating the male 
activists of AKP), take me from there and dropped me home. When I see the 
ones who attacked me in the street I still fear sometimes” (Interview 
conducted on 26.05.2011, Veysel Karani).  
 
Similarly, the women branch president of the same neighborhood explains that she 
decided to wear a chador after she stayed in a dispute between the BDP and AKP 
supporters and got hit. She says, “Now no one can know who I am, I prefer to work 
discreetly”  
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The violent character of the Kurdish citizens and perception of the activists do 
affect the party’s policy. When they do not identify the Kurdish voters, non-Kurdish 
activists do not expose themselves as party representatives and prefer to work 
discreetly. Even under circumstances where they provide help to these voters, they do 
not express their connections with AKP. In the absence of identification, activists 
behave the same way to voter supporting and opposing the party. This in return makes it 
difficult to incorporate supporters to the network. In the entire neighborhoods under 
investigation, activists proclaimed that they did not expose themselves to voters they 
could not identify in door-to-door visits conducted during the electoral campaigning 
period or when they provide assistance to the ones in help. In fact, during the voter 
scans (seçmen taraması) none of the activists of non-Kurdish activists unknown by the 
voters of Kurdish origin did not inform them they were working for AKP, they mostly 
behaved as if they were coming from the municipality.  
The neighborhood president of Çukur says; “Of course we work discreetly, we 
don’t want our car to be burned in the middle of the night. We have not even opened a 
contact office. If we did they would probably burn it.” (Interview conducted on 
03.04.2011, Çukur). A similar discourse on the fear of the possible pressure of BDP 
supporters on Kurdish activists is highlighted by the woman branch district president of 
Beyoğlu when she talks about the newly formed neighborhood administration of Çukur, 
which is heavily populated by Kurdish residents. “They are so afraid of violence that 
they perform their meeting not in the neighborhood but in the district center of the 
party” (Interview conducted on 05.04.2011 Beyoğlu). As a result, the activists of non-
Kurdish origin only expose themselves to voters they can identify.  
The potential violence inherent in contacting a voter of Kurdish origin, the 
reluctance of activists of non-Kurdish origin to expose themselves due to fear of 
violence greatly damages the effectiveness of the mobilization strategy of the party. 
First, by damaging the strategy of the party of non-discrimination towards different 
types of voters, it prevents the normalization of the relations between the opposition 
groups that would decrease violence.  Furthermore, as it will be revealed in the next 
section, it makes mobilization by strangers very costly since neither of the sides gathers 
information on each other’s political orientations, decreasing the potential to identify 
possible supporters.   
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Identification, Discrimination and Prejudice  
 
 
The presence of opposition voters and the weakness of inter-group relations 
among Kurdish and non-Kurdish voters makes it more difficult to mobilize them with 
existing non-Kurdish activists.  First, group pressure decreases the desire of voters of 
Kurdish origin to publicly demonstrate their political preferences. Second, the nature of 
inter-group relations makes the identification of different types of voters difficult 
through the routine strategy of the party. Third, under circumstances of weak inter-
community relations, the presence of opposition voters among citizens of Kurdish 
origin increases the prejudice of the activists that voters of Kurdish origin are 
opportunist, making them reluctant to mobilize them.  
In geographical units with non-Kurdish voters, existing activists have several 
tools through which they can identify voters when they contact them for the first time. 
One of the first tools to differentiate between voters is acquired during the first stage of 
the contact. This identification does not require any pre-given relationship between the 
activist and the voter.  In Turkey, non-Kurdish voters’ physical appearance is an 
important indicator in differentiating actual or potential supporters from ideologically 
opposition voters. One example may be the main differences in physical appearance of 
CHP supporters from AKP supporters that are identifiable at first sight.  Wearing a scarf 
or having a modernized outlook, the socio-economic status of the voter are clear signs 
of identification for the party activists. In fact, during the electoral campaigning period 
such signs have widely been used by activists to differentiate between CHP and other 
parties’ supporters. In one occasion such a categorization has been carried by the deputy 
candidate in order to understand my political preferences. After observing my physical 
appearance and behavior he declared me, “You are a CHP supporter, but after this 
campaigning activity I will persuade you to vote for AKP” (Electoral Campaigning 
Activity on 19.05.2011, Beyoğlu).  Although it is more difficult to identify SP or MHP 
supporters such a situation does not create any problem for the party since they are both 
perceived as potential swing voters and have been targeted by the party during the 2002 
general elections.  Other tools to indentify different types of voters are the place of 
origin of the voter and his/her discourse and gestures after the activists identify him/her 
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self as an AKP activist. In contrast, although voters from Kurdish origin can easily be 
identified by physical appearance, his/her political orientations cannot.  When Kurdish 
voters are concerned, mostly both opposition voters and supporters have the same 
physical appearance; their hometown origin mostly does not help them to differentiate 
since as it has been revealed in the third chapter AKP and BDP have supporters in all 
the Kurdish populated provinces. Even more important, the Kurdish voters do not 
expose themselves through their discourses or behaviors. May be a way to differentiate 
between swing from strong opposition Kurdish voters may be their religious practices. 
In fact, Interviewed BDP activists indicate the use of neighborhood mosques by AKP 
activists to reach swing Kurdish voters. Nevertheless, such a strategy is not expected to 
as effective since a large number of core BDP supporters are also religious. 
Furthermore, as it will be revealed in detail citizens of Kurdish origin do not expose 
their ideological or political preferences in public places.  
In all the neighborhoods under investigation, the activists proclaimed that they 
could not understand whether the voters supported their party or not when they 
contacted them. A non-Kurdish activist in the neighborhood of Veysel Karani says, 
“Some citizens of Kurdish origin do not vote for us, but it is impossible to determine 
them. They say they support our party, or sometimes that they are against it but we 
don’t know if it is true” (Interview conducted on 11.05.2011, Veysel Karani). In fact 
during the electoral campaigning activities most of the voters of Kurdish origin, 
expressed that they have not yet decided whom they will vote for. The neighborhood 
president expresses in another occasion her disturbance of not being able to identify the 
electoral preferences of voters of Kurdish origin. She says, “The supporters of CHP 
mentions it very easily but we don’t know them (mentioning the citizens of Kurdish 
origin), it is more dangerous.” (Electoral Campaigning Activity, 21.05.2011).  
The in-group pressure makes it difficult to identify different types of voters 
through the strategy of street representation.  Within this respect, most the activists 
highlight that there is great pressure to Kurdish voters from their community. As a 
result, even core supporters do not want to expose themselves publicly. This is why they 
mostly behave as if they are against the party although they give support. In all the 
neighborhoods under investigation activists highlight that even their known supporters 
do not participate in the same manner as other supporters in the activities of the party. 
An activist from the neighborhood of Veysel Karani says, “We have friends among 
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them (talking about Kurdish voters), they behave very differently when they see us in the 
contact office. I think they behave like that because they have to do it” (Interview on 
11.05.2011, Veysel Karani). In the neighborhood of İnönü, the women branch president 
says;  
   “We have never been able to enter in the household of any voters of 
Kurdish origin or effectuate any home talks in the house of our members of 
Kurdish origin. Activists from Kurdish origin only have invited people they 
know are more moderate in their ideological orientations and closer to 
AKP. They try to be cautious because they fear from potential reactions in 
their community” (Interview conducted on 10.05.2011, İnönü).  
 
In all the neighborhoods activists highlighted that their supporters of Kurdish 
origin were not able to vote in the referendum because BDP boycotted it.  The president 
of the neighborhood of Hacıahmet expresses;  
  “The BDP activists declared that citizens of Kurdish origin would not go 
voting. They were waiting near the school to indentify citizens of Kurdish 
origin that went voting. Many people returned from school because of fear. 
Even our members could not go; we told that them nothing is more 
important than their security. ” (Interview conducted on 07.05.2011, 
Hacıahmet).  
 
He gives another example on the effect of group pressure on the Kurdish voters,  
   “We were sending my brother to his military service; we have friends from 
them (indicating the Kurdish citizens in the neighborhood). They also came 
to his ceremony. We had Turkish flags in our hands; they were intimated 
and stepped aside. It was only after we get out from the neighborhood that 
they participated to the celebrations. They told me that they could do 
nothing in the neighborhood due to their fear of being harassed” (Interview 
conducted on 07.05.2011, Hacıahmet). 
 
Apart from the reluctance of voters of Kurdish origin to expose their political 
preferences, the nature of the inter-community relations between them also decrease the 
effectiveness of street representation.  What differentiates swing voters of Kurdish 
origin from their non-Kurdish counterpart is the absence of common inter-group 
networks of socialization conducive to the development of personal relations. Although, 
AKP activists share common social networks where they routinely interact with 
potential swing voters of MHP and SP since they mostly come from the same 
demographic background, such places of interaction are lower among non-Kurdish and 
Kurdish residents. Furthermore, the inexistence of inter-community between non-
Kurdish and Kurdish residents in the neighborhood complicates mobilization through 
212 
 
street representation since their barely share information with one another. The inability 
of the main branch neighborhood president of the Hacıahmet to identify his own 
neighbor is a good example on how street representation is not effective for the 
mobilization of voters of Kurdish origin;  
   “For years I thought he was supporting AKP. But one day we talked on 
the terrorist attacks of PKK to the soldiers of the Turkish army. He told me 
that they were right to do this attack. You know I was shocked to hear that. 
He is my neighbor for years, I see him every day but I do not know his 
political views. Yet, I realized that I haven’t either told him that I was the 
neighborhood president of AKP.” (Interview conducted on 06.06.2011, 
Beyoğlu). 
 
During the field research, a general discrimination towards the citizens of Kurdish 
origin was dominating the discourse of non-Kurdish activists. During my interviews one 
activist expresses, “They would do everything to acquire money even if he/she does not 
need it. They even see a piece of bread as a profit” (Electoral campaigning activity, 
04.06.2011, Veysel Karani). Another one proclaimed, “Their supporters newly came to 
our neighborhood, they have changed its environment. They are the ones who use 
violence” (Interview conducted on 10.05,2011, İnönü). Another activist in the 
neighborhood of Hacıahmet recommended me not to go the side of the neighborhood 
resided by Kurdish citizens alone due to security reasons. “We don’t know what they 
will do” she asserted me.  Most of them complained that they do not know how to live 
together, that they consciously throw their trash from their windows on the street or that 
they damage the parks or store on purpose. These citizens were mostly not interpreted 
as equal members of the neighborhood society but as new comers that have to be 
educated to get civilized and learn the basic rules of living together in a city. The 
District responsible of the Center of Electoral Coordination asserts, “Kurds sabotages 
the municipal services. The municipality has made a park, everything has been 
damaged, they throw garbage, uproot the grass” (Interview conducted on 19.04.2011, 
Beyoğlu). Similar discourse was used by a district activist residing in Hacıahmet while 
we were passing from the part of the neighborhoods where citizens of Kurdish origin 
was in majority, “ you see, they don’t even veer off the road, kids, adults everyone is on 
the street. They destroy everything, the parks, the investments….” (Interview conducted 
on 07.05.2011, Hacıahmet). Another non-Kurdish activist asserts during the 
neighborhood meeting, “they are all revengeful, they are all cheaters. They got help 
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from the state, and then they attack it” (Interview conducted on 07.05.2011, 
Hacıahmet). The presence of prejudice towards citizens of Kurdish origin can also be 
observed from the complaints of Kurdish activists in the party organization. During the 
same meeting, a Kurdish activist contests, “We are also from them (indicating citizens 
of Kurdish origin), but we do not do these. This is related to your family education. Of 
course you are prone to violence when you are not educated”. (Interview conducted on 
07.05.2011, Hacıahmet).  One of the activists of Kurdish origin working in the 
municipally as field personnel responsible of distributing aid packages, expresses; 
    “ I have not been personally exposed to discrimination but witnessed a lot 
of instances where attitudinal discrimination towards citizens of Kurdish 
origin was expressed during my duty at work. During our distribution of 
packages, they say that they would take everything to give them since they 
are Kurdish. In fact, I got upset as a Kurdish citizen. I understand that they 
get radicalized when confronted with discrimination, but when you give 
your hand for help, they absolutely answer you positively” (Interview 
conducted on 03.05.2011, Beyoğlu).  
 
The inability to identify different types of voters and discrimination creates 
prejudice among activists against the voters of Kurdish origin where the activists blame 
them to be opportunist. A district activist living in the neighborhood of İnönü 
highlights; 
    “ I think we have prejudice, we think they will not vote for us. For 
example, there are some ballot boxes where we expect BDP to have all the 
votes. However, when we opened the ballot box to count the votes we have 
seen that many votes were for AKP. Unfortunately, we cannot determine 
these people” (Interview conducted on 21.05.2011, İnönü).  
 
 In fact, such a perception of non-Kurdish activists on the Kurdish ethnic group as 
a whole exists where citizens of Kurdish origin are mostly perceived to be PKK 
supporters. This situation acts as an obstacle to the effective functioning of the party’s 
strategy. Discrimination and prejudice to Kurdish demands are commonly expressed in 
the discourses of these activists towards the Kurds and their electoral preferences. 
According to a large number of them, citizens of Kurdish origin do not vote for 
AKP even if they receive help. One activist declares, “They want to enter the party only 
to provide benefit to their environment, not because they support the party” (Electoral 
campaigning activity, 30.04.2011, Sancaktepe). Another insists, “They are the ones who 
benefits from the social services of the municipality, but they do not support the party” 
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(Electoral campaigning activity, 23.05.2011, Beyoğlu). Another activist questions the 
loyalty of an activist of Kurdish origin in their neighborhood. She proclaims; 
    “I am disappointed by the hypocrisy of these people. They tell us that they 
support our party but I don’t believe them. For example, there are residents 
whose son is working at the municipality, their daughter is in our 
administration but I don’t believe they support us. I know that their father 
support BDP, what is the possibility for them to vote for us?” (Interview 
conducted on 26.05.2011, Sancaktepe) 
 
 These perceptions are rather interesting, since the electoral results indicate that in 
all the districts and neighborhoods under investigation where these activists function, a 
considerable number of citizens of Kurdish origin supported AKP in 2011 general 
elections. However, this situation was not perceived by the activists. Even more 
importantly, although there were many voters of Turkish origin whose members of the 
family supported other parties, such as SP, MHP or even CHP in the party, their loyalty 
was not questioned. Prejudice toward the citizens of Kurdish origin could also be 
observed when another member tried to guess whether one of the party member of 
Kurdish origin was opportunist or not; 
    “Last time I went to the wedding of a neighbor from Batman (A Kurdish 
populated province), they only played Kurdish songs, they danced by 
making their sign with their hands. Furthermore, the father of the household 
asked me why we have only one official language, can’t we talk in Kurdish.” 
(Interview conducted on 04.05.2011) 
 
 It is interesting that the activist reconcile the demands to use the Kurdish language as a 
sign of support for BDP, especially given the fact that it was during AKP’s incumbency 
that major rights on the use of the mother tongue were given.   
 
 
7.2.3- Strategy of the Party: Incorporation of Co-ethnics 
 
 
In the presence of violence, effective mobilization necessitates the incorporation 
of activists that are personally close to these voters and easily enter their households. 
The functioning of the party through either non-Kurdish activists known by voters of 
Kurdish origin or Kurdish activist, increases the effectiveness of the mobilization by 
first, decreasing both the reaction of the opposed voter of Kurdish origin and the fear of 
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the activists. Second, the development or presence of personal relations increases the 
effectiveness of mobilization, as it decreases the cost of identifying of different types of 
voters,  discrimination and as a result, the prejudice of the activists on the opportunism 
of voters of Kurdish origin. In fact, the discourse and experiences of these activists 
indicates decrease in prejudice, increase in ability to prevent violence, increase in 
identifying different types of voters among residents of Kurdish origin. 
  
Risk of Violence and Fear:  
 
The Activists’ experiences and declarations confirm that the reaction of voters of 
Kurdish origin and fear of the activists change according to the characteristics of the 
activists who perform the contact. As a result, the party can function more publicly, 
increasing the positive image of the party in the eyes of both swing and opposition 
voters of Kurdish origin. When voters of Kurdish origin are contacted by people they 
know personally, the degree of violence of both opposition and swing voters decreases. 
One activist proclaims, “As we know them they do not attack us, for example my friend 
is from Siirt supporting BDP, he sees me when I distributed the brochures, he did not 
react when I also gave him one. They also behave according to their entourage” 
(Interview conducted on11.05.2011, Sancaktepe).  
Similarly, one representative of the neighborhood of Veysel Karani highlights,  
   “The reaction of the voters greatly changes according to the general 
characteristics of the person who contacts them. The organization split into 
groups to distribute the brochures of the party to every door in the 
neighborhood. Our group had no problem …voters gave great reaction to 
the other members that they do not know, when we went there their reaction 
immediately changed. Who you are and how you behave to them are very 
important in shaping their reactions towards you and the party. I have been 
a merchant in the neighborhood for 18 years, everyone knows me, 
supporters of other parties are my friends, why would they dispute with 
me.” (Interview conducted on 04 June 2011, Sancaktepe) 
 
Similarly, the neighborhood coordinator of Hacıahmet expresses;  
   “They send me a message where they asked me to leave the party. They 
tell that they do not attack our activists because they like me. If I were not in 
the party, they would not let the activists of the party to work in the 
neighborhood” (Interview conducted in 07.05.2011, Hacıahmet).  
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Furthermore, although in all the neighborhoods under investigation, the possible 
reaction of the Kurdish voters to the party is a great concern for non-Kurdish activists, 
the attitude of the activists to the violent character of the Kurdish opposition also 
diverges according to the closeness of the activists to these groups and their experience 
with them. As a result, these activists are not afraid to expose themselves and perform 
their activities publicly. The diverging perception of two activists working in the same 
neighborhood reveals a good example on how the perception on the violent activities 
changes according to the activists’ closeness to voters of Kurdish origin. After the 
contact office of AKP in the neighborhood of Veysel Karani has been attacked, the 
president of the women branch who has no relation with the residents of Kurdish origin 
of the neighborhood has annulled the meeting on the ground that it was dangerous. 
Another activist having friends from Kurdish origin defines this attack as something 
unimportant. “These kinds of attacks are very normal. They are the activities of some 
teenagers that should not be taken very seriously. BDP supporters are mostly violent 
when they are in a convoy. Otherwise when they are alone they do nothing” (Interview 
conducted on 11.05.2011). The perception of activists close to the citizens of Kurdish 
origin on violence could easily be observed from the discourse of youth branch 
president of Kurdish origin from the same neighborhood:  “They say they will burn, 
damage everywhere but all is just a flash in the pan, no one does anything” (Electoral 
campaigning activity on 10.06.2011, Veysel Karani).   
The neighborhood coordinator of the neighborhood of Yenişehir populated by 
Kurdish voters expresses, “When I was first appointed to this job I was very afraid. 
However, as I contacted and helped them, I saw their reaction change. When you began 
to know them you see that they are good people” (Interview conducted on 24.05.2011, 
Beyoğlu). Another neighborhoods president from the women branch highlights; 
   “I was first hesitant but now I am not afraid of them. I went to the contact 
office of BDP. I talked with them and told them that I was from AKP. 
Everyone who hears this from the party says I am insane. Why should I be?  
I drank their tea and got out. No one has done anything to me.” (Interview 
conducted on 06.06.2011, Yenişehir) 
 
Both the fear of the activists and the reaction of the BDP supporters decrease 
when activists are from reputable and strong families in the neighborhood. When I 
asked one of a newly incorporated woman branch neighborhood activists whether she 
was not afraid to function publicly, she answers, “They can do nothing to me, my family 
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is very large, if they try to do something they know they will have trouble” (Interview 
conducted on 21.05.2011, İnönü). Similarly, another activist from Kurdish origin 
immigrated from the same village as the district president of BDP informs me that he 
asked the president to warn her party’s supporter not to harass AKP activists. He adds, 
“She knows that her relatives will have problem back in our villages if she 
underestimates my demand. My family is very powerful there, they will not let them 
breath” (Electoral campaigning activity, 21.05.2011, Sancaktepe). 
 
Identification, discrimination and prejudice 
 
Given the fact that it is difficult to identify different types of voters of Kurdish 
origin through first contact, all the activists highlight the importance of their ability to 
enter the households of Kurdish voters. Since this provided them the necessary 
information to identify them and privacy for the voters to expose their attitudes. The 
incorporation of activists close to the Kurdish voters positively affects the mobilization 
strategy since it provides the channels of communication necessary to develop personal 
relations. This in turn, not only increases the ability to acquire necessary information to 
identify different types of voters but also decreases discrimination and prejudice among 
non-Kurdish activists.  
The women district branch of Beyoğlu expresses that the new neighborhood 
president in Hacıahmet was an old resident, living in the Kurdish concentrated part of 
the neighborhood. She says, “She knows everyone and enters in every households, it’s a 
great advantage for us” (Interview conducted on 05.04.2011, Beyoğlu). Similarly, non-
Kurdish activists highlighted lots of events where nor the activists neither the voters 
knew each other’s political preferences, but get informed when they get in a close 
personal relationship”.   An activist mentions,  
    “I went to the house of friend from Kurdish origin to see her. When I 
enter the house, her husband prepared to leave. When I asked the reason, he 
told me that I was supporting CHP and this was the reason. When I told him 
that I was supporting AKP, he decided to stay by expressing that they also 
vote for AKP ”, then she adds “It is strange, I thought they were supporting 
BDP” (Interview conducted on 10.05.2011, İnönü).  
 
One interesting observation is the party’s reliance on the woman branches to 
increase the personal relations with the voters of Kurdish citizens. The activists state 
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two cause of such a strategy. First, they state that the women were less ideological in 
their perception, less prone to violence, so the activists could expose themselves. 
Second, the women can more easily enter in the household of these voters, since the 
houses are the major places of socialization for women. As a result, they can more 
easily develop personal relations and indentify their problems and preferences.  The 
woman branch president expresses their advantage in reaching female voters. According 
to her, “women expresses their bad experiences, talk with us; but we are not able to 
reach male voters. They share nothing with us” (Interview conducted on 23.05.2011, 
Hacıahmet)  In fact, the neighborhood where the party activists have difficulty in 
reaching the Kurdish voters, the main and women branch work together and the latter 
provides great assistance to the former. The main reasoning of such an expectation is 
the fact that socialization process between female and male voters are different from 
each other.  
When activists close to the Kurdish voters are interviewed the discriminative, 
reactionary discourse also disappears, and violence is perceived as the result of the 
social discrimination process.  The main branch president of the neighborhood of İnönü 
highlights, “I think they witness discrimination when they migrate to the city, this is why 
they get attached to their Kurdish identity”. When another activist says, “we do not 
discriminate them but they do” the president objects, “It is not true you also 
discriminate them” (Interview conducted on 10.05.2011, Inönü). A similar approach is 
also present in the discourse of the district president of Sancaktepe who is also from 
Kurdish origin who related the demands of citizens of Kurdish origin to the oppressive 
policies of the state. He asserts that; 
    “The ones who witnessed oppression from the states gain ethnic 
consciousness… The Fascist policies of the state towards Kurds   that 
repressed their identities are the main cause of their violent character. The 
ones who experiences suppression form the state became supporters of 
PKK, while the ones who experienced suppression from PKK became more 
conservative. On the other hand, migration to the city changed also their 
perceptions where they re-find their ethnic identities when they are faced 
with negative socio-economic experiences” (Interview conducted on 
22.03.2011, Sancaktepe).   
 
Other activists of Kurdish origin relate the potential for violence to the 
circumstances they face by asserting; 
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    “I find their violence normal, it is the only thing they have seen up until 
know. They have witnessed the use of force from both the state and the PKK. 
You do what you see. Only when we change our behavior and show that 
there are other ways to expresses your problems they will change their 
attitudes” (Interview conducted on 03.05.2011, Beyoğlu).   
 
The negative effect of the state policies in the violent reaction of Kurdish voters 
could also be observed from the discourse of another activist of Kurdish origin. After 
the attack of a group of teenagers from BDP to the activists of AKP, the activist asserts; 
    “The main cause of violence is the non-integration of these citizens into 
the system. If you take into consideration the teenagers that harassed us. I 
personally know them they are unemployed and hang around in the coffee 
house where they are consistently exposed to the mobilization of the PKK 
supporters. They would not react like that If they had a work to go” 
(Electoral campaigning activity, 21.05.2011, Sancaktepe).  
 
Another activist of Kurdish origin also related the same harassment to the policies 
of the government, albeit indirectly, when she highlights that the brother of one of these 
teenagers has been killed in the mountains one year ago. According to her, “after having 
experienced such an event, it is normal that this teenagers resort to violence” (Electoral 
campaigning activity, 21.05.2011, Sancaktepe)  
The perception of the Kurdish activists or non-Kurdish activists close to Kurdish 
voters on the political preferences of these voters also diverges. All of them warned me 
that it was a mistake to evaluate all Kurdish voters as supporters of BDP. According to 
them a great number of these voters were conservative and voted for AKP. Furthermore, 
they insisted that party’s non-discriminatory policies contributed to the changing 
political preferences of some of these voters on the behalf of AKP.  A district member 
of Sancaktepe working for a long time in the party expresses; 
    “Before we had very much difficulty in working in the field. Even women 
were very reactive. They have lots of time stoned us. Now it is changing, 
people see that they are not discriminated and attain services. Women 
tended to vote for the party that their husband supported, now they are 
voting for AKP despite their husbands.”(Interview conducted on 
14.05.2011, Veysel Karani)   
   
A member of neighborhood women branch of Kurdish origin in Beyoğlu says; 
    “We have changed their votes with our affection. I have a neighbor who 
supported BDP. He had an autistic son. Her husband told her that he would 
register him to school, but did not do it. I told her that I would do it. She 
prayed me not to do it, that her husband would be very furious. I will talk 
220 
 
with her husband I said. That night I went to talk with him and I persuaded 
him. I have also helped her to benefit from handicapped assistance. Now 
she supports our party” (Interview conducted in 07.05.2011, Hacıahmet).  
 
Most of the activists highlighted that they were especially effective in changing 
the perception of female voters of Kurdish origin who began to support the party 
regardless of the political affiliations of their husbands when they realized that the 
activists discriminate them while they help people.  
Perceptions on the preferences of the voters were also evident among some 
activists of non-Kurdish origin that had close relation with voters of Kurdish origin. 
One them proclaims; 
    “I understand that people do not want to show their support to us, they 
fear marginalization from their own community. During our door-to-door 
visits, a woman discreetly waved her hands from the window while we were 
passing. In fact, a considerable number of them have switched their votes 
for AKP, but they can not express it publicly”  (Electoral Campaigning 
activity, Sancaktepe, 26.05.2011).  
 
As a result, the major strategy of the party is to incorporate activists of Kurdish 
origin into the network. This enables the party to differentiate between voters, since 
their relationship is closer and more easily personalize their relations. The ability of 
activists of Kurdish to personalize relations within their group comes from the fact that 
they mostly are relatives, immigrating from similar villages or know each other from 
the common social networks such as coffee houses, hometown or cultural associations. 
In fact, studies on the citizens of Kurdish origin indicated that mostly the main cause to 
their decision where to migrate is the presence of relatives in the region (Çelik, 2002). 
This is why one can observe concentration of citizens of the same hometown origin in 
specific part of the districts. When I asked a citizen of Kurdish origin why he has 
immigrated in the neighborhood, he told me, “I had relatives here, I thought they would 
help me to find a job here that’s why I came” (Interview conducted on 23.05.2011, 
Hacıahmet). The use of these connections by activists of Kurdish origin to increase 
support for the party is confirmed by the answer of one of them when I ask him how he 
makes new members. He says, “First, I go to relatives I know, then I open the voters list 
and look at the surnames of people who are the same with mine, since they are probably 
my relatives. Then I go to visit them, talk with them and ask them to support the party” 
(Interview conducted on 17.03.2011, Küçükçekmece) This make easier for them to find 
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a common ground and enter their households.  In fact, the district presidents and vice 
presidents in both of the districts expressed that their main strategy was to increase their 
support among citizens of Kurdish origin to incorporate them within the party’s 
organizational structure. The president of Sancaktepe adds, “We identify people that are 
respected, influential and liked by them and try to incorporate them within the party” 
(Interview conducted on 22.03.2011, Sancaktepe). Similarly, the district president of 
Beyoğlu identifies the corner stone of their strategy for gaining the votes of citizens of 
Kurdish origin;  
   “We try to guarantee their representation of these people in the district, 
we especially are very careful when we select the representatives of the 
neighborhoods where these citizens are large in quantity. We especially try 
to find opinion leaders among them” (Interview conducted on 03.02.2011, 
Beyoğlu). 
 
In fact, not only the intensity of the activities of the organization but also the 
appointment of activists of Kurdish origin in neighborhood with residents of Kurdish 
origin is a commonly used strategy of the party to overcome both violence and gain the 
sympathy of these voters. It was not a coincidence that activists participating in the 
electoral campaigning activities in the neighborhoods of İnönü, Veysel Karani in the 
district of Sancaktepe and the neighborhood of Örnektepe in Beyoğlu were either 
known people in the neighborhood or activists from Kurdish origin. In fact, these 
activists purposefully indicated their origin through expressing their hometown or 
speaking in Kurdish. This advantage enabled the party activists to function publicly in 
some of these neighborhoods. In the absence of such activists, the party could not 
operate publicly, as in the case of the neighborhood of Hacıahmet where the district 
could contact citizens of Kurdish origin only indirectly through the activities of the 
municipality.   
This section has illustrated that the neighborhood organizations were important in 
increasing and consolidating support for the party by identifying and incorporating 
different types of voters into the clientelistic network. It revealed that the incorporation 
of new members of non-Kurdish origin into the network and compliance of the voters is 
assured through the activities of the neighborhood organizations and the criteria of 
street representation within the organization. It also illustrated that incorporation of 
voters of Kurdish origin into the clientelistic network requires the presence of activists 
of Kurdish origin who are members of the existing social networks of the residents of 
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Kurdish origin.  Based on these findings, the next chapter will investigate, through 
neighborhood level analysis, how the amount of activities of the neighborhood 
organizations and the time incorporation of activists of Kurdish origin affect the 
effectiveness of clientelistic mobilization.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
DIVERGENCE IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MOBILIZATION 
STRATEGIES 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapters have identified the use of both programmatic and 
clientelistic linkages by AKP to mobilize voters. One of the main arguments of the 
study is that clientelistic linkage is a safer strategy in persuading voters as opposed to 
programmatic linkage since it consolidates support in the long run.  It has also been 
suggested that its effectiveness derives from the ability to party to individually mobilize 
different types of voters with different types of goods through their identification and its 
ability to ensure voluntary compliance through a repeated course of interaction. 
Furthermore, the role of neighborhood organizations in the implementation of the 
strategy has also been illustrated.  It has been argued that the party increases the 
effectiveness of its strategy through the routine activities of the neighborhood 
organizations and the representation of each street in the organization. The previous 
chapter has also illustrated the major difficulties in mobilizing voters of Kurdish origin 
through non-Kurdish activists. It has mentioned the difficulty in identifying potential 
supporters of Kurdish voters via non-Kurdish activists. It has been suggested that high 
ethnic consciousness, the violent nature of Kurdish problem, weakness of 
intercommunity relations between Kurdish and non-Kurdish voters act as an obstacle 
for the party to identify different types of voters of Kurdish origin. It has been suggested 
that the party try to overcome these difficulties by incorporating activists of Kurdish 
origin into the network. 
 The study suggests that diverging support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish 
origin is the function of two variables: the number of activists of Kurdish origin who are 
members of the existing ethnic social networks, their time of incorporation and the 
amount of activities of the neighborhood organization. While the presence of Kurdish 
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activists increase the capacity of indentifying different types of voters, the time of entry 
and intensity of the neighborhood organization assure voluntary compliance and loyalty 
to the party through repeated interaction.  The aim of this chapter is to test the validity 
of the effectiveness of clientelistic linkage in stabilizing support among 
programmatically potential swing voters through comparing different geographical units 
in terms of these variables and electoral outcomes across elections.  In geographical 
units where the neighborhood organizations regularly perform their activities and 
incorporates activists of Kurdish origin, the party’s identification ability and specific 
targeting is expected to be higher. Furthermore, activists are expected to be more 
successful in consolidating solidarity among the voters and assuring compliance when 
the contact is performed repeatedly. Within this respect, not only the length of the 
contact realized by Kurdish activists, but also its intensity is expected to increase its 
repetitiveness. Thus, time of entry of the activists and the amount of the activities they 
perform is expected to affect the repetitiveness of the contact.  
The analysis will be conducted in the district of Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe that 
differs in term of AKP’s electoral support among citizens of Kurdish origin across 
recent elections. Since, the support for the party among voters of Kurdish origin is 
expected to be less sensitive to positional changes in the programmatic dimension when 
voters are clientelistically mobilized, diverging electoral results between 2009 and 2011 
in different geographical units will be used as a proxy to measure the effectiveness of 
mobilization through the clientelistic network.  
Given the fact that incorporation of new voters into the network is conducted 
through the neighborhood organization, analysis will be conducted at the neighborhood 
level.  For such a suggestion to be valid, variation in the electoral support for AKP 
among citizens of Kurdish origin should be observed. It has been illustrated in Chapter 
3 that nearly all the voters of Kurdish origin vote to either AKP or pro-Kurdish parties. 
Thus, the vote shares of pro-Kurdish parties have been used as a proxy to measure 
support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish origin. So, in the first section, the electoral 
characteristics of each district are illustrated with a special focus on divergence in the 
vote shifts of pro-Kurdish parties across elections is the neighborhoods of each district 
under investigation.  
The next section is a brief evaluation of the district in terms of alternative 
explanations given in the literature for the increasing support of ethnic parties. It will 
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demonstrate that these alternative explanations are not valid for the cases under 
investigation. Among them, the first one is the difference in degree of ethnic 
consciousness among the residents of the two districts.  This explanation derives from 
the expectation that citizens from Kurdish origin with stronger ethnic consciousness will 
be more prone to switch their votes when AKP changes its position on the Kurdish 
issue. Another alternative explanation derives from the use of the votes share of pro-
Kurdish parties as a proxy in measuring the changing electoral support for AKP among 
citizens of Kurdish origin. Within this respect, such a shift may simply result from the 
changing demographic composition of the district as a result of migration.  Under such a 
condition, this shift cannot be evaluated as an opposite shift of AKP support among 
citizens of Kurdish origin. The last section explains the relationship between on one had 
the intensity of the amount of activities of the neighborhood organization and presence 
of activists of Kurdish origin and on the other then nature of the mobilization activities 
of the activists at different levels.  
 
 
8.1- Effectiveness of the Mobilization: Different Electoral Characteristics 
within each District 
 
 
This section depicts a more detailed picture of the divergence in the effectiveness 
of the mobilization of AKP by using as an indicator the support for the party among 
citizens of Kurdish origin in the each of the neighborhoods within the selected districts. 
A major difficulty in identifying the voting behavior of citizens of Kurdish origin 
derives from the fact that these citizens to not constitute the entire population of the 
districts. Similarly, AKP and the pro-Kurdish parties are not the main competitors. 
Although, support for pro-Kurdish parties among citizens of Kurdish origin can be 
analyzed by the party’s vote shares, vote shifts from one party to the other is more 
difficult to be observed since it is impossible to discern support for AKP or other parties 
among citizens Kurdish origin or other voters within each district. This section mainly 
focuses on the change in the vote shares of pro-Kurdish parties to understand the 
changing nature of the competition between the two parties in the neighborhoods. Such 
a strategy seems logical since previous chapters have successfully showed that AKP and 
the pro-Kurdish parties take nearly the entire of the votes of citizens of Kurdish origin 
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in the Kurdish populated Province while other parties performs very poorly in the 
Kurdish populated region. As a result, change in the support for pro-Kurdish parties is 
be interpreted as a contrasting change in AKP’s support among citizens of Kurdish 
origin. One objection to such an assumption, may derive from the possible fact that 
change in the vote shares of pro-Kurdish parties may not result from change in AKP 
support among citizens of Kurdish origin but change in the demographic composition in 
given districts and neighborhoods from one election to the other. Nevertheless, it will be 
demonstrated in the next section that such kind of a situation is not present. As it will be 
evaluated in detail, the data supports our expectation on the neighborhood level 
divergence in electoral preferences of Kurdish voters in Sancaktepe and Beyoğlu.  
 
 
8.1.1- Beyoğlu 
 
 
The district may be divided into 3 sub-regions which have very different electoral 
patterns.   Table 8.1 illustrated the electoral pattern in the neighborhoods of Beyoğlu 
from 1999 to 2011 general elections. In the first region, which consists of the 
neighborhoods like Cihangir, Gümüşsuyu, Kılıç Alipaşa, Ömer Avni, Pürteleş Hasan 
Efendi, CHP is the strongest party obtaining approximately over 60% of the votes. The 
remaining votes are divided between AKP as the second party with 15-20% of the votes 
and MHP as the third party with approximately 5% of the votes in 2011 general 
elections . 
The second sub-Region consists of neighborhoods such as Kaptanpaşa, 
Piyalepaşa, Sütlüce, Fetihtepe, Kulaksız where AKP’s vote shares range between 45-
60% and constitute the electoral base of the party.  In these neighborhoods CHP is the 
second party attaining  20-25% of the votes and MHP is the third party having 5-10% of 
the votes. BDP has a relatively lower vote shares ranging from 1 to 6%, while SP has a 
relatively higher support ranging from 2 to 3 %.when compared with other 
neighborhoods. The third sub-region consists of neighborhoods such as Çukur, Bülbül, 
Tomtom, Bülbül, Hacıahmet, Yenişehir, Kalyoncukulluk, Örnektepe where AKP votes 
range between 30-40% and CHP has gained between 20% and 35% of the votes.  BDP 
is relatively strong with its vote shares ranging from 8% to 51%.  
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In these neighborhoods where BDP is relatively strong there exist two different 
patterns, in terms of the vote shares of pro-Kurdish parties from 2007 to 2011 general 
elections. In the neighborhoods of Bostan, Bülbül, Hacıahmet, Kalyoncu Kulluk, these 
parties have constantly increased their votes. This increase is also valid for 2007 general 
elections. Given the fact that at both national and regional level support for pro-Kurdish 
parties in 2007 has decreased when compared with 2002 such an outcome is interesting. 
This may be due to the characteristics of the migration flows in the region. Yet, there is 
no available data to confirm this suggestion.  On the other hand, in the neighborhoods of 
Çukur, Yenişehir, Örnektepe support for these parties remained constant from 2009 to 
2011 general elections. This electoral trend is also interesting given the ideological 
positioning of AKP in 2009 and 2011 general elections. When AKP vote shares is 
concerned , we can observe that in all of these neighborhoods the party has managed to 
increase its votes from 2007 to 2011 general elections, except for the municipal 
elections of 2009. District level data indicates that this increase is accompanied by a 
parallel decrease in other potential swing parties’ votes such as SP, DP and MHP. 
Nevertheless, change in AKP’s electoral support is far below the average in these 
neighborhoods when compared with other neighborhoods not populated by citizens of 
Kurdish origin. Among these neighborhoods, Örnektepe is the one where increase in 
AKP’s general support is relatively higher than the others.   
 
 
8.1.2- Sancaktepe 
 
 
The district has been formed in 2008 by the unification of 3 sub-districts (belde), 
namely Samandıra (from Kartal), Sarıgazi (from Ümraniye), Yenidoğan (from 
Ümraniye).  The district can be divided in two sub-regions in terms of electoral 
characteristics that are different from each other. The first, region consists of the 
neighborhoods from Sarıgazi such as Inönü, Atatürk, Merkez, Emek, Kemal Türkler, 
Meclis where CHP is the first party closely followed by AKP. Each of the parties has 
respectively attained 43% and 40% of the vote shares in 2011 general elections.  Having 
7.79 % of the votes BDP is in front of MHP that has gained 5% of the votes in this sub-
region.   
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Shifts in the Vote shares of AKP and pro-Kurdish in the neighborhoods of BEYOĞLU (1999-2011) 
Neighborhood eligible 
votes AKP %   Pro-Kurdish Parties  % 
  2011 2011 2009 2007 2002 1999* 2011 2009 2007 2002 1999 
Arap Cami 58 57,89 44,74 48,15 41,18 54,76 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,38 
Asmalı Mescit 494 24,20 24,82 31,18 22,76 11,06 12,10 8,76 3,49 11,92 7,37 
Bedrettin 684 56,66 41,29 56,44 43,25 26,98 3,00 2,46 2,77 1,79 1,32 
Bereketzade 331 35,80 29,49 39,56 39,34 30,00 5,35 6,84 1,65 5,15 4,67 
Bostan 1888 33,95 34,39 41,89 26,10 11,73 28,63 23,70 17,76 12,52 6,83 
Bülbül 3524 33,20 28,95 35,30 31,43 16,74 36,90 33,38 24,35 22,10 15,31 
Camiikebir 1915 58,28 43,70 53,88 44,45 29,07 1,40 1,47 0,61 1,95 3,01 
Cihangir 3047 20,03 18,16 20,65 17,30 9,60 10,14 2,33 0,67 6,79 2,63 
Emekyemez 111 46,25 34,43 28,40 34,15 47,73 2,50 0,00 1,23 2,44 2,27 
Evliya Çelebi 261 44,72 40,00 44,67 40,78 25,87 4,52 5,85 2,46 7,84 5,02 
Fetihtepe 12480 55,14 37,07 50,56 43,19 26,50 5,29 4,51 3,38 3,82 2,63 
Firuzağa 3782 40,33 34,68 41,08 33,19 26,01 6,66 2,71 2,67 5,25 4,32 
Gümüşsuyu 1651 14,68 14,75 16,54 15,15 7,49 12,22 3,87 1,06 6,32 2,97 
Hacıahmet 10305 29,96 26,35 31,52 27,19 16,28 32,54 25,86 20,20 15,48 9,82 
Hacımimi 1159 53,78 53,19 56,42 38,72 30,66 3,60 2,99 1,53 6,98 6,39 
Halıcıoğlu 9805 56,82 43,68 55,54 49,07 27,51 1,39 1,83 0,79 2,86 2,17 
Hüseyinağa 299 36,84 32,90 53,00 32,17 19,44 9,36 5,16 5,99 9,69 8,02 
Kadı Mehmet 7693 63,63 48,02 60,87 52,85 32,82 0,95 0,82 0,56 1,20 1,12 
Kalyoncu Kulluk 2844 37,15 32,99 38,04 30,15 17,45 25,52 22,06 18,74 16,77 12,61 
Kamer Hatun 804 46,17 40,14 48,73 37,69 24,83 11,50 7,78 3,62 9,42 6,34 
Kaptanpaşa 13955 64,07 47,05 59,84 50,21 31,67 3,51 3,12 2,81 6,04 4,78 
Katip Çelebi 751 25,94 22,01 28,39 21,06 10,40 12,59 8,20 6,03 7,87 4,35 
K. K. Paşa 130 40,00 30,34 33,93 21,98 17,19 8,42 4,49 0,89 4,40 4,69 
Keçeci Piri 10778 63,52 45,00 56,93 48,14 28,38 1,35 1,04 0,83 2,08 1,60 
Kocatepe 1855 38,99 30,54 34,68 25,47 15,49 12,16 9,00 6,08 7,92 4,10 
Kulaksız 6933 65,63 46,21 59,51 52,46 31,11 1,22 1,24 0,60 1,66 1,39 
Kuloğlu 1295 27,98 27,36 34,56 29,86 18,70 9,39 1,57 0,39 3,21 3,25 
Küçük Piyale 6449 58,12 43,40 54,99 45,70 26,78 1,88 1,35 1,25 2,89 2,33 
Kılıçali Paşa 2279 19,45 19,98 20,50 14,63 9,56 9,07 2,48 0,53 5,14 2,73 
Müeyyedzade 479 47,44 50,15 64,14 53,55 39,61 6,82 2,72 0,25 1,47 1,47 
Piri Paşa 10109 61,51 43,98 58,23 50,44 26,79 1,26 2,36 0,82 2,25 1,44 
Piyalepaşa 18228 51,01 32,05 48,19 42,12 28,99 6,05 5,81 3,55 4,48 3,33 
P. Hasan Efendi 1631 16,09 15,69 16,45 13,50 7,47 10,99 3,14 0,48 5,73 1,79 
S. Mehmet Efendi 3642 47,41 41,23 49,81 37,98 24,44 11,10 8,46 5,54 6,84 4,39 
Sütlüce 8651 65,10 50,94 63,55 50,88 39,87 3,30 2,70 2,26 5,45 3,67 
Tomtom 2182 61,33 47,59 55,74 46,31 32,21 6,24 5,94 5,46 8,97 6,55 
Yahya Kahya 2813 55,58 42,75 54,08 45,77 27,92 1,85 1,37 0,81 2,59 1,84 
Yenişehir 4551 38,95 35,70 38,09 30,24 13,97 16,47 14,57 8,38 5,06 4,06 
Çatma Mescit 1973 49,88 39,16 47,01 39,07 25,54 3,83 3,27 1,79 2,91 1,76 
Çukur 2628 24,00 18,79 23,68 18,01 12,22 51,53 53,79 45,27 41,05 23,60 
Ömer Avni 1719 15,37 12,27 15,33 11,37 6,45 7,18 1,50 0,16 3,79 1,23 
Örnektepe 8173 43,25 32,82 37,41 31,07 21,79 8,51 8,71 8,09 11,32 10,05 
İstiklal 4436 46,29 40,28 44,98 29,34 15,22 4,52 3,90 1,73 3,95 2,99 
Şahkulu 879 41,89 36,88 47,59 40,38 36,21 8,71 4,65 1,24 9,43 5,52 
Şehit Muhtar 1497 35,01 28,08 33,74 16,67 12,10 24,85 26,25 20,02 27,82 20,68 
Table 8.1: Shifts in the vote shares of AKP and pro-Kurdish in the neighborhoods of Beyoğlu (1999-2011) 
*AKP has been founded in 2001. The vote shares of FP has been used for 1999 general elections 
for reference. 
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The second sub-region consists of neighborhoods of the sub-regions from 
Samandıra and Yenidoğan where AKP, attaining approximately 60% of the votes, is 
electorally stronger. Although the second party is CHP, with 20% there is a 
considerable gap between the vote shares of the two parties. BDP is the third party 
slightly in front of MHP whose electoral support is 7.5% and 7 % respectively.  
 
Shifts in the vote shares of AKP and pro-Kurdish parties in the neighborhoods of SANCAKTEPE (1999-2011) 
Neighborhood eligible 
votes AKP** %   Pro-Kurdish parties  % 
  2011 2011 2009 2007 2002 1999** 2011 2009 2007 2002 1999 
samandıra (B)* 54429 59,78 43,26 60,82 48,57 27,46 7,67 10,71 6,91 14,39 13,40 
Abdurrahmangazi 9347 56,07 42,32 58,78    7,27 10,51 4,97    
Akpınar 8759 58,31 41,03 58,83     11,87 15,98 9,88     
Eyüpsultan 5704 60,01 40,12 56,75 
 
  3,54 4,65 2,71 
 
  
Fatih 7622 62,24 45,68 60,90 
 
  0,66 3,58 2,59 
 
  
Osmangazi 14265 63,56 43,94 62,72 
 
  7,74 10,03 6,31 
 
  
Veysel karani 8732 56,77 45,42 55,91     12,58 17,02 11,86     
Sarıgazi (B)* 57898 39,53 34,84 39,29 33,85 23,67 7,79 8,32 8,85 12,64 8,31 
Emek 8202 51,52 45,74 51,88    9,79 10,17 8,19    
İnönü 9788 30,30 26,76 29,73     4,37 5,26 8,34     
Atatürk 11913 34,99 30,39       12,25 11,92       
kemal Türkler 7892 45,83 40,49 44,92     9,98 11,46 11,49     
Meclis 11120 41,15 36,77 39,45    3,91 4,13 6,20    
Merkez 8983 37,13 32,03 37,53     6,68 7,98 9,86     
Yenidoğan (B)* 32897 60,66 42,73 57,77 47,06 34,62 6,44 7,14 4,42 9,03 7,62 
Yenidoğan  6136 49,56 42,98 68,84 
 
  2,80 2,93 5,04 
 
  
Merve 7327 59,25 37,67 49,37 
 
  4,22 4,02 3,51 
 
  
Mevlana 5884 58,84 36,60 54,46 
 
  10,37 11,39 7,74 
 
  
Hilal 2840 66,75 50,16 55,59    10,42 12,34 1,95    
Safa 4335 66,90 46,03 64,43    6,87 7,96 4,47    
Yunusemre 6375 67,65 50,84 66,54     6,95 7,29 3,86     
Table 8.2: Shifts in the vote shares of AKP and pro-Kurdish parties in the neighborhoods of Sancaktepe (1999-
2011) 
*these are the electoral outcomes of each sub-region for the indicated elections 
**AKP has been founded in 2001. The vote shares of FP has been used for 1999 general elections 
for reference. 
 
The electoral trend in vote shares of pro-Kurdish parties from 2007 to 2011 
general elections in Sancaktepe is different from Beyoğlu. As it can be seen from Table 
8.2, there are also two diverging trends in the support for these parties from 2007 to 
2011 among the neighborhoods populated by citizens of Kurdish origin, but the 
direction of this trend is different. In the neighborhoods located in the sub-region of 
Sarıgazi; Emek, İnönü, Atatürk, Kemal Türkler, Meclis and Merkez, their vote shares 
are relatively constant, slightly decreasing across the years. On the other hand, in the 
neighborhoods constituting Samandıra, especially Akpınar and Veysel Karani, their 
support increased from 2007 to 2009, and then decreased from 2009 to 2011 general 
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elections. the outcome from 2009 to 2011 are interesting especially given the fact that 
programmatically AKP’s positioned itself on the opposite end of the Kurdish dimension 
in 2011 elections. Furthermore, in all of the neighborhoods, including the ones where 
the party’s electoral support is relatively low, AKP has managed to increase it vote 
shares from 2007 to 2011 general elections. Nevertheless, its vote shares increased 
relatively more in the neighborhoods of the sub-regions of Samandıra and Yenidoğan, 
compared with Sarıgazi.  
Among these neighborhoods Örnektepe, and Hacıahmet in Beyoğlu, İnönü and 
Veysel Karani in Sancaktepe have been selected for deeper evaluation due to their 
divergence in electoral support for pro-Kurdish parties across elections.32 Table 8.3  and 
Graph 8.1 illustrate the shifts in support for these parties across the elections. One can 
observe different electoral patterns among the neighborhoods. One similar, pattern 
except from Hacıahmet, is the decrease in their electoral support from 2002 to 2007. 
The close position of AKP on the Kurdish issue has probably an important effect on this 
outcome. Nevertheless, the electoral patterns after 2007 clearly diverge from each other. 
The support for these parties from to 2007 to 2011 has constantly increased in 
Hacıahmet, an outcome in accordance with AKP’s changing position on the Kurdish 
issue. In contrast, their support remained constant in the neighborhoods of Örnektepe 
and İnönü despite reaction among the citizens of Kurdish origin towards the policy of 
AKP on the Kurdish issue in 2009 and 2011.  The most interesting case is in 
Veyselkarani where support for pro-Kurdish parties increased in 2009 municipal 
elections and decreased in 2011 general elections; a situation difficult to explain by the 
ideological positioning of AKP.      
The study will investigate the effect of strong neighborhood organization and 
incorporation of the citizens of Kurdish origin within the network of the party in 
explaining these diverging electoral outcomes. But first, the validity of alternative 
explanations expressed by the AKP activists themselves will be tested in the next 
section. 
 
 
 
                                               
32 Hacıahmet, örnektepe, Veysel Karani and İnönü are similar in terms of population size that may 
independently affect the extent in which AKP reaches citizens of Kurdish origin. 
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 Vote shares of pro-Kurdish parties across elections % (2002-2011) 
 
 
% of Kurd. 2002 2007 2009 2011 
Örnektepe 25,00 11,32 8,09 8,71 8,51 
Hacıahmet 40,00 15,48 20,20 25,86 32,54 
İnönü** 25,00 12,64 8,34 9,54 9,03 
Veysel Karani* 35,00 14,39 11,86 17,02 12,58 
            Table 8.3:  Neighborhood vote shares of pro-Kurdish parties across elections (2007-2011) 
*2002 data for this neighborhood is not available, the votes shares of the region of Sarıgazi which 
the neighborhood was part of and has similar electoral patterns has been used. In 2009 the neighborhood 
of Atatürk has been formed from the neighborhoods of Kemal Türkler, Inönü. The vote share for Inönü 
has been recalculated by taking the average vote of pro-Kurdish parties in these neighborhoods 
** 2002 data for this neighborhood is not available, the votes shares of the region of Samandıra 
which the neighborhood was part of and has similar electoral patterns has been used. 
 
 
 
Graph 8.1: Neighborhood vote shares for pro-Kurdish parties across elections 
(2007-2011) 
 
 
8.2- Alternative Explanations for the Divergence in Electoral Support for AKP 
among Citizens of Kurdish Origin 
  
 
 This study argues that an important factor that affects difference in the 
effectiveness of the mobilization efforts in Beyoğlu compared to Sancaktepe is based on 
the interaction of two factors: strong neighborhood organization measured in terms of 
the amount of activities of the neighborhood organization and the amount and time of 
ethnic representation in the party’s ranks. For such a purpose, the selected districts have 
been chosen so as to control for the effect of other possible affecting variables such as 
estimated percentage of Kurdish origin and electoral competition in terms of AKP vote 
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shares. Nevertheless, divergence in electoral outcomes may still have different 
alternative explanations. Among such factors may be characteristics specific to each 
districts and exogenous to the party’s strategy. In fact, factors such as increase in 
Kurdish population, high ethnic consciousness are factors commonly expressed by the 
party activists in explaining diverging electoral outcome. After, briefly evaluating the 
districts in terms of socio-demographic indicators, this section elaborates district and 
neighborhood level differences in each of these factors.   
 
 
8.2.1- Socio-demographic Composition of the Voters 
 
 
This section is brief evaluation of the general socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the districts in terms of the demographic composition of the 
population, socio-economic conditions of the non-Kurdish and Kurdish citizens residing 
in each of the district. Although the main comparison is conducted between Beyoğlu 
and Sancaktepe,  
Based on the 2011 Census Beyoğlu has a population of 247.85233, which 
181.15134 of them were registered voters in the 2011 general elections.  The District is 
composed of citizens that have migrated from very different regions of Turkey.35 The 
largest population is from Istanbul origin with a population of 38.398 for the year of 
2011. Immigrants from provinces of the Black Sea region such as Giresun, Kastamonu 
and Rize with populations of 29.129, 11.343 and 11.484 constitute the non-Kurdish 
majority, whereas migrants from the province of Sivas in Central Anatolia and Erzincan 
from Eastern Anatolia with populations of 19.715 and 9.059 are also large in quantity.  
With its estimated population of 39.120, which corresponds to nearly 15% of the total 
population, the residents from Kurdish origin constitute an important community in the 
districts. This population consists of immigrants largely from the Kurdish speaking 
province of Mardin with a population of 13.272 and to a smaller extent other provinces 
                                               
33http://report.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2=&ENVID=adnksdb2Env&report=turkiye_ilce_koy
_sehir.RDF&p_il1=34&p_kod=1&p_yil=2010&p_dil=1&desformat=htmlthe  (Accessed 27 June2011) 
34 http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2011MilletvekiliSecimi/SecmenSandik2011.htm (Accessed 27 
June2011) 
35 For more detailed information on the demographic composition of the district for the years of 2011, 
2010, 2009 and 2007 consult Appendix C.  
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such as Batman, Siirt, Diyarbakır, Bingöl, Ağrı with respectively 4.215, 3.052, 2.364, 
2753 and 2926 immigrants.  
The district is composed of 3 sub-regions with different socioeconomic 
characteristics. The first sub-region consists of neighborhoods such as Gümüşsuyu, 
Cihangir which are prestigious residency places and have high socio-economic 
conditions with residents constituting the elite population of Istanbul. The second sub-
region consists of neighborhoods where AKP is strong and socio-economic conditions 
and illiteracy rate is considerable in the middle. The resident of these neighborhoods are 
old immigrants that have immigrated to Istanbul for economic reasons from different 
regions of Turkey, mostly Black Sea and Central Anatolia. In some of these 
neighborhoods low numbers of Kurdish population are settled. The third sub-region 
consists of neighborhoods such as Çukur, Bülbül, Tomtom, Bülbül, Hacıahmet, 
Yenişehir, Kalyoncukulluk that constitute the region known as Dolapdere, and 
Örnektepe that have remarkably low socio-economic conditions and form the periphery 
of Beyoğlu. High illiteracy rate, poverty and unemployment accompanied with low 
infrastructural investment are the basic characteristics of these neighborhoods whose 
socio-economic situation has gradually decreased as a result of migration flows. The 
demographic characteristics of these neighborhoods have drastically changed after 1990 
due to the settlement of large numbers of citizens of Kurdish origin that have 
immigrated to Istanbul from cities like Mardin, Batman and Diyarbakır. 
The district’s illiteracy rate is 7% according to the 2009 Census, which is higher 
than the average of Istanbul. The Kurdish population constitutes the community with 
the lowest illiteracy rate and socioeconomic status. Although, there is an amount of 
early immigrants of Kurdish origin, most of the Kurdish population has immigrated 
after 1990 due to security concerns in their home region. Most of the citizens of Kurdish 
origin living in the district, have very bad living and working conditions with no 
employment or social insurance and are very poorly paid. The main activities of these 
citizens that are unqualified due to poor education is making and selling moles, which is 
an activity carried by the family as whole and has a very difficult production process or 
working in unregistered textile production. Unemployment is a major problem due to 
the lack of demand for unqualified labor force in the district where the main economic 
activities are on the sectors of tourism and services that necessitate an educated, 
qualified labor force.  In sectarian terms, nearly all of the residents from Kurdish origin 
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belong to the Shafi Sect of Sunni Islam, while a considerably small quantity consists of 
Alevis. Within this respect, the Kurdish speaking population is ideologically close to 
AKP.  
Based on the 2011 Census Sancaktepe has a population of 269.18036 which 
169.83937 were registered voters in the 2011 general elections.  As Beyoğlu, the District 
is composed of citizens that have migrated from very different regions of Turkey.38 
Immigrants from provinces of the Black Sea region such as Ordu, Tokat, Kastamonu, 
Ardahan with populations of 22.293, 22.140, 11.225 and 9949 constitute the non-
Kurdish majority, whereas migrants from the province of Sivas in Central Anatolia and 
Erzurum, Erzincan from Eastern Anatolia with populations of 20.067, 13289 and 10.246 
are also large in quantity. The district has an estimated Kurdish population of 43.429, 
which corresponds to nearly 16 % of the total population. With this percentage, the 
Kurdish population constitutes an equally important community as in Beyoğlu.  When 
the composition of the Kurdish population is analyzed we see major immigration flows 
from the Kurdish speaking provinces of Kars, Bingöl, Tunceli, Van, Ağrı and Siirt. 
With a population of 18.142 Kars constitutes an important majority, where as Bingöl 
with 10.198, Ağrı with 7.180, Tunceli with 4.003, Van with 4.098, and Siirt with 3.527 
have also considerably important communities.   
In Socio-economic terms, the sub-district and their neighborhoods slightly diverge 
from each other. Nevertheless, the demographic compositions of the neighborhoods are 
different from each other. In the neighborhoods of Sarıgazi, the main residents are 
divided between immigrants from the Black Sea regions and East and South East 
Anatolia. The peculiarity of these neighborhoods, which have large numbers of citizens 
of Kurdish origin, is the considerable number of Alevi citizens. While in the sub-region 
of Sarıgazi citizens of Kurdish origin are dispersed almost in all neighborhoods, in the 
Samandıra they are especially strong in the neighborhoods of Veysel Karani and 
Akpınar. Neighborhood such as Eyüpsultan, Fatih, Osmangazi,Yendoğan, Merve and 
Safa are heavily concentrated with immigrants from Black sea region. 
                                               
36http://report.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2=&ENVID=adnksdb2Env&report=turkiye_ilce_koy
_sehir.RDF&p_il1=34&p_kod=1&p_yil=2010&p_dil=1&desformat=html (Accessed 27 June2011) 
37 http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2011MilletvekiliSecimi/SecmenSandik2011.htm(Accessed 27 
June2011) 
38 For more detailed information on the demographic composition of the district for the years of 2011, 
2010 and 2009 consult apendix 5. 
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In terms of illiteracy rate, the socio-economic conditions and immigration 
experience of the residents of Kurdish origin in the district have a similar profile with 
Beyoğlu. While the district’s illiteracy rate is 8% according to the 2009 Census, 
residents of Kurdish origin constitute the community with the lowest illiteracy rate and 
socioeconomic status. Although, there is an amount of early immigrants of Kurdish 
origin with better socio-economic conditions, most of the Kurdish population has 
immigrated after 1990. Even if, the district is a newly developing area where huge 
factories from different sectors provide employment opportunities for the residents, as 
indicated by the district president of AKP, the low educational profile of the residents of 
Kurdish origin and their unqualified labor make to find a job very difficult (Interview 
conducted on 22.03.2011, Beyoğlu). As a result, they are mainly employed is in low 
profile jobs in textile, construction sectors. In sectarian terms, a high amount of the 
residents from Kurdish origin belong to the Shafi Sect of Sunni Islam, while a small 
quantity mostly from Tunceli belong to the Alevi Sect that are ideologically close to 
CHP. 
 
8.2.2- Changing Socio-demographic Composition 
 
 
As illustrated in the previous section Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe are very similar in 
terms of the socio-demographic composition. Furthermore, both districts have 
considerable number of citizens having a low educational profile and facing 
unemployment problems. This makes them sensitive to both ideological and material 
mobilization. Nevertheless, one possible explanation in the change of the electoral 
support for BDP across elections in the districts and neighborhoods may simply be due 
to change in their demographic composition as a result of migration. Under such a 
circumstance, change in BDP votes cannot be related to the success or failure of AKP’s 
mobilization strategy on citizen of Kurdish origin.  
Unfortunately, no data is available on the characteristics of immigration flows at 
district or neighborhood level. One of the possible ways to measure demographic 
change in the percentage of Kurdish origin is to compare the change in population size 
and the estimated number of Kurdish citizens within each district across the periods the 
236 
 
elections take place.39 Nevertheless, such data is not available at the neighborhood level, 
but as it will be explained in detail, district level changes may also be effective in 
understanding possible changes in the demographic composition of the neighborhoods.   
Even if this number covers both immigration flows and newborns, they have only 
been evaluated as immigration flows since the rate of the newborns is considerably low 
for both Kurdish and non-Kurdish citizens when compared with these numbers and can 
only explain a considerably low percentage of this change on its own.  Furthermore, it 
should be noted that there is no data to control neither for the change in the number of 
eligible voters nor the share of citizens of Kurdish origin among them, which may have 
caused such an increase in support for pro-Kurdish. Nevertheless, this fact does not 
create any problem in using support for pro-Kurdish parties as measure of AKP support 
among voters of Kurdish origin. The electoral preferences of young voters are also 
expected to be shaped by the same factors as their older counterparts within each district 
since their face similar experiences. Then, the mobilization strategy of AKP is expected 
to affect them similarly.  
 
  Beyoğlu Sancaktepe 
  2011 2009 2007 
2011-
2009 
2009-
2007 
2011 2009 2007 
2011-
2009 
2009-
2007 
Total polulation 247852 245420 248195 2432 -2775 269180 243113  26067  
Est. Kur Pop. 39119 38174 37288 945 885 43429 38565  4864  
% Est. Kurd. 15,78 15,55 15,02 0,23 0,53 16,13 15,86  0,27  
pro-Kurdish 
parties’ vote 
number 
12124 8796 5650 3328 3146 10817 10674 6383 143 4291 
           
           % pro-Kurdish 
parties 
 
8,24 
 
6,70 
 
4,95 
 
1,54 
 
1,75 
 
7,45 
 
9,02 
 
6,96 
 
-1,57 
 
2,06 
 
Table 8.4: District level shifts in demographic characteristics and votes of pro-Kurdish parties 
(2007-2009) 
*Source:www.tuik.gov.tr 
 
Table 8.4 illustrates changes in the overall population, the residents that are 
registered in the 15 Kurdish populated provinces, the estimated numbers of Kurdish 
citizens and support for pro-Kurdish parties for the years of 2007, 2009, and 2011 in 
                                               
39 The data is publicly available in the website of Turkish Statistical Institute (www.tuik.gov.tr) 
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Beyoğlu and 2009 and 2011 in Sancaktepe40. Data of population change for Sancaktepe 
for the year of 2007 is not available since the district was legally formed only in 2008.  
As it can be seen from the second group of columns of each district, both districts 
have witnessed increase in its overall population and estimated numbers of citizens of 
Kurdish origin. For Beyoğlu, change in the overall population size and estimated 
numbers of citizens of Kurdish origin is considerably low for both periods. The 
population size decreased by 2775 from 2007 to 2009 and increased by 2432 from 2009 
to 2011. Whereas estimated numbers of citizens of Kurdish origin increased by 885  
from 2007 to 2009 and  945 from 2009 to 2011 .  On the other hand, increase in the 
votes of pro-Kurdish parties is considerably higher with 3146 and 3328 votes. This 
makes an increase of 1831 of estimated number of Kurdish residents compared to 6474 
increase in vote numbers of pro-Kurdish parties between 2007 and 2011. Given the fact 
that new comers consists of citizens from diverging ages and not all are eligible to vote, 
the difference should be slightly higher.  Then, even if all new comers from the 
southeast region are from Kurdish origin and support the pro-Kurdish parties, still a 
considerable number of voters seem to have switched their preferences from AKP to 
pro-Kurdish parties in both periods. Unfortunately, there is no available data to analyze 
the population changes at the neighborhood level. Nevertheless, the hometown origin of 
the new migration flows to the district may provide clue to the effect of migration on 
neighborhood outcomes. The total number of migration flows between 2009 and 2011 
from the provinces of  Mardin, Diyarbakır, Batman and Bingöl are  650 100, 100, 4. On 
the other hand, the population of residents from Tunceli has decreased by 150.   When 
the amount of support for pro-Kurdish parties in the neighborhood of Hacıahmet is 
analyzed, in order to explain change in these parties’ electoral support between 2009 
and 2007 through migration, all the new immigrants from Mardin, Batman, Diyarbakır 
should have migrated to the neighborhood. Given the fact that these citizens also reside 
in large quantity in other neighborhoods such as Çukur, Bülbül, Örnektepe such a 
possibility is very low. On the other hand, the slight increase in the votes of pro-Kurdish 
parties in Örnektepe between 2009 and 2011 may be affected by the immigration of 
citizens from Mardin. A possible suggestion in the vote changes of pro-Kurdish parties 
in Hacıahmet may be internal migration from another neighborhood. In fact such an 
                                               
40 For a detailed analysis of the change in the number of residents’ province registration for each district 
across the years consult Appendix C.  
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explanation is given by AKP activists. However, this is not expected to be valid, given 
the fact that increase in the votes in Hacıahmet does not coincide with a parallel 
decrease in the votes of pro-Kurdish parties in any of the neighborhoods. Nevertheless, 
such an observation is not valid. In none of the neighborhoods, there is a considerable 
decrease neither in the total population nor in the vote shares of pro-Kurdish parties. 
Furthermore, the residents of the neighborhood of Örnektepe and Hacıahmet are 
respectively from Mardin, Tunceli, Bingöl and Mardin, Batman, Diyarbakır. Even if, all 
new immigrants from these provinces have settled in these neighborhoods and are all 
eligible to vote they cannot explain all increase in support for BDP in Hacıahmet. Then, 
the increase in the vote shares of pro-Kurdish parties in the neighborhood can be 
interpreted as a real increase.    
 
Neighborhood Votes of AKP and pro-Kurdish parties across elections 
 
Örnektepe Hacıahmet İnönü Veyselkarani 
PKP vote 2007 436 1230 827 701 
PKP vote 2009 544 1797 730 1323 
PKP vote 2011 596 2747 884 1099 
AKP vote 2007 2016 1919 6133 3304 
AKP vote 2009 2049 1831 7239 3530 
AKP vote 2011 3029 2529 10751 4958 
Table 8.5: Neighborhood Votes of AKP and Pro-Kurdish parties across elections 
 
When these numbers are analyzed for Sancaktepe it is evident that the party has 
managed to increase it votes among citizens of Kurdish origin from 2009 to 2011 even 
if the votes of pro-Kurdish parties have remained considerably equal. Sancaktepe has 
witnessed a large increase in both total population size and estimated numbers of 
Kurdish origin from 2009 to 2011. While the overall population increased by 26.067, 
the estimated numbers of citizens of Kurdish origin increased by 4864 which made the 
percentage of citizens of Kurdish origin nearly unchanged. Even if there seems to be 
nearly no difference when electoral votes shares are taken into consideration, AKP’s 
success is in fact higher when absolute change in both overall population size and 
estimated number of Kurdish origin are taken into consideration. Although support for 
pro-Kurdish parties has increased from 6383 to 10674 from 2007 to 2009, it remained 
nearly constant with 10817 in 2011 when compared with 2009. In contrast, although 
there is no information on the overall population from Kurdish origin from 2007 to 
2009, it has increased by 4864 from 2009 to 2011. Given the nature of the competition 
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in the Southeast Region, the probability of these new comers to vote only for AKP is 
considerably low. Then, we can conclude that party has managed to attract a 
considerably large number of citizens of Kurdish origin from old residents or new 
comers who are eligible to vote in the defined period. Even if they got the votes from 
new comers, it is still very important because it means that they attracted potential 
supporters of pro-Kurdish parties.  
Unfortunately, there is no available data to analyze the population changes at the 
neighborhood level. Nevertheless, the hometown origin of the new migration flows in 
Sancaktepe may give an idea how much they have affected population change in Inönü 
or Veyselkarani. From 2009 to 2011 the resident whose hometown origins are Kars, 
Van, Ağrı, Bingöl and Tunceli have respectively increased by 2000, 1000, 900, 750 and 
300. Given the fact that immigrants from Kars and Bingöl are mostly situated in 
Veyselkarani, the number of citizens of Kurdish origin has probably increased in the 
neighborhood. Than the success of AKP is probably more than the electoral outcomes 
indicates. As illustrated in table 8.5 even if no new residents have migrated to the 
neighborhood still the votes of pro-Kurdish parties have decreased from 2009 to 2011.  
On the other hand, residents of Kurdish origin in the neighborhood of Inönü are from 
Tunceli and Bingöl. The increase in the population of residents of Kurdish origin in 
these neighborhoods is expected to be less given the relatively low increase in these 
populations in the district as a whole. Even if, all the immigrants from these province 
had settled in the neighborhood still change in the electoral outcomes across elections is 
moderate.  
The suggestion that increase in the votes of pro-Kurdish parties derives from 
immigration flow across years is not supported by the data. As a result, the major 
assumption of the study that the districts diverge in terms of support for AKP among 
citizens of Kurdish origin is still valid for these cases. Especially for Sancaktepe, one 
can conclude that the absolute increase in support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish 
origin is even greater.  
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8.2.3- Degree of Ethnic Consciousness 
 
 
One other explanation of increase in the vote shares of pro-Kurdish may be the 
difference in the degree of ethnic consciousness  in the neighborhoods. Based on the 
literature Hetcher, 1975; Bates, 1983; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2005, Sassen-Koop 1979, 
Schmitter 1980, Schildkraut, 2005) on ethnic consciousness is expected to be higher in 
geographical units where residents of Kurdish have lower socio-economic conditions, 
immigration experience are negative, the number of citizens of Kurdish origin is higher, 
they are homogenous in terms of cultural traits, BDP is well organized. This section will 
mainly focus on these dimensions in order to understand whether these variables 
explain different electoral outcomes from 2009 to 2011 in the selected neighborhoods. 
As indicated in table 8.6, although the neighborhoods slightly diverge in term of these 
variables, this divergence does not coincide with change in the electoral support for 
BDP.  
It has been illustrated that most of the citizens of Kurdish origin residing in both 
Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe were later immigrants having negative immigration 
experiences. Most of the immigrants of Kurdish origin in the neighborhoods of 
Örnektepe, Hacıahmet, İnönü and Veysel Karani also fall under the same category.  In 
all the four neighborhoods, although there is an amount of early immigrants most of 
them consist of citizens migrating after 1990 due to the forced migration policy of the 
state in the Kurdish-speaking region of Turkey. Within this respect, they all have a 
certain amount of perceived negative experience before they have migrated to Istanbul. 
A similar situation can also be observed when their socio-economic conditions are taken 
into consideration. Since most of them have very low educational profiles, their socio-
economic conditions are very low and comprise of unqualified labor. These immigrants 
occupy low position jobs, where most of them work in textile industry as workers in all 
the neighborhoods under investigation.  
   Most of the Kurdish citizens are of the Shafi sect who is very religious in nature. 
Some residents in the neighborhoods of Inönü and Örnektepe where a small amount of 
Alevi Kurds resides are exceptions. Nevertheless, these groups do not constitute 
potential swing voters since voters from the Alevi sect mostly do not vote for AKP. 
Unfortunately, there is no publicly available statistical data on either the hometown 
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origin or the percentage of residents of Kurdish origin residing at neighborhood level. 
As an alternative strategy, the study will base its analysis on the Interview conducted 
during the field research.41 When the composition of hometown origin is taken into 
consideration we see that Kurdish residents in Hacıahmet are immigrants from the 
provinces of Batman, Mardin and Diyarbakır; in Örnektepe, they are from Mardin, 
Tunceli and Bingöl; In Veysel Karani, they are from Bingöl and Kars and in Inönü they 
are from Tunceli, Bingöl, Kars. Among the ones who immigrated from Tunceli 
approximately half are from the Shafi sect as opposed to the Alevi sect. Although group 
consciousness, in-group pressure and out-group distance is expected to be greater 
among residents from Mardin and Batman, as it can be seen from table 8.6, the number 
of province these citizens have migrated is not very different. Then their degree of 
homogeneity in terms of cultural traits and social network seems not to diverge 
extensively.   
Furthermore, in each of the neighborhoods the citizens of Kurdish origin slightly 
diverge in terms of the percentage of the population. Kurdish resident comprise 
approximately 25% of the population in Örnektepe, 40 % of the population in 
Hacıahmet, 35 % in the Neighborhood of Veysel Karani and  25% of the neighborhood 
in Inönü. Nevertheless, these differences do not coincide to the direction of the vote 
shifts. 
The neighborhoods seem also to slightly diverge in terms of the organizational 
strength of BDP. The predecessor party was functioning in these neighborhoods in 2002 
when AKP had its predecessors, too. In the entire districts, BDP has a district 
presidency and in the four neighborhoods under investigation, BDP has neighborhood 
activists that works for the party.  Furthermore, the party opened contact offices where 
party activists were active during the general elections in each of the neighborhoods. 
This can be evaluated as a sign of the party’s organizational strength. The party’s 
organization strength can also be understood from its pressure on the citizens of Kurdish 
origin. One example was their pressure on citizens of Kurdish origin not to participate 
in the constitutional referendum carried in 2010 that the party boycotted. In four of the 
                                               
41 These percentages have been asked to the Muhtars of each neighborhood and district activists of both 
AKP and BDP. These estimates are expected to be reliable since Muhtarlık’s are the places where records 
on the residents are permanently updated. Furthermore, both parties and Muhtars have access to the 
hometown origin of the residents eligible to vote in each of the neighborhoods. As a result they have an 
objective base of measurement. As a matter of fact, each of the organs have given approximately the same 
percentages.  
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neighborhoods AKP activists highlighted that citizens of Kurdish origin were asked to 
boycott the referendum and on the referendum day BDP activists waited out of the 
polling station to control the compliance to their request. Yet, the effectiveness of this 
demanded is expected to be endogenous to the support for AKP among voters of 
Kurdish origin and percentage of residents of Kurdish origin. The turnouts for 
Örnektepe, Hacıahmet, Veysel Karani and İnönü was respectively 71%, 51%, 71% and 
77%. 
 
Indicators of ethnic consciousness 
the Kurdish Group Neighborhoods 
    İnönü 
Veysel 
karani Örnektepe Hacıahmet 
socio-economic status low low low low 
Degree of homogeneity (no of 
provinces)  3 2 3 3 
Religious sect Shafi + Alevi Shafi Shafi+Alevi Shafi 
approximate percentage in the 
municipal population 25% 35% 25% 40% 
time of immigration  mostly late mostly late mostly late mostly late 
BDP's organizational strength strong strong strong strong 
Violence   high low low high 
change in pro-Kurdish parties’ vote 
shares  (2009-2011) -0,89% -4,46% -0,20% 6,68% 
BDP vote Shares in 2011 9,03% 12,58% 8,51 % 32,54% 
Table 8.6: Neighborhood level ethnic consciousness and support for BDP 
 
This section has illustrated that the neighborhoods slightly diverge from each 
other in terms of the variables expected to affect the degree of ethnic consciousness the 
citizens of Kurdish origin have. Then the ideological position of  AKP on the Kurdish 
issue is expected to affect most of the Kurdish voters in a similar manner, translating in 
similar vote shift in BDP support.    Table 6.4 is the classification of the neighborhood 
according to these variables and electoral patterns in BDP votes. As the table illustrates 
such a direct relationship is not valid. Although the neighborhoods of Hacıahmet and 
İnönü are neighborhoods where ethnic consciousness is slightly higher, BDP support 
increases in Hacıahmet as expected but it remains unchanged from 2009 to 2011 in 
Inönü. Similarly, electoral outcomes also diverge in the neighborhood of Örnektepe and 
Veysel Karani where ethnic consciousness is expected to be similar. While BDP vote 
shares remain constant in the former, it decreases in the latter.  
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8.3- Activities of the Neighborhood Organization, Representation of Citizens of 
Kurdish Origin and Effectiveness of the Mobilization Strategy 
 
 
This study suggests that the relationship of ethnic consciousness and  electoral 
preferences of voters of Kurdish origin has a more complex nature. As Chandra (2004) 
highlights, defining him/herself on ethnic grounds and voting based on this ethnicity are 
two distinct processes.  If the voter is incorporated into the clientelistic network of a 
multi-ethnic party his/her probability to vote for an ethnic party will decrease even if its 
ethnic consciousness is high. Within this respect, it is argued that in a political 
environment such as the 2011 general elections where AKP has a negative stance on the 
Kurdish issue, the main factor affecting a Kurdish voter’s decision to vote either for 
AKP or BDP is based on whether he/she has been incorporated into AKP’s clientelistic 
network and the time of this incorporation. On the other hand, high ethnic 
consciousness is expected to more rapidly translate into BDP support when citizens of 
Kurdish origin are not or very lately incorporated into the network (Chandra, 2004, p: 
170, 171).  In fact, the decision of some voters to switch their votes should be evaluated 
as the result of AKP’s unwillingness or inability to incorporate citizens of Kurdish 
origin into their network.    
This study suggests that the time of the incorporation of the activists of non-
Kurdish and Kurdish origin in the neighborhood organization and the repetitiveness of 
the contact between the organization and the voters is vital in explaining divergent 
support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish origin. On the other hand, repetitiveness 
can be measured through the length and intensity of the interaction. As a result, 
stability, increase or decrease in AKP support among citizens of Kurdish origin from 
2009 to 2011 should be related to the time of the entry of co-ethnic member of the 
existing social networks in the party’s organizational structure and the amount of 
activities carried by the neighborhood organization through these co-ethnics. The study 
uses the entry dates of the activists and the intensity of the activities of the 
neighborhood organization to measure the repeated course of the interaction.    
The neighborhood organization consists of different activists functioning at 
different levels of the party hierarchy. Within this respect, formerly entering activists 
would be in the higher level of the hierarchy. Nevertheless, although the presence, time 
and level of entry of such activists is important in understanding the previous 
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incorporation of citizens of Kurdish origin, the ability of the neighborhood organization 
to perform publicly and identify new members through these activists is based on the 
successful coordination between them and the neighborhood organization. It is only 
when the party is able to assure such coordination that it will be successful to increase 
its network among citizens of Kurdish origin through older activists. Coordination is 
especially important when the members of the neighborhood organization are new and 
activists of Kurdish origin are nonexistent. Recall that assuring cooperation between the 
district and neighborhood level activists is in the responsibility of the neighborhood 
coordinator. Then the dedication of the neighborhood coordinator to the party’s work 
would provide a measure of cooperation. This is why the dedication of the 
neighborhood activist will also taken into consideration to measure the effect of a co-
ethic in the district organization in providing information to the neighborhood 
organization when presence of co-ethnic in each of the neighborhoods is analyzed.  
The main data used in this section has been extracted from participant 
observations and personal interviews conducted before and during the electoral 
campaigning period. Furthermore, the official web pages of AKP district branch and the 
municipality where personal information on the members of the main organs are 
published also comprise a considerable part of the data used for this section. Given the 
fact that parties mobilize the maximum of their resources to contact voters during the 
electoral campaigning period (Sayarı, 1976, p: 295); the amount of activities performed 
by the district and neighborhood activists during this period should give a relative 
neighborhood comparison on the extent of the intensity of their activities and the 
amount of coordination between them.  
The composition of the district and neighborhood organization during the 
electoral campaigning activities has been taken into consideration. Although, in 2012 
congresses were held at district level and the position of some activists have changed, 
these have not been taken into consideration since they would have no effect on the 
results of the elections. An interesting observation in all the neighborhoods and districts 
under investigation is the weakening of the neighborhood organizations after 2006 and 
their restructuring after the 2009 municipal elections due to the changing characteristic 
of the electoral competition. Although their weakening and restructuring was a similar 
process for all neighborhoods, characteristics of people recruited, their dedication to 
party activities after 2009 greatly diverged among the neighborhoods. As it will be 
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illustrated into the next chapter, the experience of a critical juncture in the district of 
Sancaktepe enabled the district branch to motivate both district and neighborhood 
activists. On the other hand, uninterrupted organizational order prevented Beyoğlu to 
motivate its activists.     
 
 
8.3.1- Örnektepe 
 
 
Örnektepe was among one of the neighborhoods where the party has successfully 
organized and recruited members to the district organization in its foundation period.  In 
fact, a considerable number of these activists were former members of the FP who 
decided to continue their careers with AKP when its principle founders quit FP and 
organized under a new party in 2001, namely AKP. On the other hand, the party was 
also able the recruit activists from different traditional political orientations and 
hometown origin. The citizens of Kurdish origin residing in the neighborhood were not 
an exception.  They were represented in the party since its formation and were still 
active during the electoral campaigning activities of 2011 general elections.  During the 
electoral campaigning period, there were six activists from the district branch residing 
in the neighborhood of Örnektepe. Three of them were from Kurdish origin. One 
women branch activist from the province of Kars, two main activists from the provinces 
of Ağrı and Bingöl. All five of these activists entered the party in 2001, three as the 
founding members of the neighborhood organization and 2 as the founding member of 
the district organization during the party formation. After having worked in the 
neighborhood organization, they promoted to the district between 2003 and 2006. All of 
these members are very active in the party, respected people in the neighborhood, very 
well known among the residents and have consolidated relations with them. These 
activists have key positions in the party. Among the four activists in the main branch, 
two of them who are from Kurdish origin have been selected as members of the 
municipal council in 2009. One of them functions in the district as vice president since 
its formation while the other is member of the administrative board. Among activists 
from the woman branch, the one from Kurdish origin occupies the post of vice 
presidency while the other is the member of the administrative board.   
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Although the clientelistic network in the neighborhood has been formed during 
the foundation of the party in 2001 and was very active in the neighborhood, the 
neighborhood organization weakened and its activities decreased as some activists 
promoted to the district and others left the party after 2006. Attempts to strengthen the 
neighborhood of the organization began after the municipal elections of 2009.   
Although the neighborhood organization of the main branch was reformed by 
2010, the party did not recruit new activists. The activists, the neighborhood president 
included, of the new neighborhood organization composed of the previous activists that 
left the party after 2006. As the neighborhood president highlights, “our old 
neighborhood president did his best, but it was not sufficient. The party convinced me 
and other former activists to return to the party. In a sense the organization has 
returned to its founding stage where founding members are back” (Interview conducted 
on 14.05.2011, Örnektepe). In a sense, their support base was not different from district 
activists living in the neighborhood. Nevertheless, most of the activists were respected 
people of their community, known by the supporters of the party due to their previous 
experience and living in the neighborhood for long years. The main branch 
neighborhood president was from the province of Sivas. He mentioned to me that the 
district purposefully selects him since he was not from the dominant communities 
residing in the neighborhood, namely Kastamonu and Bingöl, and this was increasing 
the party’s image of non-discrimination. For example the neighborhood president, 
informed me that he was residing in the neighborhood for more than 40 years.   
 Furthermore, the successful formation of the woman branch could not be assured. 
This situation was confirmed by the women branch district president who asserted many 
times that they had difficulty in building up their organization as they could not find an 
active neighborhood president that would form the organization. The main branch 
neighborhood president’s attitude was also similar. After I asked the activities of the 
woman branch he answered, “We have no coordination with them, as the party we don’t 
know what they doing”, when I asked him whether this meant that they do not work 
actively, he answered me with a smile his face, “I would prefer to say, I don’t know” 
(Interview conducted on 14.05.2011). Interview conducted with the woman branch 
neighborhood president reveals that she had no experience on the responsibilities her 
post required. When I asked her what they were doing during an electoral campaigning 
activity she answered, “They told me to come with some activists and her I am, but I 
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really don’t know the purpose, I think I will walk with them” (electoral campaigning 
activity on 03.05.2011, Örnektepe). During our talk, when I asked her what they 
routinely do, she only could tell me that they were meeting once a week, she did not 
even mention a word on their strategy, the purpose of their activities or how she formed 
the organization, albeit I tried to orient her. The weakness of the woman branch 
organization was also visible in the preparation of the lists for the representatives of 
each polling station. Although each neighborhood branch has normally the 
responsibility to prepare these lists, the main branch president prepared all the lists 
himself without the assistance of the woman branch president. Furthermore, the 
neighborhood coordinator of the woman branch hardly performed her responsibilities. 
In fact, in contrast to the other district activists she participated in neither of the general 
electoral campaigning activities in the two-month period, nor to the ones carried in her 
neighborhood.    
The main branch neighborhood organization had good coordination with the 
district activists residing in the neighborhood. This coordination was visible from the 
discourse of the neighborhood president who related the expected success of the party to 
the assistance of the district coordinator in all the activities the organization had 
performed. Nevertheless, the neighborhood organization neither has incorporated new 
activists in the organization origin, nor has intensified its network through routine 
activities. After 2009, no new activists of Kurdish origin have been incorporated in 
either the main or the women neighborhood organizations. This return decreased its 
ability to identify and persuade other voters of Kurdish origin outside their actual 
network.  
 When we look at the intensity of the activities of the neighborhood organization 
we see that the participation of both main and women branch neighborhood activists, 
especially presidents, in the electoral campaigning activities in the district was very low. 
Although, they were supposed to be present during the electoral campaigning activity of 
the district, no one from the organization was present, except the woman branch 
neighborhood president who only participated in the first activity. As it will be 
illustrated later this is a rather different situation than the neighborhood of Inönü and 
Veyselkarani. The low attendance of people in the opening of the neighborhood contact 
office revealed that neither had they recruited people in the activities nor had they 
participated themselves. The only activity they performed and were responsible of was 
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to distribute the brochures of the party to the residents of the neighborhood. 
Furthermore, they mostly did not make the weekly neighborhood meeting weakening 
the information flow among the organization. Although the neighborhood organization 
had access to former connections and street representation, it was not able to increase its 
reach among citizens of Kurdish origin since neither new activists of Kurdish origin 
were recruited, nor the activities of the neighborhood organization were intense. 
Although some of the activists of Kurdish origin were incorporated into the 
clientelistic network in the founding phase of the party, after 2009 no new activist of 
Kurdish origin was incorporated. Recall, that identification of new types of voters it 
carried through either the incorporation of new activists or the regular activities 
conducted. Within this respect, although there is an amount of coordination between 
district and neighborhood level activists that gives opportunity to increase the network 
among voters of Kurdish origin, the low amount of activities decreased this possibility 
of existent activists to identify new voters through their routine activities. Under these 
circumstances although the party was able to incorporate some citizens of Kurdish 
origin through the activities of activists of Kurdish origin in the neighborhood until 
2006, the party could not increase its support afterwards. This was reflected as a 
stability in the electoral support for AKP across elections.  
  
 
8.3.2- Inönü 
  
 
A similar pattern concerning the incorporation of activists of Kurdish origin is 
also visible in the neighborhood of İnönü, albeit the amount of activities of the 
neighborhood organization during the electoral campaigning period greatly diverged. 
The voters of Kurdish origin were incorporated to the clientelistic network in the 
founding phase of the party and their representation continued across elections. 
Nevertheless, new channels of contact could not be established with different voters of 
Kurdish origin as in Örnektepe, albeit the cause of this inability is slightly different. 
Many activists still present in the party entered the organization during its formation 
phase in 2001 and among them activists of Kurdish origin comprise a considerable 
quantity. Most of these activists have entered the party through the neighborhood 
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organizations and promoted to the district between 2003 and 2006.42 Six activists 
among which three were of Kurdish origin were in the district organization of women, 
main and youth branches of the party during the electoral campaigning period. Five of 
them, including the members of Kurdish origin were founding members of the 
neighborhood organization in 2001, promoted to the district organization after 2006, 
and kept their post until the 2011 general elections. When the representation of Kurdish 
citizens in all the sub-region of Sarıgazi, which was a sub-region (belde) until 2008, is 
taken into consideration the numbers of citizens of Kurdish origin represented in the 
party since 2001 rises to six.43 The hometown origins of these activists represent the 
population patterns of the region. Two are from Kars, two from Tunceli (these are from 
the Shafi sect, nevertheless there one Alevi activist from Tunceli formerly supporting 
CHP recruited in 2009), one from Van and the last from Bingöl. These activists were in 
the executive and administrative board of the sub-district before it united with 
Samandıra and Yenidoğan to constitute the district of Sancaktepe in 2008. Then they 
passed to different positions in the district organ. One has been selected as member of 
the Municipal council in 2009; one was the main responsible of the youth branch of the 
sub-district of Sarıgazi; others were members of the auxiliary board during the field 
research.  
The district began to restructure the neighborhood organization after 2009. 
Although the main branch neighborhood president present during the electoral 
campaigning period was recruited in 2009 to form the organization, it was not until the 
woman branch of the district found a motivated and active president apt to form the 
organization in 2010 that the woman branch neighborhood organization successfully 
began to function. Although the main branch president was an old party activist that was 
transferred from ANAP in 2002 and left the party in 2008, the women branch president, 
whose family was traditionally close to CHP, was a new one having no previous party 
experience. Both of the presidents were from the Black Sea Region of Turkey. The two 
                                               
42 Recall that a similar situation was also visible in Örnektepe and is also visible for Sancaktepe. As it will 
explained in detail on the new section this coincides to the Party Congress where party completed its 
organizational restructuring.  
 
43 The reason I use the representation is Sarıgazi is due to the geographical concentration of citizens of 
Kurdish origin in a specific area which fall between the neighborhoods of Inönü, Merkez, Atatürk and 
Kemal Türkler. In fact, all of these neighborhoods are very close to each other making the neighborhoods 
only administratively divided not in terms of populations. A similar situation is also valid for the 
neighborhoods of Akpınar and Veysel Karani in the sub-region of Samandıra.   
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activists replaced all the non-working activists with new ones. The neighborhood 
organization says, “I have totally changed the organization and left no one from the old 
one”. When I ask her why she answers, “I have tried to work with them but they get 
used to do nothing, that’s why I replaced them with new people who would be very glad 
to work hard” (Interview conducted on 10.05.2011, İnönü).  
The organization could partly attain street representation in the neighborhood. 
This was the especially valid in the region of Demokrasi where residents of Kurdish 
origin are large in numbers. The woman branch president highlighted that she 
purposefully recruited a young female activist by a strong family from the region 6 
months ago so that she could be informed on what was happening there. She added that 
by her intermediary, she was able to visit people there and carry a few home-talks. 
(Electoral campaigning activity on 21.05.2011, Inönü). Nevertheless, no now activist of 
Kurdish origin were incorporated into the organization after 2009.  
The coordination between the district activists residing in the neighborhood and 
the neighborhood organization was not successfully carried preventing the 
neighborhood organization to have access to former communication channels. While the 
lack of cooperation in the main branch was the ineffectiveness of the neighborhood 
coordinator, the major cause in the woman branch was the competition between the new 
and old activists where old ones were blamed not to work enough. This situation was 
also visible in the discourses of the activists. When I asked the women branch 
neighborhood president why she entered the party, she answered, 
 
 “I was furious with  the neighborhood coordinators from the 
district, they were not fulfilling their functions. We had deaths in my family 
no one came to visits although I am a member of the party. The 
municipality performed many activities, but we were not informed. The 
party’s image was pretty damaged because of them” (Interview conducted 
on 21.05.2011, Inönü).  
 
In one of the meetings where all activists in the neighborhood meet to call for 
asking members to participate in a mass meeting, the activists were furious because the 
two women branch district members did not show up. One among them complained, “I 
don’t understand, people have changed. They enter the party, find a job through their 
connections and once they get the job they stop working for the party. It was not like 
that before” (Electoral campaigning activity, 12.05.2011, Inönü). In another occasion 
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during the district activities in the neighborhood, the main branch president was 
whispering to the woman branch president, “they do nothing, but you see they show up 
now, just to convince the higher ranks that they work and off course to introduce 
themselves to the deputy candidate” (electoral campaigning activity in 21.05.2011, 
Inönü). 
The neighborhood organization was very active during the electoral campaigning 
activities; they routinely conducted their meetings and informed people on the activities 
of the party and the municipality. In fact, the organization gathered nine full buses of 
people for the mass meeting of Erdoğan, the president of the party and the prime 
minister of Turkey. The neighborhood presidents and some activists were present in all 
the district level activities and were responsible to coordinate the places to be visited 
that they arranged through the connections of the other neighborhood activists. 
Furthermore, they continued to perform routine visits to the voters they get informed.  
 Some of the activists of Kurdish origin were incorporated in the party in its 
founding phase through the neighborhood organization and they continued functioning 
in the party afterwards.  Nevertheless, there were no new recruited activists of Kurdish 
origin in the neighborhood organization, they were deprived of old connections due to 
the lack of coordination, and the connections they formed were too new to develop 
personal relations. This prevented the party to increase its network among citizens of 
Kurdish origin through identification of new potential party supporters. Within respect, 
support for the party has remained constant across the elections. After 2009, although 
the neighborhood organization was very active, the inability of the party to incorporate 
activists of Kurdish origin and the absence of coordination with old activists prevented 
the party to incorporate citizen citizens of Kurdish origin outside their traditional 
network and the party could not increase its support among citizens of Kurdish origin. 
So compared with Örnektepe, the neighborhood organization was more active but was 
not effective to mobilize voters of Kurdish origin.  
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8.3.3- Hacıahmet 
 
 
In contrast to Örnektepe and İnönü the party in Hacıahmet has been unable to 
create permanent channels of communication with residents of Kurdish origin since its 
foundation in 2001. Although there were two activists from the neighborhood of 
Hacıahmet joining the party in 2001 and they were still in the party in the date of the 
field research, these activists directly joined the district organization and had no 
neighborhood experience.  One activist from Kurdish origin was a member of the 
executive board of the main branch, while the other was a member of the administrative 
Board of the women branch. None of these activists fully functioned in the 
neighborhood of Hacıahmet during the electoral campaigning period. As a result, 
support for BDP regularly increased across the elections where the party respectively 
gained around 15%, 20% and 25% of the votes for the 2002, 2007 and 2009 elections. 
Furthermore, a well functioning neighborhood organization was not established during 
the founding phase of the party. Given the fact that the main organ of penetration is the 
neighborhood organization, the party was unable to penetrate among the residents of the 
neighborhood through its activists.  Although after 2009 the party has also tried to 
restructure the main, women and youth organization by incorporating new 
neighborhood presidents to fulfill this function, their attempts were not really effective 
since activists of Kurdish origin were lately incorporated, there was no coordination 
between the neighborhood and district activists and the amount of their activities was 
considerably low.  
The main branch president was recruited in 2009, while the women and youth 
branch presidents were recruited in 2010.  During the electoral campaigning period, 
their experience was only for 1 year and they had no experienced coordinators to orient 
them. The woman branch president having migrated from the Black Sea region resides 
in the lower parts of the neighborhood where citizens of Kurdish origin are large in 
number. The main branch president is an old resident of the neighborhood, who has 
returned to the neighborhood after he was retired. On the other hand, the youth branch 
president is from residents of Kurdish origin that have recently migrated from the 
province of Siirt, a community that comprises a minority in the neighborhood. As a 
result, although he is from Kurdish origin, the member of the social network of the 
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voters from Mardin and Diyarbakır that constitute the majority in the neighborhood is 
very low. 
The women branch functions with 11 activists and is composed of activists 
entering the organization in between 2007-2008 and new activists entering in 2011. 
Among them, one old activist is from Kurdish origin who is among early immigrant 
from Bingöl. This is also a minority community in the neighborhood, so she has few 
channels of communication with the majority groups of Kurdish origin.  Furthermore, 
there are two activists from Mardin and Diyarbakır who were recruited to the 
organization a few months before the electoral campaigning period. The main branch 
also consists of 11 activists, but there is no activist of Kurdish origin. The youth branch 
consists of a few activists who barely perform any activities.  The organization is too 
new to establish the permanent channels of contact with the citizens of Kurdish origin. 
Furthermore, it was not able to extend its reach to all the streets of the neighborhood, 
although they informed me they could physically enter nearly all streets except two. 
Such an argument is expected to be developed to show the organization stronger than it 
is. In fact, this was a very commonly used discourse by the activists during the field 
research to increase the party’s reputation. Nevertheless, the liability of this argument is 
discussable, as the main branch neighborhood president expressed quite the contrary. 
When I asked him, whether they have activists in all the streets of the neighborhood, he 
answered me, “ In fact we should have done this, but unfortunately, me and the Bircan 
(the neighborhood president) could not attend such an organizational structure” 
(Interview conducted on 06.06.2011, Hacıahmet). 
Furthermore, there is no coordination between the district activists and the 
neighborhood organization. I have never been able to meet the main branch 
neighborhood coordinators. Although the woman branch coordinator assisted the 
neighborhood meetings, she also never participated in the activities performed by the 
district, around the neighborhood or elsewhere. Given the fact that nearly all district 
activists routinely participated to the activities in all the neighborhoods, this really 
seems to signify a lack of motivation. The activists were also poorly informed by the 
activities of the party or the municipality; a duty that the neighborhood coordinators had 
to perform. Furthermore, activities such as distributing brochures, or stuff with the logo 
of the party were told to them on the phone and none of the coordinators helped them to 
do it. This is a considerably different situation from the neighborhood of Örnektepe 
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where neighborhood activists were informed by the neighborhood coordinators on the 
activities. The lack of coordination was also valid for the district activist of Kurdish 
origin. None of the neighborhood activists mentioned her name when they were 
counting the activists functioning in the neighborhood. She was in total isolation, except 
for the activities performed by the municipality. The main branch neighborhood 
president commonly expressed the lack of coordination. On one occasion he expressed,  
“We never see them in the neighborhood and we get informed of 
nothing.  They should stay in the district office where they always are, this is 
more beneficial for them. You know the municipality has realized a visit in 
their camp in Kefken44, and we heard this from people who got informed 
from the municipality. Strange isn’t it, we should have been the ones 
informing people?” (Interview conducted on 23.05.2011, Hacıahmet).   
 
The amount of activities performed in the neighborhood was very low during the 
electoral campaigning period. The women branch president informed me that she had 
no much time to do party works since she got a new job where she works 6 days a 
week. Among the activities that they performed, she counted routine activities of the 
neighborhood organization such as effectuating the weekly meeting, voter scan (seçmen 
taraması), social assistance (Interview conducted on 23.05.2011, Hacıahmet). 
Nevertheless, none of them has been carried during the electoral campaigning period. 
The low amount of activities may be understood from the discourse of the main branch 
president  who told me,  
“Actually I don’t work very much in the neighborhood, in fact, there is 
no much to do and I am ill, I can’t even walk very long. I come here every 
day and open the office; that is all. I prepare the lists of the coordinators of 
the ballot box and the youth branch president distributes the brochures at 
night” (Interview conducted on 24.05.2011, Hacıahmet).  
 
In fact, I was able to meet none of the neighborhood activists during my visits to 
the contact office except the activist responsible of the organization who was coming to 
sign for his presence and leaving after a while. The major activities performed by the 
activists were the distribution of brochures and preparation of the ballot lists.   
Although there is one activist of Kurdish origin functioning in the district 
organization in 2001, the inexperience of the activists in the neighborhood organization 
prevented the incorporation of citizens of Kurdish origin into the network until 2009. 
                                               
44 A vacation place near Istanbul where the municipality of Beyoğlu has a camp and regularly send 
residents of the district every year.   
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Furthermore, the neighborhood organization functions in the neighborhood through the 
woman branch, but its establishment and recruitment of activists of Kurdish origin are 
too new, there is lack of coordination between activists at different levels and the 
activities of the neighborhood organizations are very low. As a result, the party could 
also not incorporate citizens of Kurdish origin after 2009.  These are expected to act as 
obstacles to the formation of permanent channels of interaction required for the 
identification of different types of voters and development of solid relations with the 
residents of Kurdish origin based on mutual trust and commitment. As expected, the 
support among voters of Kurdish origin considerably decreased across elections where 
it found its lowest point in 2011 general elections. 
 
 
8.3.4- Veysel Karani 
 
 
The representation of the citizens of Kurdish origin into the clientelistic network 
has a very changing character in the neighborhood of Veysel karani, where there were 
ups and downs from 2002 to 2007, but considerably increased after the year of 2009. As 
the neighborhood of Örnektepe the party was able to convince some of the former 
activists of FP of both main and women branches to join the organization during its 
foundation in 2001. Citizens of Kurdish origin were not represented into the network, 
but activists worked long enough in the neighborhood to develop personalized 
relationships with them. Nevertheless, none of these activists continued to function in 
the party, as a considerable number left it between 2006 and 2007.45 In fact, there is no 
activist who continued in the party from its foundation until the general elections of 
2011, except the actual woman branch neighborhood president who began with RP in 
1994. The interviews conducted with her indicate that she has no connection with the 
citizens of Kurdish origin and reluctance to incorporate them into her organization.  The 
present neighborhood coordinator of the woman branch who is very active in the 
neighborhood is from the Black Sea region of Turkey. After entering the neighborhood 
organization in 2007 and worked as the neighborhood president she was promoted to 
                                               
45 As it will be revealed in the next chapter, splits from the neighborhood organizations under the all the 
neighborhoods was due to the inability of the district branch to motivate these activists that could not 
promote to the district as a result of the internal organizational structure of the party.  
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her position in 2009. She also has no connections with voters of Kurdish origin. The 
neighborhood organization was also re-structured after 2009, where old activists and 
new ones have been recruited.  Among the old ones are the main branch neighborhood 
president and the woman branch member responsible of the organization who both of 
them have left the party after 2006. The main branch president informed me that he 
entered to the party on the demand of the district president “He asked me to re-structure 
the organization which dissolved during the former presidency.” (Electoral 
campaigning activity on 26.05.2011, Veyselkarani). Both of them have good relations 
with the citizens of Kurdish origin. Working for a long time as owner of a grocery shop 
in the neighborhood, the main branch president suggests that his respect among these 
residents is the result of his profession. The president highlights, “I have lots of friends 
from them. Some are BDP supporters. They know that we are from AKP, we discuss 
politics with them, but we know each other for a long period of time” (Electoral 
campaigning activities on 04.06.2011, VeyselKarani).  On the other hand, the female 
activist lives in the part of the neighborhood greatly populated by citizens of Kurdish 
origin. Her good relations with them could be observed during one of my visits to her 
house. The youth branch president recruited to the organization in 2007 is member of a 
Kurdish family close to AKP migrating from the province of Ağrı. An important fact, 
differentiating Veysel Karani from the other neighborhoods is the incorporation of 
activists of Kurdish origin in all the branches after 2009. These activists are close to 
BDP supporters in the neighborhood. During the electoral campaigning period there 
was one activist in the woman branch from Bingöl, two activists in the main branch 
from Bingöl and Kars, one activist in the youth branch from Kars. The main and youth 
branches representatives were very proud of the new recruited activist whose families 
were traditionally close to BDP. The youth branch president shows a teenage from the 
neighborhood who was present in all the district activities, “you see him, his family 
supports BDP, yesterday his uncle yelled at him because he is with us, but he is here 
again. People have prejudices but as you see they are not always right” (Electoral 
campaigning activity 04.06.2011, Veysel Karani). This example also reveals the 
importance of the time of incorporation into the network. As it can be seen from the 
reaction of his uncle, the incorporation of voters of Kurdish origin through the activists 
does not directly transform to support. It seems rather to be the result of a long process 
of interaction.     
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As illustrated previously there is a high degree of coordination between the 
activists in the neighborhood. The neighborhood meetings were carried every week with 
the participation of each branch and neighborhood coordinators. The main branch 
neighborhood coordinator was an activist from Kurdish origin who worked for years in 
the neighborhood organization of Akpınar46. He was present in all the activities in the 
neighborhood. Similarly, the woman branch neighborhood coordinator prepared all the 
activities of the organization and actively took part in all of them during the electoral 
campaigning activity. It was her that decided which house to visit, who to contact. She 
had total control of the neighborhood. In fact, she had total control of the information on 
all the events taking place in the neighborhood through her capacity to mobilize the 
activists residing in different streets of the neighborhood.  She was well known and 
loved by the residents of the neighborhood. All of the activists appreciated her hard 
working. One district members highlighted, “In all the neighborhoods there should be 
an activist working like that, then our votes would probably increase more” (Electoral 
campaigning activity on 26.05.2011, Veysel Karani).  
The presence of the neighborhood organization was very evident during the 
electoral campaigning activities as in the neighborhood of İnönü. In the entire district 
programs, the activists were present and were responsible to coordinate the activities. 
They all actively recruited people to the activities distributed the party’s brochures, 
carried door-to-door visits in the neighborhood. The party was able to send ten buses for 
the mass meeting of Istanbul. Activists were routinely informed by the activities of the 
district and the municipality whom they were asked to participate. In fact, nearly all of 
them, they took actively part in all kind of activities.  
 There is a great divergence in the incorporation of the citizens of Kurdish origin 
in the neighborhood. Although they were not incorporated into the network until 2009, a 
huge quantity of activists of Kurdish origin participated to the organization then. 
Furthermore, old activists have normalized relations with the residents of Kurdish 
origin.  The coordination between the activists was very well attained through the 
neighborhood coordinators and the amount of the activities of the neighborhood 
organization was very high. Under these circumstances, the party’s support among 
citizens of Kurdish origin fluctuated across the elections until 2009. Nevertheless, the 
                                               
46 This is neighborhood, which has a frontier with Veysel Karani and is divided only administratively 
from it.  
258 
 
party was able to increase its support among voters of Kurdish origin from 2009 to 
2011.      
 
 
8.4- Incorporation of Co-ethnic and Effectiveness of Mobilization 
 
 
The previous section has illustrated the relationship between the time of 
incorporation of the activists from the Kurdish origin members of the existing ethnic 
social network in the party’s rank, the intensity of the amount of the neighborhood 
organization and the electoral support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish origin across 
the years. The relationship between time of entry of Kurdish activists and electoral 
outcome has been articulated on the basic assumption that the former increases the 
effectiveness of the mobilization by enabling the party to function publicly and 
selectively. Within this respect, it has been assumed that time of activists’ entry and 
their ethnic identification increases effective mobilization. This section has the objective 
to understand how the time of incorporation of activists of Kurdish and non-Kurdish 
origin affects the effectiveness of the mobilization strategy of the party.   
 Three basic assumptions will be tested in this section.  Mobilization is ineffective 
when voters of Kurdish origin are contacted by unknown non-Kurdish activists since 
they cannot perform publicly and selectively due to the violent character of the Kurdish 
opposition and weakness of inter-community relations. The length of the contact 
decreases fear of the activists, reaction of opposition voters, increasing identification. 
The presence of co-ethnics decreases the cost of mobilization since their dense social 
networks decreases the required length to decrease fear, reaction and identify voters. 
Thus, they more easily decrease violence, identify swing voters enabling the party to 
mobilize publicly, selectively.  
Then, in neighborhoods where activists of both non-Kurdish and Kurdish origin 
are performing their activities for a long period of time the study expects these activists 
to function publicly and selectively.  Within this respect, as the activists in the 
neighborhood of Örnektepe, İnönü and Veysel Karani have entered the party in its 
founding phase, the study expects the number of identified voter to be high and the 
activities performed through these activists to be public and selective. 
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 The increase of the clientelistic network is carried at the neighborhood level. 
Then representativeness at the neighborhood level is effective in incorporating voters of 
Kurdish origin outside the party’s traditional network. Public and selective mobilization 
is expected to be possible only when there are activists of non-Kurdish or Kurdish 
origin known by the residents of Kurdish origin in the organization.  Nevertheless, 
recall that the neighborhood organization consists of different activists functioning in 
different levels of the party hierarchy.  The level of coordination between activists at 
different levels influences the effectiveness of the neighborhood level mobilization 
strategy. Coordination is especially important when the members of the neighborhood 
organization are new and activists of Kurdish origin are nonexistent. It is only when the 
party is able to assure such coordination that the neighborhood organization will be able 
to function publicly and collectively. Then, the activities of the district and 
neighborhood organization will diverge depending on the number of activists of 
Kurdish origin among them and the amount of cooperation between them. 
 Within this respect, the first section illustrates how the length of the contact of 
the activists increases identification by comparing the neighborhoods according the 
percentage of membership to their overall support. The second section will illustrate the 
effect of the length of the contact on the public and selective nature of the mobilization 
by analyzing the electoral campaigning activity carried by the district. Such kind of 
analysis is expected to accurately measure the relationship between length of the contact 
and effectiveness of mobilization since all activists old and new from different rank 
participate to these elections. Nevertheless, public and selective functioning is expected 
to increase the clientelistic network when carried at the neighborhood level. Thus, the 
last section will analyze the nature of the activities of the neighborhood organization 
according to the presence of activists of Kurdish origin either through their new 
incorporation or through coordination with the ones at district level. This section will 
especially show how incorporation of new activists of Kurdish origin and cooperation 
among different level of activists is important in increasing the effectiveness of 
mobilization at neighborhood level.  
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8.4.1- Identified Supporters in the Neighborhoods 
 
 
One of the hypotheses of this study is that the regardless of the origin of their 
origin, the length of the interaction of the party activists with voters of Kurdish origin 
influences the party’s ability to function publicly. Then in neighborhoods where 
activists are working for the party for a long period of time the study expects these 
activists to function publicly and selectively.  Then in neighborhood where the party 
functions for a long period of time the number of identified voters is expected to be 
high. This coincides to the neighborhoods of Örnektepe, İnönü and Veysel Karani. On 
the other hand, in the neighborhood of Hacıahmet where the activists began to function 
very recently membership is expected to be low.     
 The literature suggests (Mckenzie, 1963, p: 544, Sayarı, 1975) that membership 
is an important indicator for measuring the size of the clientelistic network. Membership 
should be liable data to measure the number of supporters identified by AKP in the 
neighborhoods since all activists from different ranks were asked by the party central 
administrative board to make as many members as possible before the 2011 general 
elections campaigning period. This strategy was so important for the party that rewards 
were given to districts, neighborhoods that enlarged their membership numbers.  During 
my participation in the monthly provincial meeting with the district presidents, the 
district making the most members were promised to be given a laptop. Similarly, during 
one of the woman branch district meetings that I attended, the branch president 
promised a dinner in a reputable restaurant to the members of the wining neighborhood. 
For the purpose of the study, the importance is that it shows the maximum number of 
identified supporters in each of the neighborhoods. Such a measurement could be 
objected on the ground that all potential supporters indentified by the activists would 
perhaps not become a member of the party. The main logic of such an objection derives 
from the costs that membership brings to voters. Nevertheless, the validity of such an 
objection decreases in this case. As it has previously been illustrated, membership in 
AKP has very low responsibilities, but enables voters to have access to certain benefits. 
As a result, contacted supporter would probably accept to become a member when they 
are asked.   Second column of table 8.7 indicates the membership in the neighborhoods 
highly populated by citizens of Kurdish origin in Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe before the 
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2011 electoral campaigning period. The third column measures the percentage of the 
party supporters reached by the party through membership.  
  
Membership and vote shifts in the neighborhoods (2011) 
neighborhood 
AKP 
vote Membership reached supporters Kurd. Pop % 2009 2011 
Veysel karani 4958 2707 54,60 35,00 17,02 12,58 
Inönü 2966 1413 47,64 25,00 9,54 9,04 
Hacıahmet 2529 858 33,93 40,00 25,86 32,54 
Örnektepe 3029 1931 63,75 25,00 8,71 8,51 
       
       Table 8.7: Membership and vote shifts in the neighborhoods (2011) 
* These are the total vote shares of right parties in these neighborhoods MHP included 
** Note that the members in the district are more than the actual supporters, this support previous 
studies suggesting that membership is not always a case of preferences.  
  
The data reveals a relationship between the percentage of identified supporters by 
AKP and length of the activities in the neighborhood. In the neighborhood of 
Hacıahmet where the activists have begun to function very recently membership is the 
lowest, precisely 33,93% of AKP’s total support.  In the neighborhoods of Veysel 
Karani, İnönü and Örnektepe where the neighborhood organization functions for a long 
period of time membership is considerably high.  
 
 
8.4.1- Mobilization Activities of the District Organizations 
 
 
The previous section has identified that the number of identified voters is high in 
the neighborhoods of Örnektepe, Inönü and Veyselkarani, while it is low in the 
neighborhood of Hacıahmet. It has also been illustrated that activists from both Kurdish 
and non-Kurdish origin were active in the neighborhood from the foundation phase of 
the party until 2007 in Örnektepe and Inönü. On the other hand, although there were no 
activists of Kurdish origin in the neighborhood of Veyselkarani, activists functioned 
long enough to develop relations with voters of Kurdish origin but left the organization 
after 2007. The study suggests that in the three neighborhoods the party was able to 
identify potential supporters and decrease reaction with citizens of Kurdish origin until 
2007. Then, during the electoral campaigning period, in the three of the neighborhoods 
262 
 
there were activists known by voters of Kurdish origin with a certain support base 
among citizens of Kurdish origin. In contrast, in the neighborhood of Hacıahmet 
although 2 activists one from Kurdish origin entered the district, these activists did not 
function in the neighborhood. As a result, they did not have the ability to identify or 
decrease violence in the neighborhood.  
If this argument is valid, then, we should observe different mobilization strategies 
during the electoral campaigning activities in the first group of the neighborhoods vis-à-
vis Hacıahmet. Furthermore, in the first group of the district’s the activists violence is 
expected to be low, selective targeting among Kurdish citizens high. In fact, the party 
publicly functioned in all of the three cited neighborhoods whereas it performed no 
activities in the neighborhood of Hacıahmet. In first group of the neighborhoods, public 
and selective functioning of the district organization and decreasing violence 
accompanied by high support for AKP among citizens of Kurdish origin is expected. On 
the other hand, activities in the neighborhood of Hacıahmet are expected to be more 
programmatic where the party does function neither publicly nor selectively. 
Furthermore, violence and low support for AKP is expected in this neighborhood.  In 
fact, the observations conducted during the electoral campaigning activity support these 
expectations.   
In the neighborhood of Örnektepe none of the activists feared to publicly function 
in the neighborhoods. The district organization carried 3 full day activities in the district 
with the deputy candidates and all district members. These activities comprised of door-
to-door visits of the residents and the stores, coffeehouses and hometown-associations, 
contact office meeting.47 Furthermore, the party could carry these activities in all the 
streets in the neighborhood, albeit they were more careful in the streets where 
opposition voters are in majority. In these streets, the party was very careful to walk 
between two of the election buses, one in the front and one behind. Activists were many 
times, warned on not to retreat from the group. Nevertheless, all activists were present 
in the district activities carried with the deputy candidates during the electoral 
campaigning period. Furthermore, they all know very well the residents of the 
neighborhood; easily talk about personal issues with them. Within this respect, the party 
                                               
47 The electoral campainging activity in Beyoğlu differed form Sancaktepe and Beykoz. It was mostly 
carried through walks named by the activists as “love walks”, where the members of the party distributes 
flowers to the residents.  Specific targetting was less, people asking for help were directly transmitted to 
the neighborhood organization. This was probably due to the inability of the party to motivate 
neighborhood activists to actively work and identify potential supporters. 
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could make specific targeting within the format of the electoral campaigning activities. 
An event that took place during one of the campaigning activity with a resident of 
Kurdish origin is a good example to the extent of their relationship. While we were 
sitting in the bus, one of the district member open the window and began to talk with a 
couple standing in front of their house, “your daughter came to our department for a 
job interview, she called me, I helped her, I hope she will be able to have the post” 
(Electoral campaigning activity on 03.05.2011, Örnektepe). 
Furthermore, all the activists declared the changing reaction of the citizens of 
Kurdish origin towards their party. The main branch president of Örnektepe highlighted,  
“there is no violence in the neighborhood; no one would do anything to the party’s 
activists. Once it was not like that. What can I tell you, my own car was burned once in 
the middle of the night, but those days have passed’ (Interview conducted on 
14.05.2011, Örnektepe). Decrease in the reaction of the voters of Kurdish origin is also 
supported by the electoral outcomes. Beginning with 2007, BDP received only 8 % of 
the votes in the neighborhood where citizens of Kurdish origin comprise approximately 
%25 of the total population.  
The same situation was also apparent in İnönü despite of its more violent 
character of the Kurdish opposition due to the presence of lots of members of illegal 
organizations. All of the activists were very active and the district branch could publicly 
effectuate electoral campaigning activities with the deputy candidates. The residents of 
Kurdish origin were moderate towards the candidate deputies that saluted them, listened 
to their demands and problems in the door-to-door visits. Although most of the 
contacting offices of the party were stoned and burned at nights, a few acts of violence 
occurred during the activities, these events were not taken seriously. None of the less, 
activists were careful in not provoking people and built an image of the party which is 
inclusive and against violence. As an example during their presence in the 
neighborhoods, the drivers of the election cars were careful not to open the elections 
song too loudly. When reaction was high or tension rose between different groups, the 
activists, even the younger one, were very calm and tried to continue to their activities 
without giving any aggressive reaction. The district organization performed 4 full days 
of electoral campaigning activity.  These activities comprised of door-to-door visits of 
the residents and stores, hometown associations, home talks and personal visits of 
diverse kind such as funerals, illness, social assistance etc. Activists tried to benefit 
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from the presence of the deputy candidates to solve several problems of the voters that 
were detected formerly.  Furthermore, the party was able to perform these activities in 
all the streets, albeit they were more careful in the area of Demokrasi where opposition 
groups comprise the majority. On the other hand, while they were conducting visits, the 
activists could easily identify opposition voters; voters of Kurdish origin included, and 
warn the deputy candidate in place where violence could occur. They, one by one cited 
the electoral preferences of the owners of the stores before the deputy candidate make 
visits. In one occasion, the neighborhood president prevented the deputy candidate to 
enter a passage on the ground that it was the place greatly frequented by illegal 
organizations.  
Both the activists and electoral results support decreasing violence. One women 
branch activists proclaims, “We have been stoned lots of time in the past, but as you see 
now we can publicly and comfortably work here. People’s reactions change over time 
as they better know you” (Electoral campaigning activities on 21.05.2011, İnönü).  In 
fact, although potential for violence has occurred during the electoral campaigning 
period, it was successfully prevented by Kurdish activists. The high support for AKP 
among citizens of Kurdish origin also supports the decreasing reaction to the party. 
BDP received only 9.03% of the votes in the neighborhood where citizens of Kurdish 
origin comprise approximately 25% of the population.     
Activists in the neighborhood of Veysel Karani, performed their activities even 
more publicly and comfortably. The district organization carried 4 full days of electoral 
campaigning activity in the neighborhood. The activities comprised also of door-to-door 
resident and store visits, contact office talks, but personal visits covered a greater share 
of the activities. The party could carry these activities in all the streets of the 
neighborhoods. Activists knew the electoral preferences of the voters, the citizens of 
Kurdish origin included. They were contacted in all activities and personal visits to 
some of its members have also been performed. Many voters of Kurdish origin were 
recruited by neighborhood activists for activities of the district and the municipality 
such as picnics, dinners etc.  
As in the other neighborhoods, old activists expressed the changing reactions of 
the voters of Kurdish origin. They reported incidences where they have physically been 
abused by HADEP (former BDP) supporters in the year of 2002. The declaration of the 
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main branch president shows how the activists’ personal behavior is important in 
changing these reactions.  
“You know their perception has changed over time. In the Election 
Day in 2002, they were first very reactive. Then, in the lunchtime their meal 
didn’t come. I was responsible of arranging the meal of our activists I also 
made sandwiches for them, they thanked us. My relation is pretty good with 
the ones who were there this day” (Electoral Campaigning activity, 
04.06.2011, Veyselkarani).  
 
The low reaction among voters of Kurdish origin is also supported by the electoral 
outcomes. Support for BDP in the 2011 general elections was 12,58% albeit the 
approximate percentage of residents of Kurdish origin comprise 35% of the 
neighborhood population.    
In fact, the inability of the party to identify citizens of Kurdish origin in the 
neighborhood of Hacıahmet can be observed from the decision of the party not to 
publicly perform during the campaigning period, the great reaction of the citizens of 
Kurdish origin reported by the party activists and the low support for AKP among 
voters of Kurdish origin in 2011 general elections. The activities of the party were of 
more programmatic nature. The party showed no physical appearance, except the tea 
talk of the woman branch organization in the contact office.  The district decided to 
contact its supporter in the neighborhood through the activities of the municipality. The 
municipality realized only one saloon meeting where complaints of the residents were 
taken. Voters were contacted by the municipality through the visits they performed such 
as trips to Kefken, boat trips to the Bosphorus and historical peninsula of Sultan Ahmet. 
People were informed of these activities not through the activists but directly the 
municipality.  Although district activists related such a decision to the low support for 
AKP in the neighborhood, such reasoning seems not to be valid, given the fact that the 
vote shares of the party in previous elections was slightly different from Örnektepe or 
other neighborhoods where the party carried activities (see table 8.5). In fact, the 
president of the main branch expressed the main reason of the party’s decision not to 
publicly perform activities due to low reach. In one occasion he expresses, “the district 
organization asked to visit the neighborhood, we told them that they could only visit 2 
streets identified as safe. In the other streets they may have great reaction.” (Interview 
conducted in 02.06.2011, Hacıahmet). Actually, the district was very careful not to pass, 
even for transportation purpose, from the down side of the neighborhood where 
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opposition groups comprise the majority. After the tea talk in the contact office located 
in the upper part of the neighborhood, the driver of the election bus was warned not to 
use one of the main roads to go to the district center since it passes from the down side 
of the neighborhood where contact office of BDP was located. Instead, they preferred to 
enter into the traffic jam and prolonged their trip for almost half an hour.  The only 
activities at the neighborhood were the distribution of the brochures and gifts of the 
party. Even in these activities, the activists immediately retreated when violence 
occurred in other parts of the district.    
 
 
8.4.2- Mobilization Activities of the Neighborhood Organizations 
 
 
It is mostly through the functioning of the neighborhood organization that the 
party routinely contact voters and identify voters. It has been suggested that the time of 
incorporation of the activists and presence to activists of Kurdish origin in 
neighborhood organization is decisive in shaping the nature of activities and ability to 
identify swing voters since it would affect the fear of the activists and reaction of the 
voters of Kurdish origin.  
Previous section has illustrated that the presence of old and Kurdish activists is 
low in the neighborhoods of İnönü and Hacıahmet. In both neighborhoods, the 
neighborhood activists have newly been recruited. In Inönü no activists of Kurdish 
origin have been recruited. Furthermore, although there are district level activists from 
Kurdish origin functioning in the neighborhood for a long period of time, cooperation of 
the neighborhood organization with them is very low. There are two activists of Kurdish 
origin recruited in the organization but their incorporation is too low to be effective. 
Furthermore, the district level activists have not functioned in the neighborhood and 
their cooperation with neighborhood activists is low.    
 The presence of old activists of both non-Kurdish and Kurdish origin is high in 
the neighborhoods of Veysel Karani and Örnektepe. In Veysel Karani, there are both 
formerly functioning activists, neighborhood level activists of Kurdish origin and 
cooperation with district level activists is high. A similar situation is also apparent in 
Örnektepe albeit there are no activists of Kurdish origin in the neighborhood 
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organization.  Then in each of these neighborhoods, the neighborhood organization is 
expected to carry public and selective mobilization.  In fact, Interviews conducted in the 
neighborhoods of Hacıahmet, İnönü, Veyselkarani and Örnektepe support this 
expectation. The neighborhood organization functions more discreetly, less able to 
identify Kurdish supporters in the first group of neighborhoods where as it functions 
publicly and more able to identify voters of Kurdish origin in the second group of 
neighborhoods.      
In the districts of Hacıahmet and Inönü, most neighborhood activists highlighted 
that their main problem was their inability to enter in the households of citizens of 
Kurdish origin and form close relations. This was especially been reported to be 
difficult for male residents. The main branch president of Hacıahmet, expressed that 
they should have activists in all street but they are not very successful in achieving this 
because they had difficulty in identifying who supports the party among citizens of 
Kurdish origin (Interview conducted on 07.06.2011, Hacıahmet). This fact affects the 
functions and activities performed in the neighborhoods. The party mostly relies on the 
youth and women organizations since they can work more discreetly more easily 
contact people and enter in the households. Furthermore, female voters tend to be less 
violent decreasing the amount of reaction. In contrast with other neighborhoods where 
all of the branches work in coordination but separately, especially women and main 
organizations works together in these neighborhoods in order to be able to reach more 
people. Even in that situation, all activists mention that there are a great number of 
streets where they cannot enter as the formal representative of the party. The main 
branch president of Hacıahmet mentioned me, “we go everywhere together, I don’t let 
her alone” (Interview conducted on 23.05.2011, Hacıahmet). 
All the activists in Hacıahmet, İnönü I have interviewed mention that they prefer 
to work discreetly in their activities due to their fear of security. They only expose 
themselves in home talks where only a small number of trusted people that are defined 
as more moderate towards the party participate, but these instances are reported to be 
low. In a sense, the home talks only serve as a place to persuade identified potential 
supporters to enter the party. Since it is not publicly declared to every resident, party’s 
ability to identify non-contacted potential supporters through this activity or change the 
perception of opposition voters is very low. During my meeting with BDP activists, it 
was very apparent that they did not know AKP representatives in the neighborhoods, 
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which is an indication of the party’s inability to form strong channels of contact. Since 
they had difficulty in identifying party supporters, the main aim of the party is to 
socially and economically integrate Kurdish citizens via the neighborhood branches 
activities and services of the municipality in order to decrease perceived discrimination, 
polarization and contribute to the normalization of the relations. The main activities rely 
on social assistance based on identifying the citizens in need and providing aid to them. 
Provision of these activities is performed discreetly where activists mostly disguise their 
party identity. Although major activities are still based on provision of assistance or 
visits, the fact that activists do not perform these activities as the representative of the 
party and their inability to develop personal relations with the residents of Kurdish 
origin decreases the positive perception of the party among of the residents of Kurdish 
origin. This in turn negatively affects the success of the party efforts since people are 
not publicly informed on the activities of the party’s activists, preventing the formation 
of loyalty and sympathy towards the party. Perhaps such a strategy can be effective in 
the long run only if neighborhood activists continue their activities   
Activists try to use the channels of the municipality or participate in activities of 
other civil organizations to create possible channels of contact so as to get informed 
about the events among voters of Kurdish origin and identify their demands and 
political preferences. Furthermore, the activists try to detect the voters in need and 
communicate with them with the intermediary of the lists provided from the 
municipality that gives contacting information on the residents applying to municipality 
social aid and benefit from them.  The party’s strategy may be identified as a long run 
attempt to first create personal loyalty between the activists and the residents of Kurdish 
origin independently of their party identity via different kinds of assistances, increase 
the amount of the interaction and present themselves as the party’s representative only 
after they have built enough trust and loyalty to identify the political preferences of the 
voters. It is clearly visible that the main problem of the party in these neighborhoods is 
the lack of permanent channels where the party can contact its supporters, get informed 
on their basic needs and provide them assistance, which would reinforce party 
identification. Discontinuity in the party organization and lack of motivation really act 
as an obstacle.  
The mobilization activities of the neighborhood organization greatly change in 
Veysel Karani and Örnektepe. Although the activists perform similar activities, their 
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main difference lies in the ability of the activists to function quite openly since they are 
known by residents of Kurdish origin. They participate in all kind of activities as the 
representative of the party. This in turns reinforces the positive image of the party 
among citizens of Kurdish origin and increase identification of potential supporters 
among them.  
Visits to residents for birth, funerals, and important events are routine activities 
where activists perform as the representative of the party. Furthermore, activists openly 
act as brokers between the citizens and higher authorities to resolve the formers’ 
demands and problems. Provision of economic aid and control of the economic situation 
of the citizens that benefit from the aid programs of the municipality is also a major 
function. The fact that all these activities are performed publicly increases the reputation 
of the party. Within this realm, different from the other neighborhoods one can observe 
an increased desire to enter AKP’s branches by the citizens of Kurdish origin.  
The characteristics of the home talks carried by the neighborhood organization 
where the party’s policies are introduced are also very different from Hacıahmet and 
Inönü. They are carried under any circumstances where as many people as possible are 
demanded to participate. Both potential supporters and opposition voters can get 
informed of these kinds of activities. As a result, potential supporters not identified by 
the party that participate in these activities can easily be identified and persuaded since 
after each home talk people are asked whether they want to be a member or not. On the 
other hand, it also serves as a place where opposition voters also get informed on the 
party’s policies decreasing their negative perceptions. The youth branch president of the 
district reports such a situation,  
“I demanded some of my friends supporting BDP to come to of our 
home talk, they came reluctantly. But after the hometalk, they were very 
impressed of the policy of the party. They told me, it is very surprising that 
there was no word of violence or discrimination towards us. We expected a 
harsher stand towards the Kurdish problem and Kurdish demands. This 
lowered their reaction towards us and the party” (Electoral campaigning 
activity on 26.05.2011, Veyselkarani). 
 
The presence of a permanent channel of contact between the activists and the 
citizens of Kurdish origin contribute to their incorporation to the network formed by the 
activists via their routine activities, consolidating the support for the party. The activists 
mentions that they routinely were informed by the events, problems taking place in 
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Kurdish families through their Kurdish and street activists. Furthermore, they could 
contact them in the daily activities, which mostly take the form of Koran reading for 
women branches and Coffee-house or hometown associations’ gathering for the main 
and youth organizations.  Recruitment of activists of Kurdish origin within AKP’s local 
branch seems to further contribute to the normalization of the relations between 
different communities, decreasing the potential for conflict in the district. The non-
conflictual relations among the activists that function in the neighborhood for a long 
period of time, permits the activists to publicly perform their activities increasing their 
reputation. During the electoral campaigning period home visits for providing social aid 
and home visits for condolence illness, aged citizens of Kurdish origin both close to 
AKP and BDP were routinely carried without any problem. Furthermore, the activists 
were very well aware of who the residents they contacted were and their political 
orientation. The major objective of the neighborhood organization towards citizens of 
Kurdish origin is to consolidate and increase the party’s votes rather than contributing to 
social and economic integration as in the other two neighborhoods. 
As it has been illustrated previously, the ability of the party to increase its network 
among citizens of Kurdish origin is based on the conjunction of two factors: the ability 
of the party to identify these voters through the activists and the intensity of the 
activities carried by the neighborhood organization that increases identification and 
compliance. The observation confirms that the time of incorporation of activists of 
Kurdish and non-Kurdish origin is effective in the ability of the neighborhood 
organization to perform publicly and selectively. When the neighborhood organization 
is unable to effectuate public and selective mobilization, the party cannot increase its 
clientelistic network among voters of Kurdish origin even if its activities are intense at 
the shortrun, as in the case of İnönü. On the other hand, although neighborhood activists 
had the required connections to identify new potential voters of Kurdish origin in the 
neighborhoods of Veysel Karani and Örnektepe, the low amount of activities in the 
neighborhood of Örnektepe prevented the party from increasing its network. 
The participant observations conducted in these four neighborhoods also indicate 
important difference in the organizational characteristics of the two districts and the 
mobilization strategies they formulate. The low participation of the neighborhood 
organizations in the electoral campaigning activities was observed as a general 
characteristic in Beyoğlu, whereas quite the opposite was observed in Sancaktepe. This 
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difference influenced the format of the general campaigning activities and the strategy 
of the Municipality. The electoral campaigning activities in Beyoğlu were mostly 
carried through walks named by the activists as “love walks”, where the members of the 
party distributes flowers to the residents. Furthermore, only the district activists 
participated in the activities. Since the number of district activists is low, the party 
conducted activities with the two deputies only in one neighborhood each day.  In these 
activities, individual specific targeting was less, the party conducted visits to place 
where they had the opportunity to contact potential supporters for the party such as 
visiting the mosque in a praying hour, hometown associations or coffee-houses whose 
members support the party. The number of home talks conducted was rather less. In a 
large number of neighborhoods, no home talks have been conducted.  The format of the 
electoral campaigning activities was quite different in Sancaktepe. First, both district 
and neighborhood activists participated in the activities. Since the number of the 
activists was high the party conducted activities in two neighborhoods with one 
candidate in each. On the other hand, albeit door-to-door visits were conducted, the 
main emphasis was given to personal visits and home talks realized in the house of a 
member.    
The difference in the strength of the neighborhood organizations in the two 
districts seems also to have influenced the way through which individual types of 
goods; mostly social assistances are distributed by the municipality. In the district of 
Sancaktepe, application places are very centralized. Furthermore, food packages, daily 
meals are directly sent to the addresses of the residents.  All of the process in very 
individualized where regular interaction between the personnel of the municipality and 
the residents is at the minimum. Observations confirm that the party and the 
municipality try to overcome the weakness of the neighborhood organizations through 
the municipality.  Both the application and the distribution process of social assistance 
are quite different in Beyoğlu. In every step of the process, regular interaction between 
the municipal personnel and the residents at a very low level is induced.  First, the 
municipality provides assistance services through the Neighborhood Halls (Semt 
Konakları) localted in most of the neighborhoods. Daily meal assistance is provided 
through these halls were people benefitting from them go at least once a day to the 
refectory. This creates an environment of regular interaction between the municipal 
personnel providing these services and the residents benefitting from the assistance. A 
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similar process is also at stake for the distribution of food packages. The residents attain 
the services in the stores situated in some of the neighborhood halls, where they can 
regularly assure by a credit card given to them.  This also helps to personalize the 
relationship between the municipal personnel and the residents benefitting from help.  
Recall that there was a considerable number of party activists at the district level 
working in these neighborhood halls. Through these places of regular interaction these 
activists seem to develop clientelistic linkages with these residents by easily identify 
different types of voters, assuring voluntary compliance. The interviews with the party 
activists working in these halls confirm this situation. They all declared that they could 
easily enter the households of the residents since they were known by the residents, and 
they had personal relations with people regularly coming to the hall. In fact, albeit they 
did not comprise the main field of research of the study, the opening of neighborhood 
Halls in the neighborhoods of Çukur and Yenişehir seems to have an effect on the 
electoral outcomes in these neighborhoods. The opening of a Neighborhood Hall in the 
Hacıahmet during the 2011 general elections should not be coincidence.  
Yet, since both presence of activists of Kurdish origin and the intensity of the 
neighborhood activities influences the effectiveness of the clientelistic network by 
identifying different types of voters and assure voluntary compliance, a major question 
is why the party is not capable to carry the same strategy in each of these 
neighborhoods. The next chapter provides an explanation to this question by defining 
the factors affecting the party’s ability to increase representation through either 
incorporation of new activists or cooperation among old and new ones on the one hand 
and the amount of the neighborhood activities on the other. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
EXPLAINING DIVERGENCE IN THE STRENGTH OF THE PARTY 
ORGANIZATION AND INCORPORATION OF CO-ETHNICS 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter has illustrated the main differences in the neighborhoods of 
the district of Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe in terms of the intensity of the neighborhood 
activities, the amount of coordination between new and old activists and the time of 
incorporation of activists of Kurdish origin and its effect in increasing the effectiveness 
of the mobilization of Voters of Kurdish origin between 2009 and 2011. The aim of this 
chapter is examining the factors effective in explaining these differences. 
 Recall from Chapter 2 that the mobilization of swing voters through such kind of 
a clientelistic linkage necessitates a great motivation for both existing and new activists, 
members of different ethnic groups included, to actively work for the party. It has been 
suggested that the distribution of incentives should also successfully function for the 
mobilization of activists, albeit at a higher cost. Yet, the scarcity of resources creates a 
problem of exclusion from the incentives. Existing studies focus on the exogenous and 
endogenous factors that affect the motivation of activists. Within this respect, some 
studies argue that a party’s decision to strengthen its organization and incorporate new 
activists is a function of the electoral competition it faces.  Other studies argue that the 
amount of resources available to a party may prevent parties to fulfill such a function 
even it desires to do so. Although, exogenous factors certainly affect the decisions of 
the leaders, the study will mainly focus on the endogenous factors, namely the 
characteristic of the inner party organization in explaining different abilities of the party 
to motivate both existing and new activists of Kurdish and Non-Kurdish origin. In fact 
authors such as Panebianco (1988) and Bolleyer (2006), argue that the problem of 
exclusion can be solved by tying certain incentives to the posts available in the party. 
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For Bolleyer, stability through distribution of incentives can be attained through an 
effective mechanism of intra-party advance to distribute these incentives. Panebianco 
suggests that one function of the organizational hierarchies is the regulation of the 
distribution of incentives. Chandra (2005, 2010) argues that the intra-party rule of 
advancement is the primary factor in motivating both existing and new activists.  Yet, in 
centralized party organization posts are mostly distributed by the higher-level party 
leaders, which the main criterion is rather loyalty than performance. This study suggests 
that change in the intra-party advancement rule is difficult in political parties due to the 
path dependent nature inherent in organizations that make change difficult once the 
party is established. Although rational calculations, exogenous or endogenous, may play 
major role during the initial formation of institutions; once they are designed institutions 
may act as an obstacle to the ability of the party to adapt to new exogenous changes. 
Yet, such a change may only be implemented through a critical juncture that resets the 
organizational order by changing the dominant coalition of the party and introduce a 
competitive intra-party advancement rule. 
Recall that AKP motivates the voters and activists from Non-Kurdish and Kurdish 
origin through the formation of a partisan network based on the distribution of the 
municipal resources. The clientelistic network functions through the distribution of 
party posts, in which membership is the lowest, are tied to certain incentives. Three 
factors may explain different representational profiles and amount of motivation among 
activists. It may be the outcome of the electoral competition each district branch faces. 
Second, the control of the party on the municipal resources may be a factor explaining 
different motivation capabilities of the districts. Third, the internal structure of the party 
organization may an influential factor. 
This section mainly relies on the last factor in explaining different 
representational profiles and amount of motivation of activists after 2009. Recall from 
Chapter 5 that AKP is very centralized in nature where posts are distributed mainly by 
the district president at the district level and the neighborhood president at the 
neighborhood level. Thus, promotion is based on the decisions of the leaders.  The study 
suggests that the inability of Beyoğlu to motivate its activists after 2009 is a function of 
the characteristics of its organizational order in its founding phase. The successful 
motivation of most of the party activists in Sancaktepe derives from the critical juncture 
where the organizational order of the party was radically changed when the district was 
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established in 2008. Yet, the study also reveals that exogenous factors has prevented the 
party to change all of its organizational order, creating resistance among activists of the 
old order in the neighborhood of Inönü and preventing the party to increase its network 
among voters of Kurdish origin. 
In accordance with these arguments, this section will first briefly evaluate the 
validity of exogenous factors that can constrain the behaviors of the leaders after 2009. 
These are the nature of the electoral competition and the amount of the control of the 
municipal resources.  In the second section, it will demonstrate how different 
trajectories have differently affected the districts’ capabilities to motivate their activists.  
 
 
9.3- Explaining Different Strategies after 2009: Alternative Explanations 
 
 
This section will briefly compare the two districts in terms of the exogenous 
factors that are suggested to be effective by the literature in a party’s decision to 
motivate its activists to increase its clientelistic network. Although the nature of the 
electoral competition was controlled in the selection of the districts to be analyzed via 
the vote shares attained by the party, other competitive factors may also influence the 
strategies of the parties. Within this respect, the first section will compare the districts in 
terms of the party system indicators across elections. The second section will investigate 
the amount of other potential swing voters that the party can mobilize. The last section 
will evaluate the degree of the control of the municipal resources by each of the district 
branches.  
 
 
9.1.1- Party System Indicators in the Two Districts 
 
 
The literature suggests that effective number of parties and the amount of 
volatility are influential in explaining the nature of the electoral competition the party 
faces. Thus diverge in these indicators may affect the district decisions to incorporate 
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new voters into the network through their activists. Yet, the two districts have slightly 
diverging patterns when party system indicators are taken into consideration.  
 When the effective number of parties, which in each district are analyzed, one 
can observe that the districts face a similar competition in terms of the number of parties 
AKP competes.  As illustrated in table 9.2 and graph 9.1 the number of effective parties 
is the highest for 2009 municipal elections for all the three districts. Sancaktepe has the 
lowest effective number of parties for 2007 general elections where as in 2011 
approximately the same number of parties are effective in the system.     
 
 
 
Table 9.2 Graph 9.1: Effective number of parties of the districts (2002-2011) 
 
The districts are also similar in terms of the volatility rate they face (see table 9.3 
and graph 9.2). Within this respect, the overall percentage of potential swing voters for 
each district is the lowest in Sancaktepe, albeit very close.   In fact, the data indicates a 
very stable electoral system for three of the district, which makes competition very high 
if AKP envision to increase its votes. According to the party system indicators the 
district branches in the two districts are expected to have a similar strategy in their 
decision to mobilize more potential swing or core voters.  
 
 
Table 9.3 Graph 9.2: Volatility index of the districts (2002-2011) 
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  2002 2007 2009 2011 
Beyoğlu 4,48 3,40 4,13 2,89 
Sancaktepe 3,80 2,93 3,65 2,73 
  Volatility Index   
2002-
2007 
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2009 
2009-
2011 
Beyoğlu 0,17 0,18 0,16 
Sancaktepe 0,14 0,17 0,14 
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9.1.2- Composition of Potential Swing Voters in Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe 
 
 
Although the party system indicators indicate similar competitive settings for the 
parties’ district branches, the districts may diverge in terms of the characteristics of the 
competitors they face. In all the three districts potential swing voters are expected to be 
more targeted since AKP faces a relatively competitive environment when compared 
with other districts.  Nevertheless, an alternative explanation for the decision of the 
party branches not to target voters of Kurdish origin may be the presence of a larger 
group of other potential swing voters.  As Matz Dahlberg and Eva Johanssen (2002) 
argues that when specific identifiable groups are concerned political parties will target 
groups that are not only larger in quantity but also are composed of more swing voters. 
As a result, the presence of other easily targetable potential swing voters may also affect 
the party’s decision to target a specific group. If the number of other potential swing 
voters compared to potential Kurdish swing voters is larger in Beyoğlu than in 
Sancaktepe, the party’s district branch may decide not to mobilize the later. In order to 
assess the validity of such an assumption for the districts under investigation, a deeper 
analysis of the electoral strength of other ideologically potential swing voters is 
conducted in this section. The study will mainly focus on the electoral characteristics of 
2007 and 2009 elections since they are expected to affect each district branch’s strategy.   
Representing the center-left, CHP is the second party in the two districts 
managing to increase its electoral support in each of the elections (for more detail see 
second row of table 9.1). Nevertheless, as AKP and CHP are  ideologically opposed to 
each other,  the supporters of CHP are not expected to constitute potential swing voters 
for AKP. It has been illustrated in the previous chapters that the electoral support of 
AKP came from the parties of the extreme and center right-namely FP, DYP, ANAP 
and GP. Furthermore, the 2011 general elections were characterized by AKP’s attempt 
to target the nationalist MHP supporters. Then, some of the supporters of these parties 
may be defined as potential swing voters. The difference in the relative size of the 
supporters of the parties and the estimated percentage of their potential swing voters in 
each district may have affected AKP’s branches decision not the mobilize voters of 
Kurdish origin in Beyoğlu. 
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When the electoral performance of these political parties across the districts are 
analyzed we see that MHP is the third party, considerably increasing its support from 
2002 to 2007 general elections, slightly increasing its support in 2009 and retaining a 
large part of its 2007 support in 2011 general elections in both districts. The vote shares 
of MHP are higher in Beyoğlu when compared with Sancaktepe for both 2007 and 2009 
general elections. The electoral support for the party in Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe are 
respectively, 8.31% and 6.15% for 2007 general elections, 9.60% and 8.30% for the 
2009 municipal elections and 7.94% and 6.18 % for 2011 general elections. 
 The pro-Islamist party SP is the fifth following BDP in both Beyoğlu and 
Sancaktepe. An interesting observation is the sharp increase in the support for the party 
in 2009 municipal elections in all the districts, which is accompanied by an even sharper 
decrease in 2011 general elections. The party is stronger in Beyoğlu than Sancaktepe for 
2007, 2009 and 2011 elections.  The vote shares of the party in the districts are 
respectively 4.43%, 2.91 % for 2007 general elections; 12.58% and 9.20% for 2009 
municipal elections, where as it decreases to 2.39% and 1.59%  in 2011 general 
elections. The electoral support of the parties of the center right is very low for both of 
the districts for all of the elections.   
Support for pro-Kurdish parties for all three elections has a different trend in 
Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe. Beginning with 2007 general election BDP has managed to 
increase its vote shares from 4.95% in 2007 to 6.70% in 2009 and 8.28% in 2011 
general elections in Beyoğlu. The support for the party in Sancaktepe follow a different 
trend where an increase from 6,96% in 2007 to 9% in 2009 and decrease to 7.50% in 
2011 elections is witnessed.  
Studies measure swing voters for a specific election as the volatility of its vote 
shares between two previous elections. This strategy is also expected to be used by AKP 
since electoral outcomes are publicly known data. Nevertheless, such a measurement of 
swing voters can be valid only under the conditions where the party’s ideological 
positioning is constant. As illustrated in the previous chapters, the position of AKP from 
2007 to 2011 general elections is not constant on the Kurdish issue where the party 
moved towards a more nationalist tone approaching to MHP supporters and moving 
away from Kurdish voters. As a result, voters identified as core supporters in terms of 
volatility rates have the potential to switch their votes in 2011 general elections. The 
effect of such a position change on neither MHP, other right wing parties nor AKP 
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supporters among Kurdish voters is not predictable. This is why the study has used both 
the electoral volatility from 2007 to 2009 elections and the overall vote shares in 2009 
elections to compare the magnitude of potential swing voters among the supporters of 
MHP, other right wing parties and pro-Kurdish parties. The amount of AKP supporters 
among voters of Kurdish origin has been found by subtracting the estimated percentage 
of citizens of Kurdish origin from the vote shares of the pro-Kurdish parties.  
 
Percentages of potential swing voters in the districts  
support (%)   Beyoğlu Sancaktepe 
MHP 2009 (%)   9,60 8,30 
MHP 2007 (%)   8,31 6,15 
other right wing parties 2009 (%) 13,14 10,00 
other right wing parties 2007 (%) 11,00 6,00 
Support for pro-Kurdish parties 2009 (%) 6,70 9,00 
Support for pro-Kurdish parties 2007 (%) 4,95 6,96 
AKP support among. Kurds 2009(%) 8,50 6,86 
AKP support among. Kurds 2007(%) 10,25 8,90 
Change in MHP support (2009-2007) 1,29 2,15 
Change in other. Right. parties support (2009-
2007) 2,14 4,00 
Change in support for pro-Kurdish parties (2009-
2007) 1,75 2,04 
est. Kurd Pop.2011 (%) 15,20 15,86 
Table 9.4: Percentages of potential swing voters in the districts 
 
Table 9.4 provides information on the vote shares of each party for 2007 and 2009 
elections in the two the districts.  When the vote shares of the two groups of voters are 
analyzed for each district for the two elections one can observe that they have 
considerably equal sizes in Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe. Support for MHP, right wing 
parties on the one hand and AKP supporters of Kurdish origin on the other are 
respectively 9.60 % , 13.14% and 8,5% in Beyoğlu for 2009. These shares are 
respectively, 8.60%, 10% and 6,86% in Sancaktepe. In both of the districts, the amount 
of AKP supporters among voters of Kurdish origin is lower than MHP and right wing 
parties for both 2009 and 2007. Furthermore, the shares of MHP and right wing parties 
are higher in Beyoğlu compared with Sancaktepe. A similar observation can be made 
for  support for AKP among voters of Kurdish origin for 2009  where it is higher in 
Beyoğlu than in Sancaktepe. Nevertheless when the electoral volatility is taken into 
consideration one can observe the stability of MHP votes on both regions, indicating the 
presence of a stabilized vote for the party. The volatility of the party’s vote shares from 
2007 to 2009 elections is only 1.19% and 2.15% in Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe 
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respectively. AKP decreased its vote shares by 1,75%  in Beyoğlu and 2,04% in 
Sancaktepe. Although volatility in right-wing parties is high, they do not greatly diverge 
across the districts with 2.14 in Beyoğlu and 4% in Sancaktepe.   The electoral results 
reveal that both Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe face a similar amount of other potential swing 
voters. With the high support for the party among citizens of Kurdish origin, the study 
expects a similar tendency in both districts to mobilize citizens of Kurdish origin.  
 
 
9.1.3- Evaluating Different Access to Municipal Resources 
  
 
Recall that some studies on the use of state resources for organizational or 
electoral purposes argue that access and control of state resources are an important 
requirement for its success. While access refers to the amount of resources a party can 
distribute, control refers to the party’s ability to retreat or redistribute these resources in 
case of incompliance. Then, one possible explanation for different representations may 
be the difference in the amount of the resources at the disposal of the party or different 
ability to access and control these resources. Previous chapters have indicated the use of 
municipal resources for inducement by district level organizations. As indicated in the 
previous section Beyoğlu, Sancaktepe are similar in terms of their municipal budget 
shares per citizens. Nevertheless, other factors as well may affect the party’s ability to 
distribute resources in return for support. First, access to resources may change across 
the years. Second control of the parties in the Municipal Council may be different. This 
section will analyze both districts in terms of these variables 
 
  Total Budget Budget per resident 
Budget Beyoğlu Sancaktepe Beyoğlu Sancaktepe 
realized total budget 2009 (TL) 71.860.644 48.337.491 292,81 198,83 
realized total budget 2010 (TL) 98.680.381 110.213.557 396,42 426,77 
realized total budget 2011 (TL) 148.669.628 154.848.423 599,83 575,26 
expected total budget 2012 137.000.000 117.889.655 552,75 437,96 
Population 2009 245.420 243.113     
Population 2010 248.930 258.251     
Population 2011 247.852 269.180     
Population 2012         
total amount of goods (2011) 33.188.603 45.145.500 133,90 167,71 
share of total goods (2011)         
Table 9.5: Allocation of the municipal budgets (2009-2012) 
*carried under the collaboration with the State district office 
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If different municipal budget would have a direct effect on electoral support of 
Kurdish speaking voters’ support for AKP, then one should expect, within each year 
and from 2009 to 2011 more resources available for Sancaktepe than Beyoğlu.  Table 
9.5 is a detailed illustration of the three districts municipal budgets.48 The first three 
rows illustrate the changing amount of realized budget per residents for the years of 
2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. One major observation is the increase in the total budget 
per residents in all municipalities across the years. When the districts are compared, we 
can observe that municipal budget per resident is nearly the same within each year, 
where Sancaktepe is slightly over Beyoğlu in 2010 and the later is slightly over the 
former for the years of 2011 and 2012.  The year of 2009 is an exception, where 
Sancaktepe with 198.83 compared to 292.81 is far below Beyoğlu.  Such a circumstance 
should be related to the fact that in 2009 the municipality was newly established. It has 
been illustrated in Chapter 3 that both municipalities have control over the re-
distribution of individual types of goods they have access. As a result, a double increase 
from 2009 to 2010 should not be so effective for Sancaktepe since in 2010 both 
municipalities had approximately the same amount of resources. Furthermore, given the 
fact that activists were mostly recruited in 2009, it should have been more difficult for 
the district branch in Sancaktepe to motivate both existing and new entering activists 
vis-à-vis Beyoğlu.   
Resources at the disposal of AKP is not only based on the absolute size of 
municipal budget, but also to the former’s ability to affect the main decision making 
body responsible of distributing these resources in the municipality.  This ability is 
especially based on the amount of the coordination between the municipal organs and 
the party’s district branches.  Recall from Chapter 3 that the coordination is realized 
through the municipal council and appointment of AKP activists in posts controlling the 
distribution process. Table 9.6 illustrates the number of representatives of AKP in the 
Municipal Councils of two of the municipalities. AKP is the majority in the council 
which takes decision with the plurality of its members. Within this respect, there is a 
                                               
48 Necessary data on the budget of the municipalities has been extracted from the Action Plan and 
Performance Programs prepared for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and  published in each Municipality’s 
website. While the Action Plan is an annual evaluation of past carried activities, the Action Plan is the 
forecast for future envisioned activities of the municipality.  
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similar cooperation between the two institutions in terms of general policies to be 
realized in the district.  
 
Municipal council representation (2009) 
  Beyoğlu Sancaktepe 
AKP 21 20 
CHP 10 11 
Total 31 31 
Table 9.6: Municipal council representation 
 
The study suggests that the amount of resources is of minor importance for an 
existing or new entering activist if he/she has no probability to have access to it. As it 
will be illustrated in the next section, the internal party organization regulates access. 
Thus, it is expected to be more effective in explaining different capacities of the districts 
to motivate their activists.  
 
   
9.4- The Party’s Inner Organization and Motivation of the Activists 
 
 
The previous section has illustrated that the districts of Beyoğlu and Sancatepe do 
not diverge in terms of the electoral competition they face and the amount of the 
resources at their disposal. Therefore, these variables are not influential in explaining 
different abilities of the party to motivate district and neighborhood activists for the two 
districts.  The study suggests that the ability of the party to motivate its activists and 
distribute the recourses is the function of the inner organizational structure of the party 
(Pannebianco, 1988). Within this respect, the effective mobilization of both old and new 
activists to publicly work for the party and increase their support base is influenced by 
the nature of the mechanism that regulates the distribution of the party’s posts that 
provide access to resources.    
Chandra (2004) suggests that competitive intra-party advancement rules where 
posts are distributed by elections provide a suitable mechanism to attain these two 
objectives. Yet, centralized party organizations are not suitable to the formation of 
competitive intra-party advancements rule since posts are distributed by the leaders 
where loyalty is the main criterion. According to Chandra leaders in this type of 
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organization can change the organizational structure only if they are safe. On the other 
hand, Historical institutionalist approaches (Colier and Colier, 1991; Pierson, 1993, 
Thelen, 1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Katznelson & Berry, 2005) suggest that rational 
expectations play a major role in the foundation phase of political parties, but once they 
have been established organizations have lives on their own shaping the perceptions of 
the actors. A similar suggestion is given by Panebianco who asserts that the genetic 
phase of political parties have a great impact on the behavior in their following faces. 
According to him, change in the organizational structure and composition of the 
activists, that he calls “the dominant coalition” may only occur through an 
organizational crisis. This corresponds to what historical institutionalist approaches call 
as a critical juncture. The study suggests that such crisis may only be effective in 
changing the nature of the dominant coalition and promotion mechanism.  
Recall from Chapter 5 that AKP is a centralized party organization where 
distribution of the posts is tied to the decision of the top leaders of the district. 
Furthermore, the posts of the leaders at district level are safe from the preferences of the 
lower level activists. The successful functioning necessitates a mechanism that 
motivates both neighborhood level and district level activists to actively work for the 
party to increase their support base. As placed on the higher level of the organizational 
structure, promotion to district posts is expected to be the main mechanism of 
motivation for the neighborhood activists. In fact, it is mostly the owner of these posts 
that are placed in municipal jobs. Then, the motivation of the new entering 
neighborhood activists and the desire of district activists to cooperate with each other 
should be a function of the amount of vertical circulation from the neighborhood to the 
district and the criterion through which this circulation is assured.  
Difference in the abilities of the political parties to motivate activists should be 
related to the peculiar experiences the party branches have faced in each of the districts 
under investigation. This should be important in the sense that it will define first the 
composition of the activists and second, the mechanism through which appointment in 
strategic positions is made. Thus, representational profile in 2001 should be a function 
of the competition the party faces, the composition of its electoral support.  Difference 
in the composition of the activists, the amount of their activities and the magnitude of 
their cooperation after 2009 in each district, should result from either the different 
experiences faced at the founding phase or a critical juncture in later phases. The study 
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argues the main difference in the motivation capacities between the two district 
branches is the critical juncture Sancaktepe faced in 2008 when the district was founded 
by the unification of three sub-districts each having a distinct  party organization. This 
can be interpreted as an organizational crisis since the new leaders had to establish a 
new organization from the three distinct organizations of the sub-districts. The large 
circulation in the dominant coalition and the introduction of a competitive mechanism 
based on performance to attain these posts has been a great source of motivation for 
both existing and new activists.   On the other hand, although Beyoğlu also faced a 
leadership change in 2008, this was accompanied by neither an organizational crisis nor 
an appointment outside of the dominant coalition. The inequality of representativeness, 
low vertical circulation provided an obstacle in motivating both existing and new 
entering activists after 2009.  
Yet the ability of the district of Sancaktepe to change the organizational order in 
all of the neighborhoods seems not to be identical. The amount of supporters for the 
party and the strength of the neighborhood organization before 2009 seem to have 
affected the number of trained activists required for the re-organization. The different 
capacity of the party to motivate the activists in the Neighborhood of Veysel Karani and 
İnönü in the district of Sancaktepe should be understood in this context.    
Within this respect, the first section is an analysis of the exogenous factors the 
party’s district branches face at the founding phase and their effect on the composition 
of the activists and mechanism of promotion. This will help to understand the general 
logic in the presence of representational differences at both district and neighborhood 
level and the nature of the promotion mechanism. On the other hand, the second section 
will analyze how the difference in the composition of the dominant group and 
promoting mechanism after the leadership change, differently affected the motivation of 
the activists in each district and neighborhoods.  
 
 
9.2.1- The Foundation Period of the Party (2001-2006) 
 
 
Recall from Chapter 2 that according to Panebianco the main factors affecting the 
organizational size and the composition of the leaders, as he calls “dominant coalition”, 
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is a function of the objective of the party, its ideology,  support base and external 
environment it faces. It has earlier been suggested that arising from FP’s ashes; 
ideologically AKP had a more moderate tone than the former49. The new leaders of the 
party highlighted in every occasion that they had the objective to gain the necessary 
majority to run the country as a new untried central-right party cleaned of the corruption 
of existing Turkish parties. In fact, the abbreviation of the party insistently used by the 
leader “AK Parti” meaning “white party” was and is still the symbol of this objective. 
During the field research, when I used the abbreviation “AKP” for the party, nearly all 
administrators interviewed, intentionally reminded me that their name was “Ak Parti”.  
In accordance with this objective, the electoral target of the party was not only the 
former supporters of FP but also other rightist parties in the Turkish political scene. The 
party had an advantage in persuading people to joint its ranks as a new, yet, untried 
party that promised change in Turkish politics. This situation is expected to be a driving 
force in the decisions of activists to join the party’s ranks in this period. In fact, nearly 
all the activists that were asked why they joined the party answered first because they 
were asked to and second they accepted the offer because they believed the party would 
change something in the Turkish political scene and they wanted to be a part of it. The 
Charisma of the leader of the party Recep Tayip Erdoğan seems to be very effective in 
building this image.    The party incorporated many activists from FP at different levels 
the organizational hierarchy. The strategy of the party in each of the districts and 
neighborhoods should be evaluated in relation with its objective, the competition it 
faces, the composition of its support base and the organization heritage of FP.  
Beyoğlu district branch and neighborhood organizations were first established in 
2001 during the founding phase of AKP. The electoral competition the party faced, 
socio-demographic, geographical composition of its support and the organizational 
strength of FP were factors affecting composition of the activists at district and 
neighborhood level during its founding phase. Strong electoral support for FP in the 
district, which obtained 24.62% of the votes in the 1999 general elections, meant a 
comparative advantage for the party in its competition with its opponents ANAP and 
CHP who were greatly behind the party in electoral terms gaining approximately 13% 
and 11% of the votes respectively (see table 7.1).  In parallel with the moderate image it 
                                               
49 The fundamentalist position of FP on major issues was one of the main causes of the decision of the 
founders of AKP to establish a new party in 2001 after FP has been closed by the constitutional court.  
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wanted to draw the party also targeted a considerable number of voters having center 
right tendencies. On the other hand, neither the electoral support nor the organizational 
encapsulation of FP was uniform in all of the neighborhoods. As it can be seen from 
table 8.1 neighborhoods in the second electoral region such as Kaptanpaşa, Piyalepaşa, 
Sütlüce, Halıcıoğlu, Örnektepe, which are located it the same geographical region was 
the traditional electoral base of the party according to 1999 general elections. The 
presence of former FP neighborhood activists in these neighborhoods confirms that this 
electoral support was accompanied with the organizational encapsulation of the party.  
Furthermore, the supporters of other right wing parties were also powerful in these 
neighborhoods. Given the relative advantage of the party in terms of votes, the party 
mostly targeted these neighborhoods and did not try to enlarge its organizational 
encapsulation to other ones. The party was able not only to convince FP supporters but 
also activists from other right-wing parties to join the party. Recall that the positive 
image of the party was a driving force in motivating participations. The participation of 
activists in the neighborhood of Örnektepe coincides to this case.  
The residents of these neighborhoods were mostly from the Black sea region, they 
filled important positions in the party. The exception was Örnektepe, where FP was 
organizationally strong but facing great competition. FP’s vote shares in 1999 general 
elections were nearly 21%, a lower share when compared with Kaptanpaşa, Piyalepaşa, 
Sütlüce, Halıcıoğlu where the party received respectively 31.67%, 28.99, 39.67% and 
27.51%  in the same period. Furthermore, the vote shares of other right- wing parties, 
such as ANAP, DYP, were only 7.01%, also very low, when compared with other 
neighborhoods, which shares were ranging between 14% and 23%. The number of 
Kurdish citizens supporting FP and other right-wing parties were also large in the 
neighborhood. Combined with the considerably high electoral competition the party 
faced, the voters of Kurdish origin constituting an important population of the 
neighborhoods, were incorporated in neighborhood organization of FP. After its 
foundation, they transferred to AKP.  
As a result of the party’s advantage in the electoral competition, the concentration 
of the targeted potential swing and core supporters in the neighborhoods were FP was 
organizationally strong, the district did not concentrate its mobilizing efforts to other 
neighborhoods where FP was traditionally weak, although there were also considerable 
amount of right-wing supporters.  The discourse of the activists indicates no attempts of 
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organizational encapsulation in neighborhoods of the first and third electoral regions, 
including the neighborhood of Hacıahmet where vote shares for 1999 general elections 
were 16% for FP and 18% for right-wing parties. The party only assured their 
representation in the district by appointing neighborhood coordinators. It was through 
this mechanism that the two activists from Hacıahmet entered the organization.  The 
neighborhood coordinators informed me that she was made responsible to form the 
neighborhood  organization in Çukur, Hacıahmet, Yenişehir etc forming the Dolapdere 
region, a very difficult task to attain by only one activist.  Given the fact that most of the 
residents of Kurdish origin resided in these neighborhoods, they were excluded from the 
organizational ranks of the party.   
In the initial stage, these activists came to power without elections since they were 
the founding members of the party. The foundation period provided no clue on the intra-
party advancement , except the important role of the district president in the selection 
process. The first sign on the advancement rule began to be shaped with the two regular 
congresses of 2003 and 2006. In theses congresses, some neighborhood activists 
promoted to the district organization. It was in this period that some neighborhood 
activists from Kaptanpaşa, Örnektepe, Piyalepaşa, Sütlüce were incorporated in the 
district. These activists were from the neighborhood where the party has a strong 
electoral base and a successfully functioning neighborhood organization.  In reality 
most of the real circulation at the district level was either horizontal, or through the 
incorporation of activists outside the party. As it will be illustrated, the time and the 
mechanism through which the district activists have been incorporated shows that this 
was a circulation within the district posts among the district members themselves that 
were directly incorporated into the organization without neighborhood experiences. 
This congress marked the end of the initial stage of the party organization and its 
consolidation.  These horizontal circulation and incorporation of some of the district 
activists outside the party in the congresses made a sign of the low probability for 
neighborhood activists to promote in higher positions where they could acquire the 
desired incentives. The separation of neighborhoods activists from the party by 2007, in 
Örnektepe as well as other neighborhoods such a Kaptanpaşa, Piyalepaşa coincide to the 
period. On the other hand, for district level activists it meant the low probability to lose 
their position regardless of their performance, as in the neighborhood of Hacıahmet.  
This decreased the motivation of both districts activists and neighborhood presidents to 
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increase the organizational encapsulation of the neighborhood organizations. 
Nevertheless, such a situation seemed not create any problem for the party given the 
increasing trend of its electoral support in 2007, mostly due to its national economic 
performance (Başlevent, Kırmanoğu & Şenatalar, 2005; Çarkoğlu, 2008, 2012b).   
The electoral competition, the characteristics of the support base of the party and 
FP’s organizational encapsulation have also affected the formation of the party in the 
two sub-districts (Belde) that later composed Sancaktepe.  Nevertheless, the electoral 
competition the party faced affected the strategy of the party differently in the two sub-
districts.50 
In its founding phase, the sub-district of Sarıgazi where the party faced a great 
competition with CHP, the strategy of the party diverged. The general support for FP 
was 23.67% in 1999 general elections whereas for CHP it was 28,93% Facing this great 
competition, the party targeted all the right-wing votes and incorporated in its ranks 
these citizens. The formation of the neighborhood organizations was taken seriously in 
all the neighborhoods, so as to increase the electoral support for the party.  Not only 
former FP activists but also new ones were incorporated among the ranks of the party. 
The citizens from the Black Sea region and from Kurdish origin constituted an 
important part of the communities that supported right-wing parties. Although there is 
no publicly available data on the dispersion of the voters targeted by the party across 
neighborhoods, electoral results from 2007 and 2009 elections indicates that it was 
equally distributed in all the neighborhoods. As a result, the party spent the same efforts 
to increase its organizational encapsulation for all the neighborhoods.  As a result, 
voters of Kurdish origin who resided in all the neighborhoods were incorporated among 
the dominant group of the party in its founding phase. As in the case of Beyoğlu, 
activists joining the party in this period declare that they accepted the invitations of the 
founding leaders of the party when they were asked because they believed the party 
would be able to form the government on its own and change the nature of the Turkish 
politics. It was in this period that activists of Kurdish origin in the sub-district of 
Sarıgazi and neighborhood of İnönü entered the neighborhood organizations of the 
party.  
                                               
50 In Turkey, sub-districts administratively function like the districts. Each sub-district (Belde) has their 
own municipalities. As a result, taking the plurality of the votes in a sub-district is vital for political 
parties to have control over the municipality. Given the fact that of Sarıgazi and Samandıra were sub-
districts, the nature of the electoral competition and the strategies formulated by AKP should be evaluated 
independently from each other.  
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In the sub-district of Samandıra, which the neighborhood of Veysel Karani is 
located, the nature of the electoral competition in the founding phase of the party shaped 
the composition of the activists very differently. In contrast to the sub-district of 
Sarıgazi FP had a high electoral support in 1999 general elections where it obtained 
27.46 % of the votes, whereas the vote shares of its closest competitor CHP were only 
14.26%. Although there is no available neighborhood data for this period, the vote 
shares of the party in 2007 and 2009 general elections indicate the equal distribution of 
support for the party among the neighborhoods. We can understand from the 
experiences of the present activists in these neighborhoods that FP was organizationally 
strong in nearly all neighborhoods.  Although a considerable amount of the citizens of 
Kurdish origin were among these supporters, the high and equally distributed support 
among the non-Kurdish residents from Black Sea and Central Anatolian regions in all 
the neighborhoods and the low electoral competition the party faced has resulted in their 
exclusion from the party’s ranks. The neighborhoods of Veysel Karani and Akpınar 
where large numbers of Kurdish residents reside were not an exception.  
Unfortunately, there is no available data on the composition of the district organs 
in that period for neither of the sub-districts. Nevertheless, the career path of present 
district activists signals that between 2003 and 2006 Party Congresses, the party 
witnessed a vertical circulation where activists from the neighborhood organizations 
were promoted to the district. The activists in the neighborhood of İnönü who were still 
active in the party during the 2011 general elections promoted to the sub-district in this 
period.  Nevertheless, the condition of activists in the neighborhood of Veysel Karani 
was different. Probably due to the low socio-economic and educational profile of the 
neighborhoods vis-à-vis the other ones in the sub-district; only one woman branch 
activist has been incorporated into the district, others remained in the neighborhood 
organization. Those who remain in the neighborhood organization left the party by 
2007. It coincides to the period of departure of old activists that reentered the party in 
2009 in the neighborhood.  The gaining electoral support of the party in 2007 elections 
in both of the sub-district which were 39,29% for Sarıgazi and 60,82 % for Samandıra 
did not require the district organization to strengthen its neighborhood organizations and 
increase its electoral base. Unfortunately, there is no available data on the rule of 
advancement in the party or on its efforts to strengthen its neighborhood branches in 
that period. Yet, the perception of old activists re-joining the party in 2009 indicates 
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loosening focus on the neighborhood organizations and the presence of a promotion 
mechanism through personal relations and loyalty.  A conversation between two woman 
branch activists, one old the other new, on the former district activists from the 
neighborhood is a good example for such a situation. “She promoted to the district 
through her personal relations with the wife of the sub-district president. They were 
always planning all activities together. They hanged together. They did not inform us. 
Then, in 2006, she passed to the district. When my husband died, they did not even come 
to visit me, although I was working with them. Lots of people in the neighborhood were 
offended by their attitudes and quit the party in that period” (Electoral Campaigning 
activity on 21.05.2011, Veysel Karani). A similar perception was also present in the 
neighborhood president of Inönü. “The sub-district administration asked me to take a 
break in 2007 since I had problems with some of the district members. You know I am a 
person who tells what is not right and this is not appreciated by higher ranks when you 
criticize them. I said some words they didn’t like and they asked be to take a break”, 
(Electoral Campaigning activity on 12.05.2011, Inönü). The promotion of the woman 
branch neighborhood coordinator of Inönü to the district also reveals the importance of 
personal relations. When I asked her how she entered the party she answered, “My 
father worked for years in RP, then FP and AKP. After I graduated from school, I 
began to work in the municipality through his connection, than I joined the party and 
got elected to the district administration” (Electoral Campaigning activity on 
21.05.2011, Inönü). Although the neighborhood organizations still functioned, it was 
not until 2008 that the competitive rule of advancement in the party was clearly set by 
the leaders.   
 
 
9.2.1- The Critical Junctures and the Re-structuring of the Organizations after 
2009 
 
 
The previous section has tried to illustrate the factors affecting the organizational 
structuring of the party in its founding phase in each of the districts and neighborhoods 
under selection. This section builds upon illustrating how the leadership change 
differently affected the mechanism of promotion signaled by the leaders of the party to 
both districts and neighborhood activists in each district after the District Congresses of 
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2009. The exogenous factors both district branches faced after 2009 were not different. 
Both witnessed the same electoral pressure, had similar access to municipal resources 
and objective mechanisms to evaluate performance.  Furthermore, both district 
experienced a leadership changed before the congress of 2009. However, their ability to 
motivate both district and neighborhood activists were different. The study suggests that 
this difference is a function of the nature of the leadership change before the 2009 
congress and the effect of this change on the composition of the district organs, amount 
of circulation among the district posts and the criteria shaping this circulation.     
Unfortunately, there is no available data on the mechanism of promotion for 
neither of the districts except the dominance of the district leaders in the decision 
process. Yet, the time of entry of the district activists, the procedure through which they 
have entered and their representational profiles in terms of both the neighborhoods and 
demographic characteristics provide important tools in understanding the rules of intra-
party advancement that motivate the activists. The main logic of such argument builds 
upon the fact both district and neighborhood activists will calculate their probability to 
attain a higher post or lose the existing one based on past activities of the party, which is 
successfully revealed by these characteristics of the district organs.  Furthermore, the 
experience the leaders have faced during their own recruitment process is expected to 
shape how they evaluate the mechanism of appointment in the important posts since 
these norms will be internalized.   
After 2009, in both districts, party organs enter a phase of organizational 
restructuring. The correspondence of such a strategy after the 2009 municipal elections 
should not be a coincidence.  The results of the elections where AKP decreased it votes 
from 46.58% in 2007 general elections to 38.8 % in 2009 general council elections was 
a sign that the party could lose ground vis-à-vis SP and BDP in different provinces of 
Turkey (Çarkoğlu 2009b) . The electoral pressure on the party to increase its votes in 
the 2011 general elections above its previous support should also have an effect on such 
a restructuring. Both Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe entered at a phase of strengthening their 
neighborhood organizations, which was affected by the historical process that the 
districts had faced since their foundation period. The characteristics of the restructuring 
in the districts in the 2009 Congress gave tremendously different messages to both 
district and neighborhood activists.  
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In 2009, the province district appointed the vice president responsible of the 
organization to the head of the party in Beyoğlu, when its actual president promoted to 
the provincial organization. Having gained its experience in the same district 
organization, the president did not change the members of the organizational structure 
of the district branches in 2009. In a sense, leadership change was not accompanied by 
an organizational crisis that would result in the re-structuring of the organizational 
order. This continuity in Beyoğlu, despite of a presidency change, acted as an obstacle 
to motivate existing and new activists in three ways. The first one concerns the 
difference in the representational profile of the organizations. The second one concerns 
the low number of district activists coming from the neighborhood organizations.  The 
last one concern the low probability of vertical circulation the party offered since in its 
initial phase. These characteristics prevented the leaders and lower rank activists to 
create the necessary mechanisms for increasing the motivation in the party. 
There was a huge representation problem in Beyoğlu both in terms of hometown 
origin and neighborhood representation. The organization generally consisted of 
activists whose hometown origin was the Black Sea region or Central Anatolia of 
Turkey where limited number of Kurdish residents reside. As an example, among them 
activists from Giresun were very dominant in the party. Both the main branch district 
president and vice president responsible of the organization were from this province. 
Activists whose hometown origins were Erzincan, Erzurum had also important posts. 
Similar patterns could also be observed within the municipal organs. Representing 
approximately 15% of the residents of the district, the citizens of Kurdish origin were 
under-represented. During the field research, I have been able to meet only 4 activists 
coming from Kurdish origin. One of them working in the woman executive branch was 
an early immigrant whose hometown origin is Kars. The other activist was the main 
branch vice president from Mardin.  Furthermore, there were two municipal council 
members whose hometown origins were Bingöl and Siirt. Recall that these activists 
were incorporated into the party in its founding phase. These numbers reveal the over 
representation of the district organs in favor of citizens of the Black Sea region who 
resides in the neighborhoods where the party is electorally strong. The district president 
was aware of the underrepresentation problem and expressed that they try to incorporate 
citizens of Kurdish origin among their organization but they fail to do (Interview 
conducted on 09.12.2010, Beyoğlu). 
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When the distribution of the district activists according to the population shares of 
the neighborhoods they reside is analyzed the over-representation of the neighborhoods 
where the party was electorally strong and have middle socioeconomic indicator can be 
observed. The neighborhoods with high and low socioeconomic indicators where the 
party was both organizationally and electorally weak were nearly unrepresented within 
the party’s district branches.  Although nearly all neighborhoods had one representative 
as their coordinators in each branch, neighborhoods such as Kaptanpaşa, Piyale Paşa, 
Sütlüce, Halıcıoğlu Örnektepe were over represented in both the district and municipal 
organs when compared with their population shares.  Unfortunately, there is no 
available data to make a precise comparison for both main and woman branches. 
Nevertheless, when the neighborhood of Hacıahmet and Örnektepe are compared one 
can observe a great difference in terms of the representation of these neighborhoods in 
both the main and women branches. Although the number of eligible voter of Örnektepe 
is far below Hacıahmet with 8.173 to 10.305 for 2011 general elections, the former is 
largely represented in all the effective district organs. I have been able to identify only 
one activist in each of the main and women branch residing in the neighborhood of 
Hacıahmet and no municipal council member. The number of activists identified as 
residing in Örnektepe is six among them who two are members of the municipal 
council.  The actual number of activists residing in Hacıahmet is not expected to be 
more, since the both main and woman branch presidents cited only these two activists 
when they were affirming the representation of the neighborhood in the district organs. 
On the other hand, Örnektepe may have other activists that were not identified during 
the field research. Nevertheless, even these numbers is sufficient to expose the 
magnitude of the difference in the representation of the two neighborhoods in the 
district organs. This had a negative effect on the perception of new activists having key 
posts in the neighborhood organization outside the party’s traditional geographical 
support base on their probability to advance in the party and access to other kinds of 
municipal resources to motivate lower level activists. 
When the time of incorporation of the members of district organ is analyzed, one 
can observe that they mostly joined the party in 2001 during its foundation period. 
Among the interviewed members of the executive members of the main and woman 
branch, all except one joined the party in 2001. Although there is systematic data for the 
profile all of the activists, information extracted from the CVS of the executive and 
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administrative committees of the main branch gives an idea on the composition of 
activists in terms of date of entry. Among 24 identified activists from the administrative 
committee of the main branch, 20 entered the party in 2001, 2 in 2003 and 2 in 2007.  
Even more important was the mechanism through which these members were 
recruited. Most of these activists had no neighborhood experiences and were directly 
recruited in the district organs. During the field research only three activists promoting 
to the district organ via the neighborhood organization was identified. One was the 
president of the Center for the Coordination of the elections who worked for a short 
period of time at the neighborhood organization and was appointed to a district post in 
2003. The other two, were the activists from the neighborhood of Örnektepe who were 
appointed to the district before 2006.CVs confirm this tendency where only 5 from the 
24 activists had neighborhood experience. Furthermore, these experiences were only for 
1 or 2 years since they mostly attained their post in the congress of 2003.   
Most of these activists attained their post through their personal network and 
connections. This was especially the case for the leader controlling the posts responsible 
of organizing the party and deciding the distribution of resource. Both the main and 
woman branch presidents and vice presidents responsible for the organization, 
municipal affairs and social affairs entered the party in 2001 directly from the district 
branch through their personal connections. There should have been probably more 
vertical circulation in the auxiliary board but unfortunately, there is no available data. 
Nevertheless, given the fact that this organ has no efficiency on the decision making 
process, its composition is probably not so effective in shaping activists perceptions. 
This composition provides important information not only on the probability of 
circulation in the organization and motivation of both district and neighborhood 
activists, but also the perception of the leaders on the appropriate promotion 
mechanism. For neighborhood activists this meant low probability of advancement 
while for district activists it meant low probability of losing the post, greatly decreasing 
both activists’ motivation to work actively for the party. Furthermore, the experience 
the leaders faced also seems to have shaped their perceptions on the appropriate 
promotion mechanism. No neighborhood experience, the role of the personal networks 
in promotion was internalized as the only procedure of advancement. In fact, the 
incorporation criteria cited by the activists to attain position in the party was mostly 
loyalty, where new entrance was met with distrust. As a result, their attempt to motivate 
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new entering activists who evaluated the party according to its existing structure was 
not convincing.    
In the wake of 2008, the leadership change in Sancaktepe was accompanied by a 
similar change in the organizational structure of the district.  The major cause was the 
organizational crisis the party faced while it was adjusting its organizational structure in 
accordance to the new established district. Recall that Sancaktepe is a newly formed 
district with the unification of three sub-districts Sarıgazi, Samandıra, Yenidoğan. 
Functioning as independent municipalities, the party had independent central decision-
making organs in each of these sub-districts. The unification meant the restructuring of 
one central organ from the three previous ones. The party faced an over-population of 
district members that it had to reduce by two thirds. This meant a huge restructuring in 
the party which gave the opportunity to change the dominant coalition and the rules of 
intraparty advancement for the new leaders that wanted to strengthen their control over 
the party.   The experiences of the new appointed leaders seem to be an important factor 
in shaping this process. Appointed by the province in 2008 to form the new 
organization, the main branch president was the former vice president in the district of 
Ümraniye where former RP and actual AKP had a very strong electoral base and was 
organizationally strong. Within this respect, the president had former experience on 
organizational structuring. He selected a woman branch president having the same 
experiences. The independency of these presidents from the political competition within 
the district was an important factor in putting primacy to the interest of the party as 
whole over the personal interest of the activists. In fact, after he has been appointed, the 
president of Sancaktepe began an important restructuring in the party where district 
activists were selected not only from former administrative branches of the three sub-
districts, but also from neighborhood organizations and outside the party. The 
representational criteria in terms of hometown origin, neighborhood was taken into 
consideration in all the organizational level. All interviewed district activists highlighted 
how much they were careful to incorporate in the party’s organs residents with different 
origins and neighborhoods. It was in this period that activists from the Samandıra region 
rose to the district organs from the neighborhood organizations, including Kurdish ones 
and new ones outside the party were recruited. The district presidents of Sancaktepe 
argued that in their district, the main criterion of selection was the representation of 
each neighborhood and hometown origin according to their mathematical percentages to 
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the total population (Interview conducted on 12.03 2011, Sancaktepe). A similar course 
of re-structuring was also apparent in the neighborhood organizations where old ones 
have been replaced or were promoted and new activists from different streets have been 
incorporated. It was through this restructuring that the new members of neighborhood 
organizations in İnönü and Veysel Karani joined the party. The purposeful change in the 
district and neighborhood organizations of the party to attain equal representation was 
also asserted by the woman branch district president. During our interview she reported,  
“I am normally responsible in the province, but our president asked 
me to stay here to restructure the woman branch of the district and 
neighborhood organizations. As you know, the district has been established 
by the unification of three sub-districts. Every sub-district wants to recruit 
its own activist and dominate the organization. A similar course can also be 
observed in the neighborhood organizations. They also want to bring their 
own supporters. It is a hard choice that we do here to assure 
representation” (Interview conducted on 25.04.2011, Sancaktepe).  
 
Within this respect, members of the main branch executive committee responsible 
to implement the party’s strategies were selected according to their area of expertise 
mostly outside the former activists. This provided the executive branch neutrality in 
policy implementation towards different groups in the party. The Vice Presidencies of 
Municipal Affairs and Social Affairs were exceptions since these posts required former 
political experiences and connections. All remaining posts were distributed according to 
the composition of the district.  
Neighborhood experience was also taken into consideration. A great change in the 
composition of the activists and a large amount of vertical circulation among the posts 
during the re-organization period was an important factor affecting the perceptions of 
both existing and new activists from different neighborhoods and demographic 
background. As a result, the new organizational order provided to most of the activists a 
great motivation force to actively work for the party. Furthermore, increasing the 
electoral base by the recruitment of new activists was set as the main objective by the 
party leaders.  This strategy was personally implemented by these leaders who asked 
activists from different levels to identify new potential participants from different 
demographic backgrounds. Most of the new entering activists state that they joined the 
organization on the personal demand of the district president who assured them that 
their hardworking would not be left without reward.  
297 
 
When compared with Beyoğlu, the district organs responsible of the mobilization 
strategy better represented the composition of the district as a whole in 2009.  The 
activists in the district organization were from different regions of Turkey such as Black 
Sea, Central and Eastern Anatolia. Among these activists citizens of Kurdish origin that 
compose nearly 15% of the population constituted an important portion, very well 
represented in all the important decision organs including the municipality. This is 
especially valid for the main branch decision organs. Among the district organs, the 
district president, the vice president responsible for the organization and the main 
executive board member responsible of social affairs were among activists of Kurdish 
origin. 6 members in the district administrative committee and 7 members in the 
auxiliary board were identified as being from the hometown origin of Kars, Van, 
Bingöl, Ağrı. The president and vice president of Kurdish origin are from Malatya and 
Erzincan.  
Recall that demographic representation was less important among females since 
they more easily develop personal channels of communications with their counterparts. 
As a result, the demographic criterion seems not to be strictly applied in the woman 
branch, although two activists of Kurdish origin were identified. The citizens of Kurdish 
origin were also represented in the municipal organs. Six members of Kurdish origin 
whom two of them are municipal vice presidents are identified to be from the provinces 
of Tunceli, Van and Binböl. According to the district president, representation could 
have been even higher but the low level of education among the residents worked as an 
important obstacle. This seems to be true especially for the citizens of Kurdish origin 
residing in the district given the fact that both the president and vice president who are 
from Kurdish origin are not residents of the district. None of the less, this situation can 
be observed for all residents given the low educational level of the district as a whole.  
In all the branches, leaders have tried to attain equal neighborhood representation. 
Although, the district organs successfully represented the three sub-districts (belde) of 
Sarıgazi, Samandıra and Yenidoğan, neighborhood representation was not attained. 
Among fifty-nine of the main branch activists (administrative and auxiliary members), 
the distribution of the identified twenty-seven member was, nine from Samandıra, nine 
from Sarıgazi, and five from Yenidoğan. Given the fact that each sub-district’s number 
of eligible vote are respectively 63.254, 67.067 and 38.365  for 2011 general elections, 
this seems to reflect a pretty equal representation. A similar situation is also visible 
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within the organs of the woman branch. Among nineteen identified members of the 
administrative board, eight are from Samandıra, nine are from Sarıgazi and two are 
from Yenidoğan. Among the eight identified out of nineteen members of the municipal 
council, three are from Sarıgazi, three from Yenidoğan and two from Samandıra. On the 
other hand, the inequality in the representation of Veysel Karani and Inönü confirms 
that neighborhood level representation could not be attained. Inönü is represented with 
two members in each of the main and woman district organs, while Veyselkarani is 
represented only in the administrative board of the woman branch with two activists. 
Inequality of representation can also be observed in the municipal council. While there 
is one member of the municipal council residing in İnönü, no member resides in 
Veyselkarani. Although, neighborhood representation among the organs slightly 
diverged, still the district revealed a certain degree of representation in terms of both 
hometown origin and neighborhoods regardless of divergence in the electoral strength 
of the party across the neighborhood. Furthermore, as it will be reveal in detail, the 
inequality in representation was not accompanied by a decrease of motivation since 
high vertical circulation in the posts and change in the dominant coalition signed a high 
probability of promotion on the criterion of performance in the next Regular Congress. 
These numbers illustrate a clear difference in terms of the representation of 
different groups composing the electoral machine of the party in both of the districts. 
Nevertheless, what seems even more important in understanding the difference of 
Sancaktepe from Beyoğlu was the high amount of vertical circulation that took place 
within the district organs. Most of the activists incorporated in the organization, except 
the main branch executive committee, were composed of activists formerly promoting 
from the neighborhood organization. In addition, there were also considerable numbers 
of activists appointed outside of the party organization. This signaled all the 
neighborhood activists, including the ones from under-represented neighborhoods that 
they had a high probability to promote.  
The restructuring of the party gave a message to the existing and newly entering 
activists. The promotion of considerable number of neighborhood presidents to the 
district branches, the attempts to equally represent neighborhoods and hometown origin 
in district and neighborhood organs signaled the high probability of advancement for 
existent and new activists. In fact it acted as an important motivation force for them. 
These changes gave two different messages to the activists. For the new entering ones 
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and neighborhood activists it meant that every one of them, regardless of their 
hometown origin or neighborhood, could promote to the organization if they have a 
good performance. It signaled district level activists that their post was not safe and the 
ones resisting the new organizational order could easily lose their post. This motivated 
both existing and new entering activists to work harder for the party. The hard work of 
neighborhood coordinators and presidents and their attempt to incorporate new activists 
at neighborhood level should be understood within this respect. The neighborhood of 
Veysel Karani is a good example on the influence of the availability of the necessary 
number of trained activists to form a new order and the success of the new organized 
system in motivating the activists even under low level of representation at the district 
level.  Most of the influential neighborhood and districts activist district activists gained 
their position with the formation of the new system. Electoral support for the party was 
high; the neighborhood organization was active in the neighborhood before the 
restructuring of the party. As a result, the party possessed a considerable number of 
trained activists supporting the new administration. The neighborhood coordinators who 
were previously active in the party gained their position in the district with the new 
order.  As it has been previously highlighted as huge organizational restructure was 
realized in the neighborhood organization where old activists opposing to the previous 
system and new recruited activists fulfilled the neighborhood posts.  Within this respect, 
they mostly were supporters of this new order. Albeit, the women branch neighborhood 
president was an exception, she was mostly bypassed by the neighborhood coordinator. 
Although the neighborhood was less represented in the district, the high possibility of 
promotion through performance seems to have motivated the activists to increase their 
support base.   
 Yet, the ability of the party to restructure the whole organizational order was not 
possible in some neighborhoods. The unavailability of the required trained activists due 
to the electoral support for the party and weakness of the neighborhood organization 
before the restructuring seem to influence this failure. The inability of the party to 
motivate all the activists in the neighborhood of Inönü where support for the party is 
traditionally low and neighborhood organizations were weak should be understood 
within this framework. Recall that the neighborhood coordinators in the district were 
resisting cooperation, the party was able to find a women branch neighborhood 
coordinator only in 2010. The party was able to find the main branch neighborhood 
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coordinator from an old activist opposing the previous administration. Yet it has 
difficulty in finding new district coordinators that promote to their position on the basis 
of performance. As a result, the party had to continue with previous district activists 
from the old order, whom most are of Kurdish origin, this created resistance in 
cooperating with low level activists of the new order that were perceived as a threat. In 
fact, the competition between them could easily be observed during the electoral 
campaign.  In fact, as it will be revealed, these resistances translated to a circulation in 
lots of posts the 2012 general congress. 
The discourse of the activists signals the change in their perceptions after 
restructuring. An example is the discourse of the previously cited woman branch activist 
rejoining the organization in 2009 on the district member who she criticized; “When the 
new president came, she was excluded from the district, personal relations is not always 
affective when you are not working” (Electoral Campaigning activity on 21.05.2011, 
Veysel Karani). The discourse of the woman branch president of İnönü with other 
activists also reveals their perceptions on the high probability of advancement. After the 
president complained that she was very tired, another member warned her, “Be a little 
patient, you have worked so much; you will receive what you want. I am sure you will 
pass to the district organ after the elections”. The president answers her, “I will talk 
with my president and ask her to do so, then perhaps I can refer one of you for my 
position” (Electoral Campaigning activity on 12.05.2011, İnönü).    
 Recall that district posts are important in the sense that they provide access to 
incentives, which are important motivational force for activists. There is sign that post 
distribution was also accompanied by a certain amount of job provision to motivate the 
activists.  In some instances, the district president directly distributed incentives for 
motivating new entrance in the party, at not only the district but also neighborhood 
level. This was especially the case for the incorporation of new activists within the 
organization of the main branch. The declaration of a neighborhood coordinator on the 
membership of a family successfully reveals the use of job provision to gain support. 
Showing me a house in the neighborhood, the coordinator expresses 
 “You see this house, they have approximately 8 votes. Our president 
personally came and asked them to join the party. He promised them to put 
their son in a job at the municipality and he did. Three member of the family 
entered the party” (Interview conducted on 06.05.2011, Sancaktepe). 
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For example, the activists of Kurdish origin in Veysel Karani who entered the 
party after 2009 began to work in the municipality after their entry. Especially in the 
main branch neighborhood organization a great number of activist, including presidents, 
were working in the municipality. A similar situation is also apparent among the 
members of the woman branch administrative committee. Unfortunately, there is no 
systematic data when these activists have attained these positions.  Furthermore, a 
woman branch neighborhood coordinator who also worked in the municipality signaled 
the attainment of these posts by the activists after the 2009 municipal elections. She 
reported, “I am working for a long time in the municipality, in contrast to others. I did 
not have the job after the foundation of the district, but others have (Interview 
conducted on 26.05.2011, Sancaktepe). Nevertheless, I have also witnessed activists 
that entered the party after they began to work in the municipality. An example of such 
activists was the main branch neighborhood president of Inönü.  The provision of these 
jobs gave a signal to the others that they could also be rewarded. Such a strategy was 
not observed in Beyoğlu, where municipal posts were mostly distributed to loyal 
supporters of the district organs through their personal connections.  
The circulation among activists in the 2012 regular Congress indicates the 
different rules of intra-party advancement in both of the organizations. A small amount 
of vertical circulation was witnessed in Beyoğlu, but these members were former 
neighborhood activists re-joining the party after 2009 from the neighborhoods where the 
party was traditionally strong. Probably, they joined the party at first place because they 
were promised such a promotion. Within this respect, we can observe the promotion of 
the presidents of the neighborhoods such as Kaptanpaşa, Örnektepe to the auxiliary 
district organ in the main branch. Yet, no newly recruited activists, especially from the 
neighborhoods such as Hacıahmet, where the party is traditionally weak, were promoted 
to the district organs. Neighborhood coordinators retained their position regardless of 
their poor performances during the elections. The neighborhood coordinators of 
Örnektepe and Hacıahmet were not an exception. Nevertheless, a horizontal circulation 
and recruitment outside of the organization within each district organs can be observed. 
Within this respect, all members of the executive committee of the main branch 
changed, except the president and vice president responsible from the organizations. 
Yet, the new members were from the former administrative committee. Minor changes 
have been carried in the executive committee of the women branch where circulation 
302 
 
was among the vice presidencies. Unfortunately, there is no available data to 
systematically track the changes in the administrative committee. However, all the 
presidents of the neighborhoods where the party was traditionally weak such as 
Hacıahmet, Yenişehir, Çukur were still in their duties after the congress. This 
strengthens our expectation that no major promotion were witnessed in these 
neighborhoods.     
The circulation in Sancaktepe, especially in woman branches was very different. 
It signaled the presence of competitive intraparty advancement rules where posts are 
distributed on the basis of the performance of the activists. The data indicates a large 
amount of vertical circulation within the organs. A large number of neighborhood 
activists promoted to the district organs based on their performance. Among them, were 
the woman branch neighborhood presidents or vice-presidents from Inönü and Veysel 
Karani. Beside, in Veysel Karani where the neighborhood administration worked very 
hard two neighborhood activists received promotion. So were the presidents of other 
neighborhoods such as Kemal Türkler, Merve, Yunus Emre etc. 17 members of the 
administrative committee and 4 members of the auxiliary board were new activists 
promoting from neighborhood presidencies that I have been able to identify.  Low 
performance was also taken into consideration by the leaders in the appointment 
process. Neighborhood coordinators with low performance have been excluded from the 
district organs. Among them was the woman branch neighborhood coordinator of 
Inönü, coming from the old organization, who could not find place in the new 
administration. 
Former members of the administrative committee who demonstrated good 
performance during the electoral campaigning activities such as the neighborhood 
coordinator of Veysel Karani passed to the administrative and the auxiliary district 
committees. Although, losing their posts may seem to reveal an inconsistency, given the 
fact of their high performance, the discourses of the activists provide a convenient logic. 
First, nearly all of these activists attained a post at the municipality after the 2009 
municipal elections. In a sense, they received the material incentive they desired. 
Second, these posts require a great responsibility and devotion of time, a difficulty 
expressed by many of these activists during the electoral campaigning activities. In a 
sense, passing to the administrative and auxiliary committees that requires less devotion 
was evaluated as a reward for them. In fact, a considerable number of neighborhood 
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coordinators expressed during the electoral campaigning activities that they were very 
exhausted since 2009 and they needed a break to take care of their personal stuff. All, 
especially, expressed the complaints of their husbands and kids.  The discourse of the 
neighborhood coordinator from Veysel Karani during our interview after the congress 
confirms the perception of the activists on the issue.  She asserts,  
“I am happy that our friends in the neighborhood organization 
promoted to the administrative committee. We should give place to them in 
the organization. You know I got very tired to work for the party all of these 
years. I need a little rest. Besides I can return whenever I want” (Interview 
conducted on 25.03.2012, Veysel Karani).  
 
It is important to note that, albeit, the perception of these activists on the high 
probability to regain their posts is high, whether this is an actual fact is bound to the 
future promotion mechanism of the party which can be defined only after a number of 
Regular Congresses.   
This chapter has tried to revealed major factors affecting the different capabilities 
of the district branches of Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe to motive both activists of Kurdish 
and non-Kurdish origin to join the party actively working for the party after 2009. 
Based on the existing literature, the previous section has illustrated the nature of the 
electoral competition, or the amount of resources at the disposal of each district branch 
is not effective in explaining different motivational capacities. This section has 
illustrated how the organizational order established during the initial phase in Beyoğlu 
and the re-structuring of the organizational order in Sancaktepe after 2008, as a result of 
a critical juncture it faced, affected the capabilities of the district branches of motivating 
both existing and new entering activists very differently.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
The move towards a predominant party system thanks to AKP’s successes at the 
ballot box is one of the most important developments of the Turkish party system. In 
addition, the rising Kurdish ethnic demands and support for the pro-Kurdish party BDP 
can be evaluated as a major threat to the democratic stability of the Turkish party 
system since it contributes to ideological polarization. The combination of these two 
developments make the study of mobilization strategies used by AKP in order to 
mobilize potential voters of Kurdish origin particularly interesting since a large number 
of these voters comprise ideologically a common electoral base for AKP and BDP. 
Studies analyzing the mobilization strategies of political parties have mainly focused on 
the programmatic factors where positioning of the political parties on major issue or 
ideological dimensions have been evaluated as decisive in shaping voters’ party 
preferences. In fact, the positional change of AKP on the Kurdish issue from 2007 to 
2009 and 2011 elections was characterized by a parallel switch in the support of some 
voters of Kurdish origin from AKP to BDP, albeit the former has managed to increase 
its votes nationally. Yet, geographical divergence in these electoral shifts, which is 
difficult to be explained through programmatic mobilization, was also an interesting 
outcome of these elections.  
This dissertation has been an attempt to identify possible factors increasing the 
effectiveness of the mobilization strategy of AKP among voters of Kurdish origin. In 
contrast to the general perception that evaluated different kinds of participation on 
ethnic consciousness as a function of cultural differences, the study treated participation 
on ethnic grounds as a rational strategy adopted by the members of an ethnic group in 
their competition on the distribution of material resources. Within this respect, the 
central claim of the dissertation is established around the literature analyzing the role of 
clientelistic linkage in explaining support among voters for a political party. This being 
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so, throughout my dissertation I attempted to construct a coherent explanation of the 
conditions increasing the effectiveness of the mobilization of voters of Kurdish origin 
through clientelistic accountability and test the validity of this explanation.  
This dissertation was based on three distinct but related hypothesis largely 
debated in the general literature, albeit less empirically validated. The first hypothesis 
was built upon the attempt to understand the variables affecting the incorporation of the 
voters of Kurdish origin into the clientelistics network. Given the potential of violence 
among Kurdish voters and conflictual nature of inter-community relations; the study 
suggested that the effectiveness of clientelistic mobilization of voters of Kurdish origin 
through the clientelistic network is related to the conjunction of two variables: the 
number and time of entry of activists of Kurdish origin in the party’s ranks and the 
intensity of their contacts with the voters. Second, it tried to explain the difference in the 
representational profiles of the party activists and the intensity of their contact with the 
voters within each neighborhood by focusing on the characteristics of the inner party 
organization and the role of critical junctures in changing its order.  
Third, it tested the effectiveness of mobilization through the clientelistic linkage 
on gaining the support of potential swing voters by observing the neighborhoods in the 
districts of Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe that diverge in terms of support for AKP among 
voters of Kurdish origin.   
The study has based its research on the basic assumption that if such variables are 
effective in mobilizing citizens of Kurdish origin, the conditions under which the party 
can efficiently implement this strategy should explain divergence in electoral outcome. 
As a result, divergence in the support for AKP among voters of Kurdish origin from 
2007, 2009 and 2011 elections has been used as a proxy to measure the effectiveness of 
the clientelistic mobilization strategy of the party. In order to collect the necessary data 
to provide a clear and solid ground for my claims, I have chosen to base the analysis on 
a field research conducted in a number of selected districts and neighborhoods. 
Selection of the experimental and control districts has been conducted on the method of 
most similar cases. Within this respect after grouping a large number of cases according 
to my dependent variable and other potential independent variables that may affect 
electoral outcomes, two cases that are similar in terms of other independent variables 
but different in terms of the dependent variable have been selected. This intentional 
decision provided me the opportunity not only to understand the complex relationship 
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between tested variables but also to test their validity. Within this framework, two 
districts, Beyoğlu and Sancaktepe, have been selected to perform the deeper analysis on 
the factors increasing the effectiveness of the mobilization strategy of the party. Both 
are governed by AKP, are similar in terms of the number of residents of Kurdish origin, 
socio-economic characteristics, electoral competition patterns and amount of municipal 
resources per citizens,  but differ in terms of support for AKP among voters of Kurdish 
origin across the elections.  Furthermore, Beykoz, having low numbers of residents of 
Kurdish origin has been selected as a control case for explaining difference in the 
mobilization strategy of the party for Kurdish as opposed to non-Kurdish voters. The 
necessary data has been extracted through personal interviews and participant 
observation conducted during the electoral campaigning period of 2011 general 
elections. This period has intentionally been selected, since electoral campaigning 
periods are when political parties sacrifice all of their efforts to mobilize voters. As a 
result, it provides the opportunity to collect more accurate and intense data on a very 
short period of time. 
Albeit, the main starting point of the research question treated in this dissertation, 
is based on major developments in the Turkish political context, its contribution is not 
only limited to the Turkish literature but also to the general literature focusing on the 
mobilization strategies of political parties.   Within this respect, besides providing the 
necessary data to test the main hypothesis of the dissertation, by depicting a descriptive 
account of the general mobilization of AKP, the field research has several contributions 
to the general literature on the complexity of the mobilization process of voters by the 
political parties.  
It points out the use of a different strategy by AKP in mobilizing voters of 
Kurdish origin, which is based on contacting these voters through co-ethnics.   More 
importantly, it reveals that the mobilization of the members of ethnic groups through 
their known co-ethnic members of the same social networks increases effectiveness 
through decreasing the cost of identification and persuasion. Especially under 
conditions where inter-community relations are weak and the members of an ethnic 
group have potential for violence identification of different types of voters of Kurdish 
origin may only be possible through known co-ethnic member of the same social 
network. In fact, this condition is the most important factor differentiating the 
mobilization of Kurdish voters as opposed to non-Kurdish voters. As the cases in 
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Beykoz reveals identification through un-known activists is still effective among non-
Kurdish voters.  Yet, the analysis conducted in four of the neighborhoods where support 
for AKP among citizens of Kurdish origin diverges across elections, reveals that the 
ability of the party to clientelistically mobilize voters of Kurdish origin across the 
elections is a function of both the time of incorporation of activists of Kurdish origin 
members of the ethnic social network in the party’s rank and the amount of the activities 
performed by the neighborhood organization. The field research supports the argument 
of the study that mobilization through clientelistic linkage is an efficient strategy for 
political parties in consolidating and increasing support among swing voters.  
The major importance of the claim in the Turkish political context is the 
contribution it provides in decreasing the ideological polarization that has the potential 
to threaten the stabilization of the democratic system. Restating the problem as a 
function of political and economic marginalization, the study indicates the 
indispensability of these dimensions to be taken into consideration by major political 
parties in order to solve the Kurdish problem and decrease its potential for violence.  
Additionally, district level analysis supports the argument on the role of the inner 
party organization in increasing the clientelistic network. First, it reveals that the early 
incorporation of activists of Kurdish origin within the party’s ranks is a function of the 
electoral competition the party faces in its founding phase. It also supports the argument 
that the centralized nature of the party organization which encourages the distribution of 
resources on the basis of loyalty act as an obstacle for the party to increase its 
clientelistic network after its founding phase. As the district of Sancaktepe reveals, 
increase in the clientelistic network after the founding phase of the party is possible 
through a critical juncture that provides opportunity for changing the organizational 
order so as to adapt the party to new circumstances. Yet, differences in change in the 
organizational order in the neighborhood of Inönü and Veyselkarani in Sancaktepe 
show that the availability of the required trained activists may prevent the party to attain 
this objective. These two examples also revealed that organizational change is met with 
resistance among activists of the old order, decreasing the effectiveness of the strategy. 
However, the field research has been conducted only 2 years after the re-organizational 
attempts. Furthermore, the new order has witnessed only one regular Congress just one 
year after of its establishment. Usually it may take more time for the new leaders to 
fully change the re-organizational order, especially under circumstances where it lacks a 
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sufficient number of trained activists for middle level positions. Under such conditions, 
the full change in the organizational order may only be attained after the training of new 
activists in the lower level of the organizational structure which takes time. Within this 
respect, in the neighborhoods like İnönü, the study expects further circulation in the 
posts occupied by the activists from the previous organization in the course of time.   
By asserting the importance of the organization structure in shaping leaders’ 
strategies, the dissertation does not only support the historical institutionalist arguments, 
but also indicates the negative influence of centralized party organizations in increasing 
the performance of political parties. The contribution of these last arguments in the 
Turkish literature is especially important given the fact that mostly all Turkish political 
parties have centralized tendencies. Although, such tendency provides the opportunity 
to control the entries in the parties, increase internal cohesion and assure the safety of 
the party leaders, as the dissertation indicates, it also decrease the capacity of the party 
to adapt its organizational structure to changing political conditions. Yet, by 
emphasizing the importance of critical junctures, the study reveals the condition through 
which such change may occur.  
Albeit not directly tested, the dissertation contributes also to other issues debated 
in the literature. First, the tendency of AKP to form a clientelistic linkage that functions 
not only as a problem-solving network, but also as a mean to create a system of 
common identification through ideological mobilization has been demonstrated. When 
voters of Kurdish origin are concerned, their religious identity seems to be the major 
ground of common identification. Yet, respect for their ethnic distinctness and 
opposition to the homogenization attempts of the republican institutions also constitute 
an important issue reformulated within the broader center/periphery dimension.  This 
observation supports the general argument that political parties implement a portfolio 
diversification in their mobilization strategy where they use both clientelistic and 
programmatic linkages in order to gain the support of voters. Within the framework of 
the Turkish political context, the dissertation indicates the prevailing importance of the 
clientelistic accountability in explaining the consolidated support for AKP among the 
Turkish voters.       
 Furthermore, the study also contributes to the existing debate on the types of 
voters political parties target and the mechanisms used by them to assure their 
compliance. Within this respect, field research indicates first, the functioning of this 
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network through different concentric circles composed by different types of voters, 
including opposition voters that have access to different types of resources. Yet, recall 
that the field research has been conducted in districts that face high electoral 
competition. The types of voters the party target may diverge in districts where the party 
is strong. Testing these differences may be a possible area for further research. Second, 
it has revealed that compliance of the voters is assured voluntarily through persuasion.  
These findings tend to support earlier studies’ perception on the long term, emotional 
nature of the clientelistic exchange while contradicting the pure instrumental and short-
run perceptions of current studies in the literature. Yet, this study has mainly focused in 
party/voters interactions that are on a regular base. Perhaps, the party’s strategy may 
diverge under one-time interactions.   
By incorporating the partisan network as a further factor affecting clientelistic 
mobilization, the study contributes to the literature explaining circumstances under 
which political parties distribute resources either clientelistically or programmatically. 
The organizational strength of the party is interpreted as a decisive factor affecting the 
strategies political parties formulate to mobilize the voters.  Furthermore, the 
dissertation underlines the importance of the major formal mechanisms through which 
political parties access to the resources on one hand and distribute them to the voters 
and the party activists on the other. Within this respect, it indicates the necessity of a 
more comprehensive analysis on the effectiveness of the distribution of resources that 
also focuses on the functioning of political parties especially under circumstances where 
resources are accessed and distributed by different organs at different levels of the 
organizational structure.  
Another contribution of the findings is the support it gives to recent studies on the 
use of state resources by political parties not only for electoral but also organizational 
purposes, in an era characterized by decreasing level of political participation through 
traditional means. Within this respect, the study signals the advantages for incumbents 
to use the state resources at their disposal in order to assure their own organizational 
survival. On the other hand, by indicating the importance of the clientelistic 
accountability in gaining the support of the voters and motivating party activists to 
actively work, the dissertation does not only reveals alternative tools available to 
political parties for mobilizing ethnic voters but also other ideologically swing voters. 
Within the Turkish political context, the study also indicates the importance of the 
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municipal resources for Turkish political parties not only in increasing their electoral 
support but also in strengthening their organizational structures. The persistent efforts of 
AKP in gaining the municipalities controlled by other political parties seem to be even 
more meaningful given their importance in serving the political objectives of the party. 
The provintial level electoral results in the Kurdish populated provinces also indicate a 
similar relationship. The increase in AKP’s support from 2009 to 2011 elections in the 
provinces of Kars, Bingöl, Ağrı, Şanlurfa governed by co-partisan municipalities is a 
situation that merits to be further investigated. The control of the municipality by BDP 
in a large number of provinces in the region should probably act as a constrain to the 
AKP’s efforts to increase its support through strengthening its party organization.  In 
fact, difference in the organizational encapsulation of the party in each of these groups 
of provinces should provide a suitable area of research for the influence of material 
incentives on the mobilization of the voters to actively participate in politics.   
Although the model developed in this dissertation was particularly based on the 
voters of Kurdish origin, it can also be effective in explaining possible mobilization 
tools for voters with different distinct identities; ethnic or sectarian. In fact, the field 
research in Sancaktepe indicates the use of a similar strategy by AKP in order to 
mobilize members of the Alevi community. One of the vice president of the district was 
an Alevi from a reputable family and a former CHP supporter who join the party in the 
re-organizational process in 2008.     
Yet, criticism may be directed especially deriving from the method used to test the 
arguments.  The findings may be criticized on the ground that the conduction of the 
analysis for testing the role of the inner party organization in only two districts may 
have caused to overlook the potential impact of other variables that the study has not 
taken into consideration during the selection process. In fact such an objection may 
have a rightful ground.  Nevertheless, the brief evaluation on patterns of the support for 
AKP among citizens of Kurdish voters across other districts in Istanbul seems to 
supports the results. Fortunately, Sancaktepe was not the only newly established district 
in 2008. Two other districts facing similar exogenous factors, namely Arnavutköy, 
Esenyurt have also been established through the unification of different sub-districts 
(Belde). In a sense, both districts have also faced a critical juncture characterized by an 
organizational crisis where they had to reorganize the organizational order of the party. 
Unfortunately, the increase in the population of non-Kurdish residents in these districts 
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as a result of urbanization makes it difficult to assess the real change in the support for 
AKP among voters of Kurdish origin. However, when the absolute amount of support 
for BDP as the main competitor of AKP is analyzed, a similar pattern as in Sancaktepe 
after 2009 general elections can be observed. In both districts, the absolute support for 
BDP in 2011 general elections is relatively lower than 2009 municipal elections. Yet, 
the electoral patterns in other districts such as Bağcılar, Ümraniye, Küçükçekmece, 
Bahçelievler, Esenler, Zeytinburnu where the party organizations did not faced any 
organizational crisis indicates increase in support for BDP from 2009 to 2011 elections. 
On the other hand, albeit introducing the presence of a critical juncture a necessary 
condition providing the opportunity for the party to adapt itself to changing conditions, 
actual change within the organizational order should not be evaluated as an automatic 
outcome. In fact, the field research indicates the probability of an organizational change 
to be influenced by the personal experiences the leaders have faced. Perhaps a further 
step can be the testing the effectiveness of such a variable in the party’s ability to adapt 
itself after facing an organizational crisis.   
Furthermore, the critical juncture analyzed in the study is a very particularistic 
kind of organizational crisis, which has a considerably low probability to be 
experienced. Similar analysis should also be carried for different types of organizational 
crisis and their possible influence on the strategy of the party. Given the highly 
centralized nature of AKP, such an organizational crisis may be experienced through the 
intervention of the higher-level administrators of the organization. As the intervention 
of the center to re-structuring of the neighborhood organizations after 2009 general 
election indicates, such an attempt may be implemented in case of decreasing overall 
support for the party.   
On the other hand, the study may be evaluated as the first step through which the 
main objective is to determine the influential variables in shaping the mobilization 
strategies of political parties by explaining the complex relationship between different 
interacting variables.  Perhaps one step further of the research would to measure the 
impact of the determined variables on the effectiveness of the mobilization strategies 
through an extensive field research conducted on a larger number of cases.   Such an 
attempt, I believe would also have valuable contributions to the literature by increasing 
the generalization capacity of the model built in this dissertation. Yet, it transcends the 
objective of this dissertation which was deliberately designed for explanatory purposes.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Estimated Percentages of the Provinces Established After 1990 
  The estimated percentages of Kurdish origin for this provinces established after 1990 
have been measured by calculating the mean of the provinces through which they have 
been separated from. For detail on the provinces they have been separated see below.   
 
Şırnak 
 
Hakkari, Mardin, Diyarbakır 
Iğdır Kars 
Batman Siirt, Mardin 
Aksaray Ankara, Niğde 
Bayburt Gümüşhane 
Karaman Konya 
Kırıkkale Ankara 
Bartın Zonguldak 
Ardahan Kars 
Yalova İstanbul, İzmit, Bursa 
Karabük Zonguldak, Çankırı 
Kilis Gaziantep 
Osmaniye Adana 
Düzce Bolu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
332 
 
Appendix B: Law on  the Establishment of Districts within the Metropolitan 
Municipalities and Amendment in Certain Laws 
  
 
 
BÜYÜKŞEHİR BELEDİYESİ SINIRLARI İÇERİSİNDE İLÇE KURULMASI VE 
BAZI KANUNLARDA DEĞİŞİKLİK YAPILMASI HAKKINDA KANUN 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5747.html Consulted on 08.11.2010 
  
Kanun No. 5747   Kabul Tarihi: 6/3/2008        
 
İSTANBUL İLİ ARNAVUTKÖY İLÇESİNE BAĞLANAN KÖYLER 
  
NO                  BİRİMİN ADI          İLÇESİ                                  BUCAĞI 
  
1                      Baklalı             Çatalca                                   Boyalık 
2                      Boyalık             Çatalca                                  Boyalık 
3                      Balaban           Çatalca                                   Boyalık 
4                 Yassıören          Çatalca                                    Boyalık 
5                      Karaburun            Çatalca                                        Boyalık 
6                      Hacımaşlı        Gaziosmanpaşa                        Merkez 
7                      Yeniköy                       Gaziosmanpaşa                        Merkez 
8                      Tayakadın                    Gaziosmanpaşa                        Merkez 
9                                 (Küçükçekmece İlçesi Şamlar Köyünün Sazlıdere Baraj Gölünün 
Kuzeyinde kalan kısmı Hacımaşlı Orman köyüne dahil edilmiştir.) 
  
  
  
  
   
  
(16) SAYILI LİSTE 
  
İSTANBUL İLİ ATAŞEHİR İLÇESİNE BAĞLANAN MAHALLELER 
  
Üsküdar İlçe Belediyesine bağlı 
1                      Fetih 
2                      Esatpaşa 
3                      Örnek 
  
Kadıköy İlçe Belediyesine bağlı 
4                      Yenisahra 
5                      İçerenköy 
6                      İnönü 
7                      Kayışdağı 
8                      Barbaros  
9                      Küçükbakkalköy  
10                    Atatürk Mahallesinin O4 ve E-80 Karayolunun Güneyinde Kalan Kısmı  
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Ümraniye İlçe Belediyesine bağlı 
11                    Yeni Çamlıca 
12                    Mustafakemal Mahallesinin O4 Karayolunun güneyinde kalan kısmı 
13                    Namıkkemal Mahallesinin O4 Karayolunun güneyinde kalan kısmı 
  
Samandıra İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
  
14                    Ferhatpaşa Mahallesinin E-80 Karayolunun ve E80- D100 bağlantı 
yolunun                güneyinde kalan kısmı  
  
  
  
    
(17) SAYILI LİSTE 
  
İSTANBUL İLİ BAŞAKŞEHİR İLÇESİNE BAĞLANAN MAHALLELER 
  
Küçükçekmece İlçe Belediyesine bağlı 
1                      Başakşehir 
2                      Kayabaşı 
3                      Ziya Gökalp 
4                      Güvercintepe 
5                      Altınşehir 
6                      Şahintepe  
  
Esenler İlçe Belediyesine bağlı  
7                      Başakşehir 
  
Küçükçekmece İlçe Belediyesine bağlı 
8                      Mehmet Akif Mahallesinin TEM’in kuzeyinde kalan kısmı 
  
  
  
Bahçeşehir İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
9                                 1. Kısım Mahallesinin O3’ün kuzeyinde kalan kısmı 
10                               2. Kısım Mahallesinin Hadımköy-Hoşdere/Esenyurt-Hadımköy 
yolunun doğusunda kalan kısmı 
  
  
İSTANBUL İLİ BAŞAKŞEHİR İLÇESİNE BAĞLANAN KÖYLER 
  
NO                  BİRİMİN ADI          İLÇESİ                                  BUCAĞI 
  
1                      Şamlar                         Küçükçekmece                       Merkez             
(Sazlıdere Baraj Gölünün Batısında, Doğusunda ve Güneyinde Kalan 
Kısımları)  
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(18) SAYILI LİSTE 
  
İSTANBUL İLİ BEYLİKDÜZÜ İLÇESİNE BAĞLANAN MAHALLELER 
  
Beylikdüzü İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
1                      Büyükşehir 
2                      Cumhuriyet 
3                      Sahil 
4                      Barış 
5                      Kavaklı 
  
Gürpınar İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
6                      Adnan Kahveci 
7                      Dereağzı 
8                      Merkez 
  
Yakuplu İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
9                      Marmara 
10                    Merkez 
  
 
  
 (19) SAYILI LİSTE 
  
İSTANBUL İLİ ÇEKMEKÖY İLÇESİNE BAĞLANAN MAHALLELER 
  
Çekmeköy İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
1                      Merkez 
2                      Mimar Sinan 
3                      Hamidiye 
4                      Mehmetakif Mahallesinin Ümraniye-Şile yolunun kuzeyinde kalan kısmı 
5                      Çamlık Mahallesinin Ümraniye-Şile yolunun kuzeyinde kalan kısmı 
  
Taşdelen İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı  
6                      Merkez 
7                     Çamlık 
8                      Güngören  
9                      Kirazlıdere  
10                    Aydınlar 
11                    Soğukpınar  
12                      Cumhuriyet  
  
Alemdağ İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı  
13                               Merkez 
14                               Nişantepe 
15                               Çatalmeşe 
16                               Ekşioğlu  
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Ömerli İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
17                    Merkez 
  
  
  
İSTANBUL İLİ ÇEKMEKÖY İLÇESİNE BAĞLANAN KÖYLER VE KÖY 
KISIMLARI 
  
NO                  BİRİMİN ADI          İLÇESİ                                  BUCAĞI 
  
1                      Reşadiye                      Ümraniye                                 
Merkez                         
2                      Hüseyinli                      Ümraniye                                 
Merkez                         
3                      Sırapınar                      Ümraniye                                 
Merkez                         
4                   Koçullu                        Ümraniye                                 Merkez 
5                 (Kartal ilçesi Samandıra Bucağına bağlı Paşaköy’ün Ümraniye-Şile bağlantı 
yolunun kuzeyinde kalan kısmı) 
                           
  
  
  
  
(20) SAYILI LİSTE 
  
İSTANBUL İLİ ESENYURT İLÇESİNE BAĞLANAN MAHALLELER 
Esenyurt İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
1                       Ardıçlı  
2                      Fatih 
3                      Mehterçeşme 
4                      Örnek 
5                      Talatpaşa 
6                       Yenikent 
7                       Cumhuriyet 
8                      Pınar 
9                      Yeşilkent 
10                    Merkez 
11                    Sanayi 
12                    Esenkent 
13                     İnönü 
14                    Namık Kemal 
15                    Saadetdere 
16                    İncirtepe 
  
Kıraç İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
17                    Merkez 
18                    Namık Kemal 
19                    Çakmaklı TEM-D100 bağlantı yolunun doğusu 
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Yakuplu İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
20                    Güzelyurt (Haramidere)  
  
Avcılar İlçe Belediyesine bağlı 
21                    Yeşilkent Mahallesinin O3 ile D100 bağlantı yolunun batısında kalan 
kısım 
  
Bahçeşehir İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
22                    2. Kısım Mahallesinin Hadımköy-Hoşdere/Esenyurt-Hadımköy yolunun 
batısında ve Sanayi Mahallesinin Kuzeyinde kalan kısmı 
  
  
(21) SAYILI LİSTE 
  
İSTANBUL İLİ SANCAKTEPE İLÇESİNE BAĞLANAN MAHALLELER 
  
Samandıra İlk Kademe Belediyesine Bağlı 
1                      Abdurrahman Gazi  
2                      Akpınar 
3                      Osman Gazi 
4                      Veysel Karani 
5                                 Eyüp Sultan  
6                                 Fatih   
7                      Ferhatpaşa Mahallesinin E-80 karayolunun kuzeyinde kalan kısmı 
  
Sarıgazi İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı  
8                                 Meclis  
9                                 İnönü  
10                               Merkez  
11                               Emek  
12                               Kemal Türkler  
13                    Atatürk 
Yenidoğan İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı 
14                               Abdurrahman Gazi 
15                               Yunus Emre 
16                               Safa 
17                               Osman Gazi 
18                               Mevlana 
19                               Merve  
  
Çekmeköy İlk Kademe Belediyesine bağlı        
20                    Çamlık Mahallesinin Ümraniye-Şile bağlantı yolunun güneyinde kalan 
kısmı 
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İSTANBUL İLİ SANCAKTEPE İLÇESİNE BAĞLANAN KÖY KISIMLARI 
1- Kartal İlçesi Samandıra Bucağına bağlı Paşaköy Köyünün Ümraniye-Şile bağlantı 
yolunun güneyinde kalan kısmı (Köy Merkezi) 
2- Pendik İlçesine bağlı Kurtdoğmuş Köyünün Ömerli Barajının kuzeybatısında kalan 
kısmı 
Kartal İlçesi Samandıra Bucağına bağlı Paşaköy Köyüne dahil edilmiştir. 
  
  
  
(22) SAYILI LİSTE 
  
İSTANBUL İLİ SULTANGAZİ İLÇESİNE BAĞLANAN MAHALLELER 
  
Gaziosmanpaşa İlçe Belediyesine bağlı 
1                      Sultançiftliği 
2                      50. Yıl 
3                      Uğur Mumcu 
4                      İsmet Paşa 
5                      Cumhuriyet 
6                      Cebeci 
7                      Malkoçoğlu 
8                      Habipler 
9                      Zübeyde Hanım 
10                    Gazi 
11                    Esentepe 
12                    75. Yıl 
13                    Yunus Emre 
14                    Kazım Karabekir Mahallesinin TEM otoyolunun kuzeyinde kalan kısmı 
  
Eyüp İlçe Belediyesine bağlı 
15                    Yayla 
Esenler İlçe Belediyesine bağlı 
16        Habipler (Habipler güneybatı bağlantı yolu Esenler Pafta 7-243 parselin 
kuzeydoğu ucundan başlayarak kuzey yönünde devam eden plan yolunu takiben 
Habipler İSKİ tesislerinin batısından kuzeye doğru 6164 parselin   güney uç noktası 
birleşimi ile kuzey batı yönünde devam ederek 6163 parseli  batısı sınır olmak üzere 
kuzeybatıya devam eden plan yolunun 1867 adanın batı köşesi ve Canan Sokak ile 
kesiştiği nokta, bu noktadan plan yolunu kuzeybatı yönünde takiben Eski Edirne Asfaltı 
ile Arnavutköy-Habiple yolunun kesiştiği nokta olarak planlanan plan yolunun 
doğusunda kalan kısım.) 
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Appendix C: Demographic Characteristics of the Districts 
 
Sancaktepe 
Province 
Est. 
Kurd.% 2011 2010 2009 Province 
Est. 
Kurd.% 2011 2010 2009 
Adana 10,50% 708 639 618 Kütahya 0,03% 277 271 234 
Adıyaman 43,90% 508 462 390 Malatya 17,20% 2.985 2.954 2.786 
Afyonkarahisar 0,02% 802 753 705 Manisa 3,48% 467 434 376 
Ağrı 70,45% 7.180 6.730 6.240 Kahramanmaraş 15,37% 2.220 2.163 2.006 
Amasya 0,76% 3.472 3.411 3.192 Mardin 74,84% 732 647 618 
Ankara 6,74% 680 664 559 Muğla 2,06% 103 98 77 
Antalya 3,22% 215 196 172 Muş 67,75% 2.503 2.374 2.236 
Artvin 0,02% 1.277 1.218 1.123 Nevşehir 2,10% 1.923 1.881 1.834 
Aydın 4,02% 213 192 182 Niğde 2,59% 1.723 1.660 1.562 
Balıkesir 2,48% 500 456 414 Ordu 0,04% 22.293 21.465 20.428 
Bilecik 3,93% 228 207 178 Rize 0,06% 6.311 5.990 5.675 
Bingöl 76,63% 10.198 9.899 9.404 Sakarya 2,82% 1.222 1.169 1.101 
Bitlis  64,03% 1.933 1.889 1.801 Samsun 0,58% 6.220 5.917 5.557 
Bolu 0,61% 739 722 652 Siirt 78,78% 3.527 3.268 3.051 
Burdur 0,20% 66 58 42 Sinop 0,80% 9.219 8.975 8.668 
Bursa 4,47% 555 499 408 Sivas 11,72% 20.067 19.358 18.241 
Çanakkale 0,13% 262 255 203 Tekirdağ 3,30% 355 336 283 
Çankırı 1,26% 2.174 2.087 1.895 Tokat 1,71% 22.140 21.668 20.383 
Çorum 3,89% 4.137 4.010 3.805 Trabzon 0,04% 7.874 7.602 7.258 
Denizli 3,08% 175 157 106 Tunceli 55,90% 4.003 3.908 3.715 
Diyarbakır 72,78% 991 908 789 Şanlıurfa 47,84% 619 558 508 
Edirne 0,14% 221 198 147 Uşak  0,21% 92 78 61 
Elazığ 43,15% 2.794 2.695 2.545 Van 70,70% 4.098 3.328 3.013 
Erzincan 19,74% 10.246 10.152 9.741 Yozgat 2,25% 2.957 2.805 2.576 
Erzurum 16,22% 13.289 12.806 12.312 Zonguldak 0,13% 1.111 1.056 995 
Eskişehir 3,10% 278 281 219 Aksaray 4,67% 444 455 460 
Gaziantep 13,22% 546 476 430 Bayburt 2,27% 1.568 1.513 1.370 
Giresun 0,26% 6.609 6.398 6.065 Karaman 5,42% 149 142 119 
Gümüşhane 2,27% 1.687 1.635 1.517 Kırıkkale 6,74% 234 227 236 
Hakkari 89,47% 106 78 53 Batman 76,81% 367 376 322 
Hatay 5,48% 639 587 568 Şırnak 79,03% 262 252 240 
Isparta 0,27% 781 724 662 Bartın 0,13% 1.553 1.501 1.458 
İçel 9,71% 527 514 451 Ardahan 19,02% 9.949 9.641 9.214 
İstanbul 8,16% 13.914 13.180 12.316 Iğdır 19,02% 2.554 2.460 2.299 
İzmir 6,91% 495 401 336 Yalova 6,86% 96 84 76 
Kars 19,02% 18.142 17.159 15.992 Karabük 0,70% 1.431 1.391 1.274 
Kastamonu 0,25% 11.225 10.861 10.327 Kilis 13,22% 169 166 142 
Kayseri 4,56% 1.456 1.379 1.274 Osmaniye 10,50% 292 296 272 
Kırklareli 0,24% 220 219 219 Düzce 0,61% 622 568 515 
Kırşehir 6,61% 457 437 399 total polulation 269180 258251 243113 
Kocaeli 7,94% 656 607 516 S.East population 57215 53834 50281 
Konya 5,42% 1137 1007 898 % S. East population 21,25 20,84 20,68 
    Est. Kur Pop. 43429 41122 38565 
          % Est. Kurd. 16,13 15,92 15,86 
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Beyoğlu 
Province 
Est. 
Kurd.% 2011 2010 2009 2007 Province 
Est. 
Kurd.% 2011 2010 2009 2007 
Adana 10,50% 1.910 1.795 1.724 1.631 Kütahya 0,03% 205 182 181 181 
Adıyaman 43,90% 744 719 720 656 Malatya 17,20% 2.081 2.057 2.005 2.108 
Afyonkarahisar 0,02% 449 441 418 430 Manisa 3,48% 714 709 664 658 
Ağrı 70,45% 2.926 2.802 2.758 2.482 Kahramanmaraş 15,37% 1.392 1.397 1.348 1.370 
Amasya 0,76% 1.648 1.682 1.635 1.656 Mardin 74,84% 13.272 13.099 12.522 11.285 
Ankara 6,74% 1.106 1.040 992 952 Muğla 2,06% 207 212 188 191 
Antalya 3,22% 7.507 7.087 6.507 7.704 Muş 67,75% 737 698 696 720 
Artvin 0,02% 1.024 1.046 1.084 1.034 Nevşehir 2,10% 765 787 775 777 
Aydın 4,02% 411 389 349 310 Niğde 2,59% 756 761 697 685 
Balıkesir 2,48% 1.894 1.808 1.775 1.809 Ordu 0,04% 4.196 4.247 4.148 4.238 
Bilecik 3,93% 287 278 266 252 Rize 0,06% 11.484 11.738 11.776 11.493 
Bingöl 76,63% 2.753 2.749 2.751 2.743 Sakarya 2,82% 879 887 867 861 
Bitlis  64,03% 1.129 1.302 1.234 1.230 Samsun 0,58% 5.921 5.891 5.947 5.992 
Bolu 0,61% 728 728 724 761 Siirt 78,78% 3.052 3.017 3.043 2.942 
Burdur 0,20% 74 66 76 81 Sinop 0,80% 3.126 3.213 3.186 3.245 
Bursa 4,47% 2.656 2.561 2.491 2.457 Sivas 11,72% 19.715 20.030 20.168 20.461 
Çanakkale 0,13% 1.577 1.592 1.582 1.585 Tekirdağ 3,30% 1.010 1.035 1.013 1.013 
Çankırı 1,26% 1.032 1.038 998 1.048 Tokat 1,71% 3.940 4.030 4.046 4.256 
Çorum 3,89% 933 906 888 916 Trabzon 0,04% 2.487 2.528 2.482 2.508 
Denizli 3,08% 286 278 265 269 Tunceli 55,90% 2.339 2.434 2.526 2.607 
Diyarbakır 72,78% 2.364 2.325 2.253 2.727 Şanlıurfa 47,84% 1.291 1.283 1.242 1.315 
Edirne 0,14% 1.109 1.115 1.052 1.016 Uşak  0,21% 158 147 123 113 
Elazığ 43,15% 2.128 2.102 2.083 2.055 Van 70,70% 1.614 1.564 1.537 1.478 
Erzincan 19,74% 9.059 9.294 9.380 9.720 Yozgat 2,25% 777 737 664 709 
Erzurum 16,22% 4.508 4.462 4.431 4.402 Zonguldak 0,13% 1.537 1.552 1.596 1.508 
Eskişehir 3,10% 584 542 521 490 Aksaray 4,67% 969 892 871 790 
Gaziantep 13,22% 821 820 806 864 Bayburt 2,27% 411 420 427 406 
Giresun 0,26% 29.129 29.356 29.300 29.435 Karaman 5,42% 1.396 1.254 1.070 1.045 
Gümüşhane 2,27% 2.395 2.452 2.435 2.506 Kırıkkale 6,74% 308 292 288 290 
Hakkari 89,47% 88 77 58 47 Batman 76,81% 4.215 4.501 4.106 3.577 
Hatay 5,48% 1.527 1.464 1.372 1.313 Şırnak 79,03% 827 793 740 818 
Isparta 0,27% 977 958 947 970 Bartın 0,13% 1.354 1.422 1.397 1.419 
İçel 9,71% 1.358 1.276 1.264 1.151 Ardahan 19,02% 663 663 631 631 
İstanbul 8,16% 38.389 39.172 38.828 40.895 Iğdır 19,02% 399 390 365 385 
İzmir 6,91% 1.333 1.194 1.173 1.136 Yalova 6,86% 370 369 369 369 
Kars 19,02% 977 939 909 883 Karabük 0,70% 1.028 1.050 1.041 1.058 
Kastamonu 0,25% 11.343 11.560 11.531 11.746 Kilis 13,22% 266 279 283 282 
Kayseri 4,56% 3.357 3.356 3.313 3.331 Osmaniye 10,50% 896 916 922 918 
Kırklareli 0,24% 651 653 608 592 Düzce 0,61% 463 451 443 441 
Kırşehir 6,61% 987 991 1.016 1.061 total polulation 247852 248930 245420 248195 
Kocaeli 7,94% 898 900 877 930 S.East population 37.983 37.973 36.740 35.239 
Konya 5,42% 3565 3678 3624 3769 % S. East population 15,32 15,25 14,97 14,20 
    Est. Kur Pop. 39120 39173 38174 37289 
            % Est. Kurd. 15,78 15,74 15,55 15,02 
 
 
 
 
